On Social Justice

BY ROBERT COLES

This issue of DRCLAS NEWS focuses on the theme of social justice, a theme inextricably linked with our children and the future of Latin America. So often we who study the lives of children or work with them as, say, teachers or nurses or doctors, speak and write of children's needs and problems, but fail to acknowledge their own capacity for, or interest in, doing the very same thing — taking stock of their situation, describing their troubles or worries, not to mention their hopes or aspirations. In 1985, for instance, when I was working in a Rio de Janeiro favela, I found myself quite aware of the poverty everywhere evident, and the consequences of such a state of affairs — the malnutrition and diseases which plagued the lives of the children I was getting to know. I knew how poorly educated they were. I knew how little medical care they got. I knew how inadequately clothed they were, how menial their surroundings, how bleak their prospects — even as, from the heights of a particular favela, they could glimpse
the wealth of Copacabana and Ipanema.

Yet, those children also had a view of the statue of Jesus, His arms outstretched, that is a familiar part of Rio de Janeiro's coastal landscape. That statue, which commands the eyes of tourists for a moment now and then, and which figures in countless photographs of a world-famous city, meant much more to the boys and girls I was getting to know than I had at first realized. That statue, so dramatically situated, came to mean something morally important to those young Brazilians. Jesus in concrete became for them Jesus near at hand, His spirit connecting with their thoughts. Here, for instance, is what a ten-year-old favelado girl had to tell me about some conversations she was having: “Sometimes I just don’t know what to do, because my mother is sick, and so I go and talk to Jesus, and He tells me that it’s a hard life here, but it was hard for Him, too, when He came here, and so He’s on our side, and we should remember that. So, I feel better — stronger. The time will come when the world is better, and Jesus will be back here. He’ll leap out of that statue and straighten everything out — like the nuns say, there will be fairness in the world.”

The voices of those nuns, who run a soup-kitchen of sorts at the foot of the favela, whose makeshift buildings line a steep hill, have become very much a part of that child’s mind, and in fact, had become, in their sum, the voice of Jesus — an unpretentious theological acknowledgment on this girl’s part of the Catholic Church’s claim to speak for Jesus Christ. That word “fairness” meant so very much to this girl — her sense that someday the huge disparity between the rich and the poor, so visible to her as she used her eyes to scan a city that stretched before her, would yield to divine justice, which for her would be a kind of social justice otherwise unattainable. “God will have to come back to make things better here,” she once told me.

I asked her whether “we,” mere mortals, might not also achieve some of the “fairness” she had mentioned, courtesy of the nuns. She was guarded in her response: “Maybe, we can make it better [the life she and others like her are fated to live], but when Jesus came here, He saw all the trouble there is, and He went and told the Lord, His God, of all the trouble, and someday He’ll come back and change it so everyone is the same [equal], and there won’t be some there [pointing to Copacabana] with all the money and some here [pointing to her own neighborhood] with no money. That will happen [the Second Coming] but no one knows when.”

So it goes, I was beginning to realize — a child’s thorough awareness of the extreme social divisions that inform a city’s, a nation’s life — and her moral, her spiritual response to that constantly visible disproportion of wealth, of power.

“Visions of fairness,” as expressed by this little girl, are understood in many different ways, not always as intensely spiritual. Her vision — although eminently Catholic — might also be seen as a vision of hope for all, regardless of faith or creed. For it is hope that is written about in this interdisciplinary issue on social justice in Latin America, whether in the excellent theoretical essays by Merilee Grindle and John Coatsworth on the social agenda and poverty (pages 3 and 12, respectively) or the more hands-on accounts of Caio Ferraz’ community organizing experiences in the favelas by anthropology doctoral student Richard Pendergast (p. 6), the moving saga of the School of Public Health’s Ana Cristina Terra de Souza (p. 8), a middle-class dentist from Rio de Janeiro, whose experiences with community health workers in Northeast Brazil changed her life and theirs forever, and the firsthand account (p. 19) by Mercedes Hinton of how she sought the warmth of the tropics and instead found a vision of democracy in the Americas.

These stories have a broad vision of social justice, ranging from community organizing, health, education, violence prevention to human rights, but they are all stories of human lives, of our future, of our children.

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The Social Agenda in Latin America

The Politics of Change

BY MERILEE S. GRINDLE

If the 1980s were the era of economic policy reform in Latin America, the 1990s have become the era of social sector reform. Indeed, a consensus is now forming that delivery of health care, education, and other welfare-enhancing programs in the region must be improved. A very large number of citizens, politicians, policy and management specialists, development professionals, and academics see that increased poverty and inequality can threaten the viability of market-oriented development strategies and the consolidation of new democracies.

The 1980s witnessed an extraordinary revitalization of civil society in Latin America, just as pushing economic policy reform reached the top of government agendas. Unions, political parties, neighborhood and identity-based movements, and church-affiliated organizations became actively engaged in civic life and public issues. Print and broadcast media became increasingly pluralist and inquisitive at the same time, often placing public officials under harsh lights. The reform agendas championed by democracy advocates were broad, multifaceted, and at times conflictful. Among the issues that brought them together, however, was a deep questioning of the "rightness" and efficacy of structural adjustment.

There was an equally emphatic insistence that the state had clear and unavoidable responsibilities to citizens—decent social services, protection from the worst effects of unbridled capitalism, maintenance of law and order, and monitoring of corruption in both public and private sectors. Indeed, while economic reformers continued to be wary of states that assumed much responsibility for the quality of life or social welfare, citizens and their organizations were demanding that the state do more and do it better.

Despite worsening conditions in the 1980s and part of the 1990s, most of the problems of poverty and inequality in Latin America have long histories and share a common plight—they are more often off public agendas than on them. However, a variety of policy, intellectual, political, and social trends have come together in the current period to move these problems into a prominent place on government agendas.

By the late 1980s, some advocates of reform were beginning to become aware that the market economies need public sectors that are to manage macroeconomic stability. In order to effectively implement stabilization and structural adjustment measures, public sectors need to design and implement effective regulatory policies, ensure basic physical and social infrastructure, maintain public order and the rule of law, and respond effectively to changing international and domestic conditions. Gradually, references to the reform of the state
began to mean more than downsizing and eliminating state intervention in response to fiscal deficits and inefficiencies; it began to be identified with the creation of institutions to buttress the market and to ensure an "enabling environment" for market-oriented development.

Economic reformers became increasingly convinced of the importance of factors such as legal codes affecting private property and the sanctity of contracts—the experience of developing market economies in Russia and other post-communist states loomed large in this growing conviction—and the role of autonomous central banks to both microeconomic behavior and macroeconomic performance. Scholarship on East Asian development successes also helped shape this view. Theoretical advances in institutional economics and economic history also raised new questions about paths toward sustained development. The "neoliberals" who dominated 1980s academic and policy debates were challenged by "new institutionalists" identified with Douglass North and others who argued that the evolution of the rules of the game for economic transactions—instutions—was a normal and necessary concomitant of successful economic development.

These demands were not lost on the first generation of democratic politicians, even those who were firmly committed to the economic reform agenda. Initially, the response to such demands tended to come in the guise of short-term actions to meet strong political opposition to stabilization and economic adjustment. Social adjustment funds intended to fashion the blow of economic reform through emergency public works programs, as well as community-based social assistance programs, were enthusiastically supported by reform politicians. In time, however, it became evident that more than quick political palliatives were needed to offset more than a decade of social sector cutbacks. The burgeoning of interest in innovative solutions to social sector delivery problems and the persistent demands of citizen groups encouraged greater attention to more basic questions of social sector provisioning and the role of government in assuring such services.

As with the economic reform agenda, intellectual trends also supported greater attention to progress in achieving economic and political development. Economists began to reconsider the role of human capital in economic development, a theoretical orientation that had decreased in importance since its apogee in the 1960s. Increasing evidence of rapid globalization of trade, technology development, and labor markets added impetus to analyses of the determinants of successful national development within a rapidly changing international context. Human capital in terms of an educated and skilled workforce emerged on many computer screens as an important underpinning of the "competitiveness of nations."

While economists were discovering human capital and its instrumental role in economic development, other social scientists were "discovering" social capital. Following the 1993 publication of Robert Putnam's influential book, Making Democracy Work, the notion of social capital as an underpinning of effective governance gained widespread attention. Social capital, referring to networks of trust and cooperation among citizens, was demonstrated to be the critical ingredient in explaining whether local governments were responsive, efficient, and effective in carrying out their responsibilities.

Good government, according to many who were persuaded by the importance of social capital, originates in the quality of civil societies. Greater accumulation of social capital could explain why health clinics functioned well and local schools actually delivered quality education, as well as why the post office could be trusted to deliver the mail and how the tax office was able to raise revenue for government programs.

The social capital argument also pointed in the direction of increased attention to the quality of government services and their impact on the capacity of countries to develop both economically and democratically. Likewise, scholarship on emerging or renewed social movements and the mobilization of civil society to achieve political voice, democratic responsiveness, and local level problem-solving focused attention on the ways in which social sector policies and programs affect the interaction of state and society.

The agendas of economic and political reformers also coincided with renewed interest in decentralization of government. Economists had few new arguments to support decentralizing the functions of government, since allocative efficiency and principal-agent solutions had long been held up as benefits of decentralized and socially responsive government. However, an
important change occurred in the political assessments of the benefits of decentralization. During the 1960s and 1970s, Latin America had experienced many initiatives to decentralize governments to more regional and local levels. In the 1990s, however, reformist politicians often emerged as proponents of decentralization, desiring perhaps to shift the fiscal burden of providing social and other services to other levels of government but also to demonstrate the legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic government in responding to citizen demands.

Thus, from a variety of perspectives—growth and human capital, democracy and its consolidation, electoral calculations, social capital and good government, decentralization and legitimacy—many came to identify reform of the social sectors as necessary ingredients for achieving their goals. Reformism is not without its opponents, of course. Public sector unions and public sector bureaucracies may resist reform because they will lose power, access, jobs, and control if reforms in health, education, and pension systems are put into place. Populist politicians may oppose change because new and efficient systems will rob them of vitally important spoils to distribute and make it difficult to garner votes. Organized labor may protest the loss of its protected status. Opposition parties may welcome opportunities for charging government with unresponsiveness and inefficiency in putting new programs into place.

Moreover, the future of social sector reforms will be deeply affected by the ability to deliver services that are administratively intense and that require on-going monitoring, supervision, and adjustment, even when contracted out to NGOs or the private sector. Reformers now face the challenge of putting administrative systems in place that will work reasonably well. They must figure out how to design human resource systems that incorporate appropriate initiatives for worker productivity and mechanisms that call forth norms of commitment, service, professionalism, and teamwork. They must invent organizational structures that are routinized, yet flexible enough to respond to a variety of circumstances, and design mechanisms that promote positive community or client participation and orientation.

Numerous organizations, actors, and levels of government are generally involved in any reform effort. The kinds of changes required generally emerge piecemeal and over considerable time as learn-by-doing and iterative approaches are often needed to access alternative implementation strategies. Moreover, changes in organizational design, human resource training, and management, and altered rules of the game in these sectors, do not usually produce clear results in the short term.

The challenges to social sector reform appear not only as issues of opposition and resistance from affected interests, not only as issues of design and incentives, but also as opportunities for bureaucratic resistance, sabotage, and leakage, and as the failure to mobilize and sustain political and bureaucratic support for change. Luckily, advocates of change have a growing array of experiences to draw on for insight into how the politics of change can be managed well. The current period has encouraged extraordinary innovation among those committed to the provision of more and better services in the social sectors. There have been both successes and failures among these initiatives. They offer a rich library of experience for those seeking to understand how positive changes in public policies and social services can be sustained over time.

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**WORLD BANK: POVERTY IS INCREASING**

According to a World Bank study, poverty is increasing in Latin America, with 31 percent of the population of Latin America living below the poverty line in 1989, an increase from 26.5 percent in 1980. At the end of the decade of the 1980s, almost 40 million more people lived in poverty than at the beginning of the decade, with the majority of the poor in the region’s cities. Of the 131 million people below the poverty line, some 66 million lived in urban areas. Income inequalities also increased. For instance, in Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama, the poorest 20 percent of the population shared less than three percent of total income at the end of the decade.

This is not just a matter of numbers. In practice, health posts and schools have fallen into decay; medicines and textbooks have not been restocked; equipment could not be replaced or repaired, and demoralized public sector employees were forced to work two or three jobs to make ends meet. Access to social services continued to be unequally distributed between rural and urban areas. Those who could afford it abandoned public provision of services for more reliable private health and education.

Per capita spending in the region declined in real terms by 10 per cent from 1982 to 1986. Investment in the social sector recovered somewhat during the mid 1990s, but fifteen years of worsening conditions left behind a striking “social deficit” from a “lost decade.”

There is disturbing evidence that investment in education declined more in low income countries in the region than in lower middle income countries. For the region as a whole, public expenditures on health amounted to only 1.28 percent of the GDP in 1990, well below the standard in industrialized countries.

Citizenship or Favelaship

Interview with Caio Ferraz

BY BEN PENGLASE

WHILE CONDUCTING PRE-DISSERTATION RESEARCH ON local social movements in Brazil in the summer of 1996, I decided to visit several of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. A Brazilian anthropologist friend suggested that we visit the favela of Vigário Geral in the northern outskirts of Rio de Janeiro. I had already known about Vigário Geral, the site of an infamous August, 1993, massacre of 21 people by a death squad composed of off-duty members of the Rio police. What I knew less about was the response of locals to this tragic incident. In the wake of the killing, residents of Vigário Geral had organized a local social movement to protest police brutality, work towards peace, help educate and extend services to the community—especially to its youth, who were often at risk of violence and involvement in the drug trade—and do what they could to improve their situation. When I met with members of this organization, known as the Casa da Paz, or House of Peace, they soon asked where I was from, and I responded, Boston. “Well,” several people said, “then you have to meet with the person who helped start this up, Caio Ferraz. After all, he lives in Boston now.”

This is how I came to know Caio, a Brazilian sociologist born and raised in the favela of Vigário Geral who became a visiting scholar at MIT. In response to the 1993 massacre, Caio and others in the neighborhood created the Casa da Paz, building it on the location of a house where the police had killed eight members of a family of evangelical Protestants.

Although Caio received innumerable prizes from human rights organizations, including a human rights prize from President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, he received even more death threats because of his political activities and denunciations of police violence. Caio decided to seek political asylum in the United States. His fears were not unfounded: in June, 1994, Reinaldo Guedes Miranda and Hermogenes da Silva Almeida, two Workers Party advisors investigating the Vigário Geral killings, were found dead, murdered execution style. The policemen believed to be responsible for the massacre, however, have not been brought to justice.

Caio currently lives with his wife and two daughters in Somerville, where I conducted this interview in Portuguese. (Those who are interested in the Casa da Paz can visit their website, at <www.alternex.com.br/∼casadapaz>.)

BP: Caio, the last time that I was visiting Vigário Geral, in August of 1997, the police had a full-time presence there. Before, the police were only entering to conduct raids. Could you talk a bit about the relationship between people in Vigário Geral and the police?

CF: I think that the only really positive factor, in an immediate sense, is that there aren’t any more shootouts. The social tension then was really very great. I remember the peak of the war between Vigário Geral and Parada (another favela), in about ’86 or ’87, when I lived there. Everyday, at least once or twice a day, there were shootouts between the two neighborhoods for two or three hours. Serious shootouts. You saw the houses, how many had bullet holes. Imagine how many people died. You saw the statue that (our mutual friend) Valmir made of bullets, right? More than 10,000 bullet shells, almost. That was a beautiful idea—to transform bullets into a work of art.

I’d lived with this since I was a child: I was born and raised in Vigário and I’m now 29. My father was a construction foreman, and actually helped build Vigário Geral. So when you see the evolution of the drug dealing, which began in ’82 or ’83, actually at the time when Brazil was democratizing—and it’s interesting how these things are connected in a sort of magical way—and no one usually makes the connection.

These communities, not just Vigário Geral, but other favelas too—there are about 600 or so in Rio—all begin to fight with each other. Politically this doesn’t really concern the established powers, because as long as it doesn’t affect them, as long as they can live in Ipanema or Barra da Tijuca (wealthy neighborhoods in the southern part of the city of Rio), without being kidnapped or hit by bullets, no one said anything.

This went on until ’90 or ’91, when a wave of kidnappings of business people, of famous people began. There was a high level of police involvement with these kidnappings, which were logistically complicated. The kidnappings were seen as the fault of criminals coming from the favela, and once you connect this to the favelas, it institutionalizes them even more. People who live in favelas are seen as agents of evil, as representatives of marginality. So this really creates a sort of social and geographic apartheid, besides the economic form which always existed. So the person who lives in a favela is always seen as a potential enemy of society.

BP: I was really interested in Vigário Geral in the con-
tradictory reaction to the police. People were clearly more relaxed, happy. But at the same time you can see that people have a certain tense relation with the police.

CF: Imagine that you live in this situation of war for these eighteen years. And someone shows up and says, I've got the solution. I'm going to put a bunch of policemen here. And one of the combatants in the war has been the police. You're not putting the UN, or some neutral force in there. It's one of the agents of the war. And they are also involved in a double sense: they themselves are poor, barely earn a decent salary, and are poorly trained and educated. They're even often afraid of being there. But imagine your reaction. You'd be happy, of course. You wouldn't hear any more gunshots.

I'm not saying that the police shouldn't be in Vigário Geral. Of course they should. They should be everywhere. But they have to be there in a different way. They have to create social connections, so that the community feels interdependent with them, and create social projects so that when the police leave the community knows how to defend itself.

BP: How does this relate to the work you were doing in Vigário Geral before you left?

CF: We were trying to create this sense of self-protection with the Casa da Paz. To criticize violence by the police or the Ligantes. People really tend to criticize voluntary organizations like the Residents Associations, or the Casa da Paz, saying that we criticize the state, and the police, a lot, and not the drug dealers. But our duty was first, to criticize the government, to demand protection because they are the ones paid to protect us.

Peace is a process, something that must be continually constructed. It's not something you can just grab; it isn't something you can hold on to, that you have or don't have.

So when I talk about peace in Vigário Geral, it's not in these terms. Peace has to be constructed in a process of negotiation.

What we were trying to do in Vigário Geral was to resolve a problem that has existed for 500 years. Because we never had decent housing, we never had plumbing, or electricity, or peace. We were trying to create the possibility of living. We were trying to say:

"Look, let's put the cards on the table and see where the problems are." So when you transform this into a protest—when a young person like me or Valmir who comes from a favela, who had all the potential for turning into a drug dealer, produces ideas or art—that's a real change, a real transformation.

I always told people: you are the one who is going to forge your own conscientization. Through education, through learning about computers, you are going to create a weapon, the computer will be your revolutionary weapon to transform yourself. So working in this area is to work, little by little, to give form to citizenship. Because what we have in many parts of Brazil isn't citizenship, but favelaship.

BP: But these are communities that are always united in a certain way. There really is that vision, that there's a separation, that Rio is two cities, that it's a "split city," even though there are lots of links between the two.

CF: Of course. The city over here, the white city of sun and beaches doesn't exist without the city over there, the black city, the city of violence. It couldn't survive. They are completely interdependent. Who would clean their houses, work in their buildings? This interdependence is economic, but it isn't social. That sociability doesn't exist. It's fragmented, and that's exactly the rupture of Brazilian society. It's an apartheid, though of course not institutionalized, but one which was created by Brazil's society and history.

There are lots of positive examples of how some communities are dealing with their situations. Brazil really is having a silent revolution: despite the Brazilian elite not caring about it, not paying attention, people are conquering, on the basis of daily struggle, their own citizenship. These are all sorts of small molecular revolutions. If today there is citizenship in Brazil, it's because the people themselves are creating it.

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The driver was yelling out in Portuguese with the rough-hewn rural accents of Northeastern Brazil: "This is the woman who is looking for the dead children. I have told her she should come in and see some of the children who are still alive, but she is interested only in the dead children."

Ana Cristina Terra de Souza, a doctoral student at Harvard's School of Public Health, was indeed only looking for the "dead children," or rather, the mothers of children who had died in the previous 12 months. She was seeking to do a "verbal autopsy" of the children in the communities of Ceará, far from the urban middle-class environment in which she had grown up many miles to the south in urban Rio de Janeiro.

During her summer project, funded in part with a DRLAS travel grant, she learned about the perspective of the mothers from the 40 women community health workers who became her guides, her colleagues, her mirror into the community.

The community health workers had collected information on vital statistics and health indicators, which Terra de Souza, who was trained as a dentist in Rio before going to study at HSPH, was able to use as a basis for her field research.

Ceará is one of the poorest states in Northeast Brazil. According to a recent census, 34.6 percent of the population lives in rural areas, 83 percent of families living in the rural areas earn less than $200 monthly, half of all women of reproductive age are illiterate, 45 percent of the houses are made of mud and sticks, more than half the population does not have access to potable water, and 70 percent of households do not have any type of sanitary facilities. Out of every thousand infants born, 65 die. According to 1995 data from the community health workers' program, diarrhea and acute respiratory infections caused 9.6 and 6.9 deaths per thousand live births, respectively.

The statistics gathered by the community health workers, most of whom were selected by their communities and all of whom lived there, revealed the extent of the problem. But it was not until Terra de Souza began to go house to house with the workers that it became a reality.

"You read all these articles; you research all these reports, but you find there's a real daily struggle that perhaps you never even imagined. It becomes part of you," she said. "The community health workers came and talked and worked with these people every day, and they made the numbers become meaningful to me. I could put the stories with the numbers."

The lessons learned from the field research were many. According to Terra de Souza, her field research reaffirmed the importance of understanding the social context of public health problems. She hopes her research will improve decision-making and improvement of programs and services to better the lives of children, families, and communities. "I believe that it is only when communities and programs are truly engaged in the inquiry that we as researchers can make substantial contributions to the improvements of social programs designed to better the lives of individuals and communities," she
emphasized.

She also found that the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods—research that brings together different disciplines and applies multiple methodologies in order to understand and evaluate public health and social programs—is more likely to be effective than those approaches with a single focus. The quantitative data supported the stories and the mothers’ stories illustrated in a meaningful way the results summarized by the statistics.

The paid community health workers, “Programa de Agentes Comunitarios” (P.A.C.s), all of them women, were part of a state government program started in 1987, and now operating in 182 of the 183 municipalities in Ceará, covering both rural and urban areas. They were all trained by nurses, and some of them had become leaders in their communities.

“It helps the women they work with, but it’s also very empowering to the women themselves. They gain a vast store of empirical knowledge. They may have always been born leaders and helped and given advice, but the program meant that they were being officially acknowledged by the system.”

Community health workers visit each of their assigned 50 to 250 families regularly to provide health and nutrition education, weigh children under two years of age and collect health and vital statistics once a month. Terra de Souza used the P.A.C.s data for part of her research in evaluating variations in infant mortality and undernutrition among municipalities in Ceará. In the process of designing the research, Terra de Souza worked two summers before the actual field research for the verbal autopsy project, one of them with a grant from DRCLAS. Terra de Souza and the P.A.C.s program officials realized that while statistics were helpful in assessing the community impact of various programs, they provided no information on the actual circumstances of infant deaths.

Thus, Terra de Souza designed and implemented the verbal autopsy study, integrating quantitative and qualitative techniques to investigate in-depth the circumstances of infant deaths, and specifically mothers’ health care seeking behaviors during their infants’ fatal illnesses.

The interviews took place in 11 different municipalities, and involved both closed-end and open-ended questions on the causes and circumstances of death, use of indigenous remedies, and on contacts with health care providers during the terminal illness. The mothers interviewed were asked about the illness that led to the infant’s death and the events and barriers associated with seeking health care. Most mothers described symptoms such as unexplained crying, high temperature, vomiting, loose stools, and serious breathing difficulties as reasons for seeking treatment.

According to Terra de Souza, three themes emerged from the open-ended interviews: delay in seeking medical care, delay in receiving medical care, and ineffective medical care.

Over and over again, mothers told of frustrated attempts to get appropriate care. “...He had diarrhea for several days. I sought treatment at the health center. The doctor examined him, prescribed some medicine, and told me that he needed intensive care not available. He was referred to a hospital in the neighboring municipality...but, when I got to the hospital, I was told it was too late, that there wasn’t anything they could do at the hospital to keep him from dying...” one mother told Terra de Souza and a community health worker.

The infant died at home two days later.

Despite the sadness of the stories, they also led to clues for improvement. Given that most infant deaths are due to diarrhea and respiratory infections, and that delays in seeking treatment for these conditions are common, health education and communication efforts for child survival can help underscore the severe nature of these diseases in young infants, with emphasis on the need to start oral rehydration therapy as soon as possible.

Terra de Souza also learned from her interaction with the mothers and the community health workers was that “long-term strategies that address the social and economic conditions in which these deaths happen are necessary.”

“This research reaffirmed for me that the importance of doing research is zero if there is no community involvement,” she said. “The community health workers had a better understanding of all these multiple factors. They learned from my questions, but I also learned from theirs. I came to ask about the medical system, but they’re telling me about their traditional healers. I became so aware of my perspective as a middle-class woman. It was this interaction and this dialogue that was empowering for all of us. We groped at the complexity from both sides. Even though I’m Brazilian, I thought, well, it’s a simple matter. It’s because they’re poor and don’t know the scientific basis of things. But what I learned is that with all their constraints, they do their best.”

“Right now, I am preparing to go back to Ceará to report on the findings of the research at both state and local levels,” concludes Terra de Souza. “I have been working on ways to develop community forum methods to involve groups of people from different sectors of communities to set issue agendas and identify acceptable actions. I believe that even though crucial, this "last" phase of the research, dissemination of results, is often overlooked.”
Human Rights and Health in Latin America

Socio-Cultural Reflections in Epidemiology

BY KRISTIAN HEGGENHOUGEN

Development strategies that attempt to make improvements in the lives of the rural poor without addressing the underlying structural causes of poverty serve to deflect attention away from the real needs of impoverished communities.

(Linda Green, Medical Anthropology Review, 1989)

ANTHROPOLOGISTS, involved as we are with trying to understand the lives of people within their local worlds, must be poignantly aware of the growing pauperization of the world and of the global forces which affect the everyday lives of people in the local communities we study. This is particularly pertinent for those of us who are concerned with issues of health and the various forms of human suffering, as we try to understand how best to assist local populations.

In 1994, Vincente Navarro spoke metaphorically and dramatically but, I believe, not incorrectly, when he stated that the equivalent of twenty nuclear bombs explode every year in Latin America without making a sound. From all accounts, they are more numerous today. There is violence in the world, in all parts of the world, and quite clearly so in Latin America and the Caribbean. Civil wars, homicide from a whole range of motives, torture (whether state sponsored or not), rape and a pervasive climate of fear in the lives of all too many (hundreds and hundreds of thousands of too many) have been a part of recent and current Latin American history. In a country such as Colombia, the national homicide rate is said to be many times higher than in New York City. These human rights abuses quite clearly explain a great deal of the epidemiological—physical and mental health—patterns of people’s suffering in these countries.

Structural adjustment policies are enforced on most developing countries. We are told, however, that this is “structural adjustment with a human face.” I am not convinced. Or rather, the evidence I read increasingly convinces me that this human face is not the smiling child’s face we see on the cover of books, but rather a crying face—the crying face of a child in misery.

The strength of anthropology is that we deal with ‘human faces,’ we come close to the everyday lives of people—the specific, the local—and we depict (and expose) this local world, to ourselves, back to those we study, and, perhaps more importantly, to a more general public, including policy makers....

It is not innovative for me to strongly urge, once again, that we focus on the inter-connections between the local worlds of the human faces and the global forces which very directly affect individual lives. But it bears repeating that we must constantly inter-relate the immediate and local with the global and pervasive if we are to truly understand why things are the way they are for the many, relatively small groups of people among whom we work as “stranger and friends.”

This does not mean we should forego our strength—our involvement with local worlds in favor of the global/macro. The sources of the impetus for change are many and are often rooted in specific, local community-based activities. We must do both: we must ring the alarm bells, make the connections, point to the overwhelming forces and the overall statistics, as well as “show” the human faces.

Though not to be forgotten, the focus must shift from specific vectors and the so-called unhealthy behaviors of people, to examining the total condition of people’s lives—the context (as anthropologists emphasize) in which people have to live their everyday lives.

It is not particularly fashionable to speak of social pathologies when discussing health patterns, especially for marginalized groups. People’s eyes glaze over, and they throw their hands up in despair, when “poverty” is wheeled out as the underlying, root cause of disease. The problem, then,
becomes too overwhelming, the required tasks too difficult. But, though difficult, the evidence for such a connection—for the social and human rights roots of disease—is inescapable.

In the past 20 years, the health indices in Latin America have improved, and some countries have promoted social welfare as well as immunization programs and improved health services which have been quite effective. But differences exist within the region—with Costa Rica, Chile and Colombia doing quite well, while Bolivia, Haiti and Guatemala continue at the lower end of the scale. What we must also keep in mind, however, is that traditional indicators of health and well being, such as infant mortality rates, are not always the best measures of the increased suffering experienced by a growing proportion of marginalized people.

While maintaining that the most significant health risk factors are socioeconomic and a matter of obtaining and ensuring basic human rights, inappropriate health services are also accountable. Unnecessary services, usually involving the use of expensive, sophisticated health technologies, consume one-fourth to one-third of the region’s $40 billion annual expenditure on health care. These services have little relevance to the most pressing needs of Latin America’s people. The balance between primary care and more complex services was inappropriate before the (economic) crisis, which appears to have made it still worse. As a result, around 700,000 deaths occur each year that could have been avoided if the resources already available in the region were better allocated and utilized.

More important than the differences between countries are these differences within countries—largely as a result of what can be called “functional apartheid.” During the years 1980 to 1991 inequality between the two sectors and the rest of society has particularly increased in Argentina, Mexico, Guatemala, Venezuela, Brazil and Peru but has decreased in Costa Rica, Colombia and Chile, according to 1995 World Bank data. The Zapatistas have called world-wide attention to the dire situation of the majority of the people of the Mexican state of Chiapas which, according to United Nations Development and Population (UNDP) statistics, has a Human Development Index (HDI) of 77 compared to one of 107 for the most affluent Mexican state of Nuevo León. The disparities within Brazil are even worse. “The socio-economic indicators in North-East Brazil point to the potential for considerable trouble. The region lags behind the more prosperous South in every respect: the disparity between the two regions is 17 years in life expectancy, 33 percentage points in adult literacy and $2,000 (40%) in real GDP per capita,” states a 1997 UNDP report.

By and large, anthropologists working within public health, and in collaboration with epidemiologists, have concentrated on the significance of cultural factors in explaining epidemiological patterns and in promoting successful public health interventions. In the most negative sense anthropologists have been used historically to find the culturally appropriate buttons to push to market preconceived “effective and necessary” public health interventions. In a more positive light anthropologists have been interpreters and intermediaries ensuring that public health interventions were mutually agreed upon and culturally appropriate.

Cultural patterns or practices do, of course, influence disease patterns—culturally sanctioned diets, roles for women, and the like all imply certain health risks or protection. Similarly, anthropologists’ concerns with the importance of understanding such concepts as the hot/cold dichotomies and the importance of “balance,” so prevalent for many groups in Latin America, have also enhanced public health efforts and patient-doctor relationships—the alliances with both individual patients and communities. Other contributions have related to the health impact of the stresses on immigrant and refugee populations and the relationship between degrees of acculturation and health.

But our concern must also include human rights and socio-economic (class) issues. Violence resulting from the structure of de-facto apartheid (of “otherness,” “segregation”). Whether such apartheid is official government policy or “only” functional makes little difference to those for whom it is a fact of their everyday lives.

A medical or public health program of any positive consequence, whether in Latin America or elsewhere must focus on, and grapple with, the national and international crisis which affects us all, and examine the root causes of inequity and the growing pauperization of the world. Our health—“theirs" and "ours" (which are intertwined)—depends on it.

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PARTNERS IN HEALTH

Parntes In Health spearheaded by Harvard Professors Paul Farmer and Jim Yong Kim, is a program committed to improving health in poor communities. Its goal is to make a “preferential option for the poor in health care” by working with community-based organizations in “pragmatic solidarity.” Towards this aim, PIH offers technical and financial assistance, obtains funding and medical supplies, and helps administer its partner projects.

Most of the work has been done in close association with sister organizations in Haiti, Peru, Mexico, and the United States, particularly in Roxbury.

Although founded in 1987, the roots of the organization go back to 1938 when work was begun in Haiti with a collective that is now called “Zanmi Lasante”—create for “partners in health.” In 1956, Haiti’s largest river was dammed as part of an international development project, flooding the village of Cange and leaving its residents homeless. For years, Cange consisted of a few shanties and a dispirited core of “water refugees,” who had been forced to move to less fertile land. Gradually, Zanmi Lasante and the people of Cange built a large school and completed a project to bring clean water to the dusty settlement. Cange began to resemble a real village. Partners in Health grew out of this work and determination.
Nicaraguan baby in a box is cared for by his older sister.

Poverty Blocks Economic Growth

BY JOHN H. COATSWORTH

LATIN AMERICA IS NOT THE POOREST REGION IN THE world. On average, most of Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia are poorer. But Latin America is the world’s most unequal region. Income and wealth are concentrated at the top; much less trickles down to the bottom than elsewhere.

These inequalities, however they are measured, represent an historic failure of truly epic proportions. Most of the Latin American countries now produce enough goods and services to lift most of their poor citizens out of extreme poverty and malnutrition. At comparable level of GDP per capita, other world regions have done so.

Of the Latin America’s 480 million inhabitants, more than 200 million, 38 percent of the region’s population, live in “poverty,” according to official statistics. Of that number, at least 100 million are “indigent,” so poor that if they spent their entire income on food, they would still lack essential nutrition. More than half of all rural people in Latin America are indigent. (For a summary of data from recent World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank studies, see p.5)

Inequality can be measured in many ways. One way is to look at the ratio of the earnings of the top 20 percent of income earners to the bottom 20 percent. In Sweden, Taiwan, and Cuba, the top 20 percent make four to five times on average as much as the bottom 20 percent. In the United States, the ratio is about 9 to 1. In Latin America the average is approximately 15 to 1. In some Latin American countries, like Brazil, Panama, and Guatemala, it’s over 30 to 1.

Another way of measuring inequality is to look at the distribution of assets. Assets can be tangible wealth, like real estate and stocks, or the “human capital” created by education. Wealth and human capital are also highly concentrated in Latin America.

When income and assets are more concentrated, poverty increases. That is, at any given level of productivity (GDP per capita), a Latin American country will have more poverty than a less unequal country elsewhere.

Similar conditions once afflicted many of today’s...
developed countries. The Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century raised GNP but initially lowered living standards. In the United States, for example, the decline in the physical welfare of the population was visible to the naked eye. The average height of adult native-born males fell by five centimeters beginning with the cohort born in the 1790s. North Americans did not recover their 1790 stature until the 1920s.

Like the United States, many European and Asian countries also experienced prolonged periods of declining or stagnant living standards during the early stages of economic growth. Unlike these other regions, however, the Latin America countries have yet to make the transition to more equitable distribution and less poverty. Latin America remains locked into higher levels of inequality and poverty at much higher levels of per capita GNP than any other region.

Most governments did not start collecting data on income distribution or poverty until sometime in this century. For earlier centuries, historians now use data on the average (mean) height or stature of a population. Stature provides an excellent measure of "net nutrition" that is, total or gross nutrition minus what is needed to ward off disease and work for a living. This is because human stature at equal levels of net nutrition does not vary from one racial or ethnic group to another (even though individual height can vary).

The widespread myth in Latin America that indigenous peoples are genetically shorter than Europeans or mestizos is false. Differences in height between population groups are due mainly to differences in net nutrition, especially in the first three years of childhood and during adolescent growth spurts. Where children and adolescents are exposed to more disease, lack access to adequate medical care, or engage in stressful or strenuous work, more nutrition is needed to achieve the same stature.

Differences in the stature of racial, ethnic, and social groups in Latin America, like anywhere else, are mainly attributable to differences in net nutrition. Such differences used to be common in today's developed countries. In 1800, the titled nobility of England stood a full five inches taller than the English population as a whole. Today, the difference is less than one inch and scarcely noticeable. Aristocrats and commoners are both taller today than in 1800, but the benefits of better diet were concentrated at the lower end of the income scale.

In 1800, the English population consumed a little more than 2,000 calories per day, slightly less than the average for Latin America today. At this level, historians have estimated that roughly 20 percent of the adult population was too malnourished to work. Of the 80 percent available for work, most could not have worked at anything like the intensity of the modern workplace.

Improved nutrition helped fuel the British economy. Economic historian Robert William Fogel, in his Nobel Prize Lecture in 1994, estimated that 30 percent of the increase in the per capita product of Great Britain between 1790 and 1980 was due solely to improvements in gross nutrition. Improvements in public health and access to medical care made additional contributions to growth by enabling people to use more calories for work because they needed fewer to fight disease.

Economists and policymakers usually see poverty reduction as important for reducing the risk of violence or political instability, easing pressures for inflationary increases in government spending, and broadening markets for manufactured goods. Historical calculations like those of Fogel suggest that poverty reduction may be crucial in much more direct ways to achieving economic growth. With a large proportion of the population too poorly nourished to work or to work at modern levels of intensity, economic growth in Latin America could be held back for many years to come unless governments in the region develop more effective ways of reducing poverty than they have yet implemented.

Conversely, relatively small steps to reduce inequality by raising the income of the poorest citizens in the region could produce large improvements in their physical welfare and contribute disproportionately to economic growth. Such improvements could be achieved directly through income transfers (pensions, poor relief, food stamps, nutrition supplements) or indirectly through increased investment in education, public health, medical attention for vulnerable populations, and the like.

In much of the region, however, public expenditures on social programs have not yet recovered to the per capita levels achieved before the financial and economic crisis of the early 1980s. Nor has the long-awaited "second generation" of reforms to make government more efficient and effective in its core functions yet to produce many results.

The restoration of democratic regimes in the 1980s coincided with enormous progress in opening markets, containing inflation, and eliminating wasteful subsidies to inefficient public enterprises. But the region's historic failure to invest adequately in its own people continues to act as a drag on economic growth.

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Democracy and Difference
Midwives and Market Vendors in Juchitán, Mexico

BY JEFFREY W. RUBIN

WHAT ANIMATES STRUGGLES FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE AND makes democratization possible? The southern Mexican city of Juchitán offers the paradoxical lesson that difference and disruption can foster the establishment of multifaceted democracy. Democracy occurred in Juchitán not because Western cultural and economic practices proceeded apace there, but because the outside was kept out in significant ways in the twentieth century and Zapotec Indians mobilized politically at the borders of violence.

A Zapotec political movement, the Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of the Isthmus, or COCEI, has governed Juchitán since 1989. COCEI administers social welfare funds for the city of 100,000 with widely acknowledged efficiency, promotes Zapotec language and culture, and mobilizes poor people around pressing economic issues. COCEI secured this right to govern through fifteen years of militant grassroots activism that combined direct action mobilizations with electoral participation. As a result of its opposition to the Mexican regime, COCEI faced brutal killings and military occupation. Since 1989, in contrast, Mexican authorities have respected the results of elections in Juchitán, invested in municipal services, and curbed human rights abuses, outcomes that are particularly noteworthy in light of decades of polarized conflict in nearby Chiapas and Central America.

COCEI's political mobilizations have been accompanied by extensive Zapotec cultural and artistic elaboration. Juchitecos have practiced and reinvented Zapotec painting, literature, music, dress, and ritual practice, interacting with and borrowing from national and international artistic currents.
Zapotec market women and businesspeople have similarly engaged the outside with margins of success unusual in poor regions of Mexico. In the course of these cultural and economic interactions, Juchitecos have disagreed vehemently among themselves about how much of the outside to embrace and on what terms. Through these disagreements, Zapotec culture and political life have continually been recast.

In this context, COCEI’s internal characteristics and its role as governing party have been tempestuous and contradictory. As a non-violent movement, it has incited turbulence and threat. While claiming to be democratic, it has limited dissent and reached internal decisions non-democratically, while at the same time reinvigorating electoral competition for public office. As municipal administration, it has paved streets and installed drainage honestly and transparently, while neglecting to develop new leadership and forward-looking economic programs.

Juchitán suggests that democracy arises through mobilization and threat and that movements for social justice may combine, and indeed be animated by, both praiseworthy and negative characteristics. The interaction between Zapotec culture and Western democratic discourse has (re)produced difference and conflict and also brought about unprecedented democratic innovation. The autonomy of Zapotec culture and the ability of Juchitecos to interact with the outside from a position of strength were key ingredients in these transformations.

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Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas
A Century of Sub-Citizenship

BY BRODWYN FISHER

SOME TIME IN LATE 1897 OR EARLY 1898, a ragged and desperately poor group of ex-soldiers returning from the Canudos war in the northeastern state of Bahia received permission from their superiors to set up residence on a steep hillside near the center of Rio de Janeiro. The hillside, or morro, was not entirely uninhabited; it seems that its lower flanks were already occupied by the rudimentary shacks of large numbers of people whose tenement homes had been destroyed by Rio’s municipal health authorities over the course of the 1890s. It was only with the arrival of the soldiers and their families, however, that this small shacktown first earned a name, and, along with it, controversial notoriety as the prototype of a new, completely extra-legal form of housing for the city’s urban poor. The name came from the scrubby vegetation that covered the hill, commonly called ‘favela’ in the homelands of the soldiers’ Bahian wives. The controversy surrounding the establishment of Rio’s favela marked the beginning of a century of contentious and often violent disputes about the living arrangements, moral character, and civic rights of favela dwellers—disputes which, to this very day, reveal the high legal barriers that restrict the progress of Rio’s poorest residents towards full political, social, and economic citizenship.

In the hundred years since Rio’s first favela earned its name, nearly 600 others have come to share it, and the word has become the repository of more social prejudice and polemic than nearly any other in the Portuguese language. City planners, social workers, journalists, and middle- and upper-class residents of nearly every social and political stripe have condemned the favelas; even a relatively mild list of this invective would include such terms as ‘excruciating ulcers of human misery,’ ‘concentrations of vagabonds, thieves, and disorderly characters,’ ‘places whose climate fosters the disintegration of the human personality,’ ‘hotbeds of communism and political demagoguery,’ and ‘dens of vicious bandits.’ Although poverty, poor sanitary conditions, crime, desperation, political radicalism, and drug use in Rio have never been concentrated exclusively—or even mostly—in the favelas, the city’s shantytowns have always been a sort of symbolic vessel for collective social fears related to these phenomena.

Perhaps because of this, throughout the 20th century, Rio’s favelas have been treated by policymakers as extra-legal, irregular settlements, whose residents were viewed more as problems to be solved than as citizens with rights to be respected and needs to be met. Favelas have been torn down, burned up, threatened, and relocated; favela residents have been harassed and discriminated against; at best, until quite recently, shantytown residents have gained flimsy promises from politicians in exchange for electoral support. Although judges and lawyers were often willing to bend property laws, or even break them if necessary, in the interest of land developers or wealthier cariocas, scattered attempts by favela residents to claim rights of ownership over their lands mostly met with failure before the 1970s. Indeed, it was only in the 1960s that policymakers—pushed by elevating social pressure from favela residents themselves—even began to seriously consider the possibility that favela dwellers might have some actual, legal right to remain in their homes and receive the public services enjoyed by other cariocas. This fact is particularly revealing given that, under Brazilian law, many had earned these rights through decades of steady occupation. In general, despite the limited property rights won by some favela residents over the course of the last three decades, favelas continue to be the geographic expression of a more general exclusion of the very poor from the legal protections and guarantees taken for granted by more affluent cariocas.

Neither the condemnations nor the legal exclusion have gone unchallenged. From early in the 20th century,
Samba alone, however, could only go so far in dispelling the negative images surrounding Rio's favelas, and the brief glory of carnival certainly could not overshadow the legal insecurity, official neglect, and material deprivation that shaped the daily realities of favela life. Scattered attempts by social workers, academics, and church leaders to destroy what would come to be called the myth of marginality—the widely accepted view of favela dwellers as fundamentally parasitical beings incapable of participating in or contributing to the city's economic, political, and social life—met with similarly limited success. Many officials were willing to pay lip service to the notion that most favela dwellers were in fact honest, working people—indeed, they could hardly have done otherwise when confronted with statistics that began to prove as much from the 1940s on. But this positive view has always been undermined by underlying social and racial prejudices that continue to defy fact and logic in associating favelas and all of their residents with laziness, ignorance, squalor, immorality, and crime. Such contradictory beliefs largely explain the dramatic oscillations between accommodation and repression that have characterized public policy towards the favelas over the course of the last century.

Given such inconsistencies, favela residents and their scattered allies within civil society realized early on that they would have to rely on their own strength and creativity if they hoped to preserve their communities and what they perceived as their rights. In the first half of the century, tactics centered around moral appeals to government officials and private negotiations with municipal politicians. Favela residents argued that,
whatever the letter of the law may have indicated, their poverty and real need for centrally located housing outweighed any judicial or governmental claim. When such moral appeals failed—as they did, more often than not—residents would negotiate with individual politicians, aiming to exchange votes for temporary guarantees of the favelas’ permanence; alternately, they would strike bargains with individuals who claimed favela land as their own, agreeing to pay rent in exchange for peaceful habitation. These tactics were not always successful, and almost never resulted in permanent, legally recognized titles to favela land, but they did succeed in preserving the physical existence of most of Rio’s early favelas.

Around mid century, however, as rural migrants streamed into Rio’s burgeoning shantytowns, and as the interests of the favelas came into increasingly violent conflict with the ambitions of land developers and city planners, it became clear that such strategies would need to be refined if the settlements were to survive. The underlying moral logic of the residents’ claims remained essentially unchanged; it still juxtaposed the human rights of poor cariocas in desperate need of housing against the rights of private individuals and government entities to profit from legally sanctioned land ownership. But the sporadic unions of favela dwellers that had previously organized only around concrete threats to their existence now developed into semi-permanent community organizations, which employed increasingly sophisticated legal and political tactics to hold on to their land, gain access to city services, and forge crucial alliances both with other favelas and with political factions and church groups willing to support their moral claims. When all else failed, and particularly when it became clear that favela residents were hopelessly outnumbered in most legal contests, the shantytown dwellers resorted to the sheer force of determination and numbers. They sent groups of women and children to block the paths of bulldozers sent to raze many favelas in the wealthy southern regions of the city; they re-built any homes that were destroyed before supposed land owners could lay physical claim to the area; and, at last resort, many simply moved from one favela settlement to another rather than agreeing to be sent to distant, substandard housing as many government officials would have wished.

Above all, many favela residents seem to have concluded that they would have to rely on one another—and not on official legal or political networks—to regulate, protect, and develop their shantytown communities. In many cases, these convictions have persisted even after some favela residents succeeded in establishing legal title to their properties and gaining access to myriad city services. A dynamic that began with the exclusion of shantytown residents from the circle of protections and guarantees extended to more affluent citizens of Rio de Janeiro has ended with the favela dwellers’ exclusion of official authority—physical, moral, and political—from their own communities.

Such are the origins of the much discussed ‘cidade partida,’ or divided city, that Rio has become today. The tragic consequences of this division are clear enough as Rio approaches the century’s end. Drug gangs have virtually taken over many favelas, whose residents live in constant fear of both the drug lords and the police forces that alternately collaborate and violently battle them. Many residents still have no legal claim to their homes, and live in a state of constant insecurity that is only compounded by the terrible physical conditions that still remain the norm in many favelas. More than 100 years after Rio’s first favela earned its name, most residents can still only imagine a time in which they will have equal access to the guarantees and protections that go with full Brazilian citizenship. It remains to be seen whether national and municipal authorities will allow another century to pass before they are capable of granting it.

It was only in the 1960’s that policymakers even began to seriously consider the possibility that favela dwellers might have some actual, legal right to remain in their homes.
HACIA Democracy
Social Justice and Democracy in Latin America
BY MERCEDES HINTON

As I walked around the Harvard campus on a characteristically cold slushy day in February 1996, I spotted several bright posters with slanted palm trees, inviting students interested in Latin America to sunny Panama the following January. This appeal prompted me to apply to become a member of HACIA Democracy in my sophomore year. I had little idea of what I was getting into or what HACIA Democracy did or stood for beyond the fact that it involved writing a 20-page research paper that would entitle me to travel for free with the group to Panama for a government simulation conference. Learning some time later that HACIA Democracy was an acronym for the Harvard Association Cultivating Inter-American Democracy gave me a better idea of what the organization was but I still felt unable to explain it to anyone else.

Two years later, as president of the organization, those days seem very far away indeed. Our efforts recently culminated in EXPO 1998, hosted by the University of Panama in Panama City March 20-24. More than 200 participants from Latin America, the United States, and Canada listened attentively as Panama’s First Lady H.E. Dora Boyd de Prez Ballard delivered the inaugural address.

At this conference, as at my first, I experienced HACIA Democracy as a forum for students from all over Latin America to propose and discuss realistic solutions to important issues as varied as the Panama Canal transition, malnutrition, faceless tribunals, and women’s issues in Chile. I watched students accomplish these tasks through democratic processes of cooperation, consensus, and compromise. We had the opportunity to learn about issues, social groups, and cultures through active involvement and participation, rather than through textbooks and lectures.

The full meaning behind HACIA Democracy’s activities, however, did not become really apparent to me until I attended my first conference in January 1997. The night before we left for Panama I was terrified; I was getting ready to fly to another country for a week with 25 Harvard students I barely knew to stay with a host family I did not know, for a conference whose purpose I was still unsure of.

I was a part of the committee which simulated the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States. Almost a year prior to the 1997 conference, I had written a 20-page research paper on violence against street children in Brazil. This paper was mailed to the students in my committee several months before the conference to frame the issue in a socio-political context and to serve as a guide for further student research. When the discussions and debates on this issue began at the conference, I was astounded at how seriously the students took their role-playing and at how well prepared they were.

Fifteen year-olds were making impassioned, sophisticated speeches on the problems street children faced in Brazil. They discussed the military dictatorship’s legacy on the judicial system and on the structure of the military police force in Brazil; the effects of rapid industrialization; socio-economic problems of poverty and inequality; as well as Brazil’s federative constitution which delegated almost all law enforcement duties to the state governments. Later, when the students were debating another issue relating to women and economic development, one young boy stood up and made a fiery plea for the need to change cultural attitudes which relegated women to inferiority. The students worked hard for five days to reach consensus on their debate, passing numerous amendments to their resolutions while struggling to accommodate dissenting views, and to convince their peers.
As I watched these proceedings in amazement, the relevance and importance of HACIA Democracy became clear to me. These students had spent close to a year preparing for each conference and were required to do extensive research on committee topics, frame position papers, and prepare tenable arguments often from the viewpoint of many different national and economic perspectives. Once at the conference, students actually experienced the democratic process and the inter-American system as they role-played ambassadors, government ministers, senators, representatives, judges, and lawyers. Being half Argentine and having spent a great deal of time studying and traveling throughout Latin America, the importance of what I witnessed at my first HACIA conference, in terms of its efforts to encourage democratic participation from the bottom up, was not lost on me.

Although most Latin American nations are now governed by different forms of electoral democracy, the consolidation of democracy in this region has not been as widespread. Freedom House surveys, which measure freedom by the level of political rights such as the right to reply, opposition, and participation, as well as the level of civil liberties, have shown declines in freedom throughout Latin America. Much of the region continues to suffer from personalistic rule, weak parties, corruption and human rights violations. True democratic consolidation requires more than compliance with outward formal manifestations of democracy such as universal suffrage, elected officials, and free elections; a participatory citizenry deeply committed to safeguarding democratic principles is also needed to give meaning and stability to democratic institutions. By targeting the youth of this region, many of whom will be future leaders in their countries, HACIA Democracy endeavors to contribute to the spread of a democratic political culture in Latin America.

My first HACIA conference formed a lasting impression on me and prompted me to seek the presidency of the organization. After becoming president, I realized that much of the confusion I had experienced when first joining the organization arose from the fact that the organization had been only 2 years old and had not yet struck a balance between idealism and practicality. Together with my executive board, for the past year and a half, I have worked to create a more firmly institutionalized organization whose vision and purpose was clear from the outset to its members and to those who participate in its programs.

Efforts were made to involve the HACIA staff in more organizational aspects of the conference ranging from recruitment to writing press releases so that they could get a sense of what HACIA was about and what it did. Additionally, a Host Country Committee of students was created in order to enable students from the Host Country to exercise a voice in HACIA Democracy and play an important leadership role in the planning of the conference. By changing the dates of registration and of the conference to better fit the Latin American academic schedule, we were able to dramatically expand recruitment, and were successful in tripling our number of sponsors—among them American University, the Pan American Health Organization, and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University.

This year's conference featured simulations of the Organization of American States, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), an international court, a trilateral treaty committee, a domestic legislature, and a constitutional convention. Distinguished speakers from various international and domestic institutions also participated in conference activities, including Alberto Alemán, administrator, Panama Canal Commission, Dr. Claudio Grossman, a recent president of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Dr. Suki Hoagland, Professor and Director of American University's International Environment and Development semester, and Dr. Gustavo García de Paredes, Rector of the University of Panama.

Conference activities are aimed to make student participants eager to participate in the civic life of their communities and to expose them to the variety of perspectives, cultures, and complex policy puzzles in today's international community. Ironically, HACIA Democracy has had the same effect on me as well. Perhaps most fitting is the fact that throughout the course of its development as an organization, HACIA Democracy has experienced many of the very challenges of multi-lateral negotiations, of compromise and consensus building, and of balancing competing interests which are key elements in the democratic process explored by our conferences.

It is a long way from that blustery day in February, when democracy beckoned me to the hidden guise of a seductive palm tree. Now I understand, in a very first-hand way, the importance of civic participation for democracy both north and south of the border.

Mercedes Hinton is the president of HACIA Democracy and is a senior concentrating in Government. She hopes to continue her studies of democracy and development at the graduate school level next year. For further information on HACIA Democracy, check out the website <http://www.bcs.harvard.edu/~haciadem/>. 
A Lexicon of Terror
Argentina and the Legacy of Terror

A New Book by Marguerite Feitlowitz
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1998)

REVIEW BY ANA MARÍA AMAR SÁNCHEZ

How can one narrate the unspeakable? The unimaginable, the horror? This question is always raised when one talks about testimonies and tales of holocausts. Both history and literary criticism have faced the theoretical and ethical challenge of representing that which cannot be represented: those horrors that have no words at all to "signify" them. More than thirty years after the horrors of Nazism, the dilemma is repeated with the South American dictatorships of the 1970s. The Argentine military dictatorship that devastated the country between 1976 and 1983 vividly actualizes the difficulties of narrating an understandable tale of terror.

This book by Marguerite Feitlowitz, Preceptor in Expository Writing at Harvard, explores a point that has seldom been examined in the analysis of this period; the way in which, precisely, language and terror were linked, the use of language to further terror and the legacy left by that vocabulary in testimonies and memory; the remnants of a new lexicon that gave different meanings to words and changed them forever. The perversion of language was one of the most subtle forms of terror. It operated in several ways: it left its victims without words, both during the time of censorship and afterwards, when to recall—to remember—was, and is, another form of torture that makes narrative impossible. But, in addition, and this perhaps has been the most perverted use of language, the military government imposed a verbal discourse in which words took on different meanings and buried other senses of the words, a tactic designed to cover up, obfuscate, and confuse. Language became a schizophrenic system in which each term could and should—

if one wanted to preserve a bit of sanity—be read with opposite meanings. Moreover, an entirely "metaphoric" language, elaborated by the torturers, provided a vocabulary for the unnamable. Feitlowitz studies and analyzes this use of language as a means of making horror more "natural" and as a significant component in the construction of a supposed "normal reality."

The investigation is made up of five chapters; the preface and introduction inform the reader about the way in which Feitlowitz developed her research and provides the historical-political context of the dictatorship. Both the preface and the introduction are valuable to two different types of audiences: Argentine readers, who know the facts, but will find a new focus in this text, and foreign readers who will find basic, but not banal, information with which to orient themselves.

Each of the chapters concentrates on some aspect in which this relationship between terror and language is manifested in this military regime, "Brutal, sadistic, and rapacious, the whole regime was intensely verbal. From the moment of the coup, there was a constant torrent of speeches, proclamations, and interviews; even certain military memos were made public." (p. 17). Based on her investigations and on extensive interviews with survivors and family members of the disappeared, the author reconstructs the "lexicon of terror" as expressed in slogans, magazines, propaganda, and daily language. The second chapter, "Night and Fog", focuses on the world of the concentration camps and its communication codes. The next chapters discuss forms of terror suffered by the Argentine Jewish community, the peasants, and the society at large (divided into those who survived the daily horror and those who "didn't know anything"). This work—which provides outstanding documentation—concludes with a chapter about the "Scilingo Effect": the impact of the words of a repentant torturer who in 1995 publicly confessed on television about his participation in death flights. His confession provoked a return of that which had been repressed in Argentine society now confronted with the other face—the explicit—of the lexicon of terror.

Feitlowitz' book is particularly important because it focuses on an aspect of the dictatorship that has barely been examined, and it does so with seriousness and rigor. But, moreover, it is important because this aspect—the perverse use of language—allows one to glimpse the daily horror, made banal, in which the Argentine populace lived for almost a decade. It was this instrumentalization of language that covered up a "perfect" mechanism for murder. Finally, this book which analyzes the power of the word, the perverse force that words acquired in the hands of state terrorism, arrives on the scene to powerfully incorporate its word with all the other discourses that have been struggling in the last years to eliminate the forgetting, the silence, the amnesia, that those in power would yet once again impose on this history of horror, this legacy of death.

Ana María Amar Sánchez is Associate Professor of Romance Languages and Literatures at Harvard University.
Violence in Latin America

Violence—like most diseases—is caused by a complex network of factors," said Rodrigo Guerrero, a medical doctor, researcher, and violence-prevention activist. “Our challenge is to understand as many of those factors as possible, plan some interventions to address them, try them out, and see what we learn.” In short, Guerrero is trying to figure out the epidemiology of violence and then do something about it.

Developing such a strategy was one of the main themes of a two-day conference organized by the David Rockefeller Center in February on violence and violence prevention in Latin America. It was an intense mingling of Harvard and outside communities with the objective of linking serious research from different disciplines to address the growing waves of violence in many Latin American cities.

Harvard faculty included professors from anthropology and social medicine, business and law, public policy and public health, and education and economics. Those from outside Harvard were just as diverse a group: from North, South, and Central America, theorists and practitioners, those who had endured the sound of whizzing bullets in Cali, Colombia, and those who had suffered the same sounds on the streets of Roxbury, Massachusetts.

Violence in Latin America is not just about domestic abuse or family problems, it is also about political instability, civil wars, impunity, corruption, lack of social control and drug traffic.

—Alberto Concho-Eastman,
Santo Domingo Visiting Scholar

The conference entitled “Violence in Latin America: Policy Implications from Studies on the Attitudes and Costs of Violence” was co-sponsored by DRCLAS, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Development Bank, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation. Actively participating were also representatives from the World Bank and United Nations organizations.

The first study, commissioned by PAHO, examined the attitudes and cultural norms that cause people to be violent. The ACTIVA study, an acronym for Attitude and Cultural Study on Violence, compiled interviews from a sample of 10,821 people in eight Latin American cities. It attempted to measure attitudes such as aggression and to determine risk factors that make people act in a violent fashion.

The second study on the Magnitude and Costs of Violence was sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank. The investigation attempted to provide a systematic analysis of the magnitude and scope of the problem of violence, examining both its direct and indirect costs.

“From both of these studies, you will have opportunities to discuss the implications for designing policy and effective interventions,” Harvard Provost Harvey Fineberg told participants at the outset of the conference. “You will hear from Harvard faculty members about their own work on violence and violence prevention. This includes exploring the use of media in creative ways to change attitudes and behaviors toward violence; comprehensive, community-based violence-prevention initiatives in urban centers here in the US; and innovative strategies building partnerships for violence prevention.”

For example, for more than 20 years the Harvard Medical School and the Harvard School of Public Health have collaborated in a number of community health development projects co-directed by Drs. Rodrigo Guerrero from Cali, Colombia and Dieter Koch-Weser from the Harvard Medical School. These initiatives have now evolved into a new initiative with Guerrero, Koch-Weser and Ron Slaby from the Graduate School of Education working together to develop a school-based violence prevention project in Cali.

The two-day conference also provided for a dynamic and interactive exchange of opinions and experiences, as well as an informative presentation of the data collected in the two studies.

“Violence is a learned behavior process,” observed Alberto Concho-Eastman, an epidemiologist from Cali who was part of the Inter-American Development Bank’s study team. “It is not inevitable; it is preventable and avoidable.”

“But violence in Latin America is not just about domestic abuse or family problems, it is also about political instability, civil wars, impunity, corruption, lack of social control, drug traffic and many other factors,” warned Concho-Eastman, who was a Santo Domingo Visiting Scholar at DRCLAS during the fall semester.

Harvard Professor of Anthropology David Maybury-Lewis and PAHO Director of Research Alberto Pelleni joined the panel on “Study of Attitudes and Cultural Norms about Violence (ACTIVA).” DRCLAS Director John Cousins chaired the session on “Study of the Magnitude and Costs of Violence.”

Speakers and respondents covered a wide area of disciplines, ranging from Arthur Kleinman, Head of Harvard’s Department of Social Medicine, to Roger Fisher, negotiation specialist and Harvard Law School Professor emeritus, to Rodney Daley, a former gang member and founder of Gang Peace in Roxbury.

“Violence has emerged in recent years as a major obstacle to social and economic development in the Americas. It is a human tragedy of rapidly growing dimensions, that is increasingly moving across traditional boundaries,” observed Provost Fineberg.

“On a more hopeful note, we are also learning that some violence prevention initiatives and policies do work. Well-developed and evaluated interventions have been proven successful both here in U.S. and in other countries—so there is much to share and much to learn. This conference is an attempt to create a space for serious dialogue across disciplines with both researchers and practitioners doing important work on this problem.”

—JCE

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Transnationalism and the Second Generation

TRANSCATIONALISM AND THE SECOND GENERATION, a two-day conference April 3 and 4, examined the changing nature of immigration in the United States and the increasingly interactive ties between this country and the country of origin. The conference, co-sponsored by the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, was organized by Wellesley College Sociology Professor and WCFIA associate Peggy Levitt and Harvard Professor of Sociology Mary Waters.

"These strong, widespread ties turn migrants and non-migrants into transnational actors who live some aspects of their lives in two contexts, though not always simultaneously or with equal force, explains Levitt. "What is different about contemporary migration is that new technology, ease of travel, heightened economic and political interdependence and sending-state policies often heighten the intensity and frequency of these connections. Increasing macro-level economic, political and cultural interdependence mean that these transnational ties are likely to deepen and spread."

The idea for the conference proposal grew from Levitt's and Water's conversations about such questions as whether second generation immigrants will participate socially, politically, and religiously in the places that their parents come from or simply become ethnic Americans. Levitt and Waters believe their conversations mirror larger debates among scholars of immigration and race and ethnicity, and decided to bring together a small group of scholars to discuss them. The conference focused on the following questions: "To what extent can we speak about second generation transnationalism? What does it look like? How do we distinguish it from other forms of identity? How does it manifest itself in everyday social, political, and religious life? What do we know about second generation transnationalism among earlier arriving immigrants and how do their experiences compare to contemporary groups?"

Transnational culture was examined both in general contexts and specific to particular cultures. For example, Nina Glick Schiller, an anthropologist at the University of New Hampshire, and Georges Fouron, a professor of behavioral science at SUNY, Stony Brook, explored the degrees to which Haitian youth in Aux Cayes, Haiti, and New York City are participants in transnational practices and discourses.

"Understanding that the old world does not stand separate from the new, we question previous definitions of the second generation and include within the second generation all those who have been born after a transmigrational migration process has been established, whether they live in the sending or the receiving country," they observed. "Hence both young people who now live in Georges' hometown of Aux Cayes, as well as his children, the children of his peers, and the Haitian youth he teaches at college in New York are part of this second generation, wherever these young people were born. Once a migration is established in which immigrants maintain multiple familial, economic, social, religious, and political connections back home, children in the sending country grow up in a world shaped by transnational connections. Even if they themselves do not have family abroad, their environment and political consciousness is shaped by the constant interchange of goods and services that take place around them and the changed patterns of consumption and expectation of their peers."

Diane L. Wolf, associate professor of sociology at the University of California, Davis, took an intriguing look at a very different population, second generation Filipinos.

"What is surprising in this case," she found, "is the high level of Filipino assimilation and economic success in the United States when compared to other immigrant groups, juxtaposed with the despair, alienation, and unhappiness experienced by a significant proportion of youth."

Other conference speakers included Philip Kasinitz, Hunter College and the Graduate Center at CUNY; Diane Wolf, University of California, Davis; Parminder Bachu, Clark University; Jean Bacon, Williams College; Ruben Rumbaut, Russell Sage Foundation; Milton Vickerman, University of Virginia; and Nina Glick Schiller, University of New Hampshire.

Discussions included, among others, Nancy Foner, SUNY, Purchase; Joel Perlman, Bard College; Susan Eckstein, Boston University; Michael Jones-Correa, Harvard University; Reed Ueda, Tufts University, and Marcelo Suárez-Orozco, Harvard University.

—JCE
“Cuba Today”: Miracle or Mirage

BY KATHLEEN O’NEILL

MIRACLE OR MIRAGE? A CONFERENCE co-sponsored by the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, and the Inter-American Dialogue, entitled “Cuba Today” explored this question in the context of recent events in Cuba. Debate centered on whether Cuba has experienced fundamental or merely cosmetic change, whether this change demands a policy response from the United States and, what form such a response should take. Panels on the Cuban economy and politics explored the depth of change and its meaning, while Bernard Cardinal Law and Ambassador James Dobbins made divergent proposals for the proper U.S. response.

“Any blueprint for a change in policy which demands a change in leadership in another country is too rigid a starting point and depending on the means willing to be used to achieve that departure, could lack a moral claim,” asserted Cardinal Law. “It is impossible to reasonably support the embargo against Cuba, while at the same time granting Most Favored Nation status to the People’s Republic of China, and while moving into closer relations with Vietnam… If openness is thought to further freedom in those nations where change is not so evident, how is that a different standard is applied to Cuba where there is evident change?”

While Cardinal Law emphasized short-term policies, including lifting the trade embargo against Cuba, Ambassador Dobbins focused on long-term policies to build Cuba’s civil society for an eventual transition to democracy.

Cardinal Law argued that the Pope’s visit represented a culmination of changes in Cuba and requires a U.S. response. He rejected the method by which we currently measure policy change in Cuba—whether or not Castro remains in power—as immoral and inaccurate. Indeed, he argued that the Pope’s visit should replace the Missile Crisis as the starting point for our policies toward Cuba. The Cardinal suggested concrete ways the Clinton administration could capitalize on this opportunity to turn something more than a mirage into something more akin to miracle. First, he called for the creation of a bipartisan commission on U.S.-Cuba relations. Second, he proposed several specific policies: (1) licensing direct flights to Cuba for humanitarian aid; (2) easing restrictions on remittances and travel between the U.S. and Cuba; (3) continued suspension of the trade bans required by the Helms-Burton law; and (4) an examination of whether or not the executive branch can grant general licenses for the sale of medicines and food to Cuba.

Ambassador Dobbins focused on the long-term goal of Cuba’s peaceful transition to democracy. Recognizing that the trade embargo has neither toppled Fidel Castro nor inaugurated Cuban democracy, he focused on the potential to use an easing of the embargo to support a democratizing regime once one emerges. While the Cardinal suggested that U.S. action could improve the chances for democracy in Cuba, Dobbins echoed current U.S. policy and argued that moves toward democracy within Cuba should precede a change in the U.S. position. He said that the U.S. experience with democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America and its commitment to financially support democratic movements in Cuba would play a key role in the transition. He described the dilemma of U.S. policy as “how to help Cuban people without helping the Cuban regime,” suggesting that the most important role we can play is to support the construction of Cuba’s civil society.

Disagreement over the nature of change was most striking among the economists. This panel debated whether the crisis period from 1989 to 1993 owed more to external factors such as the fall of the Soviet Union and the U.S. trade embargo or to poor internal management. While steps toward economic liberalization since 1993 were applauded by all panelists, some found more hope in these limited steps than others. Optimists emphasized the positive direction of changes (toward freer markets); skeptics focused on their limited scope and evidence that liberalization has slowed in the last two years.

The panel on politics also discussed signs of hope and reasons for caution. Recent changes in political institutions and leadership—such as the increase in young members of the Communist Party Central Committee—signal the potential for fundamental change in the future. Today change seems ephemeral; the opening of spaces for civil society in the last year particularly for religious groups—may not last. The panelists noted the growth in opposition group organizing and agreed that government control of economic life had diminished markedly. Panelists also noted the persistence of many obstacles to changes, including the strong role of the military.

Kathleen O’Neill is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Economy and Government. She was a teaching fellow for Jorge Dominguez’ Cuba Revolution course last semester and is presently the teaching fellow for Deborah Yashar’s course on Comparative Politics of Latin America.

Cuban Connections

SINCE ITS FOUNDING IN DECEMBER 1994, DRCLAS HAS WORKED to facilitate academic and cultural exchanges with Cuba. Cuban scholars have visited the Center for periods as long as a semester. Harvard faculty and students have conducted research with Center support in Cuba.

In early March of this year, for example, DRCLAS director John Coatsworth traveled to Cuba with a Harvard delegation to attend a meeting of historians at the Cienfuegos Provincial Archive. The group, which included former Massachusetts Congressman Chester Atkins, also visited the Cienfuegos Botanical Garden located adjacent to the Soledad sugar plantation that once belonged to the Atkins family. The Cienfuegos Provincial Archive contains the records of the Soledad plantation, expropriated by the Cuban government in 1961 as part of the Agrarian Reform proclaimed after the victory of the Rev-

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olution in 1959. The conference, organized by Archive Director Orlando García and University of Michigan historian Rebecca Scott, focused on the history of the Cienfuegos area during Cuba's independence wars (1868-78, 1895-98). A number of papers presented at the meeting used the Soledad plantation records to trace people and events during those turbulent years. Another meeting of historians is tentatively planned for the coming year.

Harvard's Program for Latin American Libraries and Archives (PLALA), which makes small (under $20,000) grants to help institutions preserve endangered collections, awarded a grant to the Cienfuegos Provincial Archive last spring. Archive director García visited Harvard in October and delivered a lecture on the "Cienfuegos Brigade," the locally-recruited regiment of mostly former slaves that fought in the 1895-98 war.

PLALA Executive Director, Widener Bibliographer Dan Hazen, joined the Harvard group at the conference. He consulted with the Archive's staff and prepared a report that recommended urgent steps to improve preservation of documents. The Archive is located in an old house with leaky plumbing, a single unreliable air conditioner, too little space, wooden shelves that attract insects, and inadequate supplies and equipment.

The Botanical Garden once formed part of the huge Soledad plantation. It was donated by the Atkins family to Harvard in 1901. Known as the Harvard Botanical Garden until the Cuban Government took it over in 1961, it suffered extensive hurricane damage in 1996. With help from Spain and elsewhere, the staff of the Garden managed to restore it with minimal loss of species. Coatsworth discussed renewing cooperation and scientific exchanges between Harvard and the Botanical Garden as the garden prepares to celebrate its centenary in the year 2000.

Meanwhile, other Harvard contacts and exchanges with Cuba are developing rapidly. Coatsworth discussed development of a program of exchanges in economics and business with the University of Havana's Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy during his March trip. The Loeb Fellows program of the Graduate School of Design is collaborating with the city of Havana's Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital (Group for the Overall Development of the Capital) in city planning. DRCLAS has tentative plans to co-sponsor a conference on Cuban-U.S. cultural relations with Cuba's Instituto Juan Marinello next winter.

At a recent March 13 conference co-sponsored by DRCLAS, Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (WCFIA), and the Washington-based Inter-American Dialogue at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Coatsworth observed, "The US embargo on Cuba is bad public policy. It makes the exchange of information and ideas between Cuba and the United States much more difficult and reduces prospects for peaceful economic and institutional change on the island. The effects of the embargo run contrary to its stated goals."

The meeting's keynote speaker, Bernard Cardinal Law of Boston, was introduced by Prof. Jorge I. Domínguez, WCFIA Director, who accompanied the Cardinal and a plane full of New England political and civic leaders to Cuba to witness the Pope's historic visit to the island in February. Cardinal Law criticized the U.S. embargo and called for the creation of a bipartisan presidential commission to take a fresh look at U.S. policy toward Cuba. (President Clinton announced several small steps toward relaxation of the embargo less than two weeks later, but left most restrictions in place.)

The Afropaedica

In 1909 W.E.B. Du Bois, the first African American to receive a Ph.D. from Harvard University (1896), proposed the ambitious scheme for an Encyclopedia Africana. For more than eighty years, this has remained a dream. Now, at last, two important developments have made it possible to turn Du Bois' dream into a reality. First, and most important, is the vast explosion of information about black culture that has occurred since the birth of Black Studies in the 1960s. Scholars are well on their way in the process of reassembling knowledge of the history, cultures, belief systems, and the political, economic, and social institutions created by persons of African descent in Africa and the New World. In the late twentieth century it is finally possible to do for African and African-American cultures what the enlightenment encyclopedias (pre-eminentely the Encyclopaedia Britannica) began to do for Europe's rich cultural heritage two centuries ago.

The second development is the new multimedia technology that the personal computer revolution has made possible. Scholars and students have, finally, a technology that can explore and explain the expressive features of the music and dance, the art and movies, and the literature and oral traditions that are the heart of the cultural achievements of people of African descent.

The Afropedia is co-edited by Professor Kwame Anthony Appiah and Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. In its final form, it will be a comprehensive digital and print collection of information about black history and culture in Africa, the Americas, Europe, and the Caribbean. The Afropedia will appear both in print and CD-ROM form for publication in late 1998.

Francisco Ortega, the subject editor of the Latin American and Caribbean section of the Afropedia, seeks qualified academic writers to prepare articles on such subjects as Religious Syncretism in Latin America and the Caribbean, Food in Latin America and the Caribbean, Blacks and the Military, Sports in Latin America, Anti-Slavery Literature, and specific country topics. Contact: 491-2226 or e-mail, <fortega@fas.harvard.edu>.
Area Teachers Get Intensive Courses in Latin American Studies

Teachers as Scholars

BY ANDRé LEROUX

Professor John Coatsworth spoke quietly into the din.
"Okay, class. Let’s get back to Panama." The students ignored
him. Coffee and muffins disappeared into the lively chatter.
"That’s what happens," the woman next to me said laughing, "when
you give teachers the opportunity to talk. Nobody ever asks them their
opinion, so they just go on and on. They never stop."

Welcome to Teachers as Scholars, a professional
development project at Harvard for Boston-area
public school teachers. The idea behind the pro-
gram is to provide teachers with the opportunity
during the school day to become students again
with colleagues from neighboring districts. The sem-
inars are held at the Harvard Graduate School of
Education between 9 a.m.–3 p.m. and vary in
length from one to four days. This provides the
teachers with an unusual chance to study, discuss,
and reflect upon a wide range of scholarly topics in
a seminar setting.

And an inquisitive bunch they are. This particu-
lar session was part of a three-day seminar titled
"Modern Central America" given by John
Coatsworth, professor of history at Harvard and
DRCLAS director. During the break for lunch, I had
the opportunity to talk with several of his teacher-
scholars.

Jeanne Gerber (Needham), Jack Rutledge (Welles-
ley), and Guna Svendsen (Needham) helped explain
the dynamic of the program, only in its second year.
Last year, only literature and history seminars were
offered. This year, that has expanded to include math-
ematics, science, cultural studies and interdiscipli-
inary topics. Seventeen local school districts partici-
- pate. In some districts, awareness of the program was
quite low. "Another problem," said Rutledge, "is that
many teachers have trouble leaving their class even
for a day."

That situation is changing quickly. Svendsen said
that "everyone she talked to [in the program] raved
about it and especially about the quality of the pro-
fessors". In some districts with previous experience with Teachers as
Scholars, the interest already exceeds the allotted slots per district.
One bonus is that not only does the program cost nothing for the
teachers, but it also includes books and even offsets the district’s
cost of hiring a substitute.

Other notable professors of Latin American studies who partici-
pated in Teachers as Scholars were William Fash, the popular Har-
vard professor of anthropology and archaeology, and Alicia Borinsky,

the award-winning author and professor of modern foreign languages
and literatures at Boston University.

I visited Fash as he began the final session of his two-day semi-
nar on Mesoamerica titled "Before and After the Great Encounter".
The chalkboard had a list of "To-Do" topics on it. There were 23
of them, ordered by rank of student preference. Fash
eyed the monstrous list gamely. "Let’s start with the
Conquest." The next two hours were a fabulous
sequence of slides and anecdotes mixed with histo-
y and ideas. Earlier, Fash had started the day by tak-
ing his scholars through the collections of the Peabody
Museum in order to explain some elements of
Mesoamerican cultures firsthand.

However, I had less success tracking down Borin-
sky, who was swept away by a swarming sea of teach-
ers as they broke for a meal. She led a three-day semi-
nar called "The Uncanny South: Literature, Fiction,
History & Popular Culture in South America".

Coatsworth commented, "I was struck by how
patient and interested the students were. You can’t
do an exhaustive history of Central America in a few
days, but I thought that the three-day format was
enough time to look into some of the deeper issues.
The students participated more each session and the
discussions got better. They came prepared to class
and did the readings."

Henry Bolter, the program’s coordinator (Brook-
line), told me, "Teachers as Scholars seeks to pro-
vide content-based experiences not tied to school
curriculum. Other professional-development pro-
grams focus on pedagogy or help carry out some
political reform agenda." He added, "The teachers
love it. The reviews we get back from them are
absolutely glowing. They use terms like ‘the best pro-
essional development experience I’ve had in years’
or ‘a recharging experience’ or ‘a reconnection with
the life of the mind’. The idea is that good schol-
ars are good teachers. We should respect our teach-
ers as scholars."

I asked John Coatsworth why he makes time for the Teachers as
Scholars program. "I participate [in the Teachers as Scholars pro-
gram] because I believe in outreach... Universities should do more
to share their knowledge with the community," he said. "I would do
it again."

André Leroux is a DRCLAS staff member. He holds a masters from
El Colegio de Mexico in Urban and Environmental Studies.
A Mellon Update

More than 20 Latin American archives and libraries from Mexico to Rio de Janeiro, 25 in all, have received grants from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation to upgrade or preserve their facilities. The individual grants, generally up to $20,000, are part of a four-year program administered through the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies under the guidance of Harvard's Widener Library Latin American specialist Dan Hazen.

"Latin America's rich documentary heritage is crucial for those who would understand the region's culture and history. Yet this heritage is at risk," the guidelines tell applicants. "The region can point with pride to a number of well-organized, fully-supported libraries and archives. In too many cases, though, scarce or unique materials are held by repositories that lack the means either to preserve their holdings or to make them fully available to scholars."

The Faculty of Anthropological Sciences at the Autonomous University of Yucatan's photographic archive in Merida, Mexico, for example, needed help to prevent its valuable collection of 500,000 negatives, dating back to 1877, from deteriorating. The collection is used by university students, researchers, and representatives of cultural and publishing groups. The archive lacked equipment to create the necessary temperature and humidity controls to preserve the negatives. The archive received a $8,300 grant last year.

In Guatemala, the Center for Mesoamerican Regional Research (CIRMA) sought to create a microformatting unit to enable the Center "to make a significant contribution toward preserving Guatemala's written memory, now stored in personal, as well as state and municipal archives throughout the country." The unit intends to rescue and preserve local archives, as well as obtaining a wide range of primary source materials on Guatemala in microformats to strengthen its role as a research library and as a historical archive, including unique materials from Guatemala's revolutionary organizations, only now emerging from clandestinity. The Center received a $20,000 grant last year.

Other recent grant recipients include the public archive in Rio de Janeiro, the Andrés Bello archive at the University of Chile, the Dr. Manuel Gallardo Library in El Salvador, the historical archive at the Foreign Relations Ministry of Ecuador and the "Rita Suárez del Villar" historical archive in Cienfuegos, Cuba. —JCE

From Havana to HUD

Kennedy School Assistant Professor Xavier de Souza Briggs, who took a group of 17 graduate public policy students on a one-week study tour of Cuba last year, has now embarked on another adventure of sorts.

He has been appointed deputy assistant secretary for policy development and research at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in Washington D.C., and will oversee the yearly allocation of $20 million for urban policy development and research.

In November, Briggs received the Association for Public Policy and Management's 1997 award for best dissertation in policy research in any field for his dissertation on "Brown Kids in White Suburbs: Housing Mobility, Neighborhood Effects and the Social Ties of Poor Youth." Briggs is co-author of a book on the social effects of community development, From Neighborhood to Community: Evidence on the Social Effects of Community Development, a study of the impact of nonprofit community development corporations on residents' lives.

He has worked in urban projects in Brazil and Central America. After taking the student group to Cuba last year (DRCLAS NEWS, Spring 1997), he was instrumental in designing a website with a photo essay to share with viewers a sense of the changes taking place in that Caribbean country.

David Maybury-Lewis: Swedish Award

David Maybury-Lewis will receive the Anders Retzius gold medal of the Swedish Society of Anthropology and Geography on April 24, 1998. The medal is awarded to an anthropologist every few years; previous recipients have been Fredrik Barth of Oslo University in Norway and Jack Goody of Cambridge University in England.

April 24 is Vega Day in Sweden, the day on which the return to Stockholm of Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld on board his ship Vega is commemorated. Nordenskiöld was a famous Arctic explorer who made a number of expeditions to northern Siberia in the late nineteenth century. His most famous and successful voyage was sponsored by King Oscar of Sweden. In 1878 he and his crew set sail from Gothenburg in an attempt to sail up the west coast of Norway, along the northern coast of Eurasia to discover and sail through the northeast passage into the Pacific Ocean, which had never been done previously. The voyage was successful and Nordenskiöld and his crew succeeded in circumnavigating the entire Eurasian landmass, returning via Japan, Ceylon and the Suez Canal to arrive in Stockholm on April 24, 1880.

His Majesty the king of Sweden will present the gold medal to David Maybury-Lewis on Vega Day, 1998. The occasion will be marked by a symposium dealing with major themes of David Maybury-Lewis' work and a banquet. At the symposium, entitled "Anthropology, Ethnicity and Indigenous Rights," David Maybury-Lewis will speak on "The Cultural Survival of Indigenous Peoples: Theoretical Issues and Practical Considerations." Other speakers include Kay Warren, now at Princeton University, who will talk on "Maya Resurgence and Rights in Guatemala: Theoretical and Practical Reflections." Warren, who is currently Chair of the Department of Anthropology at Princeton, will be joining the Department of Anthropology at Harvard on July 1. Kai Aarhem (University of Gothenburg) will speak on "Territory, Identity and Change in the Colombian Amazon: The Implications of Anthropological Understanding" and James Anaya (The Indian Law Resource Center) will speak on "Indigenous Peoples and the Evolution of International Human Rights."

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