EDITOR’S LETTER

Brazil is different. Brazil is huge. Brazil is colorful. Brazil is magic. In Brazil, the people speak Portuguese instead of Spanish.

I’ve written a variation of these phrases some five times over, trying to decide if they are clichés. I’ve only visited Brazil four times, mostly for conferences. But once, in 1977 on an Inter American Press Scholarship, I spent five weeks on luxury buses, traveling along the Brazilian coast, wending my way from startling European-like villas in the south of the country to light years away from the so-called “chicken buses” of Mexico and Colombia. These buses had comfortable seats and even hostesses to serve us snacks. The passengers seemed to be ordinary folk. The buses and the clean, ample, and even elegant bus stations from which they left seemed to tease me with the puzzle of Brazilian difference.

Fast-forward many years. I speak Spanish, not Portuguese, although Brazilians always manage to praise my Porteñol—an awkward mixture of the two languages.

ReVista (or its former embodiment, DRCLAS NEWS) has featured Mexico, Colombia, Cuba and Chile. Brazil seems a logical next choice, especially given that the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies opened an office in São Paulo last year. In December, I attended a Visible Rights conference, sponsored by Harvard’s Cultural Agents Initiative, in São Paulo, and was hosted by the DRCLAS office there. The modernity and hustle-bustle of the Avenida Paulista just about rivaled New York. In my few days there, I began to learn of Brazil’s experiments, its search for social equity.

There was no way I could do this issue alone, not without Portuguese, not without a deep prior knowledge of this Impávido Coloso—this dauntless colossus, as my friend Daniel Samper entitled his novel about Brazil. ReVista is always a collective experience, a collaboration among writers, photographers, academics, non-profits, students and others who give their time and energy. But this issue is even more so. We formed a Brazil team, spearheaded by Kenneth Maxwell, director of the Brazil Studies Program in Cambridge. Jason Dyett, the program director in São Paulo; Erin Goodman, the program officer here in Cambridge, as well as my editorial assistant Heloisa Nogueira; and Lorena Barberia and Tomás Amorim in Brazil helped craft this magazine.

You might have noticed by now that the Brazil issue is in living color. That’s not a change for ReVista: we’ve had one color issue before, the art issue in 1999. Thanks to support from Jorge Paulo Lemann, we’re able to do it again. But this time, we also see it as an experiment: what do you, dear reader, think of the use of color? Would you like to see it in each issue? On a limited basis? Is it distracting? Is it exciting? Please write me at jerlick@fas.harvard.edu with your comments. For now, we’d like to show that Brazil is different. It is colorful. It is huge. And, as you will read in these pages, it has taken up the challenge in its search for social equity.

Jane C. Erlick
The Brazilian population is a complex ethnic and racial mix. Most Brazilians today trace their roots to Europe, as well as Africa and Asia; and historically there has been a strong Amerindian component. Brazil was the last country in the Western Hemisphere to abolish slavery (1888). It was also a monarchy until 1889. The persistence of slavery, oligarchies and an economy for many centuries based on monoculture, has had a major influence on Brazilian society, mores and self perception.

Behavioral continuities were the subject in the twentieth century of such key interpreters of Brazil as Gilberto Freyre, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, and Caio Prado Jr. Of the three, Gilberto Freyre became the best known interpreter of Brazil among foreigners as his books were widely read in translation, and inspired influential works of comparative history as well as motivating an army of North American graduate students. His popularity was not surprising. Few equaled Freyre’s readability or his rambunctious, meandering, infinitely varied and deeply erotic interpretation of the formation of Brazilian society.

Freyre argued that in the tropics the Portuguese colonists established a “polygamous patriarchal regime” in which “widely practiced miscegenation tended to modify the enormous social distance between the Big House and the slave hut.” Freyre’s three great volumes, Masters and Slaves, The Mansions and the Shanties, History Lessons, The Problem of Persistence...

How to achieve a more equitable society remains a fundamental challenge in Brazil. The country’s income disparities are among the worst in the world.
and Order and Progress, encapsulated Brazil’s social development over three centuries. By examining witchcraft, medicine, households, the role of food and clothing, and the social impact of forms of economic organization, he anticipated much of the more narrowly focused academic “new” social history that was to emerge many decades later. And Freyre also attributed what he called the “sadism” of intimate personal behavior, and the treatment of subordinates, and the violence of the men towards women in Brazil, to the heritage of the unlimited power conquerors exercised over the conquered and masters over their slaves.

Never a Marxist within a milieu where Marxist scholars set the agenda, Freyre’s ideas provided the intellectual foundation for the theory of “luso-tropicalism.” The Portuguese dictatorship in the 1960s hijacked Freyre’s interpretation and tried to justify its empire in Africa, claiming the Portuguese were less racist than the northern Europeans. Freyre, flattered by this attention, was much criticized when he embraced the military regime in his own country. But his interpretation crystallized an image of Brazil that had an enormous impact both within and outside Brazil, becoming in fact what the historian Carlos Guilherme Mota has called “the ideology of Brazil culture.”

Caio Prado’s The Formation of Contemporary Brazil, essentially a study in the Marxist tradition of late Colonial and early National Brazil, was first published in Brazil in 1942. When it finally appeared in the United States in translation in 1967—twenty-five years after its publication in Brazil—the book had a major impact on a generation of students, influenced by the U.S. civil rights movement, who were beginning to react against Freyre’s paradigm of a “racial democracy” in Brazil. The great works by Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, most famously his Raízes do Brasil (The Roots of Brazil), on the other hand, have still not been translated. His complex, sophisticated, and archive-based organic view of settlement and cultural development is more influenced by Max Weber than by Marx. Although his books are only accessible to Portuguese readers, they probably have had, in more subtle ways, the most impact on historians of Brazil in the longer term.

Ironically, all three of these “interpreters of Brazil” looked back to explain a Brazil that was in fact rapidly changing around them as they wrote. New immigrants from Europe and Asia had profoundly complicated the old mix of races and cultures inherited from the long colonial centuries. Immigration policies pursued following the abolition of slavery were intended to “whiten” Brazil. In fact, as Jeffrey Lesser has shown, the result was an immensely diverse multi-cultural society. It was against this background that Brazil urbanized and industrialized. Brazil is now overwhelmingly an urban country. Today the Brazilian states of São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, if they stood alone, would be numbered among the richest 45 nations on earth. The state of São Paulo has a gross national product larger than Argentina’s, and the city of São Paulo is a megalopolis with a population of 15 million and a vibrant cultural and financial business life.

But how to achieve a more equitable society remains a fundamental challenge. A large segment of Brazil’s population, perhaps 40 million people, remains in poverty, and Brazil’s income disparities are among the worst in the world. The most impoverished 20 percent of Brazilians receive a mere 2 percent of the national wealth, whereas the richest fifth of the population receives two-thirds. Poverty is concentrated in the semi-arid northeast of Brazil, and disproportionately among the Afro-Brazilian population. At present, Afro-Brazilians’ life expectancy is 14 years shorter than whites, infant mortality rates are 30 percent higher, and the illiteracy rate is double. Whites on average earn two and a half times as much as blacks.

Brazil is thus not easily described; it presents multiple faces to itself and to the world, not all of which have been fully absorbed into a consistent national self image; and its history does not conform to the Latin American stereotype. Raymundo Faoro, in his influential book Os Donos do Poder in the late 1940s, argued that Brazilian history is a “novel without heroes,” a history of a stagnant minority dissociated from the rest of society. Yet this is no longer the case. Brazilians are, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, rediscovering themselves. Books on Brazilian history now appear on the best seller lists. This process of national self examination can at times be a painful one since it can also provoke a struggle for historical memory on the part of previously repressed or underrepresented groups seeking to find a voice in the national dialogue. As society democratizes, alongside the heroes of the past, many long buried embarrassments resurface: slavery for instance; or the gruesome story of the violent repression of messianic peasant movements in the arid northeastern interior during the early years.
of the twentieth century; or the virtual destruction of the once vast Atlantic rain forests, a frightening warning as to the consequences of the on-going assault on the Amazon forests.

Brazilians, like Americans, tend to think of themselves as citizens of a young country. In terms of the age distribution of its population, with a high percentage of its population under the age of eighteen, this is statistically true; but, historically speaking, the assertion of newness is misleading. Brazil is a nation of considerable historical depth, and it is vital to any understanding of its institutional structures, social mores, the resilience of its oligarchies, and Byzantine intricacies of its politics, to always bear this factor in mind. The first European settlers on the Brazilian coast predated by almost a century and a half the arrival of the first English settlers in Massachusetts, and Brazil achieved its independence a century and a half before the European colonies in Asia and Africa shook off European rule.

Brazil marked the half millennium of its “discovery” in the year 2000, a commemoration of the accidental landfall in the area of Porto Seguro in northeast Brazil by the Portuguese Indies-bound fleet of Pedro Álvares Cabral. The commemorations were a disaster, and the manner in which they unfolded demonstrated much about Brazil’s ambiguous relationship with its own past, especially its Portuguese heritage. In April 1500 Cabral did not stay long—a little over eight days. He was keen to get on to Asia, which was his objective as captain major of a powerful fleet of 13 vessels and 1,500 men. Lisbon was eager to follow-up quickly on Vasco da Gama’s dramatic voyage to India (1497–1499) and consolidate Portuguese preeminence over the new maritime connection between Europe and Asia.

There are unusually good records of the “finding” or achamento of Brazil, as Cabral described his landfall on the South American coast; two letters written by observers at the time were sent back to Portugal on a ship Cabral detached from his squadron for the purpose. The most famous by Pero Vaz de Caminha, was ecstatic in its detailed description of the bronzed and nude inhabitants who welcomed the Portuguese. “They seem to me a people of such innocence,” he told the king, “that if one could understand them and they us, they would soon be Christians...for it is certain this people is good and of pure simplicity, and there can easily be stamped upon them whatever belief we want to give them.” The mariners were especially astonished by the women, who seemed to feel no “shame” in their nakedness or embarrassment before the Portuguese gaze, and which Caminha described in some detail for his monarch, King Manuel, “The Fortunate,” as he came to be known.

In this aspect at least, Caminha’s letter—“Brazil’s birth certificate” as it is sometimes called—must conjure up images for Brazilians today much like Carnival, but for the detail that the bronzed women on the festival floats are now topless not bottomless (except on such rare and memorable occasions as the famous visit of then President Itamar Franco to Rio during the 1994 Carnival, when his pretty companion in the presidential box had forgotten to put on her panties, much to the delight of the Brazilian press, which gleefully recorded this exquisite presidential moment for posterity).

The Portuguese and Brazilian heads of state in the year 2000 were less fortunate than King Manuel. The ships sent from Lisbon to retrace Cabral’s voyage missed the best tides because Fernando Henrique Cardoso wanted to leave early to get to Santiago for his friend Ricardo Lagos’ inauguration as President of Chile. Captain Amyr Klink of the new armada was not amused. “Political interference in bad taste that produced a disrespect for the historical reality,” he called the change. The Portuguese Prime Minister, António Guterres, was also on the run, preoccupied with his role as president of the European Union. Both leaders are very much focused on the 21st century, and neither had much time for sentiment or history, caravels, or sailors on white sand beaches. Brazil was thinking of leadership in South America. Portugal has embraced Europe, having lost its African colonies in the 1970s, and shows little patience these days for the old dreams of imperial glory. Brazil’s own commemorative vessel proved un-seaworthy, and sank ignominiously.

But the past has still lived, and at times in surprising ways. In planning the official celebrations, both Lisbon and Brasília forgot the indigenous Brazilian people who had welcomed the Portuguese navigators. Against all odds, the descendants of some of those original inhabitants have survived in the face of five centuries of exploitation, disease and annihilation. The Pataxós of Porto
Seguro, Bahia, built a makeshift memorial of their own on the beach to protest where the Portuguese stepped ashore and had celebrated their first mass five hundred years before. The military police of Bahia were quickly sent to destroy it. The incident provoked a group of more than 1,000 “survivors of colonialism” from the interior of Brazil to march on Brasília to protest what had happened (and still happens) to the indigenous population.

It is perhaps not surprising that in a democratic and media-driven age, commemorations take on a contentious tone. The people have a voice now, and it can be a discordant one, reflecting their own experiences, inventing their own pasts, complicating the best-laid plans of bureaucrats and politicians. History, some politicians need to remember, is “lived” as well as “invented,” and commemorations can provoke and empower protests at all levels of society, especially among those for whom the past and present injustices provide a stronger incentive to mobilization than do more promises of festas from rulers touting utopian futures. Ironically, while the Brazilians squabbled over monuments, the Portuguese, as in 1500, had their eyes on more profitable ventures, scooping up parts of Brazil’s newly privatized telecommunication networks.

Next year these old historical debates and controversies will surely revive. Brazil is busily engaged now in organizing commemorations of the arrival and establishment in 1808 of the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro; the creation of a “Tropical Versailles” in the words of the historian Kirsten Schultz. Some will celebrate this remarkable and unique New World monarchy as one of the causes of the preservation of Brazil’s vast territory and institutional continuity in an epoch during which violent independence movements rent Brazil’s Spanish American neighbors asunder. Others, however, will look back to the works of Freyre, Caio Prado, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda and Raymundo Faoro, who each in their very different ways painted a less euphemistic picture of Brazil’s colonial heritage where they found the roots of Brazil’s stubborn and resilient social exclusion and inequality.

Kenneth Maxwell is the director of the DRCLAS Brazil program. He is completing a book on the Lisbon earthquake to be published by Harvard University Press. Parts of this article are adapted from material originally appearing in the Foreign Policy Association’s “Great Decisions” Series and in Time Magazine.

Modern office buildings in São Paulo’s newest business district include TV Globo Group and BankBoston’s former headquarters in Brazil, purchased in 2006 by Itaú, the country’s second largest bank.
Why is Brazil “Underdeveloped” and What Can Be Done About It?

Overcoming Social Inequity

By John H. Coatsworth

The numbers tell the story (see tables). Brazil is underdeveloped because its economy failed to grow or grew too slowly for most of its history. In the colonial era, sugar, gold and slavery did not create a dynamic economy. In the mid-eighteenth century, Brazil’s economic backwardness worried its Portuguese rulers, but even the great Pombal, as historian Kenneth Maxwell has shown, could not make good policy substitute for good business. At the time of independence (1822) Brazil had one of the least productive economies in the western hemisphere, with a per capita GDP lower than any other New World colony for which we have estimates.

After independence, while the industrial revolution gathered steam elsewhere, imperial Brazil stagnated, growing at a mere 0.2 to 0.3 percent from 1820 to 1870. By the time slavery ended and the empire fell (1888–89), Brazil had a per capita GDP less than half of Mexico’s and only one sixth of the United States. Even when the end of slavery (1888) stimulated massive immigration, the economy failed to grow consistently.

Then came the turnaround. From 1913 to 1980, Brazil experienced sustained growth, interrupted only briefly in the early years of the Great Depression, at nearly two percent per year from 1913 to 1950 and nearly four percent from 1950 to 1980. In this period of nearly seven decades, Brazil had the fastest growing economy in the western hemisphere. Per capita GDP increased over eight hundred percent, from $678 in 1900 to $5570 in 2000, measured in 1990 dollars. Brazil’s economy gained on the U.S. economy, rising from only ten percent of US GDP per capita to over 20 percent.

Brazil’s long era of economic growth ended with the crisis of 1982. For the past quarter century, the Brazilian economy has barely grown at all. It has occasionally spurted ahead, as in the past three years, but has fallen back each time it does so. Unfortunately, Brazil cannot turn the clock back and restore the conditions and policies that spurred growth up to 1980.

Why has Brazil grown so slowly for most of its history? Economic historians point to three kinds of answers: geography, institutions and policies.

Geography is the easy part. Most of Brazil’s valuable (that is, tradable) natural resources were too far from potential markets for profitable exploitation until the late nineteenth or twentieth century. For example, the major export of the colonial era, sugar, had to be produced within 15 miles of a port or navigable river. Without railroads or trucks, most of the country’s agricultural lands lay fallow. The huge Amazon river system flows through vast tropical forests with thin soils that lack nutrients, but there are practically no navigable rivers running where export crops could be produced without modern fertilizers. Brazil has a long coastline, but few protected harbors. Without railroads or trucks, the only colonial “crops” produced in the interior were cattle and slaves that walked to market and gold that had a high value-to-bulk ratio. Even with modern transport technologies, the investment needed to build railroads, highways, and airports proved to be enormous. And in many regions, the environmental costs of destroying forests and using chemical fertilizers have outweighed the economic benefits from doing so.

The institutional obstacles to Brazilian growth fall into three main clusters: slavery and its long aftereffects, excessive centralism before 1889 and too much federalism thereafter, with a persistent failure to define and effectively protect human and property rights.

The legacy of slavery can be seen in many aspects of Brazilian society, but the greatest damage to the economy came from the failure to invest in human beings, that is, in the education and training of slaves and their descendants. Until recently, Brazil not only lagged behind the developed world but much of Latin America in developing its human capital. A big part of the educational gap came from the failure to invest in schools for the children of poorer citizens in states, cities, and neighborhoods where the Afro-Brazilian population predominated.

Excessive centralism in the nineteenth century prevented municipal and state governments from borrowing abroad, or at home, to invest in needed infrastructure, such as roads, ports, railroads, utilities, schools, and hospitals. After the centralist empire fell in 1889, excessive federalism magnified regional inequalities in public investment and the distribution of public goods. For example, literacy rates were low under the empire, but the gap between wealthy Rio de Janeiro and poor, predominantly Afro-Brazilian Bahia was small. Republican federalism left education and social policy to the states, where the wealthier south did well and the poorer north and west did not.

Modern legal codes, judicial protections, civil rights, property registries, and other essentials for economic growth developed slowly and imperfectly in seventeenth and eighteenth century Brazil. In much of the country,
even today, the police abuse citizens with impunity, property rights are ill-defined and poorly protected, and the costs in red tape and regulatory compliance of doing business, for enterprises large and small, is exceptionally high by world standards.

Finally, the government policies that have contributed most to stagnation are those that have privileged established interests over competitive efficiency. Such policies have included excessive protectionism, regulation that discourages entry and blocks competition, fiscal and expenditure policies that exacerbate regional and social inequalities, and a lack of public investment and incentives for private effort in scientific and technological development.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Brazil’s economy has the potential to explode into rapid and sustained growth, despite this long list of inherited problems.

Modern technologies in transportation, communication, and production have already overcome many of the constraints of geography. The new issues that Brazil is confronting have less to do with how to overcome great distances and more to do with where and how to develop natural resources in ways that do not damage the Brazilian and the global environment.

Some of the institutional impediments are also disappearing. As democracy takes root, politics is coming to focus more and more on serving the public, and citizens’ expectations have risen with each new step forward. It will also help that, for the next few decades, a higher proportion of Brazil’s population will be old enough to work but not yet old enough to retire, so less will need to be spent on building new primary schools and more efforts can be focused on increasing quality and retaining students in school longer. There is still time to reorient public health care to serve an aging population before today’s population boomers all retire.

With technology available, democracy consolidated, and demography cooperating (at least for now), it may be that all Brazil lacks to achieve a new era of sustained economic growth is a modern state and governments sufficiently coherent and competent to do what is needed. Three areas to tackle seem especially important.

The first is the persistent social, ethnic and regional inequality that makes income distribution in Brazil one of the most unequal in the world. High rates of poverty, chronic malnutrition, and preventable disease are a serious drag on the economy. If the World Bank is right, every ten-percentage point increase in poverty lowers economic growth by one percent. By this measure, Brazil could boost growth by 2–3 percentage points per year by eliminating poverty.

The second is the widespread and costly insecurity of civic and property rights. At the bottom of the social ladder, where insecurity is most pervasive, the lack of effective legal protection exacerbates social inequality. In economic life, the cost of protecting life and property acts as a huge drag on productivity.

The third is the cost and inefficiency of the public sector. It takes an average of 152 days to register a business in Brazil; the world average is 48. Transparency International ranks Brazil 62nd out of 158 countries in perceived corruption. Public sector pensions divert resources from needed investments and services. Some of the regulatory systems and state interventions left over from the pre-1980 era continue to impede competition and greater productivity.

Brazil has been making progress in these and other areas incrementally over the past decade. Keeping inflation down has helped prevent inequality and poverty from growing. Primary education is now available to nearly every child. Poverty programs are supplementing the meager incomes of millions. Police and pension reforms are on the agenda.

Most important of all, Brazilians have become impatient for further and deeper changes.


Ruins of the 17th century Igreja de Nossa Senhora do Carmo in Alcântara in the northern state of Maranhão.
Above: Highway in typical precarious condition in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul; Below right: the iconic Banespa Building skyscraper; Below left: this iconic São Paulo vertical favela was taken over by the homeless in the late 1970s and 80s, housing more than 3,000 people at the time.
Barracas (open-air market stalls) in the Largo da Concórdia, a popular informal commerce shopping area in the center of São Paulo.
The Rise and Fall of Brazilian Inequality

A Summary

BY FRANCISCO H.G. FERREIRA, PHILIPPE G. LEITE AND JULIE A. LITCHFIELD

Although Brazil remains one of the world’s most unequal countries, new research shows that the period between 1993 and 2004 (which saw the restoration of macroeconomic stability, and a modest resumption in growth) was also marked by sustained—if unspectacular—declines in inequality. Although the 2004 figures confirm that Brazil’s inequality level continues to be very high by international standards, its distribution of household per capita incomes has not been as stable over the last two and a half decades as previously thought. Changes in the Gini coefficient, a commonly used measure of inequality, tell an interesting story about Brazil.

During the 1980s, Brazil’s Gini coefficient for the distribution of household per capita income rose from 0.574 in 1981 to 0.625 in 1989. After that five-point (or 9 percent) increase during the 1980s, 80 percent in 1980 to 1509 percent in 1990. Volatility in the real economy was also pronounced, with a deep recession between 1981 and 1983, followed by a brief two-year recovery and then a price freeze in 1986, aimed to reduce inflation. When the government abandoned the failed Cruzado stabilization plan, however, inflation surged again in 1987 and most measures of household income per capital fell.

The increase in inequality in the 1980s appears to have been driven, in large part, by high and accelerating inflation. While the distributional impact of inflation is hard to measure, or even to simulate counterfactually, inflation is likely to have a regressive impact on the distribution of income for two reasons. Firstly, the inflation tax tends to be a regressive wealth tax, since the ability to protect wealth through portfolio adjustments is generally held to be increasing in income, at least over an initial range. In addition, there is some evidence that indexation in the labor markets is not perfect, and that the real wages of poorer workers may lag behind during high-inflation periods.

The evidence also suggests that the rise in inequality during this period resulted from the gradual expansion in the educational levels of the labor force. Due to the convex nature of the returns to schooling in Brazil, with rising marginal returns to each additional year of schooling, the expansion in the levels of formal education in the labor force—which helps increase productivity and reduce poverty—can nevertheless lead to greater inequality between educational sub-groups of the population. This tendency was partly, but not entirely, offset by declines in the

Brazil has experienced periods of greater and lesser poverty. The nature of inequity has not been linear. Many questions about these trends remain unanswered.

Brazil’s inequality was the second highest in the world, narrowly behind Sierra Leone (although such international comparisons are fraught with technical difficulties, given differences in survey methods across countries). From this peak in 1989, Brazil’s Gini fell by six points, or roughly 10 percent, to 0.564 in 2004. These are not insubstantial changes.

Over the same period, poverty also followed a non-linear evolution, rising during the 1982–1983 recession, falling sharply during the mid-1980s recovery and the Cruzado stabilization plan of 1986, and then rising again at the end of the decade. At least in terms of income poverty reduction, the 1980s really were a lost decade for Brazil: poverty was still higher in 1993, the year which preceded successful economic stabilization, than it had been in 1981. In the ten years following the Real Plan of 1994, poverty fell steadily, by various measures and lines. By the standards of an “administrative poverty line” of R$100 per capita per month, incidence fell by ten percentage points, or a third (see Table 1).

The outstanding economic fact of the 1980s in Brazil was macroeconomic instability and, in particular, hyperinflation. The annual inflation rate accelerated from

### TABLE 1.

Brazil 1981–2004: Incomes and Inequality in Select Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MEAN INCOME*</th>
<th>MEDIAN INCOME</th>
<th>GINI</th>
<th>REGIONAL POVERTY LINE**</th>
<th>&quot;ADMINISTRATIVE POVERTY LINE***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>336.7</td>
<td>173.2</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>382.7</td>
<td>170.6</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>0.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>320.7</td>
<td>157.2</td>
<td>0.595</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>401.2</td>
<td>198.3</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>393.9</td>
<td>210.0</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>0.222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* Incomes are monthly household incomes per capita, measured in September 2004 Brazilian Reais with a dollar exchange rate of R$1/US$ = 2.89
** A set of regionally-specific poverty lines calculated by Rocha (1993).
*** The “administrative poverty line” is set as R$100 per person per month, in September 2004 values. R$100 per capita per month is also the mainst in Brazil’s main cash assistance program, Bolsa Família.

Sources: Authors’ calculations from surveys of the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD).
return to schooling, which arose from this increase in the supply of more skilled workers.

THE DECLINE IN INEQUALITY BETWEEN 1993 AND 2004

The restoration of macroeconomic stability in 1994 was followed by sustained—if unspectacular—declines in inequality. While most of the contemporaneous decline in poverty was driven by Brazil’s (modest) economic growth, the decline in inequality did also contribute. In fact, inequality reduction during 1993–2004 accounted for almost half of the decline in the more bottom-sensitive poverty measures, like the squared poverty gap.

Inequality decomposition analysis suggests that three main forces combined to reduce income inequality from 1993 onwards. First, the single most important correlate of individual incomes in Brazil, as in most of Latin America, is educational attainment. In fact, data indicates that over a third of overall inequality in Brazil can be accounted for by differences across five groups of households, sorted by the education of the head. Interestingly, there is some evidence that this share, while still very significant, has been falling, due to a secular decline in average returns to schooling over the last two decades.

Second, there has been a remarkable convergence in household incomes between the country’s rural and urban areas, which has replaced and added to the inter-state convergence that had been documented until the mid-1980s. Though meriting further research, the convergence of rural-urban incomes is consistent with the sectoral evidence on agricultural and agriculture-related business growth in Brazil since the trade liberalization of the early 1990s.

Third, a decomposition of inequality by income sources—such as employment earnings (formal and informal); self-employment incomes; labor incomes of employers; social insurance transfers; and a residual category that consists largely of capital incomes and social assistance transfers—suggests that receipts of cash-based social assistance transfers from the government have become much more widespread. There is also evidence that these transfers have become better targeted to the poor. From 1993 to 2004, mean “other” incomes have risen, and their inequality level has fallen substantially. The population share receiving incomes from this source has almost doubled, from 16 percent to 30 percent, and inequality among recipients has fallen. Perhaps most tellingly, the correlation between this income source and total income has fallen from 40 percent to 30 percent. While it is possible that these changes reflect changes in the distribution (or the reporting) of capital or rental incomes, it is more likely that they reflect, at least in part, the substantial expansion of Brazil’s cash-based social assistance system, beginning with the Projeto Alvorada in 1994–95, the launch of the national Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Alimentação programs in 2000, and their integration into the Bolsa Família in 2003.

In addition to these three “structural” and policy processes, the macroeconomic stability ushered in by the Real Plan of 1994 has eliminated the contribution from hyper-inflation to inegal-
Poverty dynamics in Brazil were marked by considerable volatility between 1981 and 1993, largely as a reflection of the country’s macroeconomic turmoil over that period. In 1993, the incidence of poverty was higher than it had been at the beginning of the 1980s. Against that background, solid evidence of a reasonably sustained and statistically significant decline in inequality and poverty since 1993–94 is cause for cautious celebration. These changes remind us that, although resilient, Brazil’s inequality is not immutable. It responds both to structural economic and demographic transformations, and to policy.

Nonetheless, a more detailed analysis of the 1993-2004 inequality decline is a priority for future research. Several critical questions merit further exploration, including an examination of the general equilibrium factors behind the decline in returns to education in Brazil. A more disaggregated analysis of the incidence of social assistance transfers—particularly of the Bolsa Família program—is also needed. Finally, it is also important to examine what lies behind Brazil’s remarkable rural-urban convergence over the last two decades. To what extent were these changes driven by the growth of the modern agricultural export sector, ignited perhaps by the trade liberalization of the early 1990s, and supported thereafter by high international commodity prices? Or are they due instead to greater access to land among small-holders, including those who have benefited from the ongoing land-reform initiatives? Finally, did the expansion of social security coverage in rural areas associated with the “aposentadorias rurais” play a role?

Interested readers should watch out for a forthcoming two-volume compilation of studies on these issues, which will be published by Brazil’s Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), in the next few months. Those studies mark a major contribution to this research agenda, and begin to answer some of the questions left unanswered here.

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Brazil is a leader in the fight against AIDS. But in the poor northeast, many children have stunted growth. This section explores Brazil’s search for equity in health care.
Health Inequalities in Brazil

Observations from the Field

BY PAMELA SURKAN

As the fifth largest nation in the world, Brazil is diverse not only in culture but is also clearly marked by social disparities. While the melodic rhythm of the Portuguese language and generous spirit of the people are enchanting, it is also the Brazilian people’s openness to share their lives that makes extremes of wealth and poverty so evident. After only a few rides on the public bus, one is privy to stories of the joys and tragedies of people’s lives. Likewise, no more than a few hours in one of Brazil’s major cities are necessary to observe firsthand the infamous slums beside skyscrapers or beachside resorts.

I first arrived in Brazil as a doctoral student in 1999 to carry out a pilot study for a research project that would eventually become part of my thesis in public health. This led to a number of visits over the course of the next four years to set up the study and oversee fieldwork. My purpose was to examine how the circumstances of caregivers, specifically informal social support and depression in mothers, might be related to child growth. This endeavor brought me to discover not only the world of research, but also the vibrant country of Brazil, full of complexity and contrasts.

According to the World Bank, Brazil consistently ranks among the top ten most unequal countries in the world in terms of income distribution. As I reflect on my experiences and what is particular to Brazil, I hope that my training as a researcher and my distance as a foreigner can provide some perspective. The focus of my research on the role of social conditions on the growth of infants and toddlers brought me to the most impoverished communities in one of the poorest states, located in the most economically depressed region of the country. The study was based in low-income neighborhoods of Teresina, Piauí, in northeast Brazil.

Because there were no direct flights to Teresina, my trips from Boston often extended over thirty hours door to door. Although I did not realize it at the time, many short visits in a short period—from home in Boston, to southeast Brazil, and then back to Piauí—facilitated comparisons between these settings. If my experiences had been confined to the industrial southeast or southern regions, I certainly would have had a very different impression of Brazil. The research project in Piauí provided an unusual opportunity to enter the homes of a randomly selected sample of mothers over 15 years old. Our study’s demographic statistics revealed that the average income in these households was approximately US $100 monthly, with 15 percent of the residents making less than $35 monthly. Seventy-seven percent of the mothers had completed less than an eighth grade education. Half of the families lacked a toilet and 46 percent lived in a house made of mud. Perhaps most surprising to me was that, despite these difficult conditions, hospitality and welcome were almost never lacking.

These hardships also created some challenges for the research team. Since study participants often lived on unnamed streets without addresses, creating maps was often the only way that we could locate and keep records of those we interviewed. Also, since many mothers had low literacy skills and almost no households in these neighborhoods had phones, in-person interviews were necessary to administer the questionnaires. Finally, household surveying was especially tough, given the weather in Teresina. Although there are dry and rainy seasons, it is always hot (often over 90°F). Confronting the heat on a daily basis to reach the houses and conduct the interviews (while carrying the anthropometric measuring devices and scales) was not easy.

What is quickly apparent is that inequalities in Brazil exist by socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and gender, and are also clearly demarcated by geographic region. The northeast region has lower percent- ages of literacy, number of years of formal education, and the highest percentage of the population living in extreme poverty. Data from 1998 show that the south and southeast regions provided 75 percent of Brazil’s gross national product. However, even without knowledge of the actual figures, one promptly senses this difference, noting that an equivalent meal is approximately double the price in São Paulo than in Teresina. These inequalities can be upsetting. On one of my stopovers on the way back to the United States, I realized that the bill from dinner that I shared with several Brazilian researchers in São Paulo was approximately Brazil’s monthly minimum wage (i.e., more than the monthly salary of a family I had visited the day before). I began to wonder how much people think about these disparities and how they come to terms with them.

In terms of public health, there is ample reason to be concerned, since it is well known that poverty is almost always associated with poorer health. So it is not surprising that health statistics in Brazil clearly reflect regional economic differences. Although not the focus of our study, our findings supported the already-existing literature showing that poverty and inadequate sanitation are strong correlates of poor child physical growth. Child growth as a health indicator is extremely important. It reflects child well-being and nutrition and is intricately associated with child mortality as well as later physical and cognitive development. A report from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) using 1990 census data indicated that the infant mortality rate in the northeast was more than double that of the southeast and southern regions. Likewise, a study published by Monteiro and colleagues in 2002, summarizing data from 1996, showed that the prevalence of stunting in 1-4 year olds was more than ten times higher in the 25 percent poorest compared to the 25 percent richest in the northeast region.

It is possible that regional identities in Brazil are accentuated by these geographical income disparities. Upon hearing my foreign accent when I spoke Portuguese, people...
Although there are strong historic and cultural differences across Brazil, it is likely that the economic and ethnic inequalities that track these geographic regions also strengthen their separate identities. There have been many initiatives aimed at reducing regional economic inequalities, especially over the last half century. These include governmental administrative reform at the end of the 1960s, a series of specific programs during the 1970s, the World Bank-funded *Projeto Nordeste* in the 1980s, and more recent initiatives to attract investment in the region. Some current programs to improve children’s health include Brazil’s national *Programa de Saúde da Família* (used as a basis for our pilot studies and targeted as part of our study sample) and the recent hunger reduction program, *Fome Zero*.

Since my first visit to Brazil almost ten years ago, many formal attempts have been made to improve public health and reduce economic inequalities. Undoubtedly, these programs have made some difference, but there is still a long way to go. I hope that my study, for which more data analysis is now underway, will make a small contribution to improving our understanding factors related to child growth in low-income settings like Piauí.

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### BEYOND VIOLENCE: SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS

Sitting across from her, I wondered how, after the 23 years she had lived, she still looked so young. Her fragile frame had survived the deaths of her mother, father, brother and cousin. In response to my questions, she gave a nod, a shrug of the shoulders, and occasional words allowing the details of her story to slowly unfold. In a community center in Mare, a poor community just one hour’s bus ride from the photo-famous beaches of Rio de Janeiro, I listen to how her sexual and reproductive health choices were dictated by the reality of living in a slum, in this *favela*. A Portuguese word often understood without translation, *favelas* are infamous for their violence, but few understand how completely the presence of such violence determines daily decisions and interactions.

For example, this young woman was forced to have sex at 14, didn’t use a condom then and hasn’t used one since. But she doesn’t want to get pregnant. “Have you considered other types of contraceptives?” I ask. Then discussing the options she knows are available at the community health clinic, she answers me with another silent shrug. Continuing on to other aspects of her sexual and reproductive health, her responses consistently relay the highest level of risk. Without prompting, she concludes the interview by telling me how each person in her family died. Violence, largely in connection to drug trafficking, had claimed each one.

I was hesitant to ask my final question, “Where do you see yourself in five years?” Having glimpsed at the roots of her self-destructive behavior, I assumed daily survival would be enough for her. “To go to school,” she replied. She paused, looking me in the eye, straight, for just a moment before repeating, “I want to go back to school.” Her desire to return to school made her just like every other young woman I spoke with from Mare: they all, regardless of their circumstances, kept hope, kept believing, that education would be their chance at a better life.

That was my final interview. With the support of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, I was able to return to Brazil for two weeks during the month of January to conduct qualitative research for my Masters thesis that focuses on the sexual and reproductive health of young women in Mare. As the core of my thesis, I am analyzing the baseline interviews for Project M. A program developed by Instituto Promundo, one of Brazil’s leading NGOs, Project M explores the role of gender and power in personal relationships, providing an immediate opportunity to be associated with the intervention in the spread of HIV/AIDS, in addition to improving the overall quality of life by empowering these same youth to choose healthy lifestyle behaviors. Trying to add context to the quantitative analysis, I conducted the interviews in an effort to connect the words and stories of these women to the statistics.

I will try, through the analysis of my thesis, to explain the difficulties these women face to make healthier lifestyle decisions. Using both quantitative and qualitative data to provide a snapshot of their sexual and reproductive lives, it is clear that violence is a consistent theme throughout their lives. Not until I provide a more complete picture of their reality, can one begin to understand just how inspiring their spirits are as they continue to dream and persevere.

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The dramatic beginnings of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s were characterized by ignorance, fear and lack of solutions. Since the 1990s—the turn of the century—and in the new 00 decade, successful responses and hopeful scenarios for some, and a mix of stigma and inadequate responses for the majority, have marked the consolidation of the AIDS epidemic. During this time, we have become part of the Brazilian AIDS Social Movement, have made friends with many people living with HIV and AIDS, and have conducted research to obtain our graduate degrees.

Over time, it has become clearer to us that the AIDS epidemic represents different kinds of threats not limited to the need of preventing the spread of a rapidly growing epidemic, or of treating all those who live with the infection and need medical care. In addition to the challenges and threats to conservative cultural approaches around gender relationships, sexuality and power hierarchies in the medical setting, we want to concentrate in this essay on one of the biggest threats of the epidemic: how it impacts national and global markets.

Sick and dying citizens are in their most productive years, given that the epidemic mostly affects young adults. Moreover, countries’ cultural survival is in jeopardy because young adults are also the teachers responsible for educating children or the parents in charge of raising the new generations. A global economy scenario with a future generation of poorly educated producers and consumers who could migrate to more prosperous countries does seem like a “security concern” for world economic powers, as Bill Clinton put it when he was the U.S. president.

National and international responses to combat the AIDS epidemic have taken place within a growing influence of the for-profit pharmaceutical industry on foreign economic policies and treaties. In this scenario of a global epidemic within an expanding neoliberal world economy, the Brazilian fight against AIDS is most significant. Brazil, ranked as a middle-income country, is in fact a powerful economy and an important player in the global economy scenario. This Latin American power for economic growth and regional integration has become a significant port in the global market. But, how does this
The economic position of Brazil relates to the AIDS epidemic? What is the meaning of the successful Brazilian strategies to deal with the AIDS epidemic within a global neoliberal economy?

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank have become the reference points for third world countries' economies. These banks lend money to third world countries for social and developmental programs. However, accessing these loans has brought with it more economic dependency. A big portion of countries' income is now dedicated to paying the very high interest rates of the loans—an important part of the rapidly escalating international debt. In addition, the World Bank’s growing focus on global health resulted in a situation in which countries, like most in Latin America, were required to implement market-based health care reforms in order to access credits. Many Latin American countries have also been obligated to sign trade agreements that favor a free-market approach to global health, including the patent protection of new and old drugs of the for-profit pharmaceutical companies. The results of more than a decade of neoliberal reforms and coercive international treaties on the AIDS epidemic are extremely high prices of the necessary AIDS medications (anti-retrovirals—ARVs) and collapsing national economies that cannot purchase them.

Confronted with the duty to ensure very high profit margins for pharmaceutical companies with their newly discovered drugs for the treatment of AIDS and other diseases and the minimal purchasing capacity of the countries to afford these inflated prices, the World Bank faced a dilemma. Undoubtedly, it was not a moral but an economic dilemma. From the World Bank’s perspective, pharmaceuticals’ profits could not be endangered, and at the same time third-world countries with their impoverished economies could not spend the majority of their income in purchasing drugs.

As a solution, the bank proposed that countries should only spend state resources in cost-effective strategies for the poor (in the AIDS situation this meant prevention campaigns) leaving expensive treatments that included AIDS therapies for individual purchasing within free markets. The moral dilemma, however, is that this free-market “sound” mentality represents a death row for the majority of the people living with AIDS, given that most cannot afford the life-saving medications. Over time, national and transnational NGOs, the other growing players of the global market economy, started to provide free-of-charge access to AIDS treatment in some local settings, creating a black market of AIDS medications. Dire poverty forces people to strategize means for survival and, for many people, AIDS is just another life threat but not the only or most significant one. Those who could afford medications but were afraid of the stigma would buy the medicines from those who would get the free medications from the NGOs, but they would rather have money for food or other basic needs.

Despite the World Bank’s recommended approach, which for many countries ended up in an imposition, given their dependency on the banks’ credits, Brazil strongly opposed this approach. However, its alternative approach was fraught with obstacles, hesitations, or contradictions. It was not an easy process. Notwithstanding the difficulties, it is now fair to consider that Brazil was faithful to its tradition in social medicine and two of its principles: 1) Prevention and treatment should go hand
in hand and cannot be thought of as two separate approaches but rather as interconnected ones and 2) Health is a universal and integral human right and attempts to charge for health care represent access barriers and thus, a blatant human rights violation.

If health is a right for all and no condition (including payment capability) can exclude people from it, then it should be the state’s responsibility to provide it. In fact, the Brazilian 1988 constitution was not shy in declaring this right: “health is a right of all and the duty of the state.” This constitutional stand, now seen as progressive, is understandable only when looking at the history that gave rise to it. The constitution was enacted after more than twenty years of military dictatorship and was the result of a large social mobilization from different sectors, including health care workers and patients movements, who wanted a profound democratic transformation of the country.

Following these constitutional principles, the country organized its national health care system, Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS). During that same time, the first responses to the AIDS epidemic were taking place. The principles of the constitution were shared and used by AIDS activists (both people living with AIDS and non-infected citizens who have created groups and NGOs) to demand from the state free-of-charge distribution of ARVs, as well as all other needed medications and exams within the public health care networks of the country.

Even though AIDS activists are considered the main actors in these free of charge and public approaches to AIDS treatment, social medicine scholars, journalists, celebrities, members of other social groups like feminists, sexual minorities, and labor groups, and even politicians were themselves part of the AIDS activist groups or shared the goals of the movement and became important players in the implementation of the Brazilian responses.

The heterogeneous—and at many times conflicting—amalgam of actors and interests (some clearly advocating for a “health as a human rights” approach, and others thinking about strategies to show that cost-effectiveness did not conflict with peoples’ right to health) have largely agreed that AIDS care should include prevention and treatment in tandem and cannot be thought of as part of purchasable free-market merchandise. Even though the state needed to negotiate prices of brand and generic medications in the global market, people did not need to negotiate their health and right to live.

Over time, this Brazilian approach has proven to be not only morally right, but an unquestionable economic success. By integrating prevention with treatment, the country has avoided thousands of new infections, treatments of opportunistic infections and hospitalizations, and thus, saved millions of dollars in medical expenses. Moreover, people living with AIDS have increased their life span, living many more years plentifully. They have regained their vitality and many have been able to go back to work or avoid disability, families have been reunited and many more avoided splitting up because of disease or death. Children born with HIV, fewer every year, have been able to go to school. Many who have reached adulthood have become productive citizens, fallen in love, and started new families on their own.

Besides survival, a very significant aspect in the Brazilian history is that these successes have lead to a deep ethical debate in society aiding in the consolidation of democratic practices in the country. Most
importantly, the successful responses have forced society to revisit gender, sexuality, age, race, and class inequalities, and to transform traditional hierarchies in medical settings in which a successful treatment no longer depends exclusively on the knowledge and expertise of the health care professional, but on how the health care and social support networks understand and accompany people in their treatments and life struggles.

The Brazilian strategy tells the world that people have the right to prevention strategies but that once infected, they also have the right to all necessary health care and to continue to be engaged in full and active lives like all citizens. In addition, a primary lesson is that the elimination of all inequalities, for example by not demanding the purchasing of medications or insurance policies which deepens class-based inequalities, is the cornerstone of a successful prevention and treatment approach.

In spite of the unquestionable Brazilian successes, proposals to expand this approach are timid when it comes to the global economy. On the one hand, many insist on prevention-only approaches, with some of these policies, like those of George W. Bush and and some funding agencies, actually worsening the situation by insisting on abstinence-only messages. On the other hand, the most “advanced” members of international AIDS agencies have accepted that Brazil’s free of charge access to medications is a keystone in combating the epidemic, yet they have avoided challenging the free-market and for-profit agenda in global health. In a global market economy, the Brazilian approach teaches us that a good way to keep on thinking about health and human rights and their links to prosperity is to fight dogmas that place profits over people. This is nothing new, but international lending institutions mandate its forgetting.

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Why Brazil Responded to AIDS and Not Tuberculosis

International Organizations and Domestic Institutions

BY EDUARDO J. GÓMEZ

You are probably familiar by now with the famous “Brazilian AIDS Miracle.” A strong, highly centralized AIDS bureaucracy, the incorporation of a well-organized civic movement and strong relations with the world health and financial community has led to an impressive decline in AIDS deaths since the 1990s.

Yet many are unaware of the government’s response to other lingering epidemics such as tuberculosis (TB). In sharp contrast to the AIDS response, the government has not responded to TB nearly as effectively as it should and could have. People infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) are also often infected with TB; the Brazilian government is aware that the problem of co-infection had been spiralling in favelas and other urban areas since the 1980s.

However, the government did not create a highly centralized institutional and policy response to TB; rather, it completely dismantled the National TB Program through decentralization while refraining from working with the international community and civil society on this health problem. Why did the newly democratic government respond in this manner?

The government’s response was motivated by the following reasons. First, there was no burgeoning global health movement and attention to TB. Like leprosy and malaria, TB did not receive nearly as much attention as the “mystical,” globally popularized AIDS epidemic. As a result, the government was not racing to obtain global recognition for its response to TB, something which it did for AIDS.

Second, TB did not benefit from a well-organized civil society pressuring for human rights, gay rights, and health equality, as we saw with AIDS. Even now, there is not one single TB NGO, but rather a consortium of civic organizations focusing on AIDS and TB-related issues. Finally, the government had initially thought the TB problem had practically gone away prior to its resurgence in the 1980s. These perceptions were influenced not by morals or discrimination against the poor, but from structural factors, such as a decline in TB cases during the 1960s and 1970s and the weakened allure of treating TB.

However, the rise of new global pressures, such as direct policy criticisms from international organizations like the World Health Organization and the World Bank, and the recent financial incentives for responding to TB, which derive from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and TB’s provision of new grants based on specific conditionalties, gives us new hope that the government will finally respond to the ongoing TB problem. Only time will tell, however, if Brazil will respond just as well to these new global movements and incentives as it did for the AIDS epidemic.

GLOBAL HEALTH MOVEMENTS AND DOMESTIC RESPONSE

The global health community can have a profound effect on how domestic governments respond to epidemics. AIDS policy provides a good example of how this can occur. Prior to the 1990s, Brazil’s institutional and policy response to AIDS was just as lackluster as the United States’. While the government created a National AIDS Program in 1985, it was very poorly funded and was not well integrated in civil society.

Nevertheless, as the global health community (composed of various international health and financial organizations, such as the UN, the WHO, PAHO, and the World Bank) started paying more attention to AIDS, the Brazilian government’s position began to change. By the late 1980s, increased international attention and commitment to AIDS, coupled with direct pressures on Brazil, led to a radical shift in political elite perceptions and interest in responding more effectively to it. With the prospect of a major World Bank loan arriving in 1992, moreover, the government quickly increased its commitment to strengthening the National AIDS Program.
and working more closely with civil society. Essentially overnight, the government transformed a poorly funded National AIDS Program into a very wealthy agency that was highly autonomous and successful at imposing policy on the states; this has led to arguably the world’s best institutional response to AIDS, leading to a host of prevention and treatment measures that have contributed to a massive decline in AIDS deaths since the mid-1990s.

And what of TB? Despite its resurgence in the poorer, more concentrated urban areas of Brazil, such as Rio and São Paulo, similar to what we saw with the first few years of the AIDS epidemic, the government did not immediately respond. In part this had to do with the fact that the global pressures and attention to TB during the late 1980s and early 1990s were not nearly as strong as they were for AIDS. As a result, the government’s interest mirrored that of a somewhat apathetic global health community. Under these circumstances, the response to TB would depend entirely on the newly decentralized health care system, which was poorly funded and staffed. In fact, by the late 1980s the government had completely dismantled the historically centralized, well-funded national TB program through the decentralization of health care services through the Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS) in 1988.

But why was the government more biased in its response to AIDS? The main reason has to do with the fact that as has always been the case, the government responded to a new health epidemic that garnered a lot of global attention. By responding to AIDS, Brazil was able to demonstrate to the global health community that as a modern, newly democratized nation it was capable of successfully controlling a deadly virus, paving the way for social and economic prosperity. More importantly, it provided the government with the opportunity to lead the global fight against TB.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil societal response for more effective public health policy has a very long history in Brazil, spanning back to the first Republic. As in the past, the AIDS epidemic triggered a very aggressive civic response. In sharp contrast to the past, however, this response emerged in a context of re-democratization, strongly grounded in the tenets of human rights and equality in social policy (with health being a major component of this). In addition, the movement for AIDS benefited from a burgeoning, well-organized gay rights movement that started to benefit from the outgoing military regime’s somewhat progressive stance towards gay rights (mainly through the allowance of gay publications). By the time AIDS emerged in the 1980s, there was a well-organized, vibrant civic network unwaveringly committed to creating a host of AIDS NGOs that would flourish throughout the 1980s and 1990s. By the mid-1990s, over 100 AIDS NGOs existed.

Unfortunately, such a movement did not occur for TB. Despite data rates illustrating a parallel growth rate alongside HIV/AIDS, most notably in Rio and São Paulo, in sharp contrast to the past (especially when compared to the well organized Liga de Tuberculose of the early 20th century), medical elites, intellectuals and local politicians were not interested in immediately creating a new civic movement for TB, needless to say NGOs. In contrast to the well organized gay and AIDS NGO community, moreover, the urban poor (even those with HIV) had no organizational resources and support to depend on, no one to help them fight for a more effective, decentralized TB program. The whole movement for “human rights” and “human equality” in health care treatment thus seemed to overlook the needs of the urban poor suffering from a clandestine —yet quickly burgeoning—TB epidemic.

Why did this occur? In large part, it was the absence of TB’s “sex appeal,” when combined with a decline in civil elite perceptions that TB was still a problem, which generated few incentives for a new civic movement to emerge. In contrast to AIDS, there was simply no mysticism associated with TB; it had no global allure and, more importantly, there was no opportunity for medical elites to distinguish themselves by finding a cure. Direct and successful treatment for TB had existed for years. And the fact thatTB had been for the most part eradicated during the 1960s and 1970 contributed to the misperception, both within government and especially civil society, that it was no longer a problem. And lastly, the simple fact of the matter is that TB was always, and continues to be, perceived as a poor man’s disease. Its association with the
poor—in marked contrast to AIDS’ initial association with the gay white, upper-middle class—created few incentives for civic elites to mobilize for the poor.

The end result is that there was no NGO movement for TB throughout the 1980s and 1990s. AIDS NGOs and their ability to directly pressure the state would flourish, while the poor and the co-infected became increasingly marginalized. The problem became so obvious that by the late 1990s, the WHO and even the World Bank would start to criticize Brazil for its biased response to AIDS at the very costly, border-line discriminatory expense of overlooking tuberculosis.

GLOBAL HEALTH MOVEMENTS—ONCE AGAIN?

But there is hope. As was the case with AIDS, the global health community finally started to realize that TB had resurfaced as a global pandemic. In 2003, the WHO officially declared the resurgence of TB as a global health threat. And as always, the Brazilian government was eager to respond. As with the AIDS program, the National TB Program was re-centralized, with larger staff and more resources—though, of course, still paling in comparison to the more affluent, autonomous National AIDS Program. As with AIDS, shortly after these new global pressures emerged the federal government realized that unguided decentralization processes were not yielding effective TB prevention and treatment policies. The National TB Program was thus re-strengthened through a renewed commitment by the current Lula administration (and mind you, the response to TB bodes well, with his emphasis on increasing social welfare redistribution to the poor).

In addition to increased global recognition of the TB problem, the ability to obtain new sources of international funding has once again created new incentives for the government to increase its commitment not only to the National TB Program but also to state and especially municipal health agencies. In 2006, the government was the recipient of an $11 million dollar grant from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria. Similar to what occurred with the first World Bank loan in 1992, the acquisition of this grant, in addition to the fact that continued funding will be contingent on grant performance, has created new incentives to strengthen the National TB Program and, more importantly, to engage in a continuous dialogue with municipal health agencies for more effective policy implementation.

Once again similar to AIDS, the arrival of this new grant, when combined with an increased global recognition of TB, has also led to the emergence of new civic movements in response to TB. In 2003, a new civic forum for TB was created in Rio by several AIDS activists, doctors, community and church leaders; a similar movement was created in São Paulo in 2005. Referred to as the “TB Forum,” this movement is dedicated to increasing awareness of TB’s resurgence and to working with the federal and local governments to implement more effective policy measures. Since its existence, it has created a host of public prevention campaigns and has organized conferences with the National TB and AIDS Program.

It is no surprise that this movement has grown in tandem with the increased attention and financial support of the global health community. The Global Fund in fact stipulates that a necessary condition for grant approval and renewal is the creation of a Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), which guarantees the representation of civil society on the official committee drafting grant applications. Keep in mind that the Global Fund declined Brazil’s initial application for funding in 2005, based on the fact that the CCM could not prove adequate civil societal representation. Months later, it was finally approved by demonstrating to the Global Fund that it had finally achieved this involvement of civil society.

In sum, as we saw with AIDS at the beginning of the 1990s, the beginning of the 2000s has created similar incentives for the federal government to respond to tuberculosis through the strengthening of institutions (this time, the re-centralization of the National TB Program) and interest in working closer with civil society and local governments. In response to the government’s efforts, new civic movements continue to emerge in order to help those suffering from TB. While an official TB NGO still does not exist, several related civic associations and the church are coming together to create new TB forums throughout the nation to consistently monitor and apply pressure on the federal government for reform.

CONCLUSION

Governments, even the most democratic and socially progressive, can be biased in the types of health epidemics they respond to; Brazil is no exception. This should be alarming to those familiar with the nation’s historical institutional response to disease. Brazil’s most effective campaign against epidemics emerged during the far less democratic era of the early 20th century, most notably the Vargas military dictatorship (1930–45), when the government created strong federal ministries in response to all health threats. Brazil has become more democratic and committed to human rights, but it has not been as committed to immediately responding to all types of health epidemics, especially through institutional building. This suggests that democratic consolidation may not necessarily guarantee an equitable response to epidemics—and perhaps lends insight into why less democratic, more centralized nations, such as Cuba, have far more progressive and effective anti-AIDS policies than Brazil and even the United States.

Brazil’s recent response to AIDS and TB demonstrates that domestic response may reflect new global demands and incentives to become world leaders in the fight against disease. Global pressures for institutional and policy reform, in addition to foreign lending for these endeavors, continues to have a very positive effect on Brazil’s response to epidemics. Time will only tell if the new grant from the Global Fund and other donors will create the types of political and civic incentives needed to work together to finally arrest the growth of TB and other health ailments still troubling Brazil, such as malaria, samparo, and more recently, obesity and type-two diabetes.

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Implications of Globalization for Mental Health Care in Brazil

Negative consequences for the treatment of depression

BY FELIPE FREGI

Brazilians are seen as warm and friendly people with large social networks. Although these factors often protect against major depression, local studies show that Brazilians get depressed as much as people in other countries.

Indeed, sometimes the rate of depression is higher. Researcher C. M. Vorcaro and colleagues, for instance, tell us about a study of 15,000 people in a community in Brazil that yielded some surprising results. These Brazilians showed a higher rate of depression than that observed in similar studies in developed and developing countries: one out of every ten people were depressed over the course of a year, and 15.6 percent of the people in this community were depressed over the course of their lives. That is far from the stereotype of the happy-go-lucky Brazilian.

Socio-economic status explains much about why Brazilians are experiencing so much depression. When people don’t have enough to eat or can’t provide for their family, they tend to get depressed. Low socio-economic status (SES) is associated with an increased prevalence of psychiatric disorders, such as major depression, V. Lorant and other researchers have found. Poor people often don’t know how to cope with frequent tragedies known in the field as ongoing life events. They are constantly stressed and often have weaker social support. All these factors might explain their increased risk of depression. In addition, a recent study showed that patients from low-income neighborhoods are less likely to respond to antidepressant treatment (Cohen, A., et al., “Social inequalities in response to antidepressant treatment in older adults.” Arch Gen Psychiatry, 2006).

In a population-based 2004 study conducted in Brazil with 2302 individuals, the scientist Almeida-Filho and colleagues observed a relationship between major depression and social class. Upper and middle class people were depressed less often than the working class and poor. Although Brazil is the eighth largest economy in the world, it has one of the worst income distributions. These statistics help to explain why Brazilians get depressed. A recent study from IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada—Institute of Applied Economic Research) showed that the Gini index in Brazil is 0.60. The Gini index measures equality: a Gini index of 0 represents perfect economic equality, and 1 perfect inequality. Brazil ranks 148 in a list of 150 countries, only ahead of Swaziland (0.61) and Sierra Leone (0.63).

In this scenario, mental health care is critical in Brazil. However, at the present time, lower income populations that suffer the most from depression receive less mental health care, compared to the more privileged population. This phenomenon has been described as the “inverse care law.” Although globalization has improved mental health care in several aspects, it might, at the same time, be worsening mental health care for the poor. There are four main reasons: (1) inadequate psychiatric training—not suitable for local conditions; (2) increase in global health care expenditures that takes resources from mental health care; (3) lack of clinical research in mental health care in Brazil and (4) lack of drug development in Brazil.

THE PHENOMENON OF GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is the global movement characterized by an increase in the movement of commodities, money, information, and people. Since the end of World War II, this spiralling movement has been catalyzed by technological developments and new economic theories. Indeed, the development of technology, organizations, legal systems and infrastructure is responsible for sustaining this movement.

The consequences of this phenomenon in medicine are significant. With globalization, medical practices moved fast across borders creating a change in the practices of several countries, including developing countries. This phenomenon of medical knowledge transference is particularly accentuated in the direction from the developed to developing world because of the intensive volume of medical research, scientific production and also the entrepreneurship of several institutions in developed countries.

While globalization is a new trend that has intensified in the last half century, this transfer of information from developed to developing world is not new and indeed has improved public health in developing countries. For instance, most vaccines were initially developed in industrial countries and then taken to developing countries. Thus, common infectious diseases like smallpox were wiped out or, like polio, dramatically reduced. However, globalization has brought not only beneficial, but also collateral, effects.

INADEQUATE PSYCHIATRIC TRAINING

One important concern is that psychiatrists in Brazil are being trained to treat their patients as if they were living in Europe or the United States since most information—from textbooks to journal papers—comes from these countries. But what is the problem of training psychiatrists using the U.S. and European mental health care standards with their highly efficient medical systems? The main issue here is not having this training but not having an alternative training tailored to the socio-economic conditions of Brazil. Young psychiatrists want to learn how to treat depression using newer antidepressants such as venlafaxine and reboxetine that cost 30 times more than the old antidepressants, such as amitriptyline and imipramine. This issue is aggravated in large urban areas as these young psychiatrists aim to work in the private system, therefore, treating wealthier patients.

If newer antidepressants were better than old antidepressants, then there would be no reason to train psychiatrists to use old drugs. However, this is not the case. In a study of 116 patients published in the Journal of
The cost of new drugs is a major factor in the sharp and constant increase in health care expenditures. New policies in mental health care in Brazil are critical.

Another example is the use of cognitive behavior therapy for the treatment of depression. A review article published in the renowned American Journal of Psychiatry by a group of Canadian researchers led by Dr. Casacalenda showed that the percentages of symptoms remission for patients that received medication, psychotherapy and control treatments were 46.4 percent, 46.3 percent and 24.4 percent respectively. Because cognitive behavior therapy only depends on the training of psychotherapists and cost of labor in Brazil is less expensive than in developed countries, this might be a more cost-effective alternative to be used in Brazil. Therefore, further policies in mental health care should give incentives to the training of mental health workers in these alternative therapeutic approaches.

INCREASE IN HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES

Health care costs have been rising globally for several years. In the United States, for instance, expenditures in health care more than doubled between 1990 and 2003 (from $696 billion in 1990 to $1.7 trillion in 2003). This increase was less pronounced in Brazil. Nevertheless, in 10 years, this increase was almost 50 percent. In part, the development of new technologies and new treatments accounts for increased health care expenditures. Therefore, politicians—confronted with higher health care expenditures without greater resources—end up cutting the budget in some areas such as mental health care.

The cost of new drugs is a major factor in the sharp and constant increase in health care expenditures. Pharmaceutical companies, confronted with the expiration of drug patents, create new compounds similar to old ones in order to get a new patent and charge more for the new drug. In an editorial in the Canadian Medical Association Journal, Marcia Angell, the former editor in chief of the New England Journal of Medicine (the most influential journal in clinical medicine), states that "the main output of the big drug companies is 'me-too' drugs"—minor variations of highly profitable drugs already on the market. This problem is frequently observed with antidepressants as they represent one of the largest markets for the pharmaceutical industry.

LACK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH IN BRAZIL

One of the consequences of the globalization of medicine is that standard medical care might not be adequate for certain areas. In the case of Brazil, as I discussed above, use of old antidepressants and other treatments such as cognitive behavior therapy should be intensified. But in order to change current practices and policy, clinical research is necessary.

As in other areas, there is a chronic lack of research in mental health in Brazil. Although some progress has been made in the past years, much remains to be done. One problem is the lack of a health research agenda in Brazil. Research conducted in Brazil does not necessarily address national health priorities because research grants are based only on scientific merits. Researchers usually choose topics likely to be published internationally, such as clinical trials involving newer and more expensive drugs.
Brazilian babies are getting more of a chance to grow up these days. Older folk are living longer. Between 1998 and 2004, life expectancy for newborns was extended 3.7 years in Brazil. Men and women over 50 years old experienced a four percent drop in mortality rate from 1998 to 2003.

Moreover, since the year 2000, there has been a marked increase in the amount of government spending on health care, particularly at the federal level. It’s no small change either, and also involves greater emphasis on preventive care. The federal budget for health care in Brazil has more than doubled in six years, from about US$10.7 billion in 2000 to a projected US$22.4 billion for 2007. At the state and municipal levels, the increase over this period is estimated at 60 percent, reaching US$37.4 billion in 2007.

These figures come at a time when many governments around the world are cutting back on health care spending. So what’s going on in Brazil?

In 1988, the Brazilian government signed into law a new Federal Constitution. This historic milestone marked the end of a long period of dictatorship in Brazil and put new social policies in place. These policies included the creation of the Sistema Único de Saúde (Unified Health System) or SUS. Article 196 of the Constitution redefined the concept of health care in broad terms as a citizen’s right and as the state’s responsibility. The Constitution also defined the means of financing Social Security, including health care.

Set within the larger context of re-democratization, the health-related measures in the new constitution came about through the efforts of health professionals and civil servants to pursue reforms that would democratize health care in Brazil. Two years before the enactment of the Constitution, the fundamental principles of the SUS were set forth at the 8th National Health Conference, a significant step toward the democratization of health care.

The SUS can be characterized as universal, comprehensive, decentralized and having a high level of community involvement. It is universal in including all citizens regardless of their status within or outside of the formal labor market. It is comprehensive in that it aims to provide care for all health needs from the simplest to the most complex. It is decentralized in that it stimulates and ensures the political and financial involvement of all three levels of government—federal, state, and municipal. Community involvement is secured through municipal, state and national councils, through regular national health conferences (12 up to the writing of this article) and other forms of representation.

Universal Health Care
Closing the Equity Gap

BY JOSÉ CÁSSIO DE MORAES AND PAULO CARRARA

Photographs by Dominique Elie
The SUS has achieved much of its success to date by thinking in terms of preventive and primary family care. The strategy for family primary care is to create health care teams dedicated to geographic regions with an average of 2,500 residents. These teams are generally composed of a doctor, a nurse, two nurses’ aides, and five or six health officials. Family care teams are present in 5,000 of the 6,600 cities in the country, providing coverage to 44.4 percent of Brazil’s population and making it possible to implement health policies more effectively. The scope and volume of the services provided is impressive (see box on next page).

In moving to its universal approach to public health care services, Brazil transitioned from a completely centralized system to a decentralized one that includes state and city governments. Prior to the SUS, health care focused primarily on hospitals and specialty clinics and was completely dissociated from preventive care.

Before the new unified system came into being, the National Immunization Program was the only universal health program in Brazil. It operated through health clinics usually administered by the state governments. Municipal clinics only existed in the richest locations. Vaccination coverage, under this system, remained limited.

Over the past 15 years, decentralization has taken root. A 1990 federal law (8080) spelled out the role of each of Brazil’s three levels of government, regulating funding sources to finance an ambitious universal health care system.

One of the fundamental characteristics of the SUS is the agreed-upon and obligatory transfer of federal resources to the state and municipal levels without partisan bias, which, from the legal point of view at least, ensures the process of decentralization.

In the fifteen years since the SUS was formed, health indicators demonstrate important advances in public health care in Brazil. The infant mortality rate declined 20 percent between 2000 and
2004, a significant statistic because it deals primarily with the reduction of deaths in children younger than 28 days old. After the introduction of annual vaccination campaigns, the diseases covered by basic immunization programs have appeared infrequently: polio was eliminated years ago and measles, diphtheria and whooping cough occur only in isolated cases. Health care—including preventative medicine—has become accessible to almost half of Brazil’s population.

CHALLENGES FOR SUS
Despite advances in the standard of care and the implementation of health services since the creation of the SUS, great challenges must be overcome before we can say that there is a satisfactory level of health or a model health care system in place for Brazilians. A brief analysis of the current situation can be carried out by looking at how constitutional principles regarding health and the guidelines and organization of the SUS are being implemented.

As for universalization, we should bear in mind that there is still a segmented system in place which consists of the SUS and a supplemental system of private individual and collective health plans which involve direct payment by the patient and are characterized by expenses for prescription drugs and dental care. The coverage provided by the SUS needs to be extended to include prescriptions and dental coverage, which account for close to 25 percent of the country’s health care costs. Similarly, Brazil faces innumerable challenges in confronting the inequalities that exist across its different regions and socioeconomic classes and in providing access to and allocating resources. Health administrators have a great deal of ground to cover in their efforts to achieve the goal of equitable and universal coverage.

In considering the constitutional guidelines for the SUS, various additional hurdles come to mind:

- The decentralization of the SUS was implemented effectively, principally in the transfer of resources and responsibilities to municipal councils. Decentralization, however, runs contrary to the Brazilian government’s federal principles, which have implications for determining the role state governments play in the management of the SUS and how to coordinate the responsibilities and actions of the three levels of government.

- The integration of health care has been viewed as one of the most difficult problems to address as it requires numerous changes, both conceptual and cultural. It should be analyzed along two fronts: horizontally, looking at how the patient is seen in light of his or her “biopsychosocial” (biological, psychological and social) aspects, and vertically, in which we seek a definition of technological hierarchy that is rational and based on scientific evidence in order to ensure comprehensive, efficient, and effective care.

Brazil’s Unified Health System (SUS) has achieved much of its success to date by thinking in terms of preventive and primary family care.

Despite the accumulated experience of the National Council of Health and several state and municipal councils, the role of community involvement stills needs to be more clearly defined in terms of its capabilities and its scope. Community participants appear to hope for conditions that would raise the level of politicization in academic discussions, which in turn could serve as the fuel to propel the SUS on the road of progress.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to address the problematic context of financing the SUS. Even with the constitutional amendment in 2000 that earmarked funds to be spent on health care, national spending has continued at a relatively low level when compared to similarly developing countries. Per capita spending is inferior to that of Chile, Argentina and Colombia. The majority of analyses concerning an increase in financial resources for publicly-funded health care conclude that it is not politically viable to increase funds through tax hikes. Brazil’s taxation rate is already one of the highest on the planet. This, in turn, suggests two possible alternatives: an effective policy of growth and socioeconomic development, and a greater allotment to health care of present and future public funds (including funds from unions, and state and municipal governments).

These two alternatives require taking on complex political and technical challenges. If successful, however, they would drive enormous progress in strengthening and modernizing health care management and service delivery in Brazil. And quality universal health care might well be the greatest social victory for the Brazilian people in their history.

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By the Numbers: Public Health in Brazil (SUS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Federal health care spending</td>
<td>US$22.4 billion</td>
<td>2007 (up from US$10.7 billion in 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal and state spending</td>
<td>US$37.4 billion</td>
<td>2007 (up 60 percent from 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in life expectancy</td>
<td>3.7 years</td>
<td>for newborns between 1998 and 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drop in mortality rate</td>
<td>4 percent</td>
<td>for men and women over 50 between 1998 and 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>In-patient stays per year</td>
<td>12 million</td>
<td>* Assumes a population of 130 million people that is exclusively covered by the SUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to doctor per year</td>
<td>151 million</td>
<td>* Assumes a population of 130 million people that is exclusively covered by the SUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vaccine doses administered per year</td>
<td>140 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary care procedures per year</td>
<td>1 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transplants per year</td>
<td>15,000</td>
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ONE BRAZILIAN MOTHER WAS EMBARRASSED because her children were thin. She thought family and neighbors would think she could not provide enough food for her children.

Another insisted that it is preferable to have a chubby child (“bigger is better”); a perception influenced by social pressures. She equated thinness with lack of health. Many agreed.

As the developed world battles eating disorders and obesity, the developing world—including some of Brazil’s poorest regions—face a seeming contradiction: an environment in which obesity and malnutrition co-exist. In fact, studies show that the pace of the nutrition transition faced by many developing countries, like Brazil, has increased the likelihood that under- and over-nutrition will coexist in the same population group, and perhaps within the same household. Brazil’s level right now is about where the United States was in the 1970s. While some studies have been made on the more prosperous southeast, the poorer sections of the country previously have been overlooked because of their association with malnutrition.

Our study explores Brazilian mothers’ child feeding practices and their perceptions of their association with child weight status, as well as the role of socioeconomic, cultural and organizational factors on these relationships.

We selected 41 women from rural, urban, coastal and indigenous areas in Ceará State in northeastern Brazil to participate in four focus groups. How and what the mothers fed their children depended on economic resources, but the mothers’ social support networks, such as neighbors and family, and participation in nutrition assistance programs also were important. All mothers in the groups were enrolled in the Family Health/Community Workers Program.

MOTHERS’ PERCEPTIONS AND BELIEFS RELATED TO CHILD WEIGHT STATUS
It was evident from mothers’ discussions that child malnutrition, food insecurity and hunger were the main concerns with respect to questions related to child weight status.

Mothers often spoke of their struggle to make sure that their children “gained enough weight” and that they were “at the right” or “at targeted” weight for their age. Mothers’ perceptions of “right” or “targeted” weight for their children appeared to be influenced mainly by their own judgment of their child’s appearance (e.g. “too skinny,” “have enough flesh”), and in some cases, by information they received from health professionals, including doctors, nurses, and health agents.

Despite the belief that it is better for children to be chubby when they are small, mothers prefer that their children were “thin” or “normal weight” as they grow older. Some explained their belief that once the child grew older they would lose excess weight and “be at normal weight.” Only a few mothers reported that some of their children were overweight.

Photographs by Paul Goodman <WWW.PGOODMAN.COM>

Above: Two girls take a break from Capoeira training; a child clings to mother’s skirt at a Kiriri Indian reserve in Bahia.
In spite of worrying most about child malnutrition, food insecurity and, in some cases, child hunger, mothers were also aware that child obesity was bad. However, they often didn’t understand what caused obesity, thinking that birth control pills and stimulants given to children could make them fat. Several reported their own struggles with overweight. Some of these mothers appeared to be bothered by the harsh comments about their personal appearance, while others seemed to believe that they were “destined” to be overweight or that “it was the way God intended them to be.”

Mothers in all focus groups made a distinction between foods they considered “good,” and therefore “healthy” for their children, and foods they considered “bad” and “unhealthy.” Mothers believed that good, healthy foods included those with protein and calcium, those with fewer chemicals and additives and fruits and vegetables. Sweets were seen as bad.

For mothers who did not face such serious problems associated with hunger, gender of the offspring played a more significant role in mothers’ perceptions of ideal weight and body type; mothers tended to equate thinness with their daughters being physically attractive and acceptable in society. These same mothers aspired for their daughters to enter professions that place high value on thinness and beauty.

For their sons, several mothers described an ideal body type as strong and healthy as opposed to a thin body they envisioned for their daughters. Overall, mothers in our study associated unhealthy eating habits in early childhood with the development of subsequent overweight and obesity in later childhood and adulthood.

Mothers were also aware of the social stigma attached to being “fat,” especially for females, resulting in mental health issues such as depression, poor self-esteem, humiliation and shame. Other recent studies, conducted among mothers of different race and ethnicity, have demonstrated that mothers are knowledgeable about the connection between weight status and health, including the relationship between overweight and obesity and health and social problems.

Photos on right: Rainer Schultz depicts a child in Menino Jesus in northeast Brazil. Nefer Muñoz captures grain in a market.

**Mothers’ Daily Feeding Practices**

Mothers reported being responsible for planning, cooking, and deciding what their children eat. Family members, especially grandmothers, have a powerful influence on mothers’ child feeding practices, and consequently on the child’s diet. This finding is consistent with conceptualizations of the family as a setting of health practice at the center of the network of social systems.

This way of thinking about nutrition and many other aspects of health highlights the role of the family in integrating interactions with organizations and the community that have a bearing on children’s lifestyle behaviors. Most recent literature in the field describes the “health-promoting family,” as well as the “eco-cultural pathway” (family values, goals, needs, health practices), as significant influences on child health behavior and status that can mediate community and societal factors.

Mothers seemed to agree that they all wanted the best for their children in all aspects of their lives including making sure that their children eat a healthy diet. Despite mothers’ discussions of their efforts to avoid feeding their children unhealthy foods, several mothers spoke of using strategies such as promises of sweets (e.g. ice cream), candies, and toys to make their children eat or to reward children’s good behavior.

**Socioeconomic Status and Food Assistance**

Money and unemployment emerged as the main factors influencing children’s diet and mothers’ feeding practices. Consistently, mothers spoke of not having enough money or being unemployed as a barrier to providing the foods they wanted for their children. In a few cases, by contrast, competing demands of work outside of the home emerged as factors influencing mothers’ feeding practices.

Mothers’ comments reflected the degree to which their food practices were tied to their family socioeconomic status. Mothers spoke about their children being hungry and the personal sacrifices they made (e.g., going without food) to better provide for their children. For poorer mothers, hunger appeared to be a far greater family concern than obesity. These mothers spoke of hav-
ing to give their children sugar water or “herbal tea” when there was no money for food, of not being able to afford foods recommended by their pediatrician and feeling stressed and worried about not being able to provide food for their children on a daily basis.

For mothers describing dire socioeconomic situations, the Food Grant Program was seen as a valuable form of assistance. The Bolsa Alimentação (BA) program is a relatively new federal program administered by the Ministry of Education. This “Charter of Responsibilities,” which ensures regularly attendance at prenatal care and growth monitoring, compliance with vaccination schedules, and health education. This “partnership of trust” reinforces the bond between local health services and marginalized families of limited resources.

Many mothers said that the Food Grant Program was commonly underutilized because of difficulties with the registration process. Others said they didn’t receive benefits despite registration. Still others simply didn’t know about the program. Among Food Grant Program recipients in the focus groups, many said that the money was not only used for food but also school supplies, clothes, shampoo, medicine and cooking gas. Many of the mothers said that they enjoyed this aspect of the program.

Our research findings have important applications in developing nutrition education strategies for child health promotion that can adequately account for the social and cultural context of minority, low-income caregivers. Nutrition education interventions could be implemented through the existing PSF/PACS program and work in conjunction with the Food Grant program to educate mothers on important factors associated with early child feeding and nutritional status. Our results can form the basis for the design of interventions to prevent childhood under- and over-weight in low-income populations in Brazil and other Latin American countries with similar epidemiological profiles.

Something should be done before the situation worsens. As our study shows, the poorer are the ones that carry the heaviest burden of nutritional problems. In transitional societies like Brazil, the poor are now bearing not only the problems of child malnutrition, food insecurity and hunger, but are also starting to feel the negative effects of obesity. While obesity is still more prevalent among adults, especially women, than among children, only preventative education can keep poor children from bearing a double burden.

Especially with their daughters, mothers may put more emphasis on dieting to obtain “beauty” and thinness than on proper nutrition for health concerns.

Health and designed to reduce nutritional deficiencies and infant mortality among poor households.

The target group includes low-income families (means-tested) with pregnant and lactating women, and/ or infants and young children aged six months to six years of age. The program provides beneficiaries a monthly cash benefit (R$15.00) conditioned upon their commitment to a “Charter of Responsibilities,” which ensures regularly attendance at prenatal care and growth monitoring, compliance with vaccination schedules, and health education. This “partnership of trust” reinforces the bond between local health services and marginalized families of limited resources.

Our findings revealed the important influence of food assistance programs on children’s nutrition. For some mothers in our study, the Food Grant Program (Bolsa Alimentação) was an important resource of healthy lifestyle behaviors.

Other studies in Latin America that have suggested obesity prevention be incorporated into nutrition programs and that note that while providing food to low-income-stunted populations may be beneficial for some, it may be detrimental for others, contributing to increased risk of overweight and obesity especially in urban areas.

Finally, our findings suggest that nutrition programs should provide more detailed, explanatory models about the causes and consequences of overweight and obesity. Nutrition education should focus on the importance of proper nutrition and healthy weight status for health’s sake rather than for beauty’s sake. It is especially important that mothers learn not to overly focus on thinness and beauty for their young daughters as a means of reducing the subsequent risk of eating disorders. Given the well established logistic and success of the PSF/PACS programs, these could also be important vehicle of nutrition education for low-income families.

Mothers’ explanatory models of health and nutrition for their children are important to guide the design of public health interventions targeted at mothers’ child feeding practices and behaviors, and thus, ultimately the health and nutritional status of their children. Formative research such as ours is essential for developing interventions for which existing information is limited.

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Her research focuses on the diverse problems affecting child health with a special emphasis on early childhood nutrition, including health behaviors and parental influences among low-income, multi-ethnic mothers and children linked to the burgeoning rates of obesity and chronic disease in the United States and Latin America.

Lindsay has worked for the past thirteen years in Ceará, collaborating with Brazilian colleagues at the Federal University of Ceará, the Ceará School of Public Health, UNICEF/Ceará, and the State Secretariat of Health on a number of research projects ranging from infant mortality and child undernutrition to more recent studies focusing on the problems of HIV/AIDS and child obesity.
Citizenship encompasses civil, political and social rights. This section explores how Brazilians of different social classes, religions, sexual orientations and races are asserting their citizenship in the search for equity.
In his classical text on citizenship in the era of the welfare state and the coming together in the 1950s of the three strands of civil, political and social rights, British sociologist T.H. Marshall argued that modern democracy is held together by a delicate balance through which people are prepared to tolerate a certain degree of economic inequality. Within limits, they will accept that earnings can vary provided that in other areas of collective endeavor, equality—increasingly expressed in terms of rights—will be the overriding premise.

Unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly clear in many countries that things are not that simple. The hoped-for delicate balance is being undermined by the chaotic oscillations of exaggerated financial liberty, poverty and ineffectively distributed services. The result has been the growing use in the arena of public action of a principle that has been around for many centuries in legal philosophy: equity. Equity, the quality of being fair or just, is what we expect from judges; it is why we talk about leveling the playing field, of giving some people an advantage so as to counterbalance any disadvantage they may have and it is what leads us to affirmative action, the recognition that equality alone is not enough—that being fair is much more than giving everybody the same chance.

In the field of public administration, the racial conflicts in the United States in the 1960s led scholar H. George Frederickson to argue the need to include social equity—responsiveness to the needs of citizens—as the needed new rule for service provision. As he well put it: “To say that a service may be well managed and that a service may be efficient and economical still begs these questions: Well managed for whom? Efficient for whom? Economical for whom?” (The New Public Administration, University of Alabama)
One way Brazilians express their citizenship is through street demonstrations. Depicted here is a recent demonstration in São Paulo.

Press, 1980). For the administrator who sees the advantage of using the banking system to provide easy access to benefits, a plastic card approach to welfare seems like a good idea; but if the recipient lives somewhere where there is no bank, the result may be very different. Recently, a woman colleague spent the night talking with people in line waiting for a trade union and local government-supported job center to open at 7 a.m. One girl broke into tears when describing how she had to borrow some flour, milk and sugar from friends, make a cake which she sold by the slice, in order to get the money to pay for the bus ticket to the center plus some more bus tickets to use if she managed a job interview.

Nobody would doubt that questions of poverty and inequality are identity marks for most of Latin America and that the continent in general—and Brazil specifically—has not had much success at changing the overall picture. The increased use of income supplement grants has provided some relief. However, the many analyses that have been made of programs, such as Brazil’s family grant scheme, show that while necessary to guarantee minimum food requirements, these programs are not likely to break the poverty cycle. Nor will the conditionalities attached to such programs—for example, for children to attend school or parents to go for job training—produce any lasting effects, given the overall low quality of schooling and the general lack of work opportunities.

What is needed is a more expanded approach to poverty, that considers not only the economic means of sustaining a viable livelihood, but the many different aspects that sustain the households and communities to which the livelihood is related. Everyday life is not a homogeneous experience nor is constructing and maintaining a viable livelihood, or being part of a household and a community. As we unpack the statistics and look at the differences in terms of gender, location, ethnicity and many other factors, we see that poverty is a heterogeneous process, produced and reproduced in many everyday actions.

In unequal settings, it is necessary to be highly skeptical of averages. For example, to discuss average annual income is one thing in a country where everybody gets the same, and something else in a country where a few are very wealthy and many are poor. Brazil is one of these. In terms of income, the wealthiest ten percent have nearly 50 percent of all the income while the poorest ten percent have only one percent. In certain parts of the country, such as the northeastern semi-arid areas, this difference will be even more extreme. A minimum wage—the maximum that many workers will get—is about one seventieth of the salary received by many judges, business executives and national congress members. Unemployment figures are higher for Afro-descendants than for Euro-descendants and for women than for men; black women face a double exclusion. Salary levels follow a similar negative distribution.

Overall averages for illiteracy show a decline over recent years. However, once functional illiteracy is taken into consideration and the averages are opened up, we find that about 83 percent of adults over 15 years old in rural areas have had only four years of schooling or less. As a result, they have great difficulty in dealing with documents and bureaucratic procedures or reading newspapers. In the country as a whole, 3.6 million people (2 percent) are without basic documents such as birth certificates and identity cards, necessary for welfare benefits and access to the judicial system. This figure can rise to over 40 percent among quilombo dwellers (the former fugitive slave hideaways). The usual reason given is that the quilombos are located in out of the way areas of the country; that may have been true at the beginning of the 19th century, but by now the rest of the country has grown up around them. In the federal government’s search to register families for the family support grant, teams recently found one such grouping without any documents in the rural zone of a medium-sized town close to Porto Alegre, the state capital of Rio Grande do Sul.

In terms of health, the challenge facing the country’s unified health service is no better. Despite constantly falling overall infant mortality rates, these numbers will still range between 16 per thousand among the 20 percent wealthiest in the southeast to 111 per thousand among the 20 percent poorest in the northeast. In the country as a whole, infant mortality is three times less when the mother has eight years or more of schooling than when the mother has studied less than four years.

Unpacking statistics is not that difficult. Community health agents have learned to draw maps of the community to pinpoint certain vulnerabilities. The Catholic Church’s infant support program (Pastoral da Criança) gathers data on a weekly and monthly basis to monitor trends among more than a million new born infants, using a register that was largely designed by their volunteer field workers. The Recife municipal government, along with the Federal University of Pernambuco and the United Nations Development Programme, has broken down the Human Development Indicator (HDI) on a block-by-block level, replacing the gray averages with the sharp contrasts that will enable policy makers to act affirmatively. The mayor of Boa Vista in Roraima did the same...
THE BLACK MOVEMENT: REVISING THE STORY

This summer I traveled to Brazil for a major international gathering of scholars, political leaders, poets, and students at A Conferência de Intelectuais da África e da Diáspora (The Conferences of Intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora) in Salvador, the capital of the state of Bahia in the northeastern region of Brazil. A Tarde, a popular Bahian newspaper, called the event “o mais importante evento de e para a comunidade negra brasileira ocorrido nos últimos anos [the most important event by and for the black Brazilian community in recent years].”

Only minutes from my hotel window, members of the Movimento Negro (Black Movement) raised placards that read “COTAS RACIAIS JÁ.” (Racial Quotas Now), chanting “Contra as cotas, só racista” (Only the racist is against quotas). They demonstrated in support of quotas that had grown out of and contributed to this change.

The scene felt like stories my parents and grandparents had told me about picket signs, marches, sit-ins, and Freedom Riders. I realized I was looking into the face of imminent change in Brazil. And, just as it had been for the United States, a change that had much to do with the politics and problems of race. The fact of race and racial discrimination in Brazil was now receiving national attention, a fact that challenged the popular idea that Brazil was a “racial democracy,” as Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre had claimed in the early thirties. As a literary scholar I would have to think about the way literature fit into this change.

The final day of the conference featured a panel called “Vertentes Contemporaneas nas Literaturas Africanas e Diaspôricas” (Contemporary Developments in African and Diasporic Literatures). Afro-Brazilian poets Esmeralda Ribeiro and Conceição Evarista and others read their work, speaking of slavery and continents, dreams and poetry. I realized more than ever before that my doctoral research in the area of Afro-Brazilian literature would have to consider this tension between a legacy of slavery and a loyalty to the idea of a Brazilian racial paradise. It would have to recognize the challenges to and revisions of the racial, cultural, and literary history of Brazil.

As it grew out of and contributed to this change, the poetry of many Afro-Brazilian poets at once questioned and revised the story that had dominated Brazilian scholarship and literature since the nineteenth century. They called attention to a history of racialized marginalization. At the same time, these poets used their words to legitimize the place of African descendants in a Brazilian nation. In short, they wrote to rewrite history. My responsibility, then, would be to reread it.

Monique-Adelle Callahan is a Ph.D. candidate in Comparative Literature at Harvard University. Her research focuses on the intersections of the African American, Afro-Cuban, and Afro-Brazilian poetic traditions. Monique was a recipient of a 2006 DRLCAS Summer Travel Grant and traveled to Brazil as a Jorge Paulo Lemann scholar.
poverty and inequality remarked: “As a concept, it’s full of flaws, but it is much better than what we’ve got.”

If we can accept the need to act affirmatively, there are a number of examples at the local level that can help. The Public Management and Citizenship Program was set up in 1996 as a joint initiative of the Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo and the Ford Foundation, drawing on earlier experiences at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. Its aim is to identify, analyze and disseminate innovative practices amongst sub-national Brazilian governments (states, municipalities and indigenous peoples’ tribal governments) that have a positive impact on strengthening citizenship and on the quality of life. It focuses on experiences—policies, programs, projects or activities—that innovate in service provision, can be reproduced in other localities, utilize resources and opportunities in a responsible manner and extend the dialogue between civil society and public agents. Among the more than 8,000 registered experiences, there are numerous examples of an intuitive approach to being fair in everyday service provision.

Evaluations of the widely known participative budgeting approach to local government investment decisions have shown that local re-distribution of policy priorities and resources is possible. Inter-municipal cooperation in the north of Brazil has changed food supply patterns and created new market opportunities for family farmers by stimulating production of vegetables, flowers, fruit, dairy and livestock for local and export consumption. In doing so, agricultural research agencies have been persuaded to switch their focus from the problems of the large scale single crop producers, to the multiple crops of local ecologies. In the Belo Horizonte metropolitan region, the organizing efforts of the independent associations of street recyclers of paper, glass, plastic and aluminum cans (catadores), along with the Catholic Church, local authorities, the Banco de Brasil and other businesses, have led to the associations finally owning their own reprocessing factory.

However, it is a very difficult and uphill struggle on a very unlevel playing field. Equity helps us to focus on the problems to be solved, but also makes visible those features of everyday life that are preventing them from being solved. Bringing small-scale producers into the food producing chain has required learning how to develop micro-factories that meet food processing standards, and how to cooperate in purchasing packaging material, creating brand names and stamping the bar codes that supermarkets require, only to fail at the tilted negotiating table of the huge supermarket chains. Brazil’s top business schools are well supplied with specialists in logistics and the country’s consultancy firms are as up-to-date as elsewhere on the continent. But at the same time, hundreds of thousands of small micro-producers in urban and rural areas, including street sellers and neighborhood shops and services, which together form an immense and invisible nanoeconomy, cannot get past first base in economic integration.

Businesses may be ready to join in on responsibility issues, usually on photogenic questions such as children and the environment, but will not lend their key executives to try to sort out how micro-enterprises can cluster and strengthen themselves, or show interest in how more balanced supply chains can be developed through action on all sides, or even introduce a bit more fairness in trade relations. Banks are great funders on a number of social issues, yet Brazil is only able to meet two percent of the current estimated demand for micro-credit loans. Its active micro-credit client base (that is, those receiving loans) is only 158,654 clients, a long way behind Bolivia which is only a twentieth of the size of Brazil yet has 379,117 active micro-credit clients.

There are signs of hope. Optimistically, we could say that—compared to twenty years ago—an increasing number of local governments in Brazil are intuitively, if not explicitly, bringing equity into policy making. But if we don’t also pay attention to the problems that have been preventing us from working on the issues at hand, we may well find ourselves back where we began. As the saying goes: if we are not part of the solution, we are probably also part of the problem.

Peter Spink is Professor of Public Administration at the Getulio Vargas Foundation’s Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo, where he also coordinates the Public Management and Citizenship Program <http://inovando.fgvsp.br>.

São Paulo’s Hilton hotel and Microsoft’s Brazil headquarters in the modern Berrini business district, with neighboring favela (foreground).

PHOTOGRAPH BY JOÃO WAINER/FOLHA IMAGEM
Social entrepreneurs are mingling these days with prime ministers, kings, gazillionaires and executives. In his January 30 column in the New York Times on the most recent World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, Nicholas D. Kristof registers this fact as one of the “the most hopeful and helpful trends around.”

“These folks aren’t famous, and they didn’t fly to Davos in first-class cabins or private jets, but they are showing what it really takes to change the world isn’t so much wealth or power as creativity, determination and passion,” he writes.

Brazilian social entrepreneurs and their organizations are also making efforts to seek equity and inclusion in their country. We at the BrazilFoundation, a grant-making nonprofit transnational organization incorporated in New York, tap into the resources of the Brazilian diaspora in the United States by raising awareness of a booming third sector in Brazil. Investments of individuals and corporations, tempered by social responsibility, are linked to grassroots social entrepreneurs in Brazil.

In Search of Equity in Brazil
A BrazilFoundation Perspective

From Housing Self-Help to the Voting Booth
By Leona Forman, Sheila Nogueira and Gláucio Gomes

BrazilFoundation initiatives
BrazilFoundation, created with the mission to generate resources in the United States for social projects in Brazil, promotes social corporate responsibility among companies that invest in Brazil and individual social responsibility among potential donors —both Brazilian and American—through better understanding and strengthened trust in social initiatives in Brazil.

Built as a bridge, BrazilFoundation’s work is carried out by offices in New York and Rio de Janeiro, with the New York base responsible for fund-raising and donor community building.

The Rio de Janeiro office concentrates on program development. Grantees work in the fields of education, health, human rights, citizenship (which means capacity building, basic rights and responsibilities, preparation for a first job) and culture.

Susane Worcman, founding vice president, heads up the Rio office. She has traveled by plane, car, bus, motorcycle, canoe and on foot to the most distant locations to visit prospective grantees, whom she describes as extraordinarily determined social leaders,
young and old, living and working under most precarious circumstances, totally invested in improving their communities.

Brazil Foundation and its grantees consider the small discretionary grants (up to $10,000, with a one-year timeline) as only a part of the grantor-grantee relationship. The follow-up includes technical assistance, administrative guidance and workshops on such topics as institutional communication and budget development. The opportunity to meet each other, to exchange experiences and information, and even strike up partnerships has further buttressed the work of many of the grantees.

The Foundation has now established a database with excellent small projects, selected from all regions of the country. In 2006, HSBC, TAM Airlines, the Foundation of Vale do Rio Doce (the CVRD mining company) and the Inter-American Foundation became partners on 13 of the 33 projects selected by Brazil Foundation, thus providing funding for more of the finalists.

These foundation-corporate partnerships open new doors for funding opportunities to local non-profit organizations that have little access to larger donors. To its corporate partners, the Foundation provides full grant-making services for vetted small projects in regions where they normally would not be active.

The following sampling of projects demonstrates how NGOs are bringing equity to communities in different regions. They each reflect a particular modality: self-help, public/private partnerships, direct access to legislative process, and outreach by an indigenous community wanting peace with its neighbors.

SELF–HELP—AÇÃO MORADIA (ACTION FOR HOUSING)

Eliana Setti, a businesswoman in Uberlândia, Minas Gerais, has volunteered many years with the NGO Pastoral da Moradia, a humanitarian organization helping low income families secure housing. This experience led her to believe that she could do more to improve access to housing for the poorest members of the community. She and her husband, engineer Oswaldo Setti, founded Ação Moradia.

Most families Eliana Setti had visited lived in canvas shacks, with no running water, sanitation or electricity. There were no schools, health or other social services in the vicinity. Though geographically part of one of Brazil’s municipalities high on the GIP (Gross Internal Product) and M-HDI (Municipal-Human Development Index) scales, inequality here is stark—tall buildings, modern industrial installations and wealthy suburbs situated side by side with slums and misery.

Ação Moradia developed a specific technology for building brick houses in poor communities. The bricks are made with a hand press, using a mixture of sandy soil and cement. They are known as “ecological bricks,” because they do not require drying with heat produced by wood or coal.

Eliana and Oswaldo built a shed in Morumbi, the poorest community in the periphery of Uberlândia, to house a small factory where families from neighboring communities come to make ecological bricks either to fix up a house or build a new one.

With a grant from Brazil Foundation in 2003, Ação Moradia mobilized 15 families to participate in cooperative house building. Currently, the major achievement of Ação Moradia is no longer the making of ecological brick but the house itself, a social product that mobilizes families and helps develop strong community bonds.

A house built using Ação Moradia methods costs approximately 30 percent less than a common house. The design is based
on innovative social and environmental technologies that reduce the cost of maintenance. Natural ventilation and good lighting are obtained by positioning of windows and the use of specific materials for roofing, to reduce heat in the summer. A solar panel is installed for heating water, thus reducing the use of electric showers. The bricks have holes for wiring and plumbing, reducing waste of material and construction time. In laying bricks, there is no need for cement-glue, since the bricks fit into each other like toy Legos. Each house has a water tank, a septic tank and is part of a common sewage system.

Ação Moradia also built a Center for Capacity Building in Morumbi that provides 23 different social services, such as vocational courses, literacy and continuing education courses, and even vegetable gardening.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP—CETCAF

In 2004, BrazilFoundation made a grant to the NGO Center for Technological Development of Coffee (CETCAF) in support of the project “Coffee-Culture and Family Production” in Anchieta, a rural community of the region of Córrego da Prata, known for the lowest per capita income in the state of Espírito Santo.

Municipal authorities were seeking to advance rural tourism, increasing productivity of small rural properties where agricultural and culinary practices could be of interest to urban tourists. Here citydwellers would see how cachaça (white sugar cane rum) is produced in family stills, learn about animal breeding and enjoy “pay-and-fish” facilities, and taste food produced in the farmers’ kitchens.

Although fundamental to the history and culture of Corrego da Prata, small local coffee growers were excluded from the tourist route, since the 30 family-run, small plantations employed traditional ways of planting and the coffee beans produced were of low quality and the smell generated by inadequate storage made them unattractive to visitors.

CETCAF proposed to provide the 30 small producers with information on new ways to cultivate coffee and diminish waste. As well as learning new techniques, the farmers began to work cooperatively, discovering economic advantages to bulk sales.

The CETCAF team provided technical assistance, monitoring local properties and checking coffee quality and market prices received.

This higher-quality production diminished emigration of young people from this rural community. In addition, cooperative production among the 30 farmers consolidated relationships among community members.

CETCAF collaboration with public authorities and technical assistance agencies allowed it to contribute to the development of an important public policy, to stimulate and empower the local coffee farmer, and to contribute to the rebuilding of family structures.

PARTICIPATORY CITIZENSHIP—ÁGORA INSTITUTE

The Ágora Institute in Defense of the Voter and of Democracy promotes democracy and citizenship participation by monitoring municipal-level legislatures. The work of Ágora Institute is consolidated in the municipality of São Paulo. A group of journalists monitors the daily actions of town counselors in the Municipal Chamber, evaluating town counselors’ performance against indicators generated by Ágora Institute technical staff. Annually, a legislative report is produced and distributed to the citizens in São Paulo township with information about the activities of each town counselor.

Ágora Institute also offers civics courses in schools and promotes voting education in low income communities, focusing especially on the young adult who is to vote for the first time.

Ágora Institute’s direct governance program “Ouvidoria do Eleitor” (Voter’s Listening Post) also allows civil society organizations, corporations and individual citizens in São Paulo to send requests to their town counselor, and by law, to receive an official response. Ágora monitors all phases of the request process, informing the voter on its status through periodic mailings.

Recently, it expanded the program to the neighboring towns of Mayrink and Atibaia, both in the state of São Paulo, and is now expanding to Rio de Janeiro. In partnership with Instituto Telemig Celular, the foundation of a telephone company, Ágora is also training members of municipal councils in twelve cities in the state of Minas Gerais to monitor the performance of local legislative chambers.

PROMOTING DIVERSITY THROUGH EDUCATION

THYDÊWÁ PAU BRASIL—BAHIA

Thydêwá Pau Brasil, an indigenous non-profit organization in the state of Bahia seeks to promote, preserve and generate respect for indigenous cultures.

The organization wants its neighbors to understand the culture and see the indigenous people as they see themselves, promoting intercultural dialogue and respect for differences through educational activities.

In the past few years, the level of ethnic strife has increased in this low-income region, resulting in conflicts between Indian and non-Indian populations. The Indian population is seen by others as a passive recipient of benefits. The Thydêwá organization believes that the indigenous population must take on a proactive role in developing policies to govern life in their villages and to establish norms for their relations with the white population in neighboring farms and towns.

The project Indians Want Peace came to BrazilFoundation in 2004 to seek training of 32 teachers and 10 indigenous leaders as agents for peace and as conflict mediators.

The initiative includes visits by the Indian elders to local public schools to share indigenous stories and history with the student population. It also supports organization of meetings with local government authorities to raise awareness. These activities are developed arduously, and results can only be expected over time when mutual suspicion is overcome and peaceful coexistence and cultural exchanges can be encouraged between indigenous people and the local population.

BrazilFoundation acts as a bridge to generate resources in the United States for diverse projects in education, health, culture and citizenship throughout Brazil.
Jair Ribeiro, a successful Brazilian investment banker in New York, a philanthropist and donor to BrazilFoundation, returns to live and work in his home town of São Paulo. His office in the city center abuts a public school with youngsters loitering in the street, the school in obvious disrepair. Feeling unsafe and sad, Jair Ribeiro gets personally involved. He consults experts in education, NGOs working on issues of education and curriculum development, as well as state educational authorities. In May 2005, with Ana Maria Diniz, a business executive, they establish Associação Parceiros da Educação—Association of Partners in Education.

Acting as program coordinators, Ribeiro and Diniz have since engaged twenty other executives to invest in twenty other public schools in São Paulo, with a total of around 20,000 students. Their vision is to improve public education through public-private partnerships, to inject private interest and investments in the improvement of public education. They aim to achieve 100 school partnerships benefiting 150,000 students in 2007 and 500 schools, with 750,000 students, by 2010.

Among emerging market countries, Brazil has the lowest average in years of schooling—five years—the highest rates of illiteracy, 13 percent, and of students repeating classes, 21 percent. Though the State of São Paulo has an annual budget of R$9 billion (approximately US$4.5 billion) for the education of 5.5 million students in 6,000 public schools, the conditions of many of these schools and the quality of teaching are deplorable.

The Association of Partners in Education brings to the program business experience in human and financial resource administration and other business practices. As a framework, it took the experience of one enterprise that formed a partnership with three public schools sixteen years ago in the slum called Paraisópolis, in southern São Paulo.

In conjunction with the educational authorities of São Paulo, the Association of Partners in Education identify a public school that needs and has the interest in establishing a partnership. It then develops a diagnostic of the school’s needs (infrastructure, governance, pedagogical and community support), working with the school administration, the teachers, parents, students and staff in elaborating an annual plan of action.

Investment in the school made by the business executive ranges

Grassroots communities across Brazil have shown extraordinary energy and creativity, working with local social entrepreneurs to fight social inequity.
between US$35,000 and US$125,000 a year. The resources are used for improvement of the classroom infrastructure, in acquisition of teaching materials, in teacher-training opportunities and in community outreach. Most of all, they focus on the performance of the students.

The Association of Partners in Education also does contract services for competent non-profit organizations to provide educational support for a school or a group of schools and to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the program.

Initial results are promising. Participating schools in the last two years show decline in illiteracy rates and external evaluations have found an over 20 percent growth in the students’ performance rates. There was also a reduction in student absenteeism and in the turnover of teachers.

The direct engagement of the business executive in the program is crucial, especially in the contacts and meetings with the school principal, the teachers and the students. Once the impact of the investment becomes apparent, experience has shown that the state begins to inject public funds it holds, the parents become participants and the overall teaching and learning experiences have a healthy effect on the community as a whole.

**CONCLUSIONS**

- Despite what often seem to be unsurpassable problems facing grassroots communities across Brazil, extraordinary energy and creativity can be found in local social entrepreneurs who deal with poverty and inequity in both rural and urban environments.
- Results are directly correlated with trust, commitment, the ability to inspire and lead by example, and the creativity of the project leader.
- The non-profit sector is reliable and dependable. Although "accountability" may not be a word in the Portuguese language, the social leadership we met and support do know the concept and how to act on it.
- Individuals are not able to shoulder the task of transforming society alone—organization and partnerships are necessary to bring their ideas and aspirations to fruition.
- It does not take a very large investment to encourage a small organization to develop strategically and implement its creative ideas. Success in the highly competitive grant-seeking field boosts confidence and opens new doors.
- Public-private partnerships can and do produce results. Under the leadership of Ruth Cardoso, Brazil’s First Lady from 1995 to 2002, new forms of collaboration between the state and civil society were developed, often including the private sector. Comunidade Solidária, the organization she headed, proved it was possible for groups of citizens to mobilize and to pressure the State to act, as well as to take action themselves. One of the concrete results was the creation of the legal status of OSCIPs – Organizations of Civil Society of Public Interest—regulating activities of non-profit organizations.
- Many of the initiatives of NGOs have effectively contributed to improvements in education, community development, capacity building, environmental protection and empowerment of women. Public-private partnerships help build trust and inclusion across the First and Third sectors.
- Foundations and NGOs continue to play an important role in pressuring government for legislation that recognizes the crucial role of non-profit organizations and calls for tax relief (incentives are currently minimal) to encourage both individual and corporate philanthropy.
- Media has tremendous influence in the promotion of what newsmagazine EXAME calls *Good Corporate Citizenship*. An annual special edition ranks corporations by their social investments, by conditions they provide to workers and by initiatives they establish for environmental protection. Public recognition of good corporate citizenship creates a competitive sense of urgency and a pressure to act.
- Third sector media plays an extremely important role of informing, guiding, connecting and furthering the efforts of nonprofit social leaders. *Revista da Filantropia*, an Internet based magazine, was created by Marcio Zeppelini five years ago as a tool for social entrepreneurs to administer their projects. It is not enough to do good; he says, it is necessary to do it well! The electronic newsletter published by the Rede de Informações do Terceiro Setor (Information Network of the Third Sector) is an indispensible source of information about events, resources, publications, articles. Newsletters published by various trade associations such as SENAC (National Merchants Association), SENAI (National Industry Association) and by a number of NGOs, provide a much needed exchange of information.
- *BrazilFoundation*’s work has only scratched the surface. A Brazilian diaspora donor community exists today in New York, and we are poised to take this experience to California, Florida, Massachusetts and other communities with large Brazilian populations with the purpose of fund-raising for, and knowledge raising about social projects in Brazil.

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Sheila Nogueira has worked as Program Manager at *BrazilFoundation* since 2003. With a Master’s degree in Social Policy Planning from the State University of *Río de Janeiro*, she has worked in the Third Sector for over 15 years, with direct experience in human rights and citizenship (basic rights and responsibilities, capacity building and local sustainable development) projects.

Gláucio Gomes has worked as Program Officer at *BrazilFoundation* since 2004. Gomes has a Master’s degree in Local Development Planning and Management from the International Studies Center of the International Labor Organization. He has five years’ experience in the design, monitoring, and evaluation of social projects, including provision of technical assistance to NGOs across Brazil.
Becoming Brazuca? A Tale of Two Teens

The Immigrant Experience

BY LETICIA J. BRAGA

Prior to arriving in the Boston area almost five years ago, I had heard anecdotally that a significant Brazilian immigrant population had been arriving en masse to the region since the 1980s. I could not have predicted then that, in my progression from observer to volunteer to researcher, participating in and understanding this community would become my main focus for years to come. I have spent most of my life in areas of the United States where I was often one of a few “token Brazilians,” but never lived in proximity to such a concentrated and organized network of Brazilian shops, restaurants and organizations. True, I still remain one of a few Brazilians inside the bounds of my academic world. Yet a quick bus ride to Somerville or across the river to Allston quickly immerses me—or any other visitor—into the world of Brazucas, the name frequently used to refer to (oftentimes undocumented) Brazilian working-class immigrants in the United States.

Antonia is one inhabitant of this world whom I had the pleasure of meeting and who later agreed to participate in my research. At the time of our interview, Antonia was in 8th grade (I’ve changed Antonia’s name, as well as those of other participants, to protect their identities). She told me that she had been in the United States for two years and two months, having turned 13 soon after arriving. Before coming to the United States, she had lived in Salvador (the capital of the northeastern state of Bahia) since the age of 8, but was born in the southeastern state of São Paulo. Antonia emigrated with her mother and her two younger brothers, while her father stayed in Brazil for nine months more, tending to the family business. An uncle who had already been in the United States for eight years received the family upon their arrival in Boston. From her tightly-curled hair down to her Lycra-infused jeans, she would likely be classified as Latino/a or Hispanic by an American, even though she self-identified as White.

Throughout our many interactions, Antonia always came across as talkative and perceptive, characteristics illustrated in her description of coming to the U.S. as an adolescent:

*It’s not only the parents that miss Brazil. It’s not only the parents who…miss the heat, who miss their family; we also feel it… I missed my father a lot… I even missed the smell of my bed, when I awoke, of the bird singing by the door to my house. Of my dog barking. Each little detail we miss, because it is different. It’s a different country, it’s a different culture, it’s a different land. The land here has a different smell than it does there… even when you fill a pail with water and then you throw it down the [sink] drain. Have you seen how it turns differently? Here clockwise. In the South counter-clockwise. So, even this is different. Imagine. Each stone, each step that you take. It’s different. So, the things that you were used to, you miss.*

Though perhaps more eloquent than other peers her age, Antonia’s immigration story and her perceptions are common to many adolescent Brazilian immigrants in the Boston area. At the same time, however, each immigration experience is unique in its details. Understanding immigrants (like Brazilians) as groups can be useful for the purpose of policy and measurement, but understanding individual experiences helps us to transform these foreign “others” into humans and neighbors. For youths like Antonia, the meaning of coming to the United States as an adolescent Brazilian immigrant varies by how the interplay of these components of identity—being an adolescent, being Brazilian and being an immigrant—defines the experience differently for each newcomer.

Youths who immigrate during their adolescent years are shaped by both cultural systems to which they are exposed: their country of origin (Brazil) and their host country (the United States). As Carola and Marcelo Suárez-Orozco detail in their 2001 book *Children of Immigration*, these influences create a “dual frame of reference” for immigrants, leading to a constant comparison of the “‘here and now’ with the ‘there and then.’” Adult immigrants may compare both cultures, but their identity is firmly grounded in their native country. Similarly, while second generation (U.S.-born) youths might share in the language and customs of their parents’ background, their reference is not grounded in personal experience of that country. For youths who immigrate during late childhood or early adolescence,
however, their identities are being forged in and by two cultural spheres of influence; these frames act as two mirrors refracting one perspective of what it means to be an immigrant.

While I was too young to remember the first time that I moved from Brazil to the United States, comparisons made by adolescent immigrants like Antonia are not based on abstract images of the past. Instead, they rely on details—like smells and sounds—that highlight what is missing from or different between the two environments. Feelings of loss can be especially poignant for the many youths who experience periods of separation from one or both parents. If memories of past events are shaped by such dualities, so are decisions in the present; as Roberta, a 16-year-old carioca who emigrated a little less than two years earlier from the vicinity of Rio de Janeiro, told me, “when I make a decision, with anything that I do here...I also think there, in Brazil, like ‘Man, if I did this, there in Brazil, would I do the same thing?’” One’s status as an adolescent immigrant can be seen as a matter of borders between Nation-States, but becoming an adolescent Brazuca is more about a State of Mind that shifts the meaning of “Brazilian” from being foreign to being American in some ethnic way.

While Antonia and Roberta look similar across many demographic categories like age, undocumented status and age of arrival in the United States, their Brazuca identities are very different. Tipping the scale at the Brazilian end is Roberta, who throughout our interview differentiates between “the Brazilians from Brazil, really, and here, the Brazilians in the United States.” Specifically, Brazilian immigrants are more financially-driven and “only think of how I can make money...I also think there, in Brazil, like ‘Man, if I did this...I also think there, in Brazil, would I do the same thing?’” One’s status as an adolescent immigrant can be seen as a matter of borders between Nation-States, but becoming an adolescent Brazuca is more about a State of Mind that shifts the meaning of “Brazilian” from being foreign to being American in some ethnic way.

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Antonia, tipping the scale at the other end, consistently identifies as an immigrant. She certainly is proud of being Brazilian, and indicates that there are characteristics that unite Brazilian immigrants through culture and the necessity of having supports within the community. Still, she feels connected to a broader immigrant experience, telling me that, “when you say immigrant, you’re not just talking about Brazilian. You’re talking about Spanish, you’re talking about Argentine, you’re talking about Italian, you’re talking about Indian....even being different nationalities, different religions, different cultures, there’s that little thing that connects us; we’re immigrants.” Identifying as an immigrant—albeit a Brazilian one—moves Antonia away from a purely national and foreign identity, so that adaptation to and acceptance in the United States become achievable goals for her.

These differences in identity help to explain why youths opt to tell their stories of immigration in a particular way, highlighting gains or losses in the process. Similarly, these differences frame youths’ opinions on which country provides a better life, a choice consistently defined through the educational opportunities that each place can offer. Roberta described her family’s decision to come to the United States as one of the hardest of her life to accept because, at the time, she had received good scores on her exams and had received a scholarship to a good school in Brazil. As she put it, “or you go to a country that is going to help you to learn other languages...or you stay there in Brazil, with the scholarship that you attained yourself. So it was a hard decision because, damn, I fought for what I got, I’m going to lose it...and I did, because I’m here today.”

While Roberta emphasizes her losses, Antonia frames her family’s decision to immigrate as the search for better educational opportunities for the children. She felt that “the middle class in Brazil is going through hardships” brought on by economic instability that forces people to make the choice to leave. One such person was Antonia’s mother who, in the teen’s words, said that in the United States “my children will learn English...They will have a better education. Because, when you learn another language, this opens the doors for you to any job.” In Antonia’s view, having these doors open is valuable “not for the money, but for you being able to do what you want.”

Of course, these individual views on identity and education do not exist in a vacuum but, rather, are influenced by attitudes in the immigrant community and the host society. For all of the immigrant youths that I have met, there is an apparent contradiction between their families’ explicit dialogue of choosing to immigrate for a better life based on education and the explicit or implicit messages sent that financial gain is valued above all. Parents often work long hours at multiple jobs in order to support family members here and back in Brazil. It was not uncommon for me to hear that these schedules sometimes made it impossible for parents to see their children when everyone is awake. And while they may have owned a business or held a college degree in Brazil, as Antonia’s parents did, they now clean houses or carry boxes at their jobs here.

One possible conclusion youths could reach upon seeing their parents’ choices could be that education cannot provide you with a better life, and that it is better to have a lower status job that pays more. Another possible conclusion, one Antonia makes, is to see parents’ lives as motivation to work hard in school; her parents struggle “so that I, one day, don’t do this...so I don’t go through what they’re going through.” But while both Roberta and Antonia see learning English as an educational achievement, I also see many youths in the community who view English as a necessary skill for getting a better-paying job in a fast-food restaurant or retail store; once this is achieved, the need to continue going to school disappears.

Another factor that defines the experience of adolescent Brazilian immigrants are the ramifications of being undocumented in the United States. Even when a youth is a U.S. citizen or has a Green Card, he or she almost always has friends or relatives who do not hold the proper documentation to be here. Historically, most undocumented Brazilians have been tourist visa overstayers whose “Disney World dreams” are used as a means of entry but, post-September 11th, stricter enforcement has driven many Brazilians
Nearly three-quarters of Brazilians identify as Roman Catholic, and many perceive their country to be the world’s most Catholic—witness the 2003 film Deus é Brasileiro (“God Is Brazilian”), a comedy that affirms this status and pokes fun at the absence of Brazilian saints. So it may come as a surprise that some of the most vibrant religious activity among Brazilian immigrants overseas has come in the form of evangelical and Pentecostal Protestant denominations that resemble—and often mimic—exuberant American styles of worship while delivering Portuguese-language services tailored to a Brazilian audience. These congregations have also succeeded in attracting participation from outside the Brazilian immigrant community to include nationals of other Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) countries such as Portugal, Cape Verde, and Angola. The resulting blend, set within a framework of fervent, charismatic religious experience and against the background of immigration and acculturation, is an extraordinary manifestation of the sort of cultural hybridization that continues to occur in the seething crucibles of large metropolitan areas.

I recently observed services at Brazilian Protestant congregations in London, England, and Cambridge, Massachusetts as fieldwork for sociological research. Brazilian immigration to both metropolitan areas has grown dramatically in recent years. During the period 1990-2000, the Brazilian population in the Boston area grew 332 percent to more than 22,000, while a recent British government report puts the number of Brazilian immigrants in London at 25,000, an increase of 500 percent since 1997.

At these congregations, cultural and religious tension with secular society manifests itself in creative ways. One British congregation’s tool for spreading the Good News was an unconventional youth choir that sang Christian pop songs in English and Portuguese. Before they performed live for the congregation, a music video was shown of the group performing in St. James’s Park (near Buckingham Palace), where singers from Africa, Europe, and South America attempted to appeal to staid passersby with brightly colored T-shirts and bilingual slogans such as “Jesus is the way/Deus é a onda.” The pastor commented on the appeal to youth culture in a tone that sounded more like justification than endorsement, although he did praise the young people for taking an active role in evangelism. A church in Cambridge played a role in easing Brazilian and Portuguese immigrants’ transition to their new country: sermons included didactic lectures on U.S. culture, and the church organized dinners for traditional American holidays such as Thanksgiving. These congregations engaged in a balancing act, easing assimilation into the dominant culture while hoping to preserve some of the unique cultural elements that allow their multinational membership to worship together in a unified manner.

During a Christmas Eve service in London, the pastor referenced a survey from a major British paper that indicated that significant majorities of Britons did not believe in God, attend church, or consider their country a “Christian nation.” The pastor considered this a tragedy in a “supposedly evangelical nation,” as he curiously described Great Britain, which in his view should logically have been much farther along than his native (regrettably Papist) Brazil. Consequently, he urged the congregants to go out and spread the word of God so as to turn back this tide and preserve the religion that they had brought with them to London.

**LUSOPHONE COMMUNITY**

Curious as it is that immigrants from predominantly Catholic countries should be the ones to revitalize Protestantism in Britain, it is worth dwelling on the question of how believers of varying nationality, economic background, and even immigration status came together to form such solidary congregations with a marked Lusophone identity. The idea of a “Lusophone community” has been the object of some academic criticism, illustrated by the following example: At a conference on Brazilian immigration to the United States held at Harvard University in early 2005, Letícia Braga discussed a Portuguese class at Harvard which brought students together with civic organizations in Boston’s “Lusophone community” as a language-learning tool.

A savvy questioner praised the design as a useful vehicle for language instruction, but challenged the course’s premise: he asserted that this community is an artificial construct, one which scholars have imposed on several distinct communities that do not have much interaction, in spite of their common outward features. There was general agreement from the other participants. Since then, my own experiences with Boston’s numerous Portuguese speakers led me to believe that the questioner was entirely correct.

Thus I was surprised to find at my field sites not only a healthy mix of participants from varying sections of this allegedly mythical community, but an explicit recognition and celebration of their common heritage. While the services were Brazilian-dominated in terms of speakers, singers, and much of the cultural material such as music and literature, strong efforts were made to reach out to non-Brazilian members. At one point during a Christmas service in London, the pastor embarked on a relatively long discussion of the members’ commonalities. He emphasized that they spoke the same language, despite differences in accent and vocabulary, and had many similar traditions due to the shared history of Portuguese colonization. Memorably, he asked the audience to name the type of cake that they ate at Christmas. He feigned deafness so as to elicit responses from various sections of the audience; when all corners
predictably responded with rabanada, a dish similar to French toast, he was pleased to have made his point, saying that Brazilians, Portuguese, and Angolans had all produced the same response.

I found the blend of Lusophone identities in evangelical congregations both diverse and deeply rooted. How to explain this otherwise invisible link among members of the “Lusophone community,” whose existence could be casually dismissed by a roomful of Brazilian immigration experts at Harvard? One answer may lie in the high level of international cooperation at the national level in the sending countries: multilateral organizations such as the Community of Portuguese-Language Countries, as well as private initiatives and foundations such as the Lisbon-based Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, encourage cultural and diplomatic ties among countries of the “Lusofonia,” much like the British Commonwealth and the Francophonie. Portuguese-speaking countries also have preferential immigration treaties and other special arrangements with one another. Perhaps most importantly, most of Portugal’s overseas colonies did not gain independence until 1975, meaning that certain institutional links remain especially strong (Brazil has been independent since 1822).

These strong international ties might have facilitated the proliferation of transnational churches, often originating in Brazil despite many Protestant churches’ American roots. The Assembléias de Deus Brasil, an organization which was itself founded by American missionaries from the Midwest in 1911, boasts that it began overseas missionary operations in Portugal just two years after its founding, and these efforts continue to the present day. A chain of international proselytism has resulted in the growth of churches like Assembléias de Deus and Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus in developed countries, a network that has frequently passed from the United States to Brazil, onto Portugal and Lusophone Africa, and back again to wealthy countries such as the United Kingdom.

The religious activity of immigrants from Brazil is a dynamic phenomenon that runs contrary to the trends taking shape among immigrant communities from other majority-Catholic countries such as Poland, which have swelled the ranks (and coffers) of aging, decadent congregations in their new countries. The heavy Protestant and evangelical character of much of the immigration, as well as the inclusive outreach to multiple populations believed to share common characteristics, is an intriguing development that demonstrates the growing ability of social movements to transcend international boundaries, allowing previously distant groups to reclaim a part of their shared history.

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to attempt the riskier and more costly trip across the U.S.-Mexico border. Youth often carry the weight of these decisions in their daily lives: just last week I spoke to a young man whose happiness over his father’s successful border crossing attempt was tempered by his mother’s recent deportation when trying to re-enter the United States at the airport.

Adolescent Brazilian immigrants may not differentiate between documented and undocumented immigrants, as the two often go hand-in-hand in this community. When Roberta says that she “won’t be able to get a license, now…because I’m not American” or when Antonia tells me that “when you’re an immigrant, you are afraid of doing anything and [the former INS] discovering that you are an immigrant,” they are actually voicing frustrations and fear over being undocumented. State and Federal policies also send mixed messages of belonging to immigrant youth. They are guaranteed a free public education through high school but, once graduated, cannot qualify for college in-state tuition in most states even if they have been in that community since preschool. For these teens, both the present and the future are shrouded in uncertainty.

Not surprisingly, youths’ narratives of past expectations and present experiences tend to align with future plans for living in Brazil or the United States. Roberta’s resistance to coming to the United States has translated into a resistance to incorporating anything ‘American’ or befriending Americans, and into a goal of returning to Brazil:

I don’t want to live here… I’ll finish my ‘high school,’ and I’ll go back….This is, what I think, right, because by then many things can change in my thinking, but until today it hasn’t changed… I don’t like it here, I can’t get used to [being] here…. it’s being a very good experience for me but, I miss my country a lot.

Antonia, on the other hand, feels she made the choice to come to the United States and sees her educational opportunities—and her family’s financial opportunities—as having expanded in this country, telling me, “I won’t go back, my life is here.”

One thing is certain: today’s globalized culture allows for greater transnational ties and identifications, so that youths who immigrate don’t necessarily sever communication with or plans of return to their home countries. Roberta’s desire to return to Brazil is made more feasible by the fact that her family is making payments on a house there. Her Boston home, though simple in other respects, does not lack the one commodity that so often suggests a Brazil daily life: just last week I spoke to a young man whose happiness over his father’s successful border crossing attempt was tempered by his mother’s recent deportation when trying to re-enter the United States at the airport.

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Equality for Same-Sex Couples

Brazilian Courts and Social Inclusiveness

BY ADILSON JOSÉ MOREIRA

The series of judicial decisions extending spousal rights to same-sex couples in Brazil emerges as a remarkable example of how the judicial system can bring about social change. Abandoning the traditional formalism that has long prevented greater social inclusion of many social groups, several Brazilian courts have granted same-sex couples the same rights and status afforded to domestic cohabitants. These decisions have provided a considerable degree of legal protection to a form of adult relationship of which many Brazilians strongly disapprove. This is all the more significant given that Brazilian courts have played a minor role in the process of construction and expansion of citizenship. In recognizing their essential role in the process of social change, the Brazilian courts have significantly contributed to the transformation of the social status of gays and lesbians, a group that faces severe forms of discrimination in Brazil.

A particular aspect of same-sex union litigation in Brazil has generated these judicial decisions that promote social inclusiveness of gays and lesbians. Conscious of the obstacles to legal recognition of same-sex marriage in an extremely conservative country, Brazilian same-sex couples have prioritized the struggle for the access to the institutions that regulate domestic cohabitation. The incremental approach that characterizes Brazilian same-sex union litigation has proven to be very successful since the decisions granting legal protection to same-sex partners have initiated a decisive movement toward the process of legal recognition of same-sex unions in Brazil. Considering the various categories of rights afforded to same-sex couples in one of the most unequal countries of the world, same-sex union litigation can be classified as an example of a successful struggle for the achievement of higher levels of social justice in Brazil.

Despite the criminalization of homosexuality, pervasive social prejudice, and the absence of any form of social support, Brazilian same-sex couples have entered committed relationships throughout Brazilian history. The prohibition of homosexuality by both canonical and secular law during the colonial period did not prevent gays and lesbians from seeking same-sex partners. Several historical studies reveal a striking contrast between the harshness of the law and the social reality. The records of ecclesiastical trials indicate the existence of long-term relationships, even between persons of different social classes and racial groups. The elimination of the sodomy law in the early nineteenth century did not eradicate the stigma surrounding same-sex relationships, but Brazilian gays and lesbians often dealt with the enduring social prejudice by living extremely discreet lives or concealing relationships behind the curtain of marriage to other people. Only the process of urbanization in the middle twentieth century has finally created the conditions for the construction of a community of social support for same-sex relationships. The recent enactment of a new Constitution that affords a considerable degree of legal protection to social groups encouraged Brazilian same-sex couples to seek legal recognition for their unions.

The convergence of two main factors triggered the series of judicial decisions that extended spousal rights to same-sex couples: the liberalization of Brazilian family law and the struggle for new forms of citizenship. Brazilian same-sex union jurisprudence derives from the long national tradition of giving legal protection to unmarried couples, a practice that reflects the liberal approach which has long characterized Brazilian family law jurisprudence. Brazilian family law courts have always emphasized the importance of the judicial system in maintaining an adequate balance between legislation and the transformation of social reality. Several Brazilian family law courts have argued that a conservative interpretation of family law legislation in a country with a large number of informal families would have increased the level of social exclusion. Favoring the promotion of social justice over moral concerns regarding legal protection to nonmarital relationships, Brazilian courts have consistently extended legal protection to same-sex cohabiting couples. They usually claim that such protection realizes the basic principles of the Brazilian constitutional order by extending legal protection to new forms of family arrangements.

In addition to the liberal position on questions regarding domestic cohabitation, the Brazilian courts have emphasized the importance of the judiciary in promoting social inclusion of same-sex couples. Brazilian same-sex union jurisprudence emerged after the end of the military dictatorship that ruled the country for more than twenty years. Resorting to the notions of formal and material equality—the former guaranteeing equal legal treatment and the latter granting access to social resources—gay and lesbian couples have consistently come before the courts to claim equal legal treatment. By prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, Brazilian courts have created a countervalance to the laws restricting spousal rights to opposite-sex couples. Several Brazilian courts have resorted to the argument that the Brazilian Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation to extend different categories of rights to same-sex partners. These decisions have significantly contributed

Prohibiting discrimination against sexual orientation, Brazilian courts are expanding the meanings of citizenship to effectively include gays and lesbians.

to the continuing transformation of their social status, an example of how the courts can expand the meanings of citizenship so as to include gays and lesbians. This judicial movement toward social inclusion of same-sex couples has begun to influence the legislative and executive powers, which have passed legislation and executive orders extending some categories of rights to same-sex couples.
It is possible to identify three distinct phases in the development of Brazilian same-sex union jurisprudence, each one establishing the basis for the achievement of new rights. The first phase began in 1989 with the first decisions deeming same-sex couples entitled to legal protection through the classification of same-sex unions as *de facto* partnerships. Originally created to regulate equal division of property among participants of non-registered business partnerships, this institution guarantees access to property rights to domestic cohabitants upon evidence of direct or indirect contribution to the construction of the common property. The Brazilian courts have resorted to this institution to solve problems arising from domestic cohabitation since the first decades of the twentieth century, a measure that was later applied to protect same-sex partners. Affirming that same-sex partners have legal obligations towards each other, the Brazilian courts have classified same-sex unions as *de facto* partnerships, an expedient that conferred on same-sex couples access to property rights. The Brazilian courts unanimously agree that same-sex unions can be classified as *de facto* partnerships because this institution guarantees same-sex couples access to a category of rights without deeming them to be spouses.

Representing an important turn in the history of Brazilian same-sex union jurisprudence, various courts started to recognize same-sex couples as family members as early as 1996, a process that granted a new degree of legal protection to many same-sex partners. The struggle for the inclusion of same-sex partners as beneficiaries of welfare benefits shifted the focus of Brazilian same-sex union jurisprudence from the access to property rights to the question of equal legal treatment of same-sex and opposite-sex unions. If the decisions classifying same-sex unions as *de facto* partnerships guaranteed a right to equal division of property, the decisions granting welfare benefits to same-sex partners increased the degree of legal protection to same-sex couples, recognizing them as family entities. Arguing that the Brazilian society needs to cope with the fact that same-sex couples form relationships which have the same characteristics as opposite-sex unions, several Brazilian courts have extended welfare benefits to gay and lesbian federal governmental employees on the grounds that the constitutional principles of formal and material equality require equal legal treatment of same-sex and different sex couples. Anticipating the developments of the next period of Brazilian same-sex union
Brazilian same-sex jurisprudence, some courts started to refer to same-sex de facto partnership as a form of legal status comparable to those ones regulating opposite-sex unions.

Legal recognition of same-sex unions as stable unions is the most important development in the history of Brazilian same-sex jurisprudence. Some courts began to classify same-sex unions as stable unions in 2001, a legal status that basically provides the same rights given to married couples in Brazil. The doctrine and the jurisprudence define stable union as a public, durable and stable intimate relationship between a man and a woman who, living together or in separate houses, intend to constitute a family without the formality of civil marriage. Several factors have compelled the Brazilian courts to classify same-sex unions as stable unions: the abandonment of the traditional legal formalism that has long characterized the Brazilian judicial system, the reference to progressive theories of legal hermeneutics that aims to achieve higher levels of social justice, the classification of homosexuality as a prohibited ground for discrimination, the adoption of a functionalist notion of family comprehended as a space of intimacy rather than a unity of biological reproduction, and the convergence of the principles that regulate domestic cohabitation jurisprudence with the notions of formal and material equality. Judicial recognition of same-sex unions as stable unions has granted same-sex partners access to many categories of spousal rights such as property rights, social security rights, inheritance rights, partner benefits, spousal support, joint adoption, and the right to permanent visas for foreign partners.

The number of decisions recognizing same-sex unions as stable unions has considerably increased over the last two years, but the Brazilian courts still strongly disagree as to whether same-sex couples can enter this institution. This controversy, which is the current battleground of same-sex union litigation in Brazil, derives from the constitutional definition of stable union as a union between a man and a woman. Some courts argue that the principle of equality commands the interpretation of all constitutional provisions, which justifies an expansive interpretation of the norm defining stable union. Other courts claim that the restriction of stable union to opposite-sex couples does not violate the principle of equality because this institution is legally and culturally defined as a heterosexual institution. Because these decisions do not directly determine the outcome of future cases, the possibility of legal recognition of same-sex unions as stable unions remains subject of considerable debate among the Brazilian courts.

Yet this legal controversy has not prevented some courts from increasing the degree of legal protection afforded to same-sex couples in Brazil. Representing another important strategy to guarantee equal legal treatment to same-sex couples, some Brazilian federal courts have classified same-sex unions as stable unions in a series of class action lawsuits that have granted same-sex partners spousal rights of great importance. Taking advantage of one form of lawsuit aimed at protecting minority rights, the Brazilian gay and lesbian community has sought increasing legal protection through the association of gay rights and diffuse rights. Diffuse rights are a category of rights to provide guarantees to a group of individuals dispersed within the political community who have common legal interests but are only circumstantially connected. The Brazilian courts have ruled that gay rights can be classified as diffuse rights because gays and lesbians constitute a group of people who have common legal interests but cannot be immediately identified because there are no legal bounds connecting them. Resorting to the constitutional principle that prescribes the pursuance of material equality among all social groups as a central principle of Brazilian constitutional order, the Brazilian courts have concluded that the classification of gay rights as diffuse rights is an important strategy to advance the well-being of this group of citizens. By successfully persuading the courts that gay rights belong to the category of diffuse rights, Brazilian same-sex couples have gained access to spousal rights of great importance such as social security rights, recognition of same-sex partners as next of kin, and rights against third parties. The federal agencies responsible for the administration of these benefits have issued new administrative rules complying with these judicial decisions, an ensemble of procedures representing the first form of normative regulation of same-sex unions in Brazil.

As the social resistance to legal recognition of same-sex unions increases in many parts of the world, Brazilian same-sex union jurisprudence provides viable solutions for foreign courts in countries where legal recognition of same-sex partnerships faces considerable social opposition. The Brazilian experience suggests that an incremental approach to this legal issue is an adequate strategy to avoid the backlash that has followed judicial decisions legalizing same-sex marriage in other parts of the world. Gradual extension of spousal rights to same-sex couples has permitted the Brazilian courts to maximize the possibilities of granting full marital status to same-sex couples, a process that directly contributes to the transformation of the social perception of same-sex unions. The growing number of superior court decisions favoring same-sex couples in the last six years suggests a possible unification of the jurisprudence to recognize same-sex unions as stable unions. A similar development resulted in the legal recognition of domestic cohabitation as a form of marital status in Brazil. Thus, such process can accelerate the enactement of legislation granting full equality to same-sex partners in Brazil.

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Ver the course of more than a century of existence, the favelas of Rio de Janeiro have been portrayed as the setting of an endless war, a constant conflict among conceptions of justice, legality, city, urban order and power. One only needs to glimpse the newspapers of a hundred years ago and those of today to observe a negative and fearful portrayal. Yet, the situation is slowly changing, and favela residents are involved in a myriad of projects to project their reality to others.

Dialogue between the residents of the favelas and “others” is not new, however, despite the daily violence. Channels of communication emerged even in the late nineteenth century. Dialogues and deals involved questionable authorities, corrupt public employees, sympathetic politicians, police “from the area,” and other personalities who from the early twentieth century began to populate the chronicle of the city. More specifically, the political games that mediated these forms of communication between the favela and its intermediaries eventually transformed its codes of visibility.

The favela and its residents are not immune to the urban violence exploding in many Brazilian cities, paralyzing us all with fear. Favela residents are its main victims, segregated by the absence of the state, their fundamental rights violated by the lack of basic urban services, such as sewage, water, schools, public transportation, urbanization and policing. Residents are subjected to prejudice, fed by a constant proliferation of images depicting them as dangerous second-class citizens. There is something specific about the kind of violence that affects how “favela,” morro and “favela communities” endure the most harmful and cruel forms of criminalization. This imagery results in death, physical torture and humiliation in that its residents are physically and morally affected. At the same time, it is reproduced with great efficiency through various forms of stigmatization, which is at times more cruel than the violence itself. The negative image of the favelado is expressed in the daily life of people when—in a scenario of sociabilities inscribed and differentiated by the geographic registry of Rio—they try to exercise the right to citizenship and welfare. Despite public and private projects involving community, local, and international activities, and the indirect presence of government, churches and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), favela residents are aware of the monstrous power of these images of violence and humiliation. Yet the context of Rio favelas has changed radically.

The Image of Favelas Displacing (and Recycling) the Sites of Invisibility
Community Residents Find a Voice

By Olivia Maria Gomes da Cunha
Over the last ten years, different initiatives, born of the confluence of social movements and their articulation under the rubric of NGOs in favela communities, have worked against these biased images and outright practices of discrimination. Residents and non-residents alike have mobilized, organized and engaged in several forms of activism to promote changes in the way in which the favelas are perceived and interpreted. In addition, the construction of websites as spaces for dissemination and networking have stimulated new forms of production, creation, language and mobilization among residents living in favelas. In this article, I will focus on some of these initiatives.

The proliferation of Rio-based projects over the past five years share the idea that all favelas possess a history in which residents are both subjects in the process of formation and participants in their reproduction. A large number of initiatives for the production and recuperation of the memory and history of favelas began in 2000. Networks of local organizations—community associations, community centers and schools—and external partners, local mediators and municipal, state and federal government institutions, international agencies, public intellectuals, and academic “volunteers” (primarily anthropologists, and to a lesser extent, historians) came together in this effort. As reflected in the diversity of partners, this basis already suggests a series of questions: under what circumstances did history become a focus of actions relevant and transformative, able to bring together such a diverse group of partners and constituencies? It is difficult to specify the exact chronology that can trace the formation of a network, and more or less systematic forms of connection, given the diversification and multiplication of these partnerships over the course of the past ten years.

Created as part of the Viva Favela site—sponsored by a group of NGOs, journalists, intellectuals, and agencies—the website Favela has Memory is an attempt to create a virtual and real community of producers of the histories of favelas. The project combines the work of university students who live in communities, and employs techniques of journalism, photo-journalism, history, oral history and ethnography in documenting the memory of community members. Despite the fact that the site is an initiative actually created outside of the favela, its content represents local community-based historiographical and journalistic culture. The website <www.favelatememoria.com.br> is subdivided into various sections—Gramaphone, Favelario, Speaking in Favela, Soup of Clouds, Photo Gallery, and Time Line aimed at making history “from a narrative perspective,” while using stylistic and technical support for the elaboration of text and also in the training of those who act as collectors and producers, the “community correspondents.”

This project began as a result of reflection on the externality of discourses and voices that have traditionally spoken on behalf of the favela. Participants launched a series of experiments aimed at confronting images of stigmatization while giving voice to local residents. This was a singular experience that sought, above all, to overcome symbolic and political barriers that implicitly or explicitly differentiated the various actors involved in the project—individuals and institutions from the city and residents of the favelas. Producers trained residents in the production of news, images, and local histories, developing so-called “community correspondents.” These correspondents were seeking news in a medium little known on the part of mass media and state institutions. For residents and those familiar with the social and symbolic space of the favela communities, these “correspondents” would be able to reproduce the voice of its residents on their own terms. At the same time, in taking the term “correspondents” from the language of journalism, the project was based on the idea that residents were
mediators authorized to enter as members rather than strangers in a feared territory. Even while edited by a team of professionals and specialists responsible for the training of “correspondents,” other local stories on the favela were constructed from the perspective of its residents. Histories produced based on interviews with the longest-standing residents revealed an intricate favela cartography constructed in parallel with the distancing of its residents from the formal city. However, in gathering information for a website devoted to presenting histories of the favela produced by residents based on interviews and archival research, the correspondents produced and recycled other stories about the city.

The texts, interviews and data collected by the “correspondents” were combined with other material—information about favelas principally found in the newspapers of the 1950s and 1960s. This kind of source also has an enormous importance in other projects and provides a visual memory of the historical construction of the marginalization of residents of the favelas. An example includes the Centro de Estudos e Ações Solidárias da Maré (CEASM), in the Maré favela complex, in sponsoring the collection of local histories and production of newspapers. A relevant part of the image archive is the result of a process of collection by university students resident in these communities who have helped develop the image archives under the supervision of social science professors. In the photos, perceptions on the part of the press and the elites, shocked at the growth and proximity of the favelas, led to the gradual stigmatization of the favela as something that should be removed from the city. In contrast to this perspective, students were trained to photograph the contemporary day-to-day life of the favelas, <www.imagensdopovo.org.br>. The photographs of houses built on sticks (palafitas), materials used in construction, as well as the use of metal, the remains of tapume (pieces of wood used in the construction of public buildings reutilized in the building of houses), and other leftovers from city construction sites are intermingled with personal stories about the daily experience of transformation of the physical space beyond its migrant origins, <www.ceasm.org.br>. The residents of the favela radically and continuously transform the physical spaces where they live. Still, “residence in the favela” is a continuation of other forms of organization and policies of deterriorialization carried out through removal—a constantly present form of violence.

Thus, if the history of struggle allows for the recognition over time of the legitimacy of presence in the favela, even if under precarious conditions, the history of removal gives authority to versions recreated around local ownership, based on spatial references. Thus, in trying to implode the negative signals of these historically produced strategies of subjectivity, some of the actors and their projects, contradiactorily, would be preserving and even giving force to their boundaries and features of difference based on a supposed common experience. In the current era of urban transformation of Rio, in which the favela and its members have become the focus and scene of publications, presentations, actions, symbolic forms of violence and policies of all kinds, the recognition of their history makes explicit a series of questions that should be objects of reflection.

Other websites Central Unica das Favelas (CUFA) and Favela News Agency (ANF), for example, evoke different forms of representation. Directly linked to social movements and, in particular to the Black movement and other cultural expressions such as the hip-hop movement, they reach out to other networks, mediators and forms of participation in the public debate. Acting as a broader network of communities organized in Rio favelas but linked politically to similar groups in diverse Brazilian states, the CUFA, for example, coordinates cultural movements involving hip-hop, sports, cinema, photography and political activism which interpret the favela as a symbolic territory. Rather than exclusively disseminating local interventions, their website coordinates the field of cultural production of youth who produce and consume hip-hop in the city. The
CUFA insists on its legitimacy in expressing the voice of marginalized groups without mediation. Explaining the choice of hip-hop, its organizers have affirmed that “the periphery is a figure that should speak for itself, have its own voice, and participate in cultural, political and social dialogue one-on-one with other social groups. The periphery is a majority treated by a minority. To dominate the discourse is part of our project of situating things in their true place” (see “Porque Hip Hop,” Central Única das Favelas, <http://www.cufa.com.br> Access: 20/5/05).

But these differences are not only stylistic, nor are they limited to institutional arrangements. The “authority” of their producers—residents of the favela—is highlighted to give legitimacy to the purposefully chaotic aspects of the site. Due to their specificities, these projects cannot be compared entirely on the same terms. I prefer to see them in their complementary dimension and in their possibility of suggesting a particular moment for the transformation of strategies for political mobilization in favela-based communities of Rio de Janeiro. By virtue of their importance in the realm of actions involving social movements, NGOs, and the state, these communities have attained significant visibility, which implies a measurable expansion in the networks of interaction which exist under and between the lines of the discourses that promote a polarized view of, literally, the favela versus the asphalt—that is, the paved areas of the city. These networks promote different ways of semanticallyizing the categories “favelado” and “favela resident.” By defending common memories, histories and pasts, these agents call for their rights to power and authority of the word, even if mediated, and at times “handled” by able writers. One of the specific objectives is to produce dialogue, and the coming together through symbolic leveling of citizenship in which a certain notion of history—that of the citizen who is aware, engaged and active, is a part.

The initiatives briefly described here reveal a tension, also present in the tales, testimonies and conversations about forms of engagement of members with these projects and their various “communities.” Who speaks, for what, and for whom are these stories about the favelas and their members told? By invading the virtual sphere of the Internet, favela communities and their mediators produce a kind of exhumation of ghosts present in the popular and violent imaginary of the city. They reinterpret and recycle its leftovers, fragments, and whatever else can still be reinterpreted. In this form, banners and pop-ups impode our capacity to read the images of the Internet as if they were simply words, “the sensitive territory of the favelas” (an expression coined by CUFA’s creators), populated by different actors and multiple interventions, transforming itself into a text that invades the web as a territory of expression.

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USING DANCE TO SET AND ACHIEVE GOALS IN A FAVELA

Less than three weeks into my year-long fellowship in Brazil, I wrote in my journal one morning: “The violence is intimidating and saddening... it’s quite debilitating and last night it led to a feeling of entrapment that was so powerful... I certainly understand why these kids yearn for a place to be free of fear, to be happy and loving, to be able to have faith... to not have to fiercely guard their vulnerability, their humanity.”

I was writing that morning about the kids of Espaço Aberto, a community group that teaches dance in the favela of Rocinha. Its population, estimated anywhere from 150,000 to 250,000, has earned it the popular title of the largest shantytown in Rio de Janeiro, and possibly all of Latin America. I was writing about children like Jeferson.

Jeferson is a reserved and handsome 17-year-old man; a talented capoeirista (a practitioner of a kind of Brazilian martial art) and dancer who has been with “Espaço Aberto” for a mere two years. Despite his short time with the group, his talent and dedication have earned him a small monthly stipend to take ballroom dance classes in the center of Rio.

Jeferson, who at one point dropped out of high school to help support his mother and four younger siblings, has now returned to school. He is determined to grow as a student, as he has grown as a dancer and as a young man. When I asked him why dance has made him a more focused student, Jeferson responded, “If I want to train hard to become a good dance teacher one day, then I should train to read and write well just like any teacher would.”

As with Jeferson, I have seen how dance has taught the other children of Espaço Aberto the value of goal-setting and determination. With two fully formed ballerinas and several small scholarships for dance academies outside of the favela, the students of Espaço Aberto have shown me the power of dance to develop impoverished youth into self-motivated and responsible citizens.

While such values of integrity and perseverance are important for the development of conscious and productive citizens anywhere, I find this to be especially true in Rocinha. In such a marginalized community, where poverty and the constant threat of violence limit children to their day-to-day survival needs, the power of dance to provide a future orientation for these children is invaluable.

I concluded my journal entry that morning with a small but sincere wish to not have to spend my time in Brazil on a guarded fellowship experience, restrained by the threat of violence. I wrote, “I hope I get to revel in my humanity... dance, smile, be free.” Indeed, the students and the teachers of Espaço Aberto have shown me that in creating a space for dance, they have created a limitless, “open space” for dreams, for happiness, and for the freedom to grow.

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In May 2006, a group known as the First Command of the Capital (the Primeiro Comando da Capital, or PCC from its initials in Portuguese) launched an organized campaign of revolts in 83 prisons and 274 attacks on police stations, fire departments, private schools, hospitals, the public prosecutors’ office, automatic teller machines, and city buses. In the first four days, the planned violence claimed the lives of 31 police officers, eight prison agents and four civilians. The wave of attacks caught the city by surprise (although authorities had some prior knowledge) and its lack of preparation showed. Thousands of terrified residents refused to leave their homes to go to work and school (in part, unable to do so because of the destruction and interference in public transportation); many others left early. São Paulo, South America’s greatest economic hub, nearly ground to a halt in the coming days, costing the city and the region tens of millions of dollars.

Embarrassed by their inability to provide security to its residents, a few days later, the São Paulo police responded in a highly suspect, though predictable fashion, given the institution’s long history of abuse. In the space of five days, police officers reportedly killed more than 100 civilians in armed confrontations. While much is disputed about these killings, what is certain is that in two weeks in May, there were 493 homicide victims in São Paulo, of which 43 were police officers. Those familiar with the 450 incidents involving civilian deaths (forensic experts who have reviewed the autopsy reports, rights groups, and public prosecutors) characterize many, if not most, as unjustified summary executions. A University of São Paulo research center placed the number of civilians killed by police in São Paulo in 2006 at 708, a 50 percent increase from the 2005 figure of 469. To provide a sense of the scale of this violence, in all of the United States, the number of civilians killed by police annually has not surpassed 400 since 1995.

What happened in May?

What happened in those tumultuous days in May 2006 in São Paulo? More importantly, what happened in the months and years preceding the May attacks that led to those events? How did a small group of detainees seeking to improve detention conditions morph into a massive, criminal organization able to hijack South America’s leading urban center? These questions are ones that should be on the top of the agenda for public authorities, academics and concerned citizens in São Paulo and Brazil, as well as those interested in Latin America, police, prisons, and gangs anywhere. Unfortunately, in Brazil, much of the debate has been dominated by responses driven more by interest in political gain than thoughtful public policy. Most of the proposed measures thus far have focused on aggressive approaches to crime suppression, increased sentences, more restrictive prison conditions, and reduced age of majority for criminal prosecution.

Despite this broad tendency to search for immediate, politically popular responses, some in Brazil have faced the more difficult set of questions raised above. In particular, a coalition of Brazilian scholars, research centers, rights groups, and civic organizations, working with researchers at Harvard Law School, has decided to tackle these controversial issues. The joint study (part of which has involved a team of ten students from Harvard Law School, including

**Understanding the São Paulo Attacks**

*Harvard Law researchers, in collaboration with Brazilian scholars and rights groups, work to unravel the May 2006 criminal attacks, the police response and the road forward*

**By James Louis Cavallaro and Raquel Ferreira Dodge**
two Brazilian prosecutors and coordinated by Cavallaro) considers the May attacks from the perspective of the São Paulo state police and prison system. While it addresses the growth of the PCC, its focus is on public policy. The study seeks to assess the state policies that permitted the growth of the PCC, as well as the structures and policies that have undermined the capacity to respond effectively to increasingly organized criminal violence. The research also hopes to identify strategies for effective control of rising crime consistent with democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights.

Animating the engagement of the Harvard researchers is the conviction that the May incidents and troubling state response, while unique in scale, are not unique in nature. In Rio de Janeiro, organized criminal groups engaged in similar attacks on police stations, banks and city buses in the last three days of December of 2006, causing 25 deaths. Looking beyond Brazil, signs of the potential for similar destabilizing attacks and brutal and ineffective state responses abound. The actions of organized criminal groups and gangs have increasingly provoked widespread fear and insecurity throughout Latin America. *Maras* in El Salvador and Honduras, hidden powers in Guatemala, *bandas* in Panama, and street crime in Paraguay, Venezuela and elsewhere in the region, for example, have all seized the headlines and dominated radio and television news and political debates. To a lesser extent, the failure of state responses has caused concern among the public, as well as policy makers who have tried a range of poorly developed and widely unsuccessful strategies (mostly involving highly visible police operations and harsher sentences).

In the past few years, the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program has been engaged in research projects in the area of gang violence and state responses in El Salvador, Honduras, Panama and Paraguay, as well as in Brazil. The focus of this work has been to document the phenomenon of rising crime and to identify methods of official response that are both effective and consistent with human rights and the rule of law. The research focus is driven by the Program’s concern with the role of crime and state response in the protection of human rights in the Americas and beyond. While much of the world has focused on religious-based extremism, the face of terror in Latin America—organized crime violence and abusive police—has been somewhat more mundane, though far more deadly in absolute terms. In Brazil alone, for example, ordinary street crime, much of it gang-related violence, claims the lives of tens of thousands per year. The number of civilians killed by police per year is nearly on the same order of magnitude. In addition to the 708 civilians killed by São Paulo police in 2006, police in Rio de Janeiro killed another 1,112 civilians. In January 2007 alone, perhaps in response to the late December attacks, Rio de Janeiro police killed 117 civilians, an increase of 77.3 percent compared to the same month the prior year. While figures for the rest of Brazil are less accurate, they are likely in the range of several thousand per year.

**THE PCC: BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT**

Although its first appearance on the national stage did not occur until 2001 (when it coordinated two dozen simultaneous prison riots), the PCC had been formed nearly a decade earlier by detainees in São Paulo state in 1993 with the knowledge—and without the opposition—of the prison authorities. The organization began as a response to the abysmal conditions of detention in São Paulo. Extreme overcrowding in dank, filthy prisons and rampant physical abuse were the norm in the state’s detention centers. Extreme incidents of police and prison guard abuse in São Paulo jails had traumatized detainees (and also shocked public opinion). The two most noteworthy incidents were the February 1989 death by beatings and asphyxiation of 18 prisoners in the 42nd Police District in São Paulo, and the 1992 massacre of 111 prisoners by police—mostly pre-trial detainees—at the House of Detention (*Casa de Detenção*) in Carandiru. The latter incident remains a central rallying cry for the PCC and detainees in São Paulo state in general.

The jail in which the PCC was formed was a particularly notorious center of abuse at the time, known as the Piranhão or “Big Piranha.” In this context, detainees formed the First Command of the Capital, or Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) to defend detainees against official abuse and to fight for better conditions and privileges, such as basic hygienic conditions, better food, television sets and other amenities. Over the years, the PCC has grown, while becoming more organized. It has extended beyond detention centers and into street crime, enforcing strict, internal rules with brutal punishments, including decapitations of enemies and those considered traitors. It has also established a strategy of helping the spouses, partners, and children of group members, paying their rent, supplying them food, and organizing free transportation for weekly visits to the prisons, thus cultivating sympathy and support for the group.

**PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSES: A SERIES OF FAILURES**

During the second half of the 1990s and the first half of this decade, the São Paulo state government took steps to address extreme overcrowding in the prison system by building prisons throughout the state and removing thousands of detainees from police lock ups and jails (generally, the centers with the most horrendous conditions). Yet the ambitious construction initiative failed to keep pace with the increasing inmate population, fueled in part by a judicial system that has continued to emphasize prison as the main solution for criminal infractions. Over the past decade, the prison population in the state has more than doubled: 62,278 in 1996 to 144,542 in 2006.

Similar failures have characterized efforts at police reform over the same period. While efforts to professionalize the police and respond to police violence marked public policy in the 1990s, in
the past several years, authorities have returned to approaches that have fostered police brutality. Not surprisingly, police corruption and brutality scandals have continued and perhaps intensified in recent years. State policy geared towards encouraging police to respond violently and without adequate safeguards was most transparent in the days after the initial PCC attacks in May in which police engaged in widespread killings of suspects.

At the same time, the research project considers the ways in which the strategies of the PCC have undermined effective responses by exploiting the state’s weaknesses. The research examines how PCC strategy contributed to the definition of ambiguous public policy, which at times repressed (targeting PCC leaders for restrictive conditions in detention) and at other times legitimized the group’s actions (permitting the group’s leaders to control benefits within prisons).

**MOVING FORWARD?**

Several legal reform measures have advanced in the Brazilian Congress. Our research examines the potential of these proposed legal reforms to defeat the powerful structure for funding and for communication that the PCC has established among its members and with other criminal groups to control the prison system and to commit crimes. The research also considers the need and potential for non-legal reform, such as measures to reform police practice and transform prison policies. Because it is an ongoing project, we cannot be certain about the final conclusions the study will reach. Yet we can say for certain that the capacity of state authorities to respond lawfully to the actions of the PCC and similar groups may well be the most important single challenge facing São Paulo—and Brazil—in the years ahead. We hope that our work with our Brazilian colleagues will help to advance understanding of policy developments likely to address the broader issue of citizen insecurity within a framework guided by the rule of law and human rights.

**James Louis Cavallaro**, Clinical Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School, has written extensively on issues of criminal justice and human rights, and is the founder and Vice President of the Centro de Justiça Global in Brazil. **Raquel Ferreira Dodge**, a former visiting fellow at the Human Rights Program and candidate for the LL.M. degree (’07), is a leading federal prosecutor in Brazil who has led successful investigations and prosecutions into organized crime.

**Gente que faz a paz** is a project that takes individuals from all sectors—students, janitors, community leaders, and church members—and teaches them that peace can be taught and implemented. My summer public service internship was actually with Viva Rio, a non-governmental non-profit organization (NGO) that actively tries to reduce the cultural, socio-economic, and political gaps between favelas and bairros (neighborhoods). However, since this large NGO is expanding, I became more specifically involved in the Gente que faz a paz project, a sub-division of the NGO that tries to create and inculcate a “culture of peace” in Brazilian society.

*Gente que faz a paz* (People Who Make Peace) is linked to and supported by Palas Athena, an organization that promotes the just and correct use of citizenship; UNIPAZ Brasilia, a university that teaches Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution; and UNESCO, the mother international organization that encourages international peace and universal respect. *Gente que faz a paz* is supported by Brazil’s federal government and some private donors, but it is also heavily assisted by foreign governments such as Denmark, England and Germany.

This project also places great emphasis on holistic learning and understanding of all of society’s problems and how the solutions must come about the same way, respectful and conscientious of everyone’s needs. Apart from socio-economic differences being outstanding markers of the need for change, this NGO tries to teach the importance of responsible behavior and reaction to problems in the environment, the political climate and even economic fluctuations. *Gente que faz a paz* also proudly supports Luta pela paz, a boxing program in the Mareaa favela that tries to get young kids out of the streets (one of which they have nicknamed the Gaza strip to indicate the level of violence) and into the boxing ring.

*Gente que faz a paz* actively believes that Brazilian society must disarm its mentality before it can become a more democratic and just society. Therefore, they distribute a plethora of material that deals with how past Nobel Peace Prize winners have handled their societal adversities and how lessons can be learned from all of those non-violent encounters. *Gente que faz a paz* is a very down-to-earth program that believes in the simple and clear message of peace as a starting point and solution to many of Brazil’s societal problems. These focos (community groups) that get

trained in peace studies are expanding not only all over Rio de Janeiro, but also in Bahia, Brasilia, and even São Paulo in the near future. After these peace agents graduate from these five-week seminars they are expected to teach and expand their peaceful techniques throughout their surroundings—the workplace, the classroom, or the streets.

Another positive factor of this program is its staff. Except for the executive director of the program, the other members of this group are all either past volunteers in the umbrella organization, Viva Rio, or current favelados. This background provides the project with a level-headed approach to its goals and aspirations. I also did a lot of learning and reading of sociological works about Brazilian youth and their needs in my spare time and with staff guidance. *Gente que faz a paz* was a great experience and I hope many others get to emulate it to a certain extent. I truly exhort all to learn more about Brazil and for all those that can, to continue supporting research and internships in this beauty and contradiction of a country.

**Odeviz Soto** ’07 received a DRCLAS summer internship to Brazil. He hopes to “learn more about the fascinating Brazilian nation.”
The definition of Brazil as a racial democracy has been contested for decades. Yet, few people would predict that by 2007 more than thirty Brazilian public universities—the most prestigious in the country—would have implemented the most radical form of affirmative action—quotas—to address racial gaps in higher education enrollment.

Since race-targeted affirmative action emerged in Brazil, many debates have emerged. Two 2006 manifestos for and against racial quotas highlight the arguments.

Since the end of slavery in 1888, all state policies have been formally color-blind—Brazil never had anything equivalent to either South African apartheid or U.S. Jim Crow segregation. Furthermore, the Brazilian educational system has never formally used race as a criterion of exclusion. Certainly, discrimination does exist, although the belief in racial democracy has been prevalent in popular culture and some academic works.

Despite differences in formal policies, Brazil is similar to the United States and South Africa in that blacks are overrepresented among the less privileged groups in society and underrepresented in professional occupations and in higher education. This has been the main argument to push forward the implementation of race-based affirmative action policies. Since the end of military rule and the return to democracy,
affirmative action policies in the form of quotas have been constitutional. Quotas for racial and ethnic minorities, women, and the handicapped have been implemented in the public service sectors (Piovesan 2006). In the United Nations Third Conference against Racism and Discrimination in 2001 in Durban, South Africa, Brazilian black movement advocacy groups denounced the existence of racial discrimination in Brazil. The conference, widely publicized in the media, served as a catalyst for universities to implement racial quotas. The formal legality of quotas, however, has not hindered a heated public debate on the legitimacy of quotas and other racially targeted policies. The two manifestos published in 2006 illustrate the main arguments that have emerged in the past four years since quotas were first implemented.

The first manifesto—the one against the quotas—was published on June 30, 2006. It is short, very well written, and signed by a small group of prominent artists, scholars and public intellectuals. It presented three main arguments to reject the implementation of quotas and other race-conscious policies in Brazil. First, Brazil is a Republic that had not relied on race classification for any social policy since the end of slavery. Second, exclusion of blacks from university education is not a problem of race discrimination—since the criterion for university access has always been color blind—but a problem of socioeconomic inequality and low-quality public education. Third, using race as a criteria for distribution of resources will intensify racial antagonism in Brazil.

These arguments are not unique to Brazil—similar arguments are used in the United States to reject affirmative action policies, and the imagery of Republic is used to reject any type of racially or ethnically targeted policies in France. However, unlike citizens of these other countries, Brazilians are more willing to accept the idea of racial and socioeconomic inequality.
ties as structural problems of one of the most unequal countries in the world. A recent survey of Brazilian elites shows that they view poverty, inequality and low educational levels as the most important threats to Brazilian democracy (Reis and Moore, 2005). This same survey, however, showed that these elites are against any type of affirmative action for women or ethnic groups, arguing that this would be discriminatory against white males. Instead, they support universal policies of education and land reform. They insist that race is a subproduct of class. As defined in the manifesto—written mostly by members of these elites—acknowledging racial categories in public policies would mean giving up on racial democracy as an ideal, “allowing the strengthening of racial conflict and intolerance.” Ironically, the manifesto against affirmative action argues that diversity should be supported as “one lively and integrating process of humanity.” Diversity here is understood not in the U.S. sense—as an acknowledgment of the unique perspectives and contributions brought by people from different backgrounds—but rather as a process of assimilation into the spirit of the Republic. The U.S. version of the diversity concept is seen as a threat, because it questions the homogeneous Brazilian national identity as a “mixed country.” Accordingly, Brazil’s blurred racial boundaries are perceived as a great asset that is to be preserved. Or as put by Guimarães (2007), the authors of this manifesto argue that it is acknowledging racial diversity that creates racism.

The second manifesto, published on July 5, 2006, came as a reaction to the first document and as a defense of racial quotas and affirmative action policies. It is much longer and unfocused. It was signed by more than 200 people—many of whom are black activists—but also by intellectuals and artists. The manifesto starts by differentiating between formal and substantive equality, arguing that to achieve the latter, affirmative action is necessary to overcome the history of slavery and selective immigration. Most of the text, however, addresses the need to acknowledge the existence of racial inequalities in schooling, employment and income—providing references and data on the racial gaps in these areas. The goal of the manifesto is to respond to the class-race distinction arguments of the previous document and to stress the racial hierarchies in Brazilian society. Here racism creates race, instead of the other way around. However, when the manifesto goes on to justify the need for affirmative action, it focuses on the universalistic need of social inclusion—coming closer to the Republican argument. In other words, if blacks should be targeted because they are poorer than whites, there is an acknowledgement that poor whites should also benefit from affirmative action policies.

In the second manifesto, traditional race-based arguments like diversity and slavery redress are not central as justifications for affirmative action. Diversity is rejected based on a belief in assimilation combined with weak cultural boundaries between racial groups in Brazil—the word diversity does not even appear in the manifesto favoring quotas. Slavery redress arguments appear in the formal justifications for affirmative action, but are rejected as a criterion for selection of beneficiaries due to the difficulty in identifying who are actually descendants of slaves. For example, in a survey of Rio de Janeiro, approximately 70 percent of all respondents claimed to have some “African descent.” In the same survey, 37 percent of whites claimed to have black ancestors, while 80 percent of browns and 59 percent of blacks claimed on a redress for slavery argument can be problematic: can people with white skin be included if they can prove their ancestors were slaves?

The use of socioeconomic inclusion as the goal of affirmative action policies has had strong consequences in the policy implementation and public debate. This use of socioeconomic inclusion as the goal of affirmative action policies has had strong consequences in the policy implementation and public debate. In sum, race in Brazil is defined by the color of skin, not by hypodescent laws (i.e. by having a certain percentage of black ancestors). Therefore, deciding who should benefit from race-targeted policies based

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The use of socioeconomic inclusion as the goal of affirmative action policies has had strong consequences in the policy implementation and public debate. There is a trend in Brazil’s affirmative action policies to place a higher degree of emphasis on income or “social class” instead of (or in addition to) race. For example, the state universities of Rio de Janeiro have created a 50 percent quota for students from low socioeconomic backgrounds. Race appears as an additional criterion: within the social quota, 40 percent of the selected students have to be black. This has been the model recently approved in the Brazilian Lower House of Congress and, if approved by the Brazilian Senate, will become mandatory for all federal universities in the country.

The two universities that have insisted on purely racial categories—using pictures in addition to self-identification—have
been strongly condemned. The focus on socioeconomics supports the perspective that race and class go hand in hand and cannot be dealt with separately. In addition, joining these two criteria created strong support for affirmative action policies. Surveys show that support for quotas in universities and jobs has increased from 49.9 percent in 1995 to 66.5 percent in 2005. Even among the university educated, initially the most resistant group in the country, the support went from 19.6 percent in 1995 to 43.5 percent (Datafolha Institute).

However, joining race and class as almost similar categories can have serious consequences for collective action. It was organization around a racial agenda that first pushed for quotas in universities, pointing out to the strength of mobilization around race. Furthermore, if socioeconomic inclusion is the goal, what happens to the black lower middle class? Should poor whites be benefited over working class blacks? What are the possible benefits of race-based collective organization? What about discrimination against black professionals? These are questions that have been largely ignored in the Brazilian debate. The Republican assimilationist principles consider the organization around race as illegitimate suggesting that race created racism and not vice versa. As such, other types of criteria emerge in conjunction with or as a substitute for race in affirmative action policies.

In sum, affirmative action debates have been encouraged by the black movement, and have triggered a strong debate on racial inequalities in Brazil. Overall, it is safe to say that whatever the developments of affirmative action policies are, they have already served the purpose of challenging the color-blind perception of Brazilian social structure. More recently, there has been a move away from race-based policies towards more universalistic policies focusing on socioeconomic status. The socioeconomic justifications conflated the problems of the black population with the problems of a large contingent of the white poor, creating stronger support for the policies. However, one needs to acknowledge not only the existence of racial inequalities, but also the contemporary mechanisms of racial exclusion. Only when Brazilians understand these mechanisms—that are very different from mechanisms in other racialized societies and different from mechanisms of socioeconomic exclusion—will we be able to design effective policies to address racial inequalities.

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Skin Color and Educational Exclusion in Brazil

Affirmative-action programs in Brazilian higher education

BY PAULO SERGIO DA SILVA

Worldwide, the black population in Brazil is second only to that in Nigeria. Brazil’s black citizens account for the largest number of people of the African Diaspora in the Americas. Historically, both within and outside its borders, Brazil has been described as a racial democracy, a society that avoided the state-sponsored segregation of South Africa and the U.S. South and where “miscigenação” among blacks, whites, and all other racial categories is highly celebrated. Yet, racial stratification does exist and the white population occupies a superior position. Blacks (pretos and pardos), on the other hand, have lived under a cumulative cycle of disadvantages, proving the country to be confronted with discriminatory and racist practices based on an individual’s race or skin color. In 2001, right after the Durban Conference on Racism and Xenophobia, the government officially acknowledged that there is racism in Brazil, making it clear that the concept of “racial democracy” does not reflect Brazilian reality. As a result, a form of affirmative action—quotas—was endorsed to address racial inequalities. Government sponsored programs were created, along with the implementation of quotas in various Ministries and a few public universities.

The pressure to implement affirmative action has stemmed from some sectors that have become increasingly aware of Brazil’s racial inequalities: the black movements, the academic community in the public universities, a few lonely voices within the leftist and center-leftist political parties, all of which stirred some polarizing views among public opinion. These sectors argue that the ideology promoted by Gilberto Freyre, who characterized racial relations in Brazil as democratic, has collapsed, and that a social reform focused on multiculturalism is indispensable in the modernization process of the Brazilian society.

In 2005, I began to collect data to examine the process of implementation of affirmative action through the quota system in three Brazilian public universities: Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), the Universidade de Brasília (UnB) and Universidade do Estado da Bahia (UEBA). These universities reflect a broader concern with affirmative action policies that seek to achieve equality of educational opportunity in higher education. The three universities have been mobilizing different groups, social movements and non-governmental organizations based in Brazil and abroad, with the explicit support of the Brazilian government.

My main goal was to examine how the implementation of a system of quotas for Afro-descendants in the public system of higher education in Brazil could bring about changes in the way Brazilians deal with concepts such as social inclusion, reparations, diversity and “race” identity. My study focused on how the universities view the process of determining racial identity through a skin-color categorization in the admissions process.

These three universities are among the first public institutions of higher education to adopt a form of affirmative action—quotas—for blacks in Brazil. In each case, proponents of affirmative action have highlighted that without race-sensitive policies it would be impossible to ensure a diverse student body. With that in mind, each one of these institutions created its own formula to guarantee the presence of minorities on their highly selective campuses.

I decided to focus on these three particular universities because of their very distinct profiles regarding the adoption of quotas and ways of proposing solutions for the problem of racial categorization. UERJ and UnB have encountered much publicity and controversy as well. The self-identification policy at UERJ paved the way to a series of frauds, detected when a great number of students applying to its programs claimed to be black when the university said they actually were not. The University of Brasília has decided to take pictures of candidates who wanted to be included in the quota, establishing a panel of “specialists” to decide who could be considered black. The Universidade do Estado da Bahia (UNEB) has adopted quotas only for students from public schools, following both a “class-based” criteria and the system of self-identification. With a very unique set of characteristics, the state of Bahia is the only one in Brazil where three fourths of the population is black. Quotas have been established at 40 percent and have left many wondering whether such a policy represents a measure for inclusion or exclusion for its population. The fact is that the institutional and regional variation between these universities might have consequences for the definition of who is “white” and who is “black.”

The National Debate over Quotas

In Brazil, the debate about affirmative action has been reduced to a debate about quotas...
and this has provoked lively exchanges in society and in the press. Quotas are said to be impossible to implement because of the difficulty of identifying who is black in Brazil. The deep cleavages in the aftermath of the adoption of quotas for Afro-descents in Brazil exposed a reality in which divergent viewpoints and perspectives surrounding policies that aimed at fostering equality of educational opportunity for the “disadvantaged.” Students provoked some heated debates on issues of access, equality, equity, exclusion, racism, discrimination, and the legitimacy of any form of race-based policy in the country. By challenging the foundation of Brazilian national identity that Edward Telles described as the one that sees Brazilians as one mixed people and where all different cultures and “races” have all contributed to the formation of the country, the quota system in higher education forced people to recognize differences in race and ethnicity and made the policy even more contentious.

Part of the reason behind this is that both proponents and opponents of affirmative action use the concepts of fairness and justice to defend their arguments, which makes it difficult to find a consensus. From higher education admissions to employment practices, affirmative action has the potential to affect everyone. Since its inception, affirmative action has been a widely debated topic. Throughout society, people have discussed the question of whether or not the policy fairly addresses inequalities that minorities may face. On one side are affirmative action supporters who argue that the policy should be maintained because it addresses discrimination in an equitable manner. On the other side, affirmative action opponents contend that it disproportionately considers minority interests over the majority. This controversy over affirmative action embodies the on-going difficulty of addressing racial inequality.

Elected officials have attempted to legislate the issue by passing constitutional amendments and laws. Brazilian lawmakers took action on the problem of racial prejudice for the first time after the United Nations Conference in Durban, South Africa, in 2001. Despite the government’s support of affirmative action in federal agencies and higher education, many questions continued to surround the issue, such as: does the policy provide an unfair advantage for minorities? Is affirmative action an important policy that helps close the economic gap between whites and blacks? In seeking answers to such vital questions I have observed that it would likely depend on whether or not one supports affirmative action. In general, arguments from the left tend to defend the use of affirmative action in higher education while those from the right argue against the policy. By looking at arguments from the left and the right, one can see why affirmative action in higher education remains such a divisive policy.

Borrowing from a functionalist point of view, opponents to affirmative action argue that selection of individuals in higher education should be based on merit and talent. This view is aligned with a functionalist stance that believes that certain needs in society can only be served by the special talents of a relatively few people. Supporters of affirmative action, on the other hand, assert that unequal social and economic conditions play an important and decisive role in inhibiting minority students’ access to higher education.

The latter view aligns with the conflict theorists’ belief that schools serve the dominant privileged class by providing for the social reproduction of the economic and political status quo in a way that gives the illusion of opportunity. Moreover, schools contribute to the continuation of the system of domination by the privileged class.

Afro-Brazilians are faced with a series of complex problems. Statistics show that blacks and browns comprise the majority of those who are at the bottom of the socio-economic scale. Poverty and racial concentration are mutually reinforcing and cumulative, leading directly to the creation of underclass communities typified by high rates of educational failure, among other factors. Essentially, this type of social condition creates a vicious cycle that makes it difficult to escape (Henales and Edwards, 2000). This disproportionate reality provides evidence to affirmative action advocates that social and economic conditions are the equivalent to racial inequality because the differences in opportunities are divided by race. Supporters who use this argument advocate that affirmative action in higher education is needed to increase educational opportunities so that minorities have the ability to improve their social and economic conditions.
The dynamics of race in Brazil

An analysis of issues of race and ethnicity in Brazil demonstrates very strongly that ethnic identity is a social construction that differs from context to context. As we agree that racial and ethnic identities are considered a resource of power, some scholars have shown that depending on specific circumstances, people tend to mobilize certain social identities because they might deem them more rewarding (Sansone, 2003). The main color line in Brazil has always been between whites and non-whites. According to the 2000 census, the population in Brazil is divided among blacks, browns and whites (6.2 percent, 38.4 percent, and 53.7 percent, respectively) based on color or race self-classification. The distribution among these groups has changed through time due to high rates of miscegenation and intermarriage or simply by change in self-classification, making racial boundaries much more blurred than those of countries like the United States or South Africa. Since the end of slavery in 1888, all state policies have been color-blind – Brazil never had any equivalent to apartheid or Jim Crow segregation – and educational systems have never used race as a criterion of exclusion. Certainly, discrimination does exist, although the “myth of racial democracy” can be prevalent in popular culture and some academic works. Blacks in Brazil are overrepresented among the less privileged groups in society and underrepresented in professional occupations and in higher education.

In most Brazilian racial relation studies blacks (pretos) and browns (pardos) are joined and classified as blacks (negros). This is justified by the similar socioeconomic characteristics of these two groups, especially when compared to whites. In addition, there are small numbers of indigenous groups and Asians in Brazil, which together represent less than one percent of the population. Although they are not discussed in this article, it is important to note that indigenous groups are included in racial quotas in certain states.

Hopefully, the discussion over quotas regarding race, ethnicity, and skin color in Brazil will be a never-ending story. Through this debate we gain a deeper understanding about the impact of race in Brazilian citizens’ conceptualization of their own identity and their level of engagement in the affirmative action process, as well as their expectations regarding the role of the state in guaranteeing social equality through education. We are also able to assess how individuals and institutions of higher education isolate the number of different identities and the diverse notions of ethnicity and race that exist in Brazil for the purpose of entering the university.

Historically, although the university system has never officially excluded blacks, general access to higher education has always been highly elitist. In the past decade, the higher education system has expanded through the private system, keeping the prestigious public universities (free of tuition, federal and state institutions) very selective and elitist. Ironically, even with the lack of a segregated system (or the inexistence of historically black universities), the underrepresentation of black university graduates is higher in Brazil than in countries like the United States and South Africa. This has been the main argument for pushing race-targeted affirmative action in Brazilian public universities.

These new race-based policies in the country have emphasized a new understanding of how race and ethnicity are constructed and they go to the core of a discussion that revolves around the question of being “black” in Brazil.

Paulo Sergio Da Silva is a doctoral candidate in the International Education Development program at Teachers College, Columbia University, where he came as a Fulbright fellow. With a grant by the Institute of Latin America Studies at SIPA he started collecting data and examining the process of implementation of quotas and its consequences regarding granting access and guaranteeing permanence of Afro-Brazilians in the country’s public colleges and universities. He is part of the committee and an active member of the Association of Latin American Scholars (ALAS), a student organization at Teachers College.
I remember walking into the room for my last interview for the scholarship from Fundação Estudar. As soon as the other five candidates and I found our assigned seats, we realized that our interviewers were among some of the most prominent business leaders in Brazil: Jorge Paulo Lemann, Carlos Alberto Sicupira, and Marcel Telles. There was nothing about that last round that made us feel comfortable, even after having grown accustomed to the rigorous three-month-long selection process. I felt particularly different from the exclusively MBA and LLM candidates—I was going to study International Education Policy. I wondered what motivated these executives to give up their valuable working hours to meet us and choose who they believed would be the most qualified individuals for the graduate scholarship and to be part of the Fundação Estudar network. As they shot off questions, tensions slowly eased. I understood immediately how important it was for them to be there. They were in fact devoting time to select potentially some of the future leaders of several sectors of the economy in Brazil. They would give the opportunity to study at the most prominent institutions in the world to those who, besides having displayed academic and professional success, were committed to returning to Brazil and making positive contributions. After being selected, for me that day meant that they were investing in someone who had the desire to improve the education system in Brazil. I understood, then and there, that funding university students is one of the means the private sector has to contribute to education.

Why should we care about education? Simply put, education is the resource that drives our knowledge-based society. The ability of individuals and nations to create wealth is positively related to the quality of the education available. Therefore, generating human capital is key to fostering economic growth in any nation. It should be an absolute priority considering the competition among developing countries.

We have already reached high levels of attendance in primary schools in Brazil: approximately 97 percent of children are enrolled. The greatest challenge now lies in improving the quality of education in these schools. While it is quite easy to recommend spending more public funds, it is harder to ensure that extra funding will indeed generate systemic results. I believe that the misallocation of funds for primary education, the lack of evaluative measures with which to hold schools accountable, and inefficient school management are the main obstacles to attaining high quality education. The private sector could be instrumental in reshaping the education system by bringing in managerial expertise.

After spending this last semester studying the education systems of developing countries under some brilliant educators, such as Fernando Reimers, I understand that to really improve the quality of education Brazil needs an entirely different system. Instead of fiddling with what we currently have, we need a dramatic shift in the way schools are organized—which is where the private sector comes into play. Education entrepreneurs could respond to the demand by creating more accomplished private education systems than those of the public sector, and at the same time, at a lower cost for students.

Thus, I propose that the primary and secondary public school system be progressively outsourced to the private sector. Allowing for the existence of private schools and giving school vouchers to parents are examples of policies that encourage freedom of choice, thereby enhancing competition in the education market. Giving families the option to choose schools will drive innovation, improve academic quality, and increase managerial efficiency, as exemplified by the charter school model in the United States. Charter schools are nonsectarian public schools run by private organizations. They are given full auton-
Governments should encourage policies that make it attractive for the private sector to participate actively in education with public-private partnerships.

The private sector is also very capable of promoting social and business networking. That is yet another fantastic opportunity provided by Fundação Estudar: the network of people from different professional fields that come together to share and trade information. By keeping track of its members throughout the years, they can see which kinds of workshops and career development plans are necessary in order to help us succeed. Schools could do the same. By following the careers of their graduates, school managers and teachers can use that information to shape curriculum planning. The idea of alumni networks is still incipient in Brazil.

After my acceptance into the Masters program, I was advised by the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies to apply to a newly established scholarship made possible through the generous donation of Jorge Paulo Lemann, an alumnus of the college. The Lemann Fellows were either Brazilians or students interested in studying Brazil. However, the most important aspect of this scholarship was that it would be exclusively for those pursuing public service careers at the Graduate School of Education, the School of Public Health, or the Kennedy School of Government. This marked a big change in the perception of which careers should be valued and encouraged in Brazil. Instead of focusing solely on business and law, the Lemann Scholarship now gives an opportunity to people who would otherwise not even contemplate studying at a university like Harvard for lack of financial resources, in careers that would formerly be considered as less important to the development of a nation.

Governments should encourage policies that make it attractive for the private sector to participate actively in education. They could do so by creating innovative and financially viable projects to improve the quality of education in Brazil. Through public-private partnerships it is possible to structure sustainable business models for the establishment of new schools and universities, as well as to efficiently redesign malfunctioning institutions. In this new system, we would be able to promote affordable access to education, use technology in creative ways to reduce costs, institutionalize the professional management of funds and resources, and develop inventive global partnerships to offer local education solutions.

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They live in one of the greatest natural resources on earth, surrounded by immense and powerful rivers. In Amazônia, it is the rivers that determine if you get to school or to the doctor. Boat trips take at least six hours here—and that is if no storms come crashing down. “This is what it’s like being young in our community...we don’t know what young people are like in other places...I think that they want to meet us and we want to meet them, too,” says Rivaldo, age 24. Just like Rivaldo, 450 young people ages 14 to 25, from 31 riverside communities in Amazônia, want to reach out to other young people and participate in national life in Brazil. Together, they formed the Rede Mocoronga de Comunicação (Mocorongo Communication Network), organized through rural branches and community telecenters. Through small community radio stations, handwritten newspapers and television programs, youth reporters trade information about local culture, spread educational campaigns, and publish their news. While no one seeks them out to ask about their dreams and interests, they themselves are the journalists and radio operators who step up to let the world know who they are.

ECONOMY AND SOLIDARITY

The price increase for flour almost ruined the Cooperativa Popular de Pães (People’s Bread Cooperative), created by the community of Engomadeira, a poor neighborhood of Salvador with high rates of malnutrition and unemployment. Against this backdrop of social exclusion, a new sort of economy is emerging: one of solidarity.

In the richer part of town, at the Universidade Federal of Bahia, a few students frustrated with the management program decide to act. They are, on average, 22-years-old and immensely determined to work for better society. “It’s a management course on capitalist and market-driven companies,” some students complained. Others asked: “I’m going to graduate from college...and then what? I don’t want to lead a life that won’t change the reality of how we live.” These young people banded together with professors and technical specialists to create a small organization that provides credit to collective enterprises that are excluded from traditional microcredit initiatives. Through efforts to rescue economic solidarity, Bansol, a credit bank, was born.

In a economy of solidarity, the supply of products and services is tied exclusively to the real demands of a community. The aim is not return on investment, but rather to attend to basic needs, generate income and solve social problems.

The credit bank saved the bread coop, and the technical support for its production, commercialization and finances stimulated growth. “If not for the meetings with Bansol, we wouldn’t have survived.”
BRAZIL

says one member of the co-operative. The Universidade Federal da Bahia recognized the work Bansol was doing and incorporated its activities in the School of Management’s curriculum. Beyond simply giving loans to social enterprises, the young people of Bansol expand their understanding of how the economy can reduce social inequality.

THE REAL STORY IS IN THE BOOKS

Far from the schools, libraries and open spaces for sports and leisure lays “Cidade Tiradentes,” a neighborhood of 190,000 inhabitants on the outskirts of metropolitan São Paulo that coexists with violence, drugs and a lack of social investment. Experiences here serve as the raw material for rap verses by the youth of the Núcleo Cultural Força Ativa (Cultural Nucleus for Action). The young men and women in this group range from 20 to 29 years old and suffer daily from the consequences of social inequality. It is through books that they learn to recognize their true identity and to understand their power to create change. Força Ativa is a youth organization that works to promote Afro-Brazilian and political awareness, using rap music and other forms of hip-hop to increase public awareness of the causes and effects of social exclusion and to drive action in response.

In Brazil, only one out of every four people is fully literate and can knowledgeably compare passages from books, according to the 2003 National Functional Literacy Indicator. Providing access to books and increasing the number of readers are national challenges. In 2001, Força Ativa founded Solano Trindade, a community library. Since then, the collection has grown to more than 6,000 books, with 4,000 total readers and 30 active visitors per day. Users of the library are children, teenagers and adult men and women who come to find books on politics, national and foreign literature, sexuality and human rights. “I want people to see themselves in the stories they are reading, to be able to relate their own experiences to what’s on the pages,” says Fernanda, 27, a Força group member who runs the library. More than simply managing a community library and granting access to books, Força Ativa spreads knowledge and serves as a wind of change throughout Cidade Tiradentes.

I’M A RURAL YOUTH, I’M A BRAZILIAN

For the young people who live in semi-arid Brazil, the main worry is unemployment. In Bahia, child laborers are used for the production of sisal, a fiber used as raw material for handicrafts. They earn minimum wage (less than US$200 monthly) while the fiber trader pockets 85 percent of the retail price. Almost six million Brazilian youths between ages 15 and 24 live in rural areas, 1.8 million in extreme poverty and 650,000 moving to cities from rural areas (IBGE, 2000 census). The youth of the semi-arid Brazil don't want to leave their land for the cities. “Our [My] fight is to keep from leaving because I can’t live off of my land. We want to get classes that will improve the quality of our work so that we can sell our products to other communities ourselves,” says Maria Luiza do Carmo. Along with 600 youths from 22 towns, she attends a monthly meeting in the offices of the Projeto Juventude e Participação Social (Youth Project and Social Participation). Working with rural trade unions and municipal youth collectives, they forge partnerships with social entities and the government to create public policy courses, community radio stations and other initiatives.

Quality education is tremendously important. Only 1.56 percent of college students Brazil are rural youths. A few collectives in the region have grown and become associations, ensuring improvements in the lives of the young in semi-arid Brazil. In some towns, there is a provision in the law calling for the creation of Municipal Youth Councils. Besides fighting for basic human rights, the youth that make up these councils are forming their own political identity and showing society that it should make youth a priority.

WITHOUT PARTICIPATION THERE IS NO DEMOCRACY

These stories are real. The main characters are teenagers who live in one of the
most unequal countries on earth, Brazil. Victims of social exclusion, they number 34 million, between 15 and 24 years old. Half are men, half are women; half are white, half are blacks, mulattos, or indigenous people. A full 84 percent live in urban areas, and only 16 percent in rural areas; 12 percent live with families whose per capita income is one-fourth of the minimum wage; 14 percent don’t study, work, or search for employment; and almost half of the unemployed in the country are youth.

Nonetheless, 92 percent of Brazilian youth believe that their life will improve in the next few years, and close to 74 percent think that the good things about being young outnumber the bad. The previous stories speak to the mature fruits of Brazil, of young entrepreneurs that believe that participation is a way of life in a democracy, of youths with a positive view of themselves and a positive outlook for their lives.

Together, they form a group of 700,000 youth who actively participate in community and social initiatives, while seven million would like to help their communities in some way. These youth understand and incorporate the importance of community in their lives and know that development stems from everyone’s involvement. Ethics, solidarity and citizenship are values that they practice each day. And they are not afraid to innovate. To the contrary, they know that the way to solve old problems is by exploring new directions.

In a democracy, two forces should exist: dignity and participation. Balance between the promotion of dignity and participation in public policy indicates a mature democratic society. Nevertheless, a recent study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) shows that Brazilians have little trust in democracy. Of the 18 countries surveyed, Brazil placed 15th for public support for democratic principles. In this study, 54 percent of those interviewed said they would support an authoritarian government if it meant the resolution of Brazil’s economic problems.

**WINDS OF CHANGE**

Aracati is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to contribute to the development of a culture of participation among Brazilian youth. Since 2001, it has developed projects related to education, enabling youth to join in social participation, political expression and informing public policies for youth.

In 2004, Aracati invited youth groups to submit stories on their experiences of community involvement. Of the 140 stories sent in from across the country, Aracati selected eight, four told briefly in the above article. These experiences are included in the book *Frutos do Brasil—Histórias de Mobilização Juvenil* (*Fruits of Brazil – Stories of Youth Mobilization*), written by renowned Brazilian journalist Neide Duarte. Duarte also directed a documentary film, which will be released in 2007, about these experiences.

The experiences of these young fruits of Brazil point to alternative ways to live in a democratic society. Their projects incorporate partnerships from different sectors, build consensus, and above all, support active participation as a means to improve the quality of their lives and the assurance of their rights. For Brazil to address the social debt of its youth, it is of fundamental importance for the country to recognize that its youth also holds the power to make the necessary changes.

**Luciana Martinelli** is the Founding Director of Aracati—Agência de Mobilização Social (Social Mobilization Agency); she is an Ashoka Fellow and a delegate of the Inter-American Development Bank’s Youth Network.

**Tatiana Achcar**, a graduate of the Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, is a journalist who works at the crossroads of education and communication. She is Communications Coordinator for Aracati.

*Frutos do Brasil—Histórias de Mobilização Juvenil* (*Fruits of Brazil – Stories of Youth Mobilization*) and additional information about Aracati can be found at <www.aracati.org.br>.
Since our founding in mid-2006, the Brazil Studies Program at Harvard’s David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies (DRCLAS) and the University’s Brazil Office have worked hand-in-hand with the goal of enhancing collaborative research and learning among Harvard faculty and students and their Brazilian counterparts. While our journey has just begun, the conditions for true two-way Harvard-Brazil collaborations have significantly improved over the past year.

From a historic perspective, expanding the international horizons of students and professors while they are at Harvard has climbed the list of institutional priorities relatively recently. Areas studies centers, aimed largely at increasing teaching and learning opportunities at the University, have emerged over the past fifty years, working to increase the knowledge of and exposure to foreign cultures at Harvard.

DRCLAS is the most recent of Harvard’s area studies centers, founded in 1994. Opportunities for two-way international collaborations that recognize important cultural and contextual differences have recently received a further boost through the establishment of a handful of Harvard international offices. In this important area, Brazil (and Latin America as a whole) has been transformed from laggard to leader. Three of the University’s international offices are located in the region: the Harvard Business School’s Latin America Resource Center in Argentina (established in 2000), the DRCLAS Regional Office in Chile (2002) and the recently-launched Brazil Office, which was established through the generous support of Jorge Paulo Lemann in June 2006 to serve the University across disciplines and throughout the country.

Harvard’s Brazil Studies Program and Brazil Office are best viewed as one integrated entity that is made up of interdependent centers. It has been a pleasure to work with them as the Harvard-Brazil collaboration has evolved.
The dynamic Brazil Studies Program in Cambridge and the new Brazil office in São Paulo work together to increase ties between Harvard and Brazilian faculty and students in many collaborative projects.

parts. Maintaining two-way collaboration between the Brazil Studies Program in Cambridge and the Brazil Office in São Paulo is vital to our ability to identify, initiate and nurture equitable Harvard-Brazil collaborations. Strong Harvard faculty engagement in Brazil is required if the Brazil Office is to be successful.

The Brazil Studies Program in Cambridge, however, is best positioned to help make this happen thanks to Kenneth Maxwell’s experience, leadership as its director and the impressive and active multi-disciplinary Brazil Faculty Advisory Committee that the Program has assembled. A steady and increasing flow of Brazilian professors and students to Harvard is, on the other hand, vital to the success of the Brazil Studies Program. The Brazil Office, thanks to regular face-to-face interactions with Brazilian professors and students and an extraordinary local Brazil Advisory Group has a clear advantage in identifying promising opportunities for collaborative research and learning opportunities in the country. We are, and should be, co-dependent.

In the past months, the Brazil Studies Program and Brazil Office team has been delighted to learn of and support numerous Harvard-Brazil collaborations, many of which appear in this issue of ReVista. Efforts to strengthen Harvard-Brazil engagement span across disciplines and include a range of faculty, fellows and students—from American professors with no prior exposure to Brazil, to Brazilian doctoral and graduate students at Harvard, to professors who have strong existing links with Brazil or are planning sabbaticals in the country.

The Brazil Studies Program is committed to building on our initial success increasing faculty engagement in Brazil. Alexander Keyssar, Professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government (KSG), came to Brazil for the first time in mid-2006 to co-teach a one-week U.S. studies seminar in Campinas. Following a rich exchange and positive initial experience, he has returned to Brazil multiple times and engaged with Brazilian professors at the University of São Paulo’s (USP) Institute for Advanced Studies, the Braudel Institute at the FAAP (which will soon launch Brazil’s first U.S. Studies Center) and members of our Brazil-based Advisory Group. In the future, Keyssar plans to deepen his Brazil engagement through a Senior Fulbright grant that would allow him to spend more than a month in Brazil.

In a recent trip to Brazil that was made possible with the help of the Brazil Office, Harvard Business School (HBS) Professor Aldo Musacchio secured nine interviews with prominent Brazilian business and political leaders. His field research, which included interviews with the head of the main workers union (CUT), former ministers of finance and education and a leader of the MST landless movement, has accelerated and enriched a case study that he is authoring on the current state of Brazil’s economy and the impact that inequality has on the business environment. The case will be part of a required MBA course on business, government and international economy. Scot Martin, Professor of Environmental Chemistry, provides a third important example of our efforts to build and support enduring and high-impact research collaborations. Martin, who is engaged in a research project on the impact of humans in the Amazon and will spend a semester in 2008 in Brazil (see article on p. 70), with funding from the Brazil Studies Program and on-the-ground support from the Brazil Office to increase the visibility and impact of his collaborative work.

Recent interaction with Harvard’s doctoral, graduate and undergraduate students has opened exciting new possibilities for us, for them and for their Brazilian counterparts. Felipe Fregni, an Instructor at Harvard Medical School and a member of the first class of Lemann Fellows, for example, has worked extremely closely with the Brazil Studies Program and Brazil Office (see article on p. 24). Our ongoing work with Felipe targets the creation of a new fieldtrip course on infectious diseases that will bring 15 Harvard School of Public Health students to Brazil, pair them with an equal number of Brazilian students from the Santa Casa de São Paulo Medical School and foster stronger ties between the professors from both institutions. Without Felipe’s guidance on course content and his collaboration with Professor Mary Wilson at Harvard, we would be at square one. Without the Lemann Fellowships that are administered in Cambridge or the Brazil Office’s efforts to identify and engage strong local collaborators at the Santa Casa (see article on p. 26), he might not have started down this promising path at all.

Ongoing interaction with students-in-residence at the Brazil Office has proven to be a promising model for future success. Carlos Gouvêa, a doctoral student at the Harvard Law School (HLS), for example, has taken advantage of our local infrastructure in Brazil to conduct research and to plan a conference that will bring young legal scholars from the United States and beyond to Brazil. Carlos is working closely with HLS Professor David Kennedy, who will also come to Brazil as a result. Carlos’ knowledge and network have helped forward our efforts to engage faculty and to create future opportunities for HLS students in Brazil.

The steady flow of Harvard undergraduate students through the Brazil Office, whether they are studying in Salvador, São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro, has been critical to improving our understanding of the types and quality of study abroad offerings in the country. While we—including our stellar Brazilian interns—have oriented students on how to identify the best courses or simply how to get from point A to point B, their candid feedback has positioned us to be better advisors in the future.

We look forward to the exciting work of helping to support a range of initiatives and sparking new collaborations that go beyond one-sided views of how Harvard can gain access to unique assets in Brazil or how Brazilian institutions can leverage the Harvard brand for their benefit. We hope to play a relevant and increasing role in surfacing and supporting opportunities for equitable collaboration and in re-orienting individuals and institutions seeking one-sided “partnerships.” Although our activities, the people we support and the geographies we cover are extremely diverse, we remain focused on the common goal of increasing long-term, two-way Harvard-Brazil collaboration. Harvard and Brazil have many exciting opportunities to work together and make a difference!

Jason Dyett is the Program Director of the Brazil Office.
A n American working on scientific research in the Amazon is not an easy thing. First, there is the special research visa and the requirement to remove nothing of the Amazon forest from the political borders of Brazil. This requirement is motivated by the Brazilian national interest to protect the biological treasure chests locked within the genetic DNA biome as some international corporations have previously harvested rainforest biological products for commercial developments of pharmaceuticals (probably not an exaggerated concern!). Second, there is the rule by the Brazilian armed forces against Americans flying on research aircraft for fears of espionage (probably an exaggerated concern!). Third, there are mosquitoes bigger than the U.S. domestic variety, roads regularly washed out in wet season, and an absence of quite a few conveniences.

Yet we Americans go again and again.

A Brazilian working with a U.S. scientist is not an easy thing. There are differences in language and culture as well as distance, all of which hamper and slow communication and potentially reduce a Brazilian’s research productivity. There are, unfortunately, condescending and insulting prejudices about the quality of Brazilian science among some U.S. scientists. The research material is inherently Brazilian in nature (e.g., the Amazonian forest), so the Americans at the face of it bring little of value to the research table.

Yet Brazilians continue to engage Americans again and again in Amazonian research interests.

Therefore, something must be afoot that Harvard and Brazilian scientists come together on many common problems time and time again. What makes for successful experiences for both parties? Fundamentally, Brazilians and Americans must have figured out, mostly by trial and error, those aspects that underpin equitable relationships and drive them together again and again. I will share in this article a few thoughts of what motivates me.

Foremost, Brazilians and Americans start by losing those nationalist distinctions and recognizing themselves just as human scientists driven by what drives all scientists and binds us in an international community: curiosity about Nature. Therefore, equity begins with recognition of our equal status and mutual respect. With that attitude in place, we then must progress into the challenges of modern societies that place barriers in the way of our common science, such as passports, customs and other restrictions. We also must make progress that the costs of research put in place, from travel to salaries to equipment. All scientists share those challenges and, in a wonderful international community, we all rely on and help each other to transcend and succeed in our common purposes.

What are examples of how this plays out in reality? I will spend my sabbatical year at the University of São Paulo, including a month long deployment in January 2008 in Amazonia to study the connections among vegetation, atmospheric particles, clouds and, ultimately, rainfall. To do so, I will need a host, and I have a great one. Paulo Artaxo has worked on atmospheric particles in Amazonia for more than two decades. By hosting me, he increases his own research productivity because we will engage in common projects and co-author publications. I, in turn, obviously gain by having a front row seat for exploring my scientific curiosities. Each of our experiences would be diminished without the other. That is the key, in my view, to equitable, sustainable and desirable collaborations.

The examples along these lines continue. Artaxo maintains a research site in Amazonia. I will bring a recently developed aerosol mass spectrometer to the continent of South America for the very first time ever. Artaxo is very animated to have a look at the new data we will collect there. I could not possibly do the work without the experience, infrastructure, and connections that Artaxo has in Amazonia. Moreover, the back-and-forth between his and my scientific expertise in the lead-up to the deployment challenges each of us and strengthens and focuses the scientific purposes and

**LAND REFORM AND COMMUNITY BUILDING**

A few minutes before eight, Marquinho runs across the dusty square to invite us to his newly-built house for the evening television novela. But we have already been invited by several other families. Our conflicting situation reflects the changing life in Menino Jesus.

Once the former squatters negotiate their land titles and begin to build their houses the communal evenings of singing and talking give way to the individualization of family life. Thus, the very raison d’être of the group—getting land parcels for poor families—puts into question other goals: remaining politically-active, solidarity-based communities. Menino Jesus lies some hundred miles northwest of the city of Salvador in the state of Bahia, Brazil. It is one among more than 3,000 communities that the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) has helped build since 1984. On December 20, 1998 some 250 families had squatted on parts of a private estate, claiming that the fertile land remained idle and could be granted to them according to agrarian reform law. For six years, old and young lived as acampados, under the permanent threat of dislodgement by police or the landowner. By June 2006, the remaining 212 families had received titles for 40-hectare (99 acres) lots. Dispersed brick houses were beginning to replace the tight group of shacks made out of thin black plastic foil and sticks. By pooling the community’s labor and making their own ecological tijolos (bricks), houses with an average foundation of 40 square meters could be built. Leftover money from the US$2,000 per family government-subsidy for these houses is used for other community projects and the movement.
actual measurements we will do on site. This scientific relationship is equitable, in my view, because we both hold valuables that we are lending to the other.

And the examples continue, much beyond the science and the professors discussed above, to the education of students and the development of human capital. In the United States, my colleague Steve Wofsy and I have made a proposal to the National Science Foundation for undergraduates and graduate students to spend time doing research in Brazil. This proposal serves the U.S. national interest because a major gap has been identified in the international education of U.S. scientists and engineers by the National Academy of Sciences (“Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future,” Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century: An Agenda for American Science and Technology, 2006). Of course, we really had to ask a deep question in preparing this proposal of why our Brazilian colleagues would be motivated to work with us on this. Although it is true that several of our colleagues’ students have later come to Harvard as graduate students (benefiting us greatly), those educational efforts were independent of this new proposal, and we needed to find a motivation that could rally support from Brazil. We realized in the end that it would be about providing research resources, i.e., exactly what motivates us here. Therefore, we proposed that U.S. graduate students would spend a year in Brazil, working in our colleagues’ groups, and those students could mentor undergraduates who, naturally, would spend shorter amounts of time there. When we made this proposal to our Brazilian colleagues, they reacted positively for exactly the same reasons we would have if a similar proposal had come to us: an opportunity to benefit from hard-working, intelligent graduate students working on a common research question for a year. Of course, the graduate students would benefit immensely by, like me, getting front row seats for their thesis work as well as having wonderful international experiences. For all of the involved parties, clear benefits were obvious. I have found that to be the basis of sustained and successful international scientific collaborations, which, although I am not an ethicist, I believe is a self-evident criterion for demonstrating equity.

Scot T. Martin, Gordon McKay Professor of Environmental Chemistry at Harvard University, will spend his sabbatical year in 2007/8 at the University of São Paulo working on the connections among Amazonian vegetation, atmospheric particles, and clouds. He teaches an introductory course, “ES6 Environmental Science and Technology,” in the College.

The new houses have a cement base, windows and sewer, varying according to seven different floor plans.

Committees to build houses and oversee health needs, education, youth projects, or cultural activities form cornerstones of the MST communities and distinguish them from other forms of land occupation in Brazil. In one abandoned building of the former fazenda, 23 year-old Maria teaches children until the fourth grade. She has just come back from three months at the MST’s national Florestan Fernandes school, near São Paulo, where she will return after three alternating months of practical work. We witness a day-long meeting of the community’s various committee representatives, community leaders who discuss at length the new challenges of community cohesion during the period of family settlement. During the initial phase of land-squatting, external threats and a common goal are pervasive. But after land-titles have been negotiated between MST leaders and the INCRA (Land Reform Institute), individual and family-centered concerns tend to get re-magnified. Moreover, the land must eventually be paid back. In addition to individual family plots, cash crops such as maize and manioc are tended to by the whole community, yielding money for infrastructure, including a community radio station.

In the nearby town of Água Fria a group from Menino Jesus attends a rally of the candidate for governor of the Workers’ Party (PT), Jaques Wagner. Our transport is a newly-acquired Mercedes bus from the 1960s that Lampion, one of the Menino Jesus’ most salient leaders, must often repair. He and others debate the movement’s relationship to the PT, supporting its broad policies, but criticizing the growth of export-agribusiness as opposed to endogenous, small-scale farming. A former squatter MST leader, Valmir Assunção is now himself secretary of development in Bahia. Jessica and Karina, attending eighth grade in Água Fria, proudly wear stickers with his photo. Since 2005, new campaigning laws restrict other paraphernalia such as T-Shirts. The girls tell us about an upcoming meeting of all MST youth in the state of Bahia where they will come together for days of discussing their needs, aspirations and challenges. The girls identify with the movement but at the same time are attracted by lifestyles in the cities. The second generation, those born or raised in MST-communities, is still working out its own compromise between urban poverty and rural alternatives.

Miriam Boyer is a sociology graduate student at Columbia University. She is pursuing work on state theory and Latin American social movements. Rainer Schultz is pursuing a PhD in Latin American history at Harvard. His interests include the history of socialist policies with an emphasis on Cuba. They spent one month with the MST.

A longer version of their article can be found at <http://drclas.fas.harvard.edu/publications>.
Biomedical Spending

Viewpoint: Could Scientists Become a Vanishing Species?

BY ANTONIO BIANCO

I have traveled a lot in recent months, from Phoenix and Salt Lake City to Budapest and Amsterdam. I even purchased a world map, one of those for putting up on your wall, so that my children know where I’m calling from. Visiting places and talking with many people, I have a sense that some things never change, such as Vesuvio and paté of foie gras in Strasbourg.

Meanwhile, U.S. biomedical science, also very famous throughout the world and a reason for national pride, does not remain as I found it nearly nine years ago, when I moved to Boston. Today, the biomedical sciences are suffering because of the budget freeze at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the principal financing agency for biomedical research in the United States. As a result, the success rate of research proposals declined dramatically, in some cases up to 50 percent! That results directly from the will of the White House, with the conniving of the Republican and Democratic leadership in the U.S. Congress. The George W. Bush administration reduced income tax, but there has been an astronomical increase in spending on the war in the Middle East and protection against terrorism, leading to reallocation of resources within the federal budget and increase in domestic debt.

It is no secret that, in contrast to this reality, the biomedical sciences are not well positioned in the list of priorities of the current administration. And it is not yet clear how much the return of Democratic control of Congress can reverse this situation. The crisis is not limited to the United States. Even laboratories in Europe feel it directly or indirectly, given that a budget of US$28.5 annual billion cannot be rocked without vibrations being felt in the four corners of the planet.

Not even North American researchers who have the support of other agencies or private entities, such as the prestigious Howard Hughes Medical Institute, can do without NIH resources. They prefer to maintain ties with the federal agency in order not to lose proficiency in the art of writing research proposals and, logically, for the eventuality of cuts in their projects.

The results of this crisis are more profound than one can imagine, taking into account the Brazilian reality. That is because in the United States the majority of scientists in the biomedical area depend on the NIH federal aid, not only for the procurement of research inputs, but also for the financing of their own salaries and of the individuals who are part of their groups. Generally, in most U.S. universities, a scientist has to bring nearly 50–60 percent of his or her salary from the outside (from the NIH, for example), with the host university paying the remaining portion. The interesting thing is that the proportion of the salary paid by the research institution is inversely proportional to its prestige. In the hospitals affiliated with the Harvard University Medical School, for example, the fraction is zero in the vast majority of cases, while in other universities that are less known or more distant from large economic and cultural centers, it can be up to 90 percent. Therefore, the reduction in the approval rate of research aid requests has a profound and immediate impact on the life of the scientist. The non-renewal of a project represents an immediate cut in expenditures and means loss of research team members, as well as, ultimately, the loss of the scientist’s own employment.

This mechanism is not new and works basically as a form of natural selection, since it promotes—without internal conflicts in the university—the exit of the least fortunate scientists and the permanence of the successful. One of the objectives of the university is to form the best possible team of researchers, composed of professionals who bring millions of dollars in resources for the university (indirect costs) and that do not need bridge support. This is a financial support provided by the employing institution for researchers who lose their research projects, so that they can maintain their salary and a minimum of laboratory support until the scientist has a chance of resubmitting his or her proposal to the NIH. One myth that is told around here is that, despite having boundless provisional bridge support, a full professor of the Harvard University Medical School has never requested such support from the university.

According to Andrew Marks, editor of the Journal of Clinical Investigation, besides the budget freeze, the NIH was also a victim of the implementation of a new master plan created by Elias Zerhouni, its director. According to Marks, the master plan promoted the displacement of resources destined to projects initiated by scientists, known by its acronym R01, for multicenter clinical research projects. The R01 is a time-tested and very successful mechanism, considered the fundamental basis of the research resources offered by the NIH. An R01 provides, to only one scientist, between US$200,000 and US$250,000 yearly, over a period of four to five years. At the same time, the institution that employs the scientist receives, directly, a technical reserve that can reach up to 75 percent of the value granted to the scientist. This aid mechanism is so important that the acquisition of a first R01 is a milestone in the academic career of the scientist, representing the transition to scientific independence and an implicit certificate of capacity and professionalism. The fact that the R01 is under the individual control of the scientist ensures the necessary freedom for creativity and innovation, placing the decision-making power and the use of resources in the hands of the scientists, far from administrative hierarchy and bureaucracy.

The multicenter projects, favored by the Zerhouni plan, involve major groups of researchers in different research centers and can exceed the mark of US$400 million. In these major projects, the decision-making power remains concentrated in the hands of a few scientists and administrators, who can be—and are—easily influenced by the NIH at different levels. Marks’ declarations triggered a reaction in defense of Zerhouni from all of the directors.
of the institutes that compose the NIH.

The deputy director of the NIH’s extramural research program, Norka Bravo, denies that the new master plan has caused a decrease in the success rate of scientists and that resources are being removed from the R01’s program. She explains that the crisis is the result of an increase close to 25 percent in the number of research solicitations in the last three years, a period in which the NIH budget remained frozen.

Even under normal circumstances, to obtain one R01 is difficult. Four or five years ago, an R01 was approved if it were classified in average among the 20 percent best. Scientists’ projects are evaluated by so-called study sections, a coordinating body of some twenty specialists in a given field. Today, in the study section of cellular and molecular endocrinology, of which I am a part, only a classification among the top 10 percent is guaranteed approval. That represents a brutal change in the success rate, mainly hurting young scientists, less experienced in the process of submitting research proposals, and privileging nuclei of excellence.

Those scientists who have their proposals classified between 10 and 20 percent are not happy, since their projects are declined even without major objections on the part of the study section. The loss of one or more proposals qualifies the scientist for bridge support. Never, in recent times, have we spoken so much about bridge support. This mechanism, that traditionally has transiently helped scientists, is clearly limited and incapable of adjusting to the current crisis. Successive failures discourage the institution to maintain bridge support and the scientist inevitably ends up having to seek new employment.

At the moment, the NIH and the research institutions are engaged in a tug-of-war over allocation of resources destined to bridge supports. That is because in several sectors of society, including the NIH, the perception exists that the research institutions are enriched by many years of indirect costs. This pressure by the NIH can function temporarily, but, little by little, the scientist ends up losing. Those who do not succeed in renewing their research projects are being forced to seek other positions in institutions with less prestige, that offer greater salary counterpart, with only those who succeed among the best 10 percent remaining. Organized movements exist in scientific societies in order to protest and even assist with some bridge support.

It is certain that the worst is still to come, since the 2007 federal budget, approved by Congress, contains no increase in resources destined to the NIH. If this pattern continues, the existence itself of the profession of biomedical scientist can be compromised once the NIH no longer contains any major support. That represents a brutal change in the success rate, mainly hurting young scientists, less experienced in the process of submitting research proposals, and privileging nuclei of excellence.

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It is certain that the worst is still to come, since the 2007 federal budget, approved by Congress, contains no increase in resources destined to the NIH. If this pattern continues, the existence itself of the profession of biomedical scientist can be compromised once the possibilities of professional success, already slim, remain increas-ingly distant. At the end of the day, how can you attract a young person to a profession where his professional success depends on his lifelong permanence among the top 10 percent?

Antonio Bianco is Director of Research of the Thyroid Section at the Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Associate Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School. He attended the Dante Alighieri College in São Paulo, Brazil, received his M.D. from Santa Casa Medical School and a Ph.D. in human physiology from the University of São Paulo.
Quem vai ao Brasil, se apaixona

A Look at Student Programs

BY ERIN GOODMAN AND LORENA BARBERIA

Since the 1994 founding of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies (DRCLAS), we’ve been able to observe an interesting (yet unsurprising!) phenomenon: the student who travels to Brazil for the first time will always return to Brazil. Like most, Harvard students quickly become enamored of the beautiful and intriguingly complex country. Whether they travel to Brazil for spring break or as a participant of a summer language program, they often make the Brazil Studies Program at DRCLAS their first stop on the way back, to learn how they can return there through study abroad, a summer internship, a research trip for a senior thesis or doctoral dissertation, or to make working or volunteering in Brazil part of their post-graduation plans.

Now, thanks to a generous gift by Jorge Paulo Lemann, more students can travel to Brazil, and more Brazilians can come to Harvard. And we hope they’ll keep returning and traveling back and forth. The establishment of the Jorge Paulo Lemann fellowships provides competitive scholarships to Brazilians enrolling in master’s degree programs at the Kennedy School of Government (KSG), the Graduate School of Education (GSE) and the School of Public Health (HSPH). This academic year, four Brazilians were able to study at Harvard thanks to the Jorge Paulo Lemann fellowships: Felipe Fregni, HSPH; Guilherme Ribeiro, HSPH; Danyela Moron, KSG; and Ana Gabriela Pessoa, GSE. In addition, two doctoral students at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences are spending the spring 2007 semester conducting dissertation research in Brazil: Patricia Vieira and Bruno Carvalho, both from the Department of Romance Languages and Literatures.

The Jorge Paulo Lemann gift also provides ten Harvard College students with generous funding to travel to Brazil for immersion experiences. One such experience, the DRCLAS Summer Internship Program, will be launched this summer in Brazil’s economic capital and the largest metropolis in the southern hemisphere. Eight students have been selected to spend the summer of 2007 in São Paulo working with local organizations, ranging from non-profit organizations working on advancing human rights, disarmament, economic development and youth participation in policymaking to financial and legal private sector companies. Undergraduates participating in the program will also be living with local host families and benefiting from an initial orientation and constant mentoring from the DRCLAS Brazil Office in São Paulo. In addition, students participating in independent summer internships in the rest of Brazil will also be invited to take part in the first week of the orientation program.

Another immersion opportunity that has attracted a record number of students is summer and semester-length study programs in Brazil. Enthusiasm for these programs places Brazil in the top ten travel destinations at Harvard. Several options spanning the breadth of Brazil exist. For students with only two semesters or the equivalent in Portuguese language training, the Harvard Summer School Program in Rio offers an intermediate level course in Brazilian culture and Portuguese language at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica in Rio de Janeiro in a five-week program led by Clémence Jouët-Pastré, Senior Preceptor in Romance Languages and Literatures (see related story on p. 76). Harvard undergraduates and graduate students can also enroll for semester-length study at leading Brazilian universities including the University of São Paulo (USP), the Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, IBMEC São Paulo and with the in-country presence of the DRCLAS Brazil Office receive advice on selecting suitable programs and courses.

Undergraduates have the opportunity to enroll in courses covering topics such as the sociology of Brazilian race relations, authoritarianism and democracy in contemporary Brazil and the modern Brazilian economy. New opportunities also exist for Harvard Law School students to gain expertise on the Brazilian Civil Code, the rules governing the largest stock exchange in Latin America or intellectual property frameworks protecting compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical drugs. In addition to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Harvard College students are taking courses with Brazilian students as far south as Porto Alegre and as far north as Salvador da Bahia in spring 2007. Plans are also advancing for Harvard School of Public Health to participate in an Infectious Disease Winter Course to be held in the spring 2008 semester in collaboration with the Santa Casa de São Paulo.
Paulo Medical School. Taught by Mary Wilson, Associate Professor in the Department of Population and International Health and Felipe Fregni, Instructor in Neurology, Harvard Medical School, the two-week course will allow fifteen Harvard School of Public Health students to gain training in diseases endemic to Brazil: schistosomiasis, leishmaniasis, malaria, cholera, dengue and yellow fever.

Students returning from Brazil keep the country’s allure and energy manifest on campus, by acting as peer advisors, joining the Harvard Capoeira Club, attending the events of DRCLAS, and partaking in the Harvard Brazilian Organization’s annual feijoada.

On February 21, the Brazil Studies Program at DRCLAS hosted a lunch with the current Lemann fellows and undergraduate students who had recently returned from spending a semester in Rio de Janeiro. The messages that came out of the lunch were clear: from the Jorge Paulo Lemann fellows: it’s imperative that Brazilians are aware of Harvard’s broad range of programs and ways to overcome perceived financial obstacles to getting to Harvard; from the students who traveled to Brazil, the impulse to return, and to spread the word to their classmates who might not have considered traveling to Brazil because of the distance, the language barrier, or the financial implications of spending a semester or summer in Brazil. Thanks to Jorge Paulo Lemann and the Brazil Studies Program, the road between Harvard Yard and Brazil continues to become shorter and more well-traveled.

Erin Goodman is a Program Officer for the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies in Cambridge. Lorena Barberia is a Program Associate for the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies’ Brazil Office.
The Portuguese Language Program

A Solid Springboard for Brazilian Studies at Harvard

BY CLÉMENCE JOUËT-PASTRÉ

PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE PROGRAMS ARE THRIVING IN VIRTUALLY all U.S. universities, and Harvard is no exception. According to a 2004 report by the Modern Language Association of America, enrollments in Portuguese language courses at U.S. universities increased 21.1 percent over a five-year period, an extraordinarily accelerated pace. The situation of the Harvard Portuguese Language Program is even brighter: enrollments increased 97 percent from fall 2002 to fall 2006. Our auspicious current state is due to multiple and creative endeavors, including attractive new courses, a program abroad, and a series of events that seek to create a tangible community of Portuguese speakers at Harvard.

“Portuguese and the Community” is one of the most successful new courses. Students learn about the large Portuguese-speaking Boston community through theory and practice. As a course requirement, students are placed with Boston-area community organizations and agencies to perform four hours per week of volunteer service-learning. Class work focuses on readings covering many aspects of the immigrants’ experience through history, ethnography, literature, sociology and linguistics. Films and documentaries by and about Lusophone immigrants and specific uses of the Portuguese language from these communities are also part of class discussions. The course provides students with the opportunity to perform a rich variety of jobs at these community-based associations. Work experiences include assisting in citizenship classes, human rights workshops, after-school programs for children of all ages, elaborating publicity materials to raise funds for associations, helping lawyers to assist immigrant workers, serving as medical and legal interpreters and translators and working in HIV prevention programs. Generally speaking, the work experiences provide exposure to a world and a world-view virtually unavailable on campus to the Harvard University student.

Most of the events spearheaded by the Portuguese Language Program, and co-sponsored by the Harvard University Brazil Studies Program at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American

I began my study of Portuguese at Harvard in 2004 out of a long-standing fascination with those who branded my Arab seafaring ancestors “pirates.” Yet, a serendipitous “discovery” akin to Cabral’s landed me on Brazil’s shores. After a sojourn in Rio with Harvard Summer School and several advanced literature courses on-campus, I am now a member of the teaching staff in the Portuguese section of Romance Languages and Literatures, and plan to devote part of my dissertation in Comparative Literature to Brazil.

Fares Alsuwaidi
Ph.D. candidate in Comparative Literature
Harvard University

I have had a long love affair with the Portuguese language, starting off when I first visited Brazil at age 15. … I took a year of Portuguese at Harvard, then applying for a DRCLAS grant to spend six months in Brazil doing work for social progress and development. Thankfully, I was awarded the grant and spent a semester studying at the Catholic University of Rio and interning with an organization that works with children from the neighboring slum —Rocinha.

When I wandered into DRCLAS with a vague notion that I wanted to go to Brazil, I had no idea that in a few months I would be in a leper colony in Rio, interviewing patients and researching my thesis. At the time, I only knew that I wanted to pass a few months in the cidade maravilhosa, and maybe learn something along the way. I applied for, and received, a scholarship to study social service at PUC-Rio.... The first week in Rio de Janeiro, I fell in love with the city’s energy, joy, and chaos, and decided to write my thesis about Brazil.

When I approached my social service professor with this idea, she sent me to speak with the national secretary of the Movement to Reintegrate Persons Affected by Hansen’s Disease (MORHAN). After a short meeting, we made plans to go to Rio’s largest leper colony, Curupaiti. Dozens of interviews, one national meeting of leprosy patients, and countless days in Rio’s libraries later, I discovered that under Vargas, the government of Brazil had not only isolated leprosy patients, but consciously inflamed the stigma that still defines their lives.

For many students, writing a thesis is a daunting task, but for me it was a labor of love. Having seen what leprosy patients had to overcome I was determined to tell their story. My work won me the Kenneth Maxwell prize for best undergraduate thesis on Brazil. It also served as a means to return to Rio, and continue my work with MORHAN. That one semester of Portuguese opened up worlds for me, worlds that are still unfolding before my eyes.

Elisabeth Poorman, Harvard ’06

Back at Harvard the following Spring I again found a course that suited me perfectly—“Portuguese and the Community.” … I had just settled on a career in Medicine and Public Health, thanks in large part to my recent experience in Rio. Through my class, I found an outlet to combine my interests in health and Portuguese and arranged work as a volunteer Portuguese Medical Interpreter with the Cambridge Health Alliance. This volunteer work became a full-time job for two consecutive summers after my graduation from the college, in between work done abroad in Brazil and, my newest Lusophone addiction – Mozambique. Now, back in the States and back at Harvard I am a first-year medical student. I work once a week with a free-clinic that serves the large uninsured Brazilian community of the Boston area—now not only as an interpreter, but as a part of the patient’s healthcare team.

I owe much of what has happened in the last few years to the Harvard Portu-
Studies, through the generous support of the Jorge Paulo Lemann Fund, involve the Portuguese-speaking community living in the Boston area. In spring 2003, for example, we launched the "First Annual Brazil Week at Harvard," attended by more than 450 people and widely covered in the press. For five days, scholars from Brazil and the United States, Harvard faculty members and students, politicians, artists, a wide range of professionals and the local Brazilian community and its leadership celebrated, discussed, and reflected upon the experiences of Brazilian immigrants in New England. Participants engaged in different activities including a fair for Brazilian organizations seeking Harvard students to perform service in the community, a photo exhibit, a film, a workshop about educational possibilities for immigrant youth, and a panel about the past and the future of Brazilian immigration.

In summer 2004, Harvard’s Portuguese Language Program launched another project to increase the visibility of the language and culture of Brazil: the first Harvard Summer Program in Rio, a total immersion second-year course. Through a combination of language sessions and instructional excursions, screening of films, and appreciation of popular music, participants strengthened their linguistic skills and learn about the history and people of Rio de Janeiro. The course is structured to provide students with direct contact with native Brazilians from diverse backgrounds and to learn Portuguese in a vibrant cultural context. During formal classroom contacts, students have the chance to reflect upon different uses of the language in which they are immersed. They compare levels of formality and informality in both written and oral language and develop their written and spoken academic Portuguese.

We are convinced that the dynamism of the Portuguese Language Program is having a positive impact on Brazilian Studies at Harvard. Each year the number of students writing Senior Thesis on Brazil increases significantly in different departments of FAS. There has been an increasing number of applications for semesters abroad in Brazil, for internships, and funds for conducting research. Finally, the enrollment numbers in advanced courses on Brazilian History, Culture, and Literature is also progressing at a fast pace.

In the United States, Portuguese is taught at an extremely limited number of high schools. Most Harvard freshmen have very little knowledge of the language and of Brazil. Our role in the Portuguese Language Program is not only teaching a language, but also raising the awareness about Brazil and hopefully nurturing possible future careers in Brazilian Studies. We appreciate the support of Harvard and of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies in this effort.

Clémence Jouët-Pastré is Senior Preceptor in Portuguese and Director of the Portuguese Language Program Department of Romance Languages and Literatures.

I chose my first-semester classes because they seemed interesting. At the top of my list was “Portuguese for Spanish Speakers,” my first step toward graduating with a degree in Romance Languages and Literatures, Brazilian studies track, in June of 2006. I loved the teacher and my classmates (everyone from first-year undergraduates to sixth-year Ph.D. candidates), but most of all I loved learning about Portuguese: how it differs from Spanish, its rhythm and sounds, the enormous variety of people who speak the language (including a large community here in Cambridge and Boston). …

Funded in part by a grant from DRCLAS, I spent part of the summer after my junior year in Rio de Janeiro interviewing local poets, translators, and academicians, hoping to develop a topic that combined my nascent interests in translation studies and contemporary Brazilian poetry….I realized what it was about Brazilian studies at Harvard that I most enjoyed: I was part of—and a contributor to—a broader intellectual community….Faculty and students listened to and respected my ideas, and I had the distinct feeling that my work was part of a broader discussion of Brazil’s history and future. I was honored to receive the Hoopes Prize for my senior thesis.

James Pautz, Harvard ’06
One of the books seized from the Minas conspirators in 1789 was an edition of American documents and state constitutions translated into French and collected under the title *Recueil des Loix Constitutives des États-Unis de l’Amérique*. Printed in 1778, the volume was organized by the otherwise unidentified Regnier, who lifted the *Recueil*’s translations and commentaries verbatim from *Les Affaires de l’Amérique et de l’Angleterre*, a European periodical which reported on the American revolutionary effort. Yet because the *Recueil* is a relatively slim volume when compared to the vast amount of published material in the *Affaires*, Regnier’s voice is present in the *Recueil* despite his piracy, in the decision over which documents to include, and the sequence in which they appear in the volume.

Opening the *Recueil* with the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and a series of recommendations from the newly-formed Continental Congress, Regnier elected to initially emphasize above all else the unity of the revolting American states. Washington’s diploma arrived in Brazil couched within the *Recueil*’s initial documents, each symbolically exhibiting a different facet of an emerging national unity. As such, the diploma fits into this project by concretely providing the personage of a military figurehead, a counterpart to the political authority of Benjamin Franklin, to whom the *Recueil* is dedicated.

Presented to Washington on April 4th, 1776, the degree formally celebrates the general’s “services to the Republic” in ousting the occupying British from Boston, and “saving this country from the dangers which threatened it.” During the stand-off, which had ended weeks earlier, the Harvard faculty and student body were forced to evacuate Harvard Yard and relocate to Concord. Initially, the British troops lodged themselves in Harvard facilities, but soon Washington’s troops would come to be based there; George Washington himself was installed in Craigie House.

It was amidst accolades from surrounding towns and legislatures that on April 3rd, Harvard’s president, Samuel Appleton, alongside fellows of the Harvard Corporation, voted unanimously to present George Washington with the degree of *Doctor utriusque Juris, tum Naturae et Gentium, tum Civilis*. This honorary degree, the first of its kind to be conferred by the University to a non-graduate, was the second LL.D. to have ever been granted by the institution. While celebrating the crucial military victory, it also marked Harvard’s return to Harvard Yard.

The degree was penned in Latin by Appleton himself and meant to be presented to Washington the following day, who French compilation of U.S. constitutional documents from 1778 owned by Brazilian anti-colonial conspirators is examined by Kenneth Maxwell in Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais.
by that time had already left for New York. The text of the diploma was nevertheless published, in English and Latin, in a host of area newspapers later that month. Before formally bestowing Washington with the degree, the text details his credentials (among them, a “deep knowledge of civil Law & the Art of war”), portraying him as the classic embodiment of civic virtue (“he renounced his tranquil life [...] & sacrificed his pleasures” in service of his “patriotic ardor”), and expressing gratitude that “our University may [...] see itself reestablished in its ancient splendor.”

Incidentally, in the same entry of the Harvard Corporation Records for the April 3rd meeting, directly following the Latin text of Washington’s degree, the members of the Harvard Corporation drafted a letter to the Representatives of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay asking retribution for the damages incurred on Harvard property as a result of the British and American occupation:

“We cannot doubt but that the Hon. Continental Congress will consider it a debt of Justice to make good these losses and damages which the College has sustained for the accommodation of the Continental army and by the British forces.”

This explicit departure from the tone of Washington’s diploma sheds light on the degree to which its conferring was a highly public and political act. From its initial dissemination in local newspapers to its eventual catapulting across the Atlantic into the *Affaires, Regnier’s Recueil*, and the hands of the Minas conspirators, the diploma had never been physically presented to Washington. As if to confirm this strange disconnect, the French translation of the diploma repeatedly refers to the academic institution of the “University of Cambridge in New England” as “Harward.” Nevertheless, the diploma’s inclusion in the *Recueil* was in many ways an extension of the Harvard Corporation’s decision to bestow Washington with the degree, continuing their work in etching out a national figurehead from the uncertain beginnings of a nation.

*Gabriel Rocha, a Harvard College junior concentrating in Literature, is a Research Assistant for the Brazil Program at DRCLAS.*

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China and Latin America


**A REVIEW BY MICHAEL CHU**

The vast majority of people in power in Latin America today—in business, government, labor unions, political parties and academia—entered professional life in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Regardless of national experiences, in the span of their careers, they have seen Latin America go from the region most like the developed North, comfortably ahead of the Communist block and the Third World, to a spectator in the slow lane watching the blur left by a resurgence of Eastern Europe and an Asia on steroids. When they first went to work as young men and women, the idea that one day Buenos Aires, Rio, Mexico City and São Paulo might look provincial in comparison to cities in China was so absurd as to be unthinkable. Accordingly, it is a surprise that, from the banks of the Rio Grande to the tip of Patagonia, one question is not posed more often and more loudly: how could this have happened?

To begin formulating the answer, the leaders of Latin America now have an essential starting block. The *Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean*, edited by Robert Devlin, Antonio Estevadeordal and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, brings together in one volume a wealth of key statistical information, together with concise descriptions of the major reforms that have resulted in the growth machine that China is today. It does so while comparing and contrasting the same information for Latin America, paying special attention to key regional nations (Mexico, Chile, Brazil and Argentina).

This work is all the more important because for the majority of those immersed in Latin America, either as professionals, residents or both, the mental picture of China, significantly as it may have changed, is likely to be lagging woefully behind. Too many Latin American leaders still believe that China’s key advantage lies in an inexhaustible supply of cheap labor. Next to misconceptions, misconceptions and outdated notions, *The Emergence of China* sets a prodigious amount of well-selected facts, figures and tables, culled from an impressive collection of sources and bibliography. Consequently, the book is a major contribution to serious readers attempting to understand how China, from so far behind, positioned herself to play a role in the global economy that by and large continues to elude Latin America. The *Emergence of China* is the reference manual to go to after being awakened by Argentine journalist Andrés Oppenheimer, whose Cuentos Chinos begins famously by reporting on how serious analysts project the future irrelevance of Latin America.

Accordingly, the most valuable part of the book is in its overview of the Chinese economy, its summary of how the country underwent a “triple transformation” (from a centrally planned to a market economy, from a rural agriculturally based activity to manufacturing and services, and from an extremely closed to a relatively open economy), and its analysis of China’s trade. In chapter 4, “Why China’s Trade is So Exceptional”, the book provides a particularly valuable analysis of factor endowments (in which education and “cheap labor” is placed), the importance of geographical distance (explaining why miles can be offset by other considerations) and the role of the size of the national market. These initial chapters also include annexes with highly useful and illuminating information, such as those that deal with export promotion policies, pro-competitiveness institutions and China’s WTO accession commitments.

The book is not the product of named authors but the collaboration of two Inter-American Development Bank departments, Integration and Regional Programs and Research. In the compilation of key comparative data and the concise explanation of the road taken by China which constitutes the first part of the book, this collaborative effort is at its best. But as it moves into the second part, in which the book assesses China’s competition with Latin America for the global marketplace and foreign direct investment, the need to draw conclusions pertaining to the region challenges the limits of consensus writing. The discussion becomes a series of technical analyses of data. While it is indeed of enormous value just to set forth what is actually happening, by being heavily bound by current conditions, the book incurs its major weakness. It assumes that current conditions reflect the equilibrium of the system, and then goes to draw its future implications on that basis in a rather formulaic and static process.

However, equilibrium in economic systems exists only in textbooks. The objective of
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

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much of public policy, and all of business, is to constantly upset that equilibrium and the first part of the book is actually a demonstration of that process. Everything in those chapters illustrate the extraordinary pace and breadth of the changes underway in China, and suggests that this will not abate for some time. Accordingly, it seems difficult to accept that the current relationships between China and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) represent the steady state for the future. Conclusions based on such an assumption then become necessarily suspect. This affects the four major questions that the book considers in the later sections: to what extent do Chinese and Latin American products overlap in given target export markets (e.g. USA), to what extent the Chinese market represents an opportunity for LAC, to what extent do the two geographies share the same investors by national origin, and to what extent China may be an investor in LAC.

To illustrate, The Emergence of China points out that currently there is no major overlap in the product mix that China and the LAC (except Mexico) sends to the United States, leading to the conclusion that China may not represent such a threat to the region. But this begs the key strategic question. The fundamental implication for the future may be not what is happening in today’s commercial trade accounts, but that LAC is being displaced as a future potential exporter of all those products that China so effectively sends to the United States—including now such items as PCs and laptops. What if LAC can maintain its export market share in developed markets only through its present product mix? With China in the picture, has something fundamental changed to LAC’s potential to be the kind of region its leaders and people hope to be in the twenty-first century?

The focus on equilibrium economic theory without incorporating business and policy analytical frameworks also affects the section on foreign direct investment. Judged on reported national origins, the national sources of foreign direct investments going into China and LAC are quite different, and so the book concludes that the two regions are not really competing for the same capital flows. But a major source of the foreign direct investment in China comes from multinational corporations. To the extent that these multinational corporations operate in both China and LAC, and actually even if they do not, the choice between China and LAC is being made on a continuous basis by the multinational’s capital allocation process. In this regard, the competition between China and LAC has always been present. Indeed, today’s snapshot showing a lack of competition may actually be the expression of one region having lost the contest. Beyond what is occurring today, the real question is not where capital is coming from but whether the advantage that one region has over the other in accessing more efficient and larger capital pools will continue. This will certainly have an imprint on how each will end up in the global economy ten years from now.

But pointing out the shortcomings of The Emergence of China should not overshadow the enormous value of the book in helping us understand one of the signal events shaping our century. In addition, the book provides an excellent base of facts from which to begin to unravel the deep implications that the rise of China will have on Latin America’s own destiny. The leaders of Latin America would do well to have this book on their night tables. One of the obstacles to achieving the region’s potential is that so few will.

Michael Chu is a Senior Lecturer at Harvard Business School and a Senior Partner of Pegasus Capital in Buenos Aires. Formerly, he was president and CEO of ACCION International and member of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.
A Drop in the Ocean
Working with Grassroots Microfinance Organizations

BY FRANKIE CHEN

“Poverty is unnecessary.”
— Muhammad Yunus

A Drop in the Ocean (ADITO), a Harvard-student-run nonprofit organization, strives to lift the world’s most disadvantaged people out of poverty through its work with grassroots microfinance organizations. The organization, founded in 2004, provides technical assistance and strategic advice to microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the developing world, including Mexico, Peru and Argentina.

MFIs provide financial services to low-economic-status clients who are excluded from the traditional financial system. Through microfinance, these individuals can gain access to capital to open small businesses and begin to improve their economic situation. Microfinance recently made the news when Muhammad Yunus—the founder of the concept of microcredit—was awarded the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize for his “efforts to create economic and social development from below.”

The mission of ADITO is to address what it views as the two principal shortcomings of MFIs: a failure to reach the poorest of the poor and an inability to benefit from international exposure and investment funds. According to Hannah-Sarah Faich, one of ADITO’s managing directors, ADITO focuses its work specifically on smaller MFIs that are not yet self-sustainable. In that way, ADITO serves as a channel for the “flow of knowledge” from larger MFIs to smaller MFIs. While ADITO works with MFIs throughout the developing world, it is particularly active in Latin America. Faich attributes this to the fact that many students speak Spanish, which make the region “more accessible.”

The organization with which ADITO has the longest standing relationship is EMCOP (Equipo de Mujeres en Comunicación y Producción) in Peru. EMCOP offers microcredit loans to women and their families to open small businesses such as selling fish in street stands or baked goods in home bakeries. Through its partnership with ADITO, EMCOP was recently able to complete an impact study, which found that the organization’s profit margins and returns on equity were higher than that for other microfinance organizations. With the impact studies showing the organization’s proven efficacy, ADITO is now able to help EMCOP increase its capital lending pool and secure greater funds from international granting institutions.

Poverty may not be necessary, but it is an all too real phenomenon in our world. Until that changes, what is absolutely necessary is the existence of organizations like ADITO that make a difference.

CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAM
More than 3,500 physicians in Buenos Aires, Argentina and Santiago, Chile have participated in postgraduate medical education courses designed and led by Harvard Medical School faculty and ICONO (The Educational Institute for the Southern Cone). With courses ranging from psychiatry to cardiology to endocrinology, the Continuing Medical Education program is helping to promote and update the medical knowledge of Latin American health care professionals.

COLOMBIA CIVIL SECTOR INITIATIVE
Harvard researchers Theodore Macdonald and David Brown have been working with NGOs in Colombia to build capacity to document local perceptions of violence and peace. Through their work with the Colombia Civil Sector Initiative, the duo has been training Peace and Development Projects on conducting ethnographic research and increasing their capacity for promoting peace and development. This training helps the organizations to develop important case materials on grassroots experiences and reactions to violence. The Initiative also has the important mission of fostering greater collaboration between academia and the community.

QUALITY IN EARLY EDUCATION CONFERENCE
DRC LAS recently sponsored a conference in collaboration with the Chilean Ministry of Education to discuss how to apply models of high quality preschool education in Chile. The summer conference featured leading figures in the early education and health fields from Harvard, including faculty members of the Graduate School of Education and the Medical School. The conference emphasized the importance of setting programmatic goals, situating early education within the context of family and community, and establishing public policy.

Frankie Chen is ReVista’s chief editorial assistant and a senior at Harvard College.

ReVista welcomes suggestions for future features on Harvard-based projects that are making a difference in Latin America and the Caribbean. E-mail: jerlick@fas.harvard.edu

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