Chile
A Changing Country
EDITOR’S LETTER

I was hesitant to do an issue on Chile when I had other topics broader and richer in content. Although in a way Chile seems like an obvious choice because of the DRCLAS Regional office there, I felt there were other priorities in terms of substance.

But on the invitation from the regional office, I prepared to go to Chile, where I had not visited since the dark days of the dictatorship in 1977. ReVista, you may have noticed, emphasizes the work of visual artists who capture the spirit of the people and places we write about. So I called my friend Susan Meiselas, who edited a moving book of Chilean photography, *Chile from Within* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990). It was Susan who set my memory in motion, and Susan who connected me with many of the excellent photographers featured in this issue.

After our conversation, I realized how much Chile had already been a part of my mental landscape, from the creative Chilean exiles whom I met in Panamá in 1975 on a Tica Bus trip to the entrepreneurial Chileans I met during my years in Berlin (West) who introduced me to the concept of Pan-Latino through their imaginative restaurants with Argentine steak and Mexican tacos, along with the Chilean *pastel de choclo*.

Arriving in Chile I expected to find a polarized nation, divided between those who insisted on remembering the past and those who insisted on forgetting it.

What surprised me was how polarized the nation was around the issue of identity. It was almost as if there were two Chiles, a modern, multicultural, prosperous and culturally avant garde country inserted into the larger region and world—and a conservative, inequitable country resistant to immigration and change. The truth, it seemed to me, was somewhere in between. But almost no one seemed to be in the middle.

I feared Chile would be boring and mired in its past—instead, I found a country of people eager to debate about their future. With its annual per capita income of $5,000, Chile is considered almost a developed nation by UN standards. The mall culture and the local Starbucks sometimes made me forget I was in Latin America, but the thoughtful conversations always made me remember that I was in the middle of a changing country. Chile, I found, is a country with a newfound responsibility to its region and to the world. A non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Chile opposed the United States on the issue of Iraq, and yet is prepared to sign a free trade agreement.

The more I heard, the more I was intrigued. I stood looking at the cordillera among the Chilean stars in wine country one December night with my friend Marcela Renteria from the DRCLAS Regional Office. I had just returned from visiting a civil society project which turned vacant lots into landscaped public space. As I was explaining to her what I had seen that day, I realized that among the seemingly polarized voices of the citizens, of the photographers, of the intellectuals and all the other Chileans I had met, they shared these mountains and stars, this “little Chile.”

This ReVista shares with its readers many aspects of this changing country. After my trip, I realized, there were no certain answers about this changing country. But one thing was certain for me: I want to go back.
How can the foreign policy of a small nation have a credible impact on global politics?

Chile’s February 2003 refusal to support the war in Iraq in the United Nations Security Council surprised many and irritated quite a few. How was it possible that a small country preparing itself to sign a free trade agreement with the United States, a measure to which it had aspired for almost a decade, was taking the risk of nay-saying in a matter so important to the world’s leading power? What national interest could justify saying no to the United States about a topic apparently so far off from regional interests? The debate briefly shook up Chileans, but the need to examine this question seemed to lose relevance with the signing of the trade agreement a few months later.

Today I find it imperative to take up this theme once again. Chile cannot remain indifferent to the precarious situation in the Latin American region. It must examine the basis of its international projection. Only in this way can it act consistently.

A country with a small population like ours desires a world with stable and recognized rules. That both decisions could be reconciled with each other is undoubtedly positive because it confirmed the value of a policy based on principles.

I believe that it is important to value this policy, as we begin this new turbulent phase in the history of our region. Chile belongs to Latin America, not just culturally and politically, but because we share some unresolved problems of underdevelopment such as poverty and shameful income distribution. However, after a decade and a half of sustained development in which the country has combined democratic recuperation, the strengthening of institutions, economic growth and visible social progress in the reduction of poverty, we ought to be capable of a greater contribution.

What are the principle courses of action? Chile should deepen its associations with its neighbors, particularly with MERCOSUR, to spur with imagination and audacity new proposals for the physical and economic integration of our countries in a framework that also includes civil society actors. I believe that Chile should also contribute to assuring that the states in the region assume more collective responsibility in the realm of democratic stability, security and standardization of international trade. The risk of the decomposition of the state and national disintegration in some of the region’s countries can be prevented by collective regional action sooner rather than later. One cannot help but notice that the present signals in the face of the recent crises in Haiti and Bolivia indicate the opposite tendency. However, it is more and more evident that it is unacceptable for Latin American countries to evade their responsibilities in the face of crisis in their own region.

If indeed the road toward regional co-responsibility is a long one, Chile today can count on the consistency of its own history to help move that agenda forward.

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Chile Has Changed

....but in what ways has it changed?

BY PEDRO E. GÜELL

A TOURIST OR A FOREIGNER ON A BUSINESS TRIP RETURNING TO Chile after a few years away receives a crystal clear impression upon arrival: Chile has changed. What he (or she) sees confirms press descriptions and favorable commentary in the hallways of the First World. The country has carried out a successful process of reform that seems to set it apart from the historic ills of the region. Government affairs are more stable; there is sustained economic growth; levels of corruption are low; the atmosphere is more cosmopolitan; cities are more modern and it’s easier to do business.

This impression has a solid basis. Statistics from the 2002 national census demonstrate Chile’s historic evolution and provide comparative international data that confirm that the country has changed. In fact, it has changed for the better. The quality of political and economic life is better today than before. However, this measurement, based in economic statistics, institutional performance and political matters does not manage to tell the whole story. Moreover, it does not demonstrate what has really changed in Chile.

Chile’s cultural history made it one of the most repressive countries in the region in regards to the bodies of its inhabitants and one with the highest rates of interpersonal mistrust. Yet in August 2003, several thousand Chileans gathered on a cold winter morning in response to a call by the U.S. photographer Spencer Tunick for a nude photo shoot. They came not only to show their bodies, but to demonstrate that it was possible for thousands of people who did not know each other to come together to form a sort of community without fear of the greatest vulnerability: nudity. Chile is changing, and the event took on significance as a benchmark in that cultural change.

But the surprises don’t stop there. The press has lately denounced the corruption of political institutions, sexual abuse by some clergy members, private perversions of some powerful figures, dark dealings by some judges, and wheeling and dealing between economic and political powers. The most successful Chilean films in recent years have ironically exposed the poor quality and double standard of our sexual life; the most innovative and best-selling newspapers and magazines have dedicated themselves to uncovering and challenging the powerful elite, tradition and prejudice. To appre-
fits should be received as a gift which elites have made through their own generosity. As a result, the masses should, in turn, reciprocate this gift through obedience, not raising any demands for an increased or better distribution of wealth. This primitive idea of gift and submission as a form of social reciprocity underlies much elitist discourse, especially in its concept of work and labor rights, and has also manifested itself in the difficulty of ordinary folk to formulate their needs in terms of demands and rights. In this myth, one finds many of the explanations for the relative absence of a culture of equality as the basis for Chilean social relations in spite of the abundance of empty words spent promoting this concept.

These two myths have worked together to produce the paradoxical form of institutional stability and social discipline that has characterized Chile for long periods and which, without a doubt, has differentiated the country from much of the region. Together, the two myths have produced a social cohesion based on fear—fear of calling the elite into account because of the belief that, without its benevolence, it would not be possible to live in peace and prosperity. This is perhaps why on the day Pinochet abandoned power in the midst of a booing public, he could only manage to declare “Ungrateful people!”

These two myths have begun to collapse. The historical way in which Chileans have understood themselves and their way of forming part of society is losing the basis, discourses and experiences that made this way of seeing things possible. This is what is really new in Chile. New forms of imagining and constructing social bonds have begun to appear. This change has not occurred because of political or intellectual criticism. It is the unintentional effect of the coincidence of many experiences and diverse aspirations in many distinct spaces within the society. The great task of democratic transition has created, in a completely unintentional manner, the conditions to express these practices and aspirations and to evolve into the changes we are discussing here.

The debate about change in Chile that is really important refers to culture. Several authors have already begun to detect this phenomenon and to give it a name. They talk about Chile’s desoligarquización—the retreat from oligarchy, the “agony” of the conservative elite, the final arrival of long-awaited modernity and the passage from a society ordered by the state to one ordered by the market.

However, it is very early to attach a name to this emerging cultural stamp and it is even more premature to deduce its direction and future consequences.

Cultural changes always come about over long periods of time, in different places and with diffuse tendencies. We’ll attempt to describe briefly some of the cultural processes that have been stimulating these changes.

The first and doubtlessly the most important process is the individualization of Chilean society. The manner of imagining social order is rapidly changing from the primacy of the collective to that of the individual as a subject of social order. Already, it is not the collective histories and belongings that give meaning to personal life but rather one’s own biographical project—what Americans call inventing oneself—and loyalty to that project. The collective sense of life and order are not disappearing, but the bonds that make up that collective sense are not necessarily seen as set in stone. The new bonds are increasingly chosen, changeable and varied; they should be reinvented from time to time in order to better take advantage of the new diversity of biographical projects corresponding to one’s feelings.

The second is the increase in the demand for liberty and autonomy accompanied by affirmations of rights and agreements as a form of regulation of these liberties. As never before in public conversations, Chileans today are demanding the right to choose their own lifestyles and rejecting institutions that seek to mold individual actions with criteria external to individual choice. The present public discussion about divorce—Chile is the only western country that still does not have a divorce law—is a good example of this. This affirmation of freedom has simultaneously happened with the development of the idea of politics as a framework for free and con-
sensual regulations. This has led to an important transformation in politics, making increasingly less room for debate about the desired form of social order and increasingly more space for demands for regulation emerging from conflicts between private parties.

The third is the transformation of the role of the media. They have been principal actors in the expression and acceleration of the cultural changes in the country. In oligarchic Chile, the media fulfilled the almost liturgical role of representing to the masses the goodness of the institutions of law and order. As a result, one of the basic codes for representing reality was to depict the unrestrained and irrational common folk contrasted with the civilized elites. This has changed abruptly. Today, the media have begun to ally themselves with the demands of the masses in order to unmask the irrationality and corruption of the institutions. What was previously represented as the public’s immoral lack of restraint is now seen as the “right to entertainment.” What lies behind this change is certainly the discovery of the commercial advantages of satisfying the demands of consumers, rather than those of the authorities.

The fourth process is the transformation of the forms of conversation. Cautious conversations are characteristic of an oligarchic country that survived by taking precautions for the “good order” through fear and reverence for the elites. What can and can’t be said, what can be seen in public and what must remain private were strongly regulated affairs. Antiseptic legal vocabulary proclaimed the rule of the “good order.” Mention of sources of irrationality such as the body, conflicts and thirst for power had to be cloaked in the language of ambiguity and veiled remarks. Today, from the affirmation of differences to the role of denunciation of the media to the legitimization of popular passions, language has become self-assured and more direct. The use of obscenity has become normal on television as expressions of disagreement or as self-affirmation. In Chile, where the purity and neutrality of legal vocabulary once dominated speech, language now names the passion of the body and the force of will.

Finally, perhaps as the profound consequence of the previous transformations, there is a diminishing of the ancestral terror of disorder and intolerance of differences that has characterized the cultural history of Chile. This is basically a transformation of the image Chileans have of themselves. The former indoctrination of Chileans with images of their own tendency toward irrational destruction of order contrasts with the experiences of recent years, some of which we mentioned at the beginning of this article. These new ways of being have demonstrated that one can affirm one’s autonomy, demand his or her rights, criticize tradition and make fun of threats, and that not a single one of these actions will cause a painful catastrophe. At the same time, the gradual installation of a meritocracy, which means that one can confide in one’s own efforts, has limited the paralyzing effect of the traditional threat of denying access to public goods and work to those who rebel against the established order.

These developing tendencies of Chile are indications that the society is undergoing a transition from an authoritarian and conservative culture to a culturally modern society. This change is a great opportunity for Chile, but also a great challenge. None of these trends in and of itself guarantees that Chile will achieve longed-for modernity in its social relations. These tendencies also have implicit threats. One is especially important: without a society of strong bonds and social consciousness that serves as support and a roadmap for the construction of biographical projects of individuation, individualism becomes aggressive. The cultural challenge for Chile is to replace the oligarchic and authoritarian order with a sense of history and collective relations capable of strengthening ties of solidarity among individuals who are increasingly diverse and sovereign.

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An Identity in the World
Not Just an Island

BY MARCELO JUNEMANN, JUAN WALKER, AND HERNÁN PASSALAQUA

ON MARCH 4, 2004, CHILEAN ARMY LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARIO Messen felt a gust of heat as he deplaned at Toussaint L’Ouverture Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Under his command, the first 120 of 340 soldiers that Chile will be sending to maintain peace and order in this tension-filled country arrived on Haitian soil. Once again, this South American country is going its own way, contrary to what its neighbors have to say.

The sending of troops to Haiti, which stirred strong internal political debate in Santiago, marked another instance of the independence that has characterized Chile within the region during the last three decades.

The arrival of Chilean soldiers to the Caribbean island also carries a symbolic burden, and that is in the way the northern hemisphere sees Chile. Santiago accepted the proposal of intervening in Haiti that France and the United States made to some of the nations of South America. Argentina and Brazil decided not to go, even though the sending of peace troops was approved by a unanimous decision in the United Nations Security Council in an extraordinary session on February 29th.

Is Chile an island within the continent or an isolated country? The question was present in this country’s political agenda throughout 2003 after writer Alvaro Vargas Llosa posed it in La Tercera, a Chilean newspaper. The government replies that Chile is not isolated and has merely opted for a different path from that of its neighbors.

There is some truth to this, even though some of the Chilean elitists say it with a certain superiority complex, an attitude which more than once has bothered neighboring countries. But at the same time, one must recognize that it is not a minor fact that Chile was invited to participate in a peace mission with its troops, with soldiers that come from the same Army that five years ago was under the command of ex-dictator Augusto Pinochet—an obligatory point of reference in any discussion of authoritarian regimes in Latin America—and it is not minor that Santiago was the only one accepting the proposal to go to the Caribbean.

Chile has long been isolated because of its distance from the rest of the continent. Consolidation of its institutions shortly after independence also made the country apply development policies to those of its neighbors.

Even the military regime was different from the region’s dictators. Although repressive and full of bloodshed, the regime imposed an institutional goal, changed the Constitution, and applied a market model. Despite some isolated cases, the cancer of corruption did not spread into the structure of power nor in the elite during the dictatorship or in the past 14 years of democracy. All the countries of South America, with the exceptions of Chile, Uruguay and Colombia, have seen their democratically elected presidencies crumble. While these governments have not been replaced by military regimes, the institutional mechanisms to replace them have not worked properly. Furthermore, many governments still stand on weak platforms and with a high degree of unpopularity.

ITS OWN WAY

Without a doubt, Chile’s unique path has resulted in great political and economic benefits, yet it has left ample gaps in social concerns such as poverty, education, health and housing. Nevertheless, the country shows remarkable progress, placing it in first place for human development in Latin America, according to the most recent report from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). For statistical information, see <www.ine.cl; www.minhda.cl; www.bcentral.cl and www.pnud.cl>.

If Chile can be or is the leader of the region, the truth is that anyone that pretends to lead is usually accepted. In this sense when facing giants such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, it is difficult to appropriate leadership.

For many of the region’s nations, Chile creates a problem. Chile’s model is impossible to copy for most Latin American societies, unless governments are willing to face an even larger internal conflict. And this is not caused by a secret formula that only Chile controls or by a supremely gifted population. The fact is that the model entered Chile by force under authoritarian conditions and with no possibility of opposition. Now, in democracy, things have become different and the same model has been improved considerably.

Internally pressured neighboring governments, heirs to enormous social and economic conflict, struggle with Chile’s progress. It is not surprising that some are asking themselves: why not us? Yet clearly, models cannot be copied; each country has its history and each society its specific nature. This does not overlook that the correct administration of a government, the responsible and efficient handling of the economy, fighting corruption and the struggle to overcome poverty should form part of the patrimony of humanity and not be exclusive to a small group of countries.

ILL WILL

Chile’s unique path has brought with it more than one problem in the region that has resulted in clear ill will. An example of this has been the dispute between Chile and Bolivia for the latter’s historic maritime claim. After the fall of Gonzálo Sánchez de Losada’s government, Bolivia applied pressure for their maritime demand to be treated multilaterally rather than bilaterally, which was how Chile had proposed dealing with the situation. This initiative generated surprising support from members of the Brazilian and Argentine governments, though they stepped back after realizing that no solution would be reached without a mutual agreement between the two countries. Others, like Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, openly supported Bolivia’s position. Chávez created a serious diplomatic crisis between Santiago and Caracas by saying that he “dreamt that he bathed in a Bolivian beach.” Even though the situation has now calmed down, it has resulted in an open wound and has allowed Santiago to learn that having the nicest house on the block doesn’t necessarily help make friends, in fact, many times all it does is create neighborhood gossip.
This situation reflected the intense session that the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs held midway through December of last year, where all international strategies were drawn up for 2004. This session concluded that 2003 was an exceptional year for international achievement: the political and economic agreement with the European Union was put into effect, achieving a 15% increase in Chile’s exports to Europe; the free trade agreement with the United States was signed, probably the most emblematic achievement the country has accomplished regarding exterior commerce. The agreement has been in force since January 1, 2003. Expectations are extremely positive. Recently the South Korean Parliament ratified a Free Trade Agreement with Chile after a difficult battle with strong opposition coming from Korean farmers. It was not all about commercial diplomacy, however: in a March 2003 meeting of the United Nations Security Council, Chile rejected the invasion of Iraq, even though at the time they were negotiating the FTA with the United States.

On the negative side, the events of 2003 highlight the estrangement of Chile’s relations with the region. The Bolivia situation was taken as an opportunity by some countries to blame Chile for following its “own way,” especially for matters that concerned “regional loyalties.” An symbolic illustration of this was that Chile had negotiated free trade agreements on their own and not within the framework of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), of which Chile is an associated member. As a result of this separate negotiation, Chile has noticeably lower tariffs than the South American commercial bloc.

For Chilean foreign policy, this year will be key in regaining trust and understanding from its neighbors. Having concluded the commercial agreements with the main global commercial blocs, the government knows that in the end, its future is linked to the region. However, it is a notable fact that Santiago opted to link its development with its economic opening to global commercial partners: North America, Europe and Asia. More than two thirds of the country’s exports go there, and that is where almost all of the investment in Chile originates.

That Chile wants to be an actor on the international stage is probable. It has solid political and economic platforms, but it also knows its limitations: distance, a small market and a serious social weakness in which the distribution of wealth is still one of the most inequitable of the continent.

Both the government and the right-wing opposition have a common objective to become a developed country by the year 2010, according to the parameters of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an international body that groups developed countries and to which Chile is applying to join.

The real question is not whether Chile is an island. Rather, the essential debate is what is the best option for development in a complex world—for all countries, particularly for small and distant ones. With all its deficiencies and its tragic history, one could say that Chile has managed to follow the path which has just begun to produce benefits.

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For a special ReVista Web feature on tourism by these authors, go to our website, <http://drclas.fas.harvard.edu>.
Two divergent views seek to define Chile today. One tends to be self-complacent, optimistic and officialist. The other is more marginal, sceptical and sour.

The first of these visions builds on the premise that Chileans have suffered too much and too long. A different country is what they deserve; one no longer torn by dissension nor economically destitute, ruled by civilians, but as unlike as possible from the radical Allende regime which brought us to the brink of civil war. In short, a consumer market economy, open to new international opportunities, bound to economic growth and orthodox fiscal policies, respected by international financial agencies and foreign investors, without forgetting the poor and the less competitive. In other words, it is a line of thinking that envisions a government not willing to waive its right to raise taxes when it finds it convenient nor wanting to relinquish the control of copper and other strategic industries in order to maintain macro-economic balances.

This position more or less coincides with what the military tried to accomplish. Paradoxically, though, this time former opponents—watched over firmly by the armed forces as constitutional “guarantors”—are in charge of the implementation of these goals. As if this were not enough oversight, a number of additional institutional mechanisms require the consensual agreement of the powerful right-wing opposition. This is a scheme hard to swallow—but not without its benefits. After all, it has given an electoral comeback, gaining more at this stage by being in the opposition than in La Moneda. Consequently, this critique questions the moral motives of those who are now in power, seeing them as a self-serving coterie bound to ideological betrayal, accommodation and personal ambition. Needless to say, people holding this view are seldom admitted to political circles. They are labelled nostalgic, bitter, unrealistic, premodern, elitist and too quarrelsome. Without any effective organization behind them, nor any concrete alternative proposal, these Chileans are often viewed as a chorus of lamentation that should be left alone, marginalized and generally unheeded.

Fortunately or not, this group cannot be dismissed so easily. What they have to say periodically generates debate. In 1997 and 1998, a number of bestselling publications diagnosed a growing climate of frustration. They could not have been more timely: in 1997, the Concertación lost popular support in the parliamentary elections. Almost four million Chileans (40%) either did not register, abstained, annulled their votes or left the ballot blank.

The economy also accounts for this increasing malaise. Annual economic growth from 1998 to 2002 was 2.4%, compared to 7.7% between 1990 and 1997. If in the earlier period employment rose 2.4% annually, in these last years, the average increase in new jobs has been a poor 0.4%. If the number of Chileans below poverty level descended abruptly from 5 million in 1990, the number has remained around 3.1 million since 1998 (21%). Other variables point to a more complex picture. According to the 2002 census, 87% of households own a color television; one out of five families owns a computer; one out of ten is connected to Internet; 51% has at least one cell-phone, and three out of four families are homeowners. However, the 2002 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report still posed anguish questions such as: “We Chileans: Who are we? What is happening to us? Where are we going?” Answers were even more sulphy; at least 52% felt they were “losers”, 54% expressed doubts with respect to the economy, and 43% said that their incomes barely allowed them to live decently.

How is it that a country can be so conservative and yet so apparently modern? The obvious explanation is that it is meant to work that way and has been doing so ever since the Pinochet years. Whoever rules Chile has to be acrobatic.
No wonder the 1998 UNDP report focussed on what it called “the paradoxes of modernization.”

A number of recent events have damaged public confidence in institutions. Pinochet’s London detention and his subsequent acquittal by Chilean courts, as well as a streak of scandals involving the illegal appropriation of public monies by high government officials to finance their political parties, may explain why only 50% of people polled in 2002 answer that democracy is the best political system; 30% think “it does not matter”; only 23% have confidence on the judiciary; and a mere 12% trust political parties. In 2002-2003, two former ministers were formally accused. One of them was Lagos’ successor in the Ministry of Public Works, the other was a close friend and political confidante. In addition, an undersecretary and half a dozen Concertación congressmen were also involved and are under present investigation. In this, the worst crisis in the past decade, the President of the Central Bank and the Vice President of Corfo, Lagos’s son-in-law, and high functionaries of the Universidad de Chile had to step down from their posts. At the beginning of 2003 there was serious talk that Lagos might not end his term. All came to nothing, though, after Pablo Longueira, the leader of the Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI), Chile’s main political party, linked to Pinochet supporters, literally saved the President and agreed to reorganize the state.

In addition to this panorama of mistrust and corruption, disturbing statistics show that 61% of crimes go unreported; 40% of Chileans show some form of mental disorder; half of Chilean women suffer family violence; and 19,000 children are mistreated each year. Data on education is contradictory. University attendance may have increased from 120,000 twenty years ago, to approximately 500,000 at present. However, one of the 70 new private universities can invest $8 million in a brand new library— and have only 40,000 volumes in its shelves; tax breaks explain high expenditures in infrastructure, while effective research commitment is still to be seen. Chile systematically ranks well below average in almost all international tests, and reading levels could not be poorer; nevertheless the Minister of Education insists on making Chile a bilingual English-speaking country. Supposedly, this ought to make us more “globalized.” Let us hope so; the main daily devotes 14 pages to “social life” against 4 dealing with international news. In the last years of dictatorship we had a more progressive and critical press than today. According to Human Rights Watch, Chile ranks immediately above Cuba as the worst record in freedom of speech in all of Latin America. In terms of personal freedom, it is not doing that well either; there is still no divorce law.

How is it that a country can be so conservative and yet so apparently modern? The obvious explanation is that it is meant to work that way and has been doing so ever since the Pinochet years. Whoever rules Chile has to be acrobatic. Witness the last bombshell, involving rightwing opposition politicians, which has kept us daily in sor- did shock these past five months. A conservative Renovación Nacional congresswoman informs the country that two UDI senators were regular participants in pederastic orgies. This bickering amongst rightwing allies takes place when Lagos’ government is barely surviving and UDI Joaquín Lavín, the 2000 election runner-up, seemed unbeatable as potential Presi-
dent in 2006. Longueira fights back and denounces a conspiracy, but tells us that he has received word of this from beyond, while praying. In the meantime, the judge in charge of the investigation has to resign because he confessed that he had attended a gay brothel, after he was filmed by a secret television camera. This “reality show” takes place as gay characters are becoming increasingly visible in the leading popular soap operas. Congress immediately passes restrictive legislation on press coverage, Chile’s most credible anchorman is taken to jail and the age of sexual consent is steeply raised. Yet it is well-known that more than half of the population is born out of wedlock, and adolescent pregnancies are commonplace. At press time, Longueira’s contentions that this has been a communication ploy is making slightly more sense, Lagos and the Concertación feel partially relieved and are making plans for a fourth term.

What are we to make of all this? My guess is that Chile is an unstable society undergoing rapid change. It obliquely deals with its past traumas, all of which center on violence, in the absence of a strong consensual agreement that would permit us to deal with them frankly on an institutional level. Consensus politics is built into the Constitution. However, in many cases, it simply serves to maintain fragile equilibria amongst powerful sectors. Chile is not an open society and has a long way to go before it can meet the standards of a demanding modern world. It may be progressive economically, but only to a point. Poverty and unequal distribution of wealth are pressing dilemmas that neither the military nor the Concertación have solved adequately. People in power are not as transparent as they like to make us believe; unfortunately, we have little, except scandal-mongering, to detect this flagrant contradiction.

Moreover, there are prospective conflicts to be dealt with. Our alliance with the U.S. and Bolivia’s recent demand for multilateral negotiations concerning sea access are headaches we might be facing in the future. The argument that we are being called to account because we are doing things right and are living well in a “bad neighborhood” is simply sham. Ethnic revindications are another of these destabilizing factors we should be considering; 15 years ago, most Chileans’ only contact with the Mapuche was in history textbooks.

Finally, if we have learned anything during these past years, it is that Chilean society resists any clear-cut definitions. This situation is not unlike what happened, back in the early 1970’s, when it turned out that we were not the Latin American exception that confirmed the rule, nor as institutionally bound as everyone wanted to think. If so, in the near future, Chile will be a far more surprising place than anyone in or out of power, self-assured or not, might be guessing at this present time.

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In Memoriam
Norbert Lechner, Chilean Social Scientist

The members of the social science community, mourn the profound loss of Norbert Lechner, a renowned Chilean social scientist. Born in Germany in 1939, Lechner visited Chile as a young political science doctoral student from the University of Freiburg, and there he remained. Last year, in an official ceremony, the Chilean Senate awarded honorary Chilean citizenship to Lechner.

Beginning in 1974 and for almost a quarter-of-a-century, Lechner was a member of the faculty of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Chile. He was director of FLACSO-Chile from 1988-1994 and was a visiting professor of FLACSO-Mexico from 1994-1997. Lechner then returned to Chile to become a senior analyst at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

Lechner made an extraordinary intellectual contribution to some of the most important debates in contemporary Latin American politics. His intellectual legacy includes path-breaking conceptualizations of the relationships between subjectivity and politics, politics and temporality, theories of the state and theories of state-market relationships. In recent years, Lechner focused intensively on the questions of the pervasive insecurity and alienation from politics, relating such trends to disaffection and a lack of collective identity. Much of his work highlights the deficits in the processes of Latin American transition and democratization, as well as the constant need to reflect deeply about politics and the construction of community as a basis for social development.

Norbert Lechner’s untimely death from cancer is a profound loss. We will miss his collaborative scholarly spirit, and will continue to cherish his legacy.

Among Lechner’s principal books is Sombre del mañana, published in 2003, for which Lechner received the Municipality of Santiago prize. One of Lechner’s books of greatest influence is Los patios interiores de la democracia, published in 1988. Other works include La conflictiva y nunca acabada construcción del orden decaduo and Qué significa hacer política? During the Chilean transition period, Lechner contributed Capitalismo, democracia y reformas, published in 1991.

Lechner’s untimely death from cancer is a profound loss. We will miss his collaborative scholarly spirit, and will continue to cherish his legacy.

This statement was prepared by Francisco Rojas, FLACSO Chile, and translated by Katherine Hite, Vassar College.
SINCE THE BEGINNING OF CHILEAN redemocratization in 1989, numerous allegations of corruption in local government, the judiciary, ministries, public services and public enterprises have impacted public opinion. The magnitude of the phenomenon cannot be compared to that of other Latin American countries. According to Transparency International (2003), Chile is the least corrupt country in the region and the 20th least corrupt country in the world. However, the new plight has no precedent in Chilean political history.

The Chilean General Comptroller’s Office investigated 241 cases of corruption at the local level between 1993 and 1994. Public enterprises such as Chile’s huge Copper Corporation, Conccin Oil Refinery, a water and sewage plant in Valparaíso, the Maritime Corporation and the Port Authority have been accused of corruption. Services such as the National Housing Service, the Sports and Recreation Department, the National Emergency Office in the Ministry of Interior, the Military Hospital, the National Police Retirement Service and the Office for the Return of Political Exiles also faced accusations of corruption. Moreover, in a couple of isolated scandals, members of the congressional staff were prosecuted for drug consumption and one member of the judiciary appeared to be involved in drug trafficking. Finally, the accusation that an informal political network functioned by the mid-1990s in Valparaíso, the seat of National Congress, led to the revelation of links among regional public enterprises, private contractors, regional authorities, mayors and members of congress to divert public funds into the 1997 congressional election.

An April 1994 poll conducted by the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (CERC) revealed that 57 percent of the sample considered corruption a malaise affecting both the public and private sectors. Corruption was considered a serious/very serious problem by 83 percent of the sample; 80 percent of those interviewed thought politicians took people into account only for elections.

Events moved President Eduardo Frei to create a National Commission on Public Ethics in 1994, four years after the re-inauguration of democracy. The initiative counted with the support of all political parties. Simultaneously, several ad-hoc commissions in the Chamber of Deputies investigated charges of corruption that acquired the tone of national scandals. However, the performance of these commissions was subject to partisan control and their recommendations and sanctions never affected senior political appointees involved in the misdemeanors. Only minor and token administrative measures were taken by the government, in spite of recommendations by the General Comptroller’s Office.

The political debate surrounding the scandals led to the creation of a Commission on Ethics in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as similar commissions within political parties. Congress enacted an anticorruption legislative package to ensure transparency in public bureaucracy by the end of 1999. However, very few of the proposals had been implemented by the end of the Frei government, just at the time when several public executives collected huge retirement benefits, causing public outrage.

Four scandals shocked Chilean public opinion in the first half of the third government of the Concertación led by President Ricardo Lagos. In the first case, a former Minister of Public Works was accused of diverting large amounts of public funds to a private contractor to increase the salary of high-ranking officers within the ministry. The consulting firm, GATE, owned by a former regional authority of the same ministry and belonging to the minister’s political party, was charged with adjudicating concessions to private constructing firms all over Chile.

In a related case, the same minister was indicted, temporarily jailed and is currently being sued for asking two construction firms to pay large sums of money through the same private contractor for nonexistent consultancies. The money went to apparently finance the 1999-2000 presidential campaign of candidate Lagos, a former Minister of Public Works himself. The Construction Chamber acknowledged the misbehavior of its associates, promising to enforce ethical standards.

In a second case, all members of the cabinet acknowledged receiving extra money in cash as a supplement to their monthly official salaries. Funds came right out of the reserved funds of the Office of the Presidency, not subject to scrutiny, either by congress or the Office of the General Comptroller, an independent agency created in 1926. Though salaries of cabinet members are well known to be low, the irregularity of the procedure was strongly questioned.

A third case involved a highly ranked officer in the National Development Corporation (CORFO), who illegally transferred governmental titles and bonds to a private investment corporation, INVERLINK. One former Lagos government minister was closely associated with the firm, and helped capture short-term investment from governmental institutions, private health corporations and pensions funds. Much of INVERLINK’s financial success stemmed from the firm’s privileged access to crucial information from the personal secretary of the Central Bank president, who resigned after the scandal. The scandal—more than a corruption case per se—is an example of white-collar crime. However, it illustrates how sordid the relationship between corruption and white-collar crime can be.
According to Transparency International (2003) Chile is the least corrupt country in the region and the 20th least corrupt country in the world. However, the new plight has no precedent in Chilean political history. A December 2002 poll conducted by the Center for Public Studies (CED) showed that 57 percent of a national sample of Chileans considered that “many/almost all” public servants were corrupt and involved in bribes.
Naked in Santiago
A Look at Chilean Media
BY CONSUELO SAAVEDRA

On a freezing winter Sunday morning in July 2002, four thousand people euphorically took off their clothes in a downtown Santiago park. Spencer Tunick, the American photographer working on a project of nude pictures in public spaces, could not believe the scene in front of his lens. Neither could millions of Chileans who watched this collective catharsis on television: grannies, couples, children, naked people of all sizes and ages and social classes jumping and hugging each other while shouting “I feel free” and “I have nothing to hide.” That happy mass of flesh marked the start of the Chilean destape.

Destape. It is strange that there is no such concept in English. It is a blend of uncovering, untying and liberalizing, all at once — a bit like the lifting of a lid that has covered the simmering stew for too long. After 40 years of dictatorship in Spain, it took only six months for a magazine like Interviú to become a success thanks to a bombastic combination of tits, ass and independent journalism. Chileans, having lived through 17 years of dictatorship, had to wait 15 more years for their own version of destape to take place.

As in Spain and later in post-authoritarian Argentina, the Chilean destape has been a heady mix of sex and freedom of expression. Some of it is playful, bold or downright silly. Television audiences have recently turned a prostitute who swindled a Japanese con man into a national public figure. They have gone crazy over reality shows recently turned a prostitute who swindled a Japanese con man into a national public figure. They have gone crazy over reality shows that allow them to snoop around the private life of young people desperate for fame. And massive numbers of them have tuned in to watch a soap opera in which one of the protagonists is gay and another has a sexual dysfunction — a show that ironically enough aired on a Catholic TV network.

But some of the new material is dead serious. In the last eighteen months, Chileans have learned of corruption in the government and of Catholic priests molesting children. They have endlessly revisited every painful aspect of the 1973 coup on its 30th anniversary. Television viewers have seen public figures — from judges to celebrities — come out of the closet and openly discuss their homosexuality.

The shift has deep political implications. Now that they can peek into the private lives of celebrities, television audiences and newspaper readers also want to know what their leaders are really up to. As never before, Chileans are demanding transparency at every level. For most of the 1990s Chileans had been persuaded by the ruling elites that the democratic transition required stability, homogeneity and consensus to succeed. Challenging authority or even expressing a dissenting opinion was perceived as dangerous and threatening to the newborn democracy.

Not any more. Nowadays Chileans value diversity, honesty and dissent because they understand that these values make democracy stronger. These are not abstractions, but concrete realities. So much for not having a divorce law when 56 percent of Chilean children are born out of wedlock. So much for being told what movies to watch (a censorship law was finally repealed in 2002). So much for a media that do not truly depict what Chileans are like in the 21st century.

It took a while for the conservative elites that historically controlled the Chilean media to realize how disconnected they were from their audiences. As Roberto Méndez, the director of a leading Chilean polling firm, has said, it took a multitude of naked people for the media to realize they were ignoring the new Chile.

The Internet, the rise of cable television and the appearance of an alternative and independent press (the best example of which is the satirical bi-weekly “The Clinic,” named after the London establishment where Augusto Pinochet was arrested in 1998) have also forced the traditional media to react. In an increasingly competitive market — with five national networks, 198 cable stations, 1,297 radio stations, 236 newspapers and 1,597 magazines — traditional media have to adapt or to die. Goodbye press releases and spokespersons. Welcome hidden cameras and unnamed sources.

Journalists are learning to be inquisitive and editors are constantly looking for the scoop that will uncover the next scandal. It can be as serious as a politician taking bribes from businessmen or as futile as a comedian cuckolding his wife. The era of secrecy and the double standard is coming to an end. One consequence is the blurring of the thin line dividing the public and private spheres. In one of the latest scandals, a judge was discovered to frequent gay sauna baths. A debate over whether homosexuals can serve as judges has ensued. In Europe or North America, the question might be moot. In Catholic Chile it is not — at least not yet.

It is revealing to notice that the same glamorous TV presenter who, in the 1980s, was fired from a Catholic TV station for saying that she would have a child with or without a marriage license, now makes regular appearances in the talk shows of the same station to discuss her recent marital infidelities. “Well, why not if her presence gives high ratings?” a media executive may argue.

If that is what people want, give it to them. The new media principle is to treat the public as the ultimate consumer. The power of the remote control has extended to the phone. Chileans are increasingly calling in and giving their opinion live on the air; or they hit the pound key and decide who stays in the reality show that evening. People feel as though they have a say in what they watch and read. While it may be only an illusion of influence, that is not the point. What is relevant is that the media, particularly television, are now part of the destape and are pushing it to its limits.
This is particularly evident in the case of television. As sociologist Eugenio Tironi observes, it is ironic that television, the most heavily repressed and censored medium during the dictatorship, is the one now testing the newfound tolerance of Chile’s democracy for unrestricted freedom of speech. Intellectual elites may think Chilean TV has turned vulgar and irrelevant. But the Chilean people are consuming that “vulgar” stuff at an impressive average rate of three hours and thirteen minutes per day.

Even old-style newspapers are fighting to catch up. Competition from La Tercera for high-income readers has forced stodgy El Mercurio to become more agile — and, recently, a bit less conservative politically. But the biggest change involves Las Últimas Noticias, a once-sleepy mid-brow paper also belonging to the El Mercurio group. LUN, as it is known in Chile, has put into place a system that may well be unprecedented anywhere: the paper’s contents are largely determined by which items in LUN’s website get the most hits on the previous day. As a result, the sexual escapades of soap opera stars and sports celebrities dominate the headlines. LUN has quickly become Chile’s most widely circulated newspaper, with more than 180,000 copies sold on an average day.

Chilean media are a work in progress. They are struggling to strike a balance between scrutiny and respect for privacy and human dignity. They may err along the way, but they are learning fast. And so are audiences. They may be demanding tacky variety shows, but they also desire better reporting and plainer answers from politicians. In the process, those who never before withstood much scrutiny — congressmen, political party leaders, media moguls, corporate chieftains and even bishops — are discovering that they, too, may be naked in the park.

Consuelo Saavedra is a Chilean journalist and TV news anchor. A former Nieman Fellow at Harvard University, she is currently pursuing a Master’s degree at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
Chile, with just 15 million people, is considered the paragon of open trade and the economic miracle of Latin America, a region where such miracles are rather scarce.

After two decades of radical macroeconomic reform, Latin America has yet to succeed in its quest to achieve high and sustained rates of economic growth. Although since the mid-1980s it has adopted a new development strategy based on market mechanisms and trade liberalization, the region has been unable to enter a path of stable and robust economic expansion.

In fact, during 1990-2003 almost all Latin American economies grew at a slower pace than in 1960-80, when they followed the then traditional strategy of import substitution and state-led industrialization. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis and the slowdown of the U.S. economy, Latin America’s economic recovery has lost steam in the last six years. Its GDP per person shrank in real terms. It is now 1.5% lower than its 1997 level. Such anemic economic performance arrested its progress in poverty alleviation, an urgent, still pending task in the social agenda. According to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, 44% of Latin Americans live in conditions of poverty, with 19% enduring extreme poverty. Particularly worrying have been the series of financial crises in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Peru and Venezuela and other countries in the region, that have plunged them into episodes of political turmoil and economic instability.

Chile is the conspicuous exception to this dissatisfying experience to date with macro reforms in Latin America. From 1980 to 2000 the Chilean economy expanded rapidly (See Chart 1). Its subsequent slowdown has been milder, scarcely affected by its neighbors’ deep economic troubles. Recall that in the peak of the 2002 financial crisis in Argentina and Uruguay, Chile was still able to place a bond in the international capital markets under very favorable terms and its Central Bank kept rather low domestic interest rates.

With its annual national income rapidly approaching US $5,000 per person—just below that of Mexico—Chile is poised to join the ranks of developed nations. It has a relatively high index of human development, and is currently ranked in 38th place worldwide of a total of 150 countries, a position comparable to Portugal, Poland and Hungary. Its sustained dynamic expansion was accompanied by a substantial improvement.
Chile boasts one of the best economic performances in the region. This section looks at diverse aspects of the country’s economy, ranging from traditional wine-making to the cutting-edge free software movement.

in social development. Chilean data indicate that the incidence of poverty fell from 45% in 1987, to 22% in 1998 and 21% in 2000. In turn, the proportion of its population living under extreme poverty conditions fell from 17% in 1987 to 5.6% in 1998, but rose slightly to 5.7% in 2000. It is one of only two Latin American countries that have already met the Millennium Development Goals of achieving a 50% reduction in the incidence of extreme poverty relative to its 1990 level. Social progress was also favored by the introduction of new anti-poverty programs targeted to low-income households.

Chile boasts one of the best economic performances in the region, with comparatively high investment ratios, low inflation rates, and prudent fiscal management. Moreover, international surveys systematically rank it among the top economies in the region in terms of international competitiveness, business conditions, transparency and corruption. It now regularly ranks among the top 20 most attractive business destinations in the world. What are the determinants of Chile’s economic success? What are the challenges and lessons for Chile to sustain such outstanding economic performance?

THE BENEFITS OF BEING AN EARLY REFORMER

It should be remembered that Chile was a pioneer in Latin America’s experiment with radical market reforms. Indeed, General Augusto Pinochet’s September 1973 coup against the democratically elected government of Dr. Salvador Allende and the subsequent military regime that lasted until 1989 had as a consequence the demise of the old development model based on the state’s active interventions in the economy. Instead, the dictatorship favored market mechanisms and private competition as the key agents of capital formation and production decisions. The economic rationale for such change, independently of its political motivation, was clear. The state’s intervention in the economy was perceived as a fundamental distortion in the allocation of resources, thus provoking high indebtedness and inflation.

Applying this new strategy, by the mid-1970s, Chile began to undertake key reforms: eliminating import controls, unilaterally bringing down import tariffs to a common level of 10%, opening financial markets to...
foreign competition, reducing the public sector and eliminating many government controls on economic activity that had become standard practice. In 1976 Chile withdrew from the Andean Pact, at the time a regional organization marked by protectionism and its adverse view of foreign direct investment (FDI). But the results of this first attempt at macroeconomic reform were far from favorable. Crucial errors in financial liberalization in the absence of adequate bank regulation coupled with a fall in the international price of copper and a sudden halt in foreign lending. The Chilean economy was pushed to an acute crisis in 1982-83, leading to the bankruptcy of the private banking sector and its nationalism.

The authorities responded by implementing a conventional economic stabilization package to control inflation, relying more on a flexible exchange rate and a rise in import tariffs to face foreign sector disequilibria. The process of structural reforms lost impetus for some time. However, in 1985, structural reforms once again began to be profoundly implemented. Trade liberalization was again pushed forward, independence was awarded to the Central Bank, a new regulatory framework for the banking sector was adopted and privatization of public enterprises was accelerated.

**CONTINUITY IN SOUND MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT CONSISTENT WITH AN OPEN ECONOMY**

The Concertación—the democratic governments that have held presidential office in Chile since 1990—have gradually and persistently pushed to restore Chile’s historical respect for civil liberties and human rights, systematically violated during the military regime. In the economic realm, they have maintained essentially the same development model regarding the role of the market and the state as the previous regime. Macroeconomic policy has emphasized two areas. The first is a deepening and modernizing the structural reform process, explicitly extending it to cover health and education areas. The second emphasis is on stressing the fundamental importance of maintaining low inflation rates.

Given this overall standard orientation, Chile’s macroeconomic policy has introduced key non-conventional elements in its fiscal management and treatment of international capital flows that, in our view, may help to explain its economic success in the 1990s and its resilience to the adverse effects of external shocks.

**ON CAPITAL FLOWS**

Capital inflows offer opportunities to finance investment and boost economic growth. However, to depend on volatile short term capital is a risk that may impose severe penalties on a developing country. Abrupt fluctuations in capital inflows may lead to a sudden sharp rationed access to foreign exchange that detonate balance of payments crisis, and push domestic activity into a severe recession. To reduce such risks, but still enjoy some of its benefits, during most of the 1990s Chile successfully imposed taxes on short term capital inflows, with the tax rate adjusted to the time-holding period. This tax was lifted in 1998 reflecting the contraction in the volume of international capital flows to the region, as a consequence of the Asian crisis and the burst of the U.S. stock market. However, not withstanding the operation of its various FTAs, the Chilean government has retained to potential capacity to reestablish such controls in the future if it is deemed necessary.

**ON FISCAL POLICY**

Relative to the rest of the region, Chile’s fiscal policy has been particularly prudent. According to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) from 1994 to 2003, Chile’s public sector current revenues systematically represented more than 30% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—several points above those of Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay and most countries in the region. For more than ten years until 1997, the annual budget showed a surplus and a reduction in government debt (Economist Intelligence Unit, February 2004). And since then the deficit has not exceeded 2.5% of GDP, and has sometimes too shown a surplus. Such fiscal prudence outperforms that of most members of the European Union, not to mention the United States. An important source of public revenues comes from its high value added tax rate, (currently 19%, one of the highest in the region). It should be also pointed out that, notwithstanding Chile’s commitment to privatization, the Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (CODELCO), the world’s leading copper producer is still state-owned, and is a considerable source of public revenues. And, as the World Bank admits, the Copper Stabilization Fund—established by the Chilean government—has reduced the impact of external shocks on fiscal revenues.

Most important, and in sharp contrast to the rest of the developing world, since the early 1990s Chilean fiscal management has been based on a commitment to maintain on average, and in a medium term perspective, a structural fiscal balance equivalent to 1% of the GDP. In other words, the policy means that, if the economy grows at its medium term potential rate (5% per year), then its fiscal results would show a surplus of 1% of GDP. In this way the government may carry out its planned expenditures in a manner relatively independent of the business cycle and its inherent fluctuations from its different fiscal revenues. So, for example, a rise in the budget deficit due to a decline in income tax revenues, associated with a downturn in the business cycle, will not necessarily lead to a cut in...
exports grew at double-digit annual rates during the 1990s. It is so far Latin America’s only case of success at macroeconomic reform. However, important challenges are open. The first and crucial one is rather significant: to boost export dynamism once again. Indeed, even though the United States economy is recovering from its slowdown, it is unlikely that it will reach and sustain the extraordinary high rates of expansion experienced during the 1990s. The European Union does not appear to be poised for quick economic growth soon. In addition, the short-term outlook of Chile’s neighboring countries is complicated. Argentina’s problematic external debt position, if not soon resolved, may deteriorate the Southern Cone’s intraregional trade, business climate and investor expectations. Chile urgently needs to reduce its dependence on exports of commodities as a source of foreign exchange. Copper still accounts for 34% of Chile’s total export revenues. Such dependence on commodities increases the Chilean economy’s vulnerability to external shocks. It also constrains its growth potential, given the unfavorable long-term trends in their terms-of-trade and its effects on the allocation of investment. Indeed, in recent years, FDI to Chile appears excessively concentrated in the mining sector, and thus adversely affected by the decline in the world prices of copper.

Chile’s free trade agreements (FTAs) with the European Union, the United States and Korea—which became operational in the last fourteen months—may somewhat reinvigorate exports. But by themselves, they are insufficient to place Chile back on a high long-term growth track and to change Chilean export structure toward more knowledge-intensive products. Recall that the FTA with the United States does not alter the subsidy scheme for American farm products. Moreover, such change in trade preferences may be insufficient to attract the foreign direct investment in the volumes required to transform Chile’s productive apparatus into a modern robust export platform of manufactures and services. The second key challenge concerns Chile’s severe disparities in income and marked differences between demographic groups. Despite the advances in poverty reduction, income distribution is still dramatically uneven. As recently noted, Chile “...has the largest gap on the continent between the rich and the poor” (UN Notebook, February 17, 2004). Moreover in 2000 income distribution was more disparate than in 1987 (EIU, 2003). Such stark inequality undermines growth potential, by concentrating saving and investment. And, more important, it may deteriorate social cohesion and the basic principles of democracy, as income inequality also means unequal access to health, education and ultimately political power. So far, the Chilean combination of economic growth and targeting of public spending towards the poor has been ineffective to reduce inequality. In particular social policies and programs need to be revised to meet the needs of especially vulnerable groups like indigenous populations, youth, female-headed households and the rural poor.

An important and—yet hard to accomplish—element in this agenda concerns Chile’s structural failure to date to create sufficient jobs. The economic slowdown from 1998 to 2003 has pushed up the level of open unemployment to critical peaks (close to 10%). Chile’s current unemployment insurance scheme partially alleviates some of the negative impacts of this phenomenon. But, the persistence of high unemployment—especially among the youth—undermines the potential production capacity, distorts incentives and, most critically, creates severe social tensions that threaten the progress made towards more democratic forms of government. Chile has indeed come a long way, but the challenges it faces are significant and may require a deep transformation of its productive structure and a much more even distribution of its social benefits. The road ahead remains an open question.

A Foray into the Mystique of Chile’s Wine Industry

Local Culture and International Commerce

BY RICHARD FREEMAN

I
n the fall of my junior year, I sat down with the undergraduate advisor at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies and announced that I would be taking myself to Chile. I needed help dreaming up an internship suitable for a Russian Literature major interested in learning about international business, something more cultural than numerical. The answer I received was simple and immediate: you should work at a vineyard. There was no hesitation on my part; I knew we had found the perfect solution, an industry that would be particularly pertinent to Chile, profoundly cultural and also extensively international.

A few months later, thanks to the assistance of the DRCLAS Regional Office in Santiago, I was offered a job in the export department of Viña Bisquertt Ltda.

Viña Bisquertt, known for its Casa La Joya wine, runs its operations out of an old colonial house in Providencia, Santiago. Its comfortable office space maintains an appropriately homey quality. After all, the wine business is most often a family affair. Don Osvaldo, the owner and family patriarch, worked downstairs and staffed much of the office with his own sons and daughters. The grapes were grown on the Bisquertt family’s hereditary estate in the Colchagua Valley, three hours south of Santiago. Leisurely lunches of familiar, home-cooked Chilean traditions, like cazuela chilena and pollo arvejado, coupled with a workspace crafted out of former living quarters, made for a remarkably close-knit staff with an intimate sense of family and community.

However, the Chilean culture infiltrates the industry long before one arrives at the main office. Back in the Colchagua Valley, one of Chile’s most prestigious wine-producing regions, the essence of the land and the culture first make their mark.

On a weekend trip to the Festival de la Vendimia, the annual celebration of the grape harvest, I witnessed first hand the magical influence of the traditional Chilean countryside on the wine industry. Chileans traveled from all over the region to sample the new wines and to cheer on the participating winners of the cueca contest who were awarded the privilege to go on stage and stomp the grapes. Here, not only the culture, but the land itself endows the wine with a quality particular only to Chile, whose unusually elongated geography makes possible the region’s ideal grape-growing terrain, perfectly embedded between the Pacific Ocean and the Andes mountains.

Having turned inward to infuse the wine with these highly localized influences — Chilean geography, the countryside and its traditions, and the patriarchal, family-centered business practices — the product is now focused in an outbound direction, ready to compete on the world market. Here is where my internship picked up the process, assisting in the search for importers and distributors in the Americas and Asia. I researched the wine market in countries as far away as China, Korea and Indonesia. In exploring potential clients, I often investigated which dealers had already shown an interest in Argentine wine, sometimes a competitor, but often the indication of a more general interest in South American products. When speaking with contacts in Asian embassies, I learned of the vast extent to which the wine’s high esteem has spread. Chilean vineyards such as Viña Bisquertt have succeeded in seizing worldwide attention because of their high quality, award-winning wines and affordable prices. In fact, Viña Bisquertt’s 2000 La Joya Merlot was actually awarded Best Merlot of the World by the London International Wine and Spirit Competition. The industry’s reputation only continues to garner even more accolades. It came as little surprise, therefore, when that summer, even while working on the other side of the globe in Moscow, Russia, I walked into the local grocery store only to discover a great big showcase, featuring none other than the exotic and marvelous wines of Chile.

Richard Freeman is a senior at Harvard College, concentrating in Russian Literature and Culture. He thanks the DRCLAS Regional Office, which made possible this unique internship experience. Freeman can be reached at freeman2@fas.harvard.edu and welcomes any questions or comments.
Freedom in Code
The Birth of the Chilean Free Software Movement

By Eden Miller

In January 2004, Congressman Alejandro Navarro Brain announced his intention to introduce Chile’s first piece of legislation requiring the use of free software in all branches of public administration. For Navarro Brain, a socialist publicly committed to issues such as indigenous rights and environmentalism, free software serves as yet another extension of his progressive platform for social and economic justice. The legislation, tentatively titled “Proyecto de Ley: Software Libre,” argues that viewing, altering and freely disseminating the software code underlying many state operations is fundamental to Chilean national security, public participation in government, and control over national destiny. Proprietary software vendors, such as Microsoft, currently prohibit these actions. Even in its preliminary form, Navarro Brain’s proposal is significant. Chile, the Latin American nation most popularly viewed as a testament to unrestrained private sector growth, has entered into the expanding fold of developing world countries taking a stand against Microsoft.

As a doctoral student studying how state ideologies have historically shaped computer use in Chile, I’ve often wondered why Chile, one of the most “wired” countries in Latin America, had abstained from these conversations. Absent, I thought, was the press and popular perception that software ideologies have historically shaped computer use. In recent years, the free software movement has extended beyond select groups of programmers and gained a following among politicians and government administrators, particularly those representing countries in the developing world. The movement provides an opportunity for poorer countries to create software applications tailored to their needs, which they can maintain and upgrade themselves. It may also help sever longstanding relations of economic dependency that have trapped developing nations in the purchase of imported technologies from more technologically advanced parts of the world. Software, a technology most view as politically neutral, actually exerts power. The label “free software” does not necessarily imply economic philanthropy, but rather the conviction that software developed using this model would ensure the freedom to view, modify and share program code openly. To date, Microsoft’s near monopoly in the software market has obligated many developing countries to design their information systems using Microsoft products, obliging them to purchase costly upgrades and technical service. Many believe free software provides an opportunity to escape this holding pattern.

Chile, however, has remained noticeably absent from these conversations. Absent, that is, until now. During my most recent visit to Chile in January 2004, I decided to speak with several of the actors involved with this technology in hopes of discerning how this emerging debate over software alternatives will take form in Chile’s distinct neo-liberal landscape.

Building a Movement
I met with Eric Baez over beer at an outdoor café in Santiago’s bohemian comuna of Núñoa. Baez, a journalism graduate, has dedicated the past few years of his life to fomenting public interest in the free software movement. Besides running the major Chilean website dedicated to the dissemination of free software related news <www.softwarelibre.cl>, he is also collaborating with Navarro Brain in drafting the recent legislative proposal.

Grass roots activism has played a key role in furthering the adoption of free software within other Latin American countries, but Chile has proven remarkably resistant to the message of free software advocates. Baez believes the causes are multiple. The 16-year military dictatorship under General Augusto Pinochet destroyed the majority of Chilean outlets for popular participation during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, Chile’s neo-liberal economy, which has only grown stronger following Chile’s return to democracy in 1989, has reinforced ideals of individualism instead of collective good. The result, Baez explains, is that Chileans lack experience in self-organization and express a general acceptance of the status quo. Organizations such as the newly formed “Centro de Difusión de Software Libre,” composed of a mixed bag of activists, educators, and programmers, are trying to correct this by running seminars on strategy and leadership skills in addition to promoting the advantages of free software adoption. “People in general do not think from the perspective of social change,” Baez notes, while lighting a cigarette. “Chileans work more hours per day than any other country in Latin America. They don’t have time for other things.”

Urban Santiaguinos, however, do not provide the only audience for the free software message. Last year Microsoft and the
Software, a technology most view as politically neutral, actually exerts power. The free software movement provides an opportunity for poorer countries to create software applications tailored to their needs and helps sever longstanding relations of economic dependency.

intellectual hegemony, a political turn that has united Mapuche concerns of cultural preservation and control over local knowledges with the ideals promoted by the free software movement.

Chilean free software groups are currently working with Mapuche representatives to develop the first operating system written in Mapudungun, a project known as Kümee Linux. Several free software groups have also joined forces to bring computerized government services in Mapudungun to Mapuche communities. “The development of software applications for free distribution in Mapudungun,” Baez writes on his website, “is the logical road for the social and practical use of this people’s cultural richness.”

BREAD TODAY, HUNGER TOMORROW
Walking up calle Teatinos in downtown Santiago, it is difficult to overlook the large glass building that houses Chile’s largest computer company, SONDA (Sociedad Nacional de Procesamiento de Datos). With $300 million in annual sales and offices throughout Latin America, SONDA offers the model for share of politics. There was a movement against IBM, now there are a lot of people who don’t like Microsoft. It’s very irrational. It’s like Don Quixote, they [members of the free software movement] fight against monsters that don’t exist. I believe much more in freedom. Let everyone do what they want.”

Yet for some, including Baez, these monsters are quite real. Baez cites a recent example where Microsoft donated computer equipment to the financially pressed state office that runs the national libraries, museums and archives. The gift, however, failed to provide all the resources needed to put the expanding Chilean library systems online. The office subsequently needed to purchase expensive hardware and software to make the gift usable, becoming long-term Microsoft customers who will pay high prices for software upgrades and new releases. For Baez, “Microsoft’s donation creates a situation of bread today and hunger tomorrow. We see this all over the developing world.”

However, Microsoft is not the only entity profiting from Chile’s dependence on the software giant, although they are certainly reaping the highest returns. In recent years, a large informal sector of the economy has evolved in tandem with the private sector to supply the growing gap between demand and affordability. According to recent estimates in PC Magazine Español, the private sector loses $73 million annually due to Chilean pirated software and more than 62% of all software applications in Chile have been acquired through illegal channels. And therein lies the quandary.

On any given workday, street vendors crowd Santiago streets selling their wares to the businessmen and women that populate the high-rise office buildings of the commercial districts. Pirated software is one of the more popular items for sale, with a single program selling for around US $5. Although sales vary from day to day, vendors in one of Santiago’s commercial sectors reported selling between 10-12 discs daily and pocketing around US $15, more than twice the national minimum wage. Of these software sales, Microsoft products constitute the majority.

Microsft’s market dominance and Chile’s informal sector arguably occupy two sides of the same coin, complicating the issue of who benefits from this set of economic relationships and who will go hungry. When I asked a Santiago street vendor what he would do if the pirated software market collapsed he replied, “I don’t know. I’d probably start selling something else, umbrellas, belts, watches, whatever moved me. But it wouldn’t be nearly as profitable.”

As this article goes to press, a “virtual community” of congressional staffers and free software advocates are putting the finishing touches on Navarro Brain’s legislative proposal, although Navarro Brain fears private sector interests will generate strong resistance in Congress. For years, the Chilean government has adopted a policy of “technological neutrality,” allowing the market to decide which technologies best serve Chilean needs. However, when debates such as these arise, we see that technologies are rarely neutral and even software has politics.

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Poverty or Potential?
Two portraits of development in southern Chile

BY SCOTT RECHLER

Teresa stops me three blocks from Nueva Imperial’s main plaza on a quiet Wednesday morning, eager to chat. She is wearing a light blue sweater and a matching blue headband glowing slightly against her dark black hair. She leans against the handle-bars of her three-wheeled bicycle, unsold heads of lettuce peaking out of the bag in the back. Teresa asks me about the Gente Expresa office, where I’ve been working as a volunteer for the past eight months. About how the November weather has been treating me. About how her two kids Gustavo and Daniela, whom I tutor in English, are advancing in their lessons. I respond enthusiastically about their progress. As we chat, I casually play with two coins in my hand, my bus fare home; they jingle slightly as they touch.

Partway through the conversation, Teresa pauses. She carefully reaches into her pocket, extracting the small handful of coins she has collected over the course of the morning. Lettuce and chard aren’t selling well this month—only 100 pesos a head. Meticulously counting, she wonders out loud whether she has earned the 500 pesos (about US $0.85) she needs to catch the bus back home, 18 kilometers up dusty dirt roads in the campo outside Nueva Imperial. The answer: just barely.

“Somos pobres,” “Somos un país sub-desarrollado”—“We’re poor,” “We’re an under-developed country”—are resounding refrains in Chile today. Worried Chileans carefully count coins to make sure they have enough to cover food, rent, telephone, transportation—and electricity and running water, should they be so lucky. This is especially true in Nueva Imperial, a comuna of 40,000 located 20 minutes from Temuco, capital of Chile’s IX Región (la Araucanía), itself eight hours by bus south of Santiago. La Araucanía—home to Teresa, Gustavo, Daniela and me for the past eight months—ranks as the poorest of Chile’s thirteen regions, in a country where 20% of the population qualifies as “poor” (“Indicadores Económicos y Sociales: (4.2) Medición de la Pobreza y la Indigencia,” Fuente: MIDEPLAN, Encuestas CASEN 1987-1998. <http://www.mideplan.cl/estudios/pobreza.pdf.> Many of these “poor” are campesinos, of Mapuche descent, living in remote sectors with limited access to running water and sanitation, education, and healthcare.

I could go on. I could mention how cilantro isn’t selling this year. How Teresa walks with a permanent limp and permanent pain—hence the bicycle—because adequate treatment is both inaccessible and unaffordable. How education, especially English education, in the campo is so insufficient that her two children spend Monday...
through Friday in the pueblo with their aunt Luisa in order to study. How they have no running hot water inside their home in the campo. How until November 2003, Teresa and her neighbors had to light their homes with candles and gas lamps because electricity had not yet reached their sector. How in many ways Chile does live up to its “third world” stereotype.

But this paints only half the picture. What if I told you that for three consecutive years Nueva Imperial’s public library recognized Teresa as the comuna’s most avid reader? That by candle-light and the gas lamp in her kitchen, Teresa would strain her eyes to make out black letters on dark pages after spending a long day of baking tortillas and pan amasado, feeding chickens, tending crops and attending meetings. And that Teresa’s family and their neighbors in and around Salta-pura can now watch the evening news after their favorite teleserie, read comfortably at night, and see their food at dinner without first fumbling for matches or worrying about exhausted batteries at just the wrong moment—all thanks to Teresa’s hard work.

**TERESA LICANLEO AND HER HUSBAND LUIS,** in just two small greenhouses and a few plots more, produce more vegetables than your salad could possibly hold: from tomatoes and cucumbers to green beans and broccoli, from potatoes and cilantro to quinoa and black raspberries. Teresa is one of the founding members of Falinche, an association of small-scale local farmers who sell their produce at a series of stalls they established near the centro of Nueva Imperial. She supports organic agriculture and the protection of native species, believes in the importance of preserving Mapuche language and culture, and is currently trying to create an identity for her region as the home of “huevo azules” (blue eggs)—known for their bigger, thicker yolks and richer flavor. With time and money she doesn’t have, she travels regularly from the campo into Nueva Imperial to negotiate with the municipio, and to participate in Comunidades Emprendedoras, an initiative of the Chilean non-governmental organization Gente Expresa, aimed at helping leaders in la Araucanía develop their skills as leaders and social entrepreneurs.

Teresa realized that electricity doesn’t just appear in the campo, passive light from an effortless hand. In 1998 Teresa, then president of the indigenous community of Salta-pura, took over as president of the comité de electrificación—the electrification committee—jump-starting an initiative begun, but abandoned, five years earlier. Over the course of the following years, she knocked
If Chile’s civil society is so active, with such demonstrated potential, where is the missing link?

Huichahue on Monday, November 24, 2003. As we stood talking that Wednesday morning in mid-November, Teresa wasn’t telling me about how hard it is to live without electricity. She was describing her final negotiations with the municipio of Nueva Imperial and the Intendente of la Araucanía to make electricity in Saltapura and neighboring Bolonto, Millecoi and indigenous populations. Why participate, they wonder, if they ultimately have no influence over the decisions and institutions that affect them and their communities?

Gente Expresa’s executive director Héctor Jorquera offers a more “cultural,” as opposed to “structural,” explanation. He argues that negative experiences have created a climate of bitterness and distrust. Those experiences, past and present, with governmental and non-governmental organizations—or even perceived negative experiences—have made citizen leaders skeptical, wary. They resign themselves to the impossibility of large-scale action and consequently turn inwards, focusing on very specific, very short-term individual projects or waiting passively for change to come to them. Héctor acknowledges that structural barriers exist, and might even be at the root of such distrust and resignation. However, he suggests that this collective mal ánimo—negative attitude—unnecessarily reinforces these structural concerns.

As a response to this social concern, Héctor introduced Comunidades Emprendedoras through Gente Expresa. He aims to change participants’ “sólo hacer”—their way of thinking and doing—through intense individual “coaching” and strengthening collaborative teams of diverse community leaders. Community workshops and one-on-one conversations emphasize the importance of listening closely to others’ interests, critiques and concerns.

At the core of the work is an important attitudinal shift, a new focus on opportunity and possibility, rather than problems and failure. If Chile continues to focus on its poverty and underdevelopment, the country will remain poor and underdeveloped, drowning in its own distrust and resignation. Only if its leaders—social, public and private—take on these problems as challenges, obstacles as opportunities, and begin to work together will the country and its citizens, move forwards. Only if Teresa and her neighbors see the lack of electricity as room for an improvement, not a sentence to failure, and take it upon themselves to build the bridges needed to make that change, will that change take place.

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CITIZENSHIP: DIVERSITY AND EQUITY

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Modernization a la Chilena
Integration and Exclusion
BY GONZALO DE LA MAZA

O N THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COUP IN 2003, CHILE ALSO celebrated two decades of practically uninterrupted economic growth and 15 years of peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy. The last two processes differentiate Chile in a positive sense from many of its neighbors in Latin America and in a certain way is an unexpected result of the struggle for democracy in the 1980s.

Even those post-1990 new democratic authorities who did not believe in the neoliberal economic model imposed during the military dictatorship continued and deepened it—with certain variations. This has produced good macroeconomic results. More than a decade of growth beyond historical rates, was followed by another period in which Chile surpassed most of Latin America, a region severely punished by different economic crises. In the political arena, on the other hand, after 15 years of democracy, the anti-democratic 1980 political constitution imposed by Pinochet is still in effect. Many of the institutions he built are still operating.

Since 1990, active social policies have helped to reduce Chile's rate of absolute poverty in contrast with the rest of the continent. In spite of economic growth, political stability and a overall improvement in income levels, an effective strengthening of civil society—greatly weakened by 17 years of dictatorship—is still lacking.

Indeed, inequality of opportunities among social groups is more entrenched and various types of social disintegration are on the rise. Political participation, as well as democratic commitment, has declined considerably since the first years of transitional governments.

The road of “modernization” agreed upon by economic and political elites at the end of the 1980s did not look at the shaping of society as a goal. Rather, it focused on economic growth, institutional political “normalization” and so-called “payment of social debt.” The goal was to try to maintain the conditions of economic growth and to add on a more active social policy. Naturally, that could not change the basic course of the productive structure. Therefore, the transition’s relevant social achievements could not be translated into stable integration and social participation.

The situation described above permits a rereading of the post-dictatorship period. The majority of the population had been objectively and subjectively excluded because of unemployment, repression and poverty before then. In the post-dictatorship period, the majority of the people were summoned to a new kind of inclusion through consumerism and institutional democratic participation. But actual economic inclusion has been precarious, partial and profoundly unequal.

In the political realm, the limitations of the transition, the reduced role of the state and “authoritarian enclaves” impede significant changes and real participation. Citizens experience insecurity, the sensation of a powerlessness, fear and lack of control over their own lives. The public sphere is weakened because of a perception of “the lack of recognition and representation of public institutions, especially those charged with creating ties for the related with modern citizenship,” as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) pointed out in its 1998 Report on Human Development.

PARTIAL INTEGRATION IN MODERNIZATION A LA CHILENA
Social policies, including higher wages and minimum pensions, as well as low levels of unemployment until 1998, contributed to an increase in Chileans’ income during the 1990s. Yet inequality of opportunities increased during this period. Workdays became longer and Chilean families found themselves deeper in debt. Inequality has gone hand in hand with economic modernization, creating a social fissure that is now having political consequences.

In 1990, 38.6% of the population received monthly income below poverty level. In the year 2000, the number had declined to 20.6%, some three million Chileans, according to the Poll on Socio-Economic Characteristics. Yet even this positive showing has not reached the level of 30 years ago, when in 1973, only 17% of the population was below poverty level. As the economy improves, the contrasts are sharper. Statistics show that 10% of today’s poorest Chilean homes have decreased from receiving 1.5% of the wealth, to only 1.3 % with an average income of $80 monthly. In contrast, the wealthiest 10%, captures 41%, of Chile’s total income and earns an average of $3,000 monthly. Poor households have a larger
number of members, which means that each person in the wealthiest sector of the population has income 40 times greater than each of Chile's poorer citizens.

Recent studies, including a World Bank report, indicate that the structure of income distribution in Chile is not much different from that of other Latin American countries, except in relationship to the highest income group, which enjoy a disproportionately great concentration of resources and opportunities. At the beginning of the decade, Chile put the problem of the “five million poor” on the table as the main challenge for social policy. We can now say that the “five hundred thousand rich,” richer by the day, are the country's main problem. The society has managed to increase resources for the poor so they can survive. However, by not reducing inequality, it has blocked the social availability of the necessary resources to live together in harmony. Because sobrevivir is not the same as convivir.

**POLITICAL POLICIES OF A SMALL STATE**

The contribution of public policies has been crucial to the increase in income of the poorest. However, employment, closely linked to the evolution out of poverty, and other key factors have not been tackled. While economic growth averaged more than 6% in the last decade, employment has only increased 0.8% yearly. This means that poverty decline has also been slower, particularly among poor women and youth. The latter experience unemployment at three times the rate of adults. The jobs that have been created are mostly in the informal sector and thus precarious, with low wages and bad working conditions.

The amount of resources destined toward social policy has increased steadily, particularly in the areas of health and education, although the impact of this investment has been relatively low. Meanwhile, the majority of the innovative agencies in the public sector created since 1990 have experienced crisis after crisis and have not managed to integrate themselves into the traditional structure of the state.

Chile's public social expenditure has doubled in absolute terms from 1990, according to the official report of the follow-up meeting of the World Social Development Summit. It has grown a bit more than two percentage points of the GNP and represents three-fourths of all public spending. How is it possible that in spite of these efforts by the public sector, the increasingly unequal structure of Chilean society has not been altered? We don’t understand why, World Bank economist Guillermo Perry recognized at the beginning of the year. Probably the answer is that only public expenditure is redistributed, while the major sources of income tend to be highly concentrated. Almost half of public expenditure is used to pay pensions, a percentage that will only increase in the future as Chileans grow older and the state assumes responsibility for its uncovered or under-covered citizens. Many of them work for the exportation activities, the dynamic “modern side” of Chilean society.

Public expenditure also has a limited impact because it represents only a fifth of total economic expenditure. Thus, paradoxically, state monetary transfers represent 31% of the income for Chile's poorest 10%, but their income participation has only improved 0.1%. At the same time, consumers are more frequently paying for public services themselves, 50% in health, almost 40% in housing and 10% in education with a growing tendency for shared costs between the consumer and the state.
At the beginning of the decade, Chile put the problem of the “five million poor” on the table as the main challenge for social policy. Now, the “five hundred thousand rich,” richer by the day, are the country’s main problem.
Gender and Chile’s Split Culture
Continuing Contradictions in Women’s Lives

BY MARGARET POWER

Even out of every ten Chileans (69 percent) believe that “Having a job is fine, but what most women really want is a house and children,” according to a July 2003 study by the Santiago-based Centro de Estudios Públicos. That same study reveals that 52% of women (versus 38% of men) strongly disagree with the statement that “Married people are, in general, happier than those who are not married.” (El Mercurio, July 19, 2003) This apparent disconnect reflects the tensions and contradictions that frame the lives of many women in Chile today.

In Chile, as indeed throughout the rest of the world, normative ideas about gender strongly influence women’s lives, expectations and possibilities. Chileans typically conflate womanhood with motherhood. They associate women with the home, family, and children. Yet, for many women, the gendered expectations they receive and frequently internalize, conflict with the drive to modernity that dominates the national discourse and shapes public values and goals. These expectations also clash with many women’s quotidian reality and desires. In this article, I seek to explore different expressions of this conflict among Chilean women today and offer some explanations as to why it has emerged.

Chile today is a product of the wrenching political, social, cultural and economic projects of the last forty years. The Chilean experience has ranged from the leftist government of Salvador Allende in the early 1970s, to the military dictatorship of General Pinochet in the 70s and 80s, to the post-dictatorial Concertación government of today. Perhaps ironically, the Pinochet dictatorship had the most profound impact on gender relations; its legacy influences many of the tensions that define Chilean women’s lives today.

The Pinochet dictatorship, like many preceding governments, pledged to modernize Chile. For the military dictatorship, modernization meant neoliberalism and the privatization of the Chilean economy. These policies (which subsequent governments have basically followed) signaled the termination of state subsidies to industry; Chile’s intensified insertion into the world economy; and substantial changes in production, such as the increased growing of fruit and wine for export and the introduction of computers. These changes led to a rapid decline in men’s traditional sources of employment, along with the trade union movement that had defended them. They opened up new areas of work, many of which women now occupy. Thus, while the military regime’s patriarchal discourse defined women as dependent wives and mothers, its economic policies either forced or allowed them to take on new roles as wage laborers, in some cases as the sole financial supporter of their families.

Two other factors explain why the Pinochet period has had such a deep impact on Chilean women today. First, a feminist movement emerged in Chile in the 1980s in opposition to the highly repressive practices of the government and in support of the emancipation of women. With its slogan, “Democracy in the streets and in the home,” this movement broadened the definition of politics to include personal and domestic relations and challenged patriarchal power in society and the family.

Although this dynamic movement no longer exists, it placed feminist demands for equality on the political agenda. Today, many of its leaders occupy important positions in government, influential think tanks, and universities. The Concertación government created SER-NAM, (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer), whose director holds ministerial rank. Under SERNAM’s direction, the Chilean government has incorporated legal equality for women and men into the Constitution. It also fostered the passage of a law that eliminated legal distinctions between children born in or out of wedlock.

Several Chilean universities now teach women’s and gender studies. Yet much of the Chilean right and the Catholic Church fervently oppose the demands of the feminist movement because feminist goals challenge patriarchal relations and entrenched ideas about gender. Further complicating the issue, some sectors of the Concertación fail to support certain goals of the feminist movement, such as divorce and abortion rights, thus undermining feminists’ ability to pass legislation on these issues.

The second legacy of the Pinochet era to the women’s movement is Chile’s insertion into the world market. This opening exposed a formerly insular country to an influx of ideas and images about women and men that directly challenged the conservative discourse of the Pinochet regime and the women’s organizations that supported it. While the Pinochet regime preached the idea that women’s fundamental, essential role in life was to be a mother, U.S. and European media showed women performing a range of different roles, many of which reflected the politics and achievements of the global feminist struggle. Furthermore, the neoliberal focus on the individual and consumerism encouraged women to work in order to have money to buy products for themselves, as opposed to being the self-sacrificing wife or mother who submerges her own needs into those of her family.

These different political, social, economic and cultural influences play out in a variety of ways in Chile today. Women’s gendered realities shape many of their political preferences and a gender gap exists in Chile, just as it does in the U.S. However, unlike the U.S., Chilean women tend to vote more conservatively than do men. For example, the majority of Chilean women opposed the Allende government and, at least initially, supported the Pinochet dictatorship; in the 2000 presidential elections a majority of women voted for rightist Joaquín Lavín, a member of Opus Dei, the extremely conservative Catholic organization. (Margaret Power, Right-Wing Women in Chile)

Today, 46.7% of women work outside the home, the highest percentage that has ever done so in Chilean history. This percentage is low compared to Sweden (81%), but only slightly lower than other South American countries such as Brazil (50%) and Colombia (48%). (El Mercurio, July 19, 2003). Economic necessity, the development of new jobs, and women’s willingness to work explain the increased number of women workers. Women workers typically receive less than their male counterparts, however. For example,
Clockwise from left: Artist Daniela Tobar in her glass house, Foreign Relations Minister Soledad Alvear; a woman plumber; and Defense Minister Michelle Bachelet gets ready for flight.

PHOTOGRAPHS: ALEJANDRO BARRUEL (LOWER RIGHT), ALL OTHERS COURTESY OF EL MERCURIO
women in industry earn only 71.3% of what men do and women in mining receive only 60%. (ICFTU, December 4, 2003) Neoliberal economic policies encourage the large-scale production of fruit and wine for export to Europe and the United States. Women have obtained the majority of the jobs in the fruit industry, in large part because the companies pay women less than they would men, thus making female employment more lucrative to the fruit companies. A high percentage of women work in the informal sector, which is not unionized and lacks security or benefits. Women’s growing participation in the labor force has not translated into gender equality. However, it may have increased women’s self-esteem, capacity to support themselves and their families, and their unwillingness to accept abusive treatment from their male partners.

The Catholic Church wields enormous power in Chile, especially over the lawmakers. Although 95% of Chileans routinely state they believe in God, only about 34% regularly attend church services; and only 27% of young people do. (Santiago Times, May 4, 2001) Equally significant, Protestant churches (which support the right to divorce) are growing in Chile. For many Chilean women professing belief in God is not synonymous with following the dictates of the Catholic Church on social issues. Although the Catholic Church fervently opposes divorce, since it perceives the granting of divorce as the beginning of the slippery slope that will inevitably lead to support for abortion and “homosexuality,” Chilean public opinion overwhelmingly supports it. And many Chileans are simply voting with their feet: larger numbers of young Chileans are simply not getting married. Recognizing that their marriage may not last, they choose to live together rather than face the cost of an annulment or the impossibility of a divorce. Only 73% of Chileans hope to marry while in Argentina 95%, Venezuela 88%, and Brazil 94% of young people do. (El Mercurio, June 21, 2002) Because so many Chileans do not marry, more than one half of all Chilean babies are born to unmarried parents.

Chilean women do not enjoy reproductive rights. As in the case of divorce, hypocrisy pervades the public debate on abortion. The Catholic Church is firmly opposed to abortion. Yet roughly one in three pregnancies ended in an abortion in 1990. (CEDAW, U.N. Concluding Observations, 1995) Without access to a safe way of ending unwanted pregnancy, many women seek unsafe clandestine abortions. Thus, one in five women who induces an abortion requires subsequent hospitalization. The current Ricardo Lagos government maintains a contradictory position on the issue of reproductive rights. It simultaneously declares its opposition to abortion and “supports both parents freely deciding the desired number of births.” (Adriana Delpiano, U.N. General Assembly on “Women 2000,” June 5, 2000)

It is hard to gauge to what degree attitudes toward women’s sexuality are changing. Few women or men expect women to be virgins when they marry and, according to a 2000 study, Power within the Couple, Sexuality and Reproduction by sociologist Teresa Valdés, 77% of the women in her study had premarital sex. The reasons they did so, however, indicate that sexual relations for women do not necessarily equate with women’s empowerment or choice. About 49% of the women said they engaged in sexual relations for pleasure, while an equal number said they did so in response to pressure from their boyfriend or because they feared they would lose him if they did not. Certainly, more women now assert their right to sexual pleasure, but as is true in many parts of the world, that does not mean they are getting it. According to a 2000 study conducted by Fundación Futuro, more than 50% of Chilean women are not sexually satisfied (neither are roughly 50% of Chilean men). The recent bestseller, Women, Their Secret Sexuality, by Chilean psychologist Maria Eugenia Weinstein and award-winning author Patricia Politzer, argues that discussions about sex between couples are still taboo in Chile. Many women fake orgasms, which make them feel both guilty and deficient, since they assume it’s their fault they don’t have them. Lesbian realities and sexuality remain fairly invisible, although groups like the Colectiva Lesbian Feminista Ayuquen, whose goal is to strengthen the lesbian organization, do exist.

Chileans’ response to the “Glass House” reveals much about current Chilean attitudes towards gender and sexuality. In January 2000 (the Chilean summer), the actress Daniella Tobar took up residence in a glass house, specifically constructed in downtown Santiago as a living art exhibit on the issue of privacy and Santiagoños’ attitude toward it. Instead, the site became an unbridled display of male sexual repression, aggression and lust. Tobar conducted all of her daily activities, including taking a shower, in full view of the increasingly large male crowd that gathered outside the exhibit to watch her. At times, the male crowd yelled at her to take her clothes off and take a shower. On various occasions, the men groped and harassed women who happened to be walking by. Despite the fact that scantily clad women serve men coffee in downtown cafes, and that the kiosks of Chile have an overabundance of newspapers displaying women in varying stages of undress, the Glass House scandalized much of Chilean society, which vocally condemned it. A comment made by Tobar in an interview reveals much, I believe, about why her presence evoked such a response and speaks volumes about gender and sexuality in contemporary Chile. When asked how she felt about what she was doing, she replied, “Every day I am getting more and more calm. I am in control now.”

Modernization, despite the tensions and contradictions associated with it, has made it more possible for Chilean women to exert more control over their lives. Economic realities, gender restraints, and women’s own desires limit the extent to which women can exercise or enjoy this control. At the same time, the history of a vibrant women’s movement, new economic possibilities, and the higher profile of women in government, the media, and intellectual centers offer women images and realities that are constantly expanding the definition of Chilean womanhood, opening new interpretations and possibilities for women to emerge from the glass houses they inhabit.

Women’s gendered realities shape many of their political preferences and a gender gap exists in Chile, just as it does in the United States.
Homosexual in Chile Today

Lights and Shadows

BY GABRIEL GUAJARDO

Homosexual advocacy organizations in Chile appeared at the end of the 1980s as a social response to the HIV/AIDS epidemics and the fight for democracy. Homosexual groups such as Liber-H began in a town in the central region of Chile, Paine, a place scarcely affected by the political repression during the military dictatorship. In 1987, the Corporación Chilena de Prevención del SIDA came into existence as a collective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. A constellation of organizations soon emerged on the scene: the so-called “Historic” MOVILH, MUMS, the Movimiento Unificado de Minorías Sexuales and more recently, Traves Chile. Lesbian organizations have forged their own way in a certain dialogue of inclusion and distinct autonomy in relation to male homosexuals. They have built their own social organizations and created their own ways of communicating. (See page 37 for website information on these organizations.)

The Chilean homosexual today finds expression in this proliferation of civil society organizations and lively Gay Pride parades. Legal restrictions on sexual relations between persons of the same sex have been removed from the books. As in the rest of Latin America, the number of publications and studies on sexuality and gender issues has increased. Certain topics such as sexual diversity and the HIV/AIDS epidemic have been integrated into the public agenda. Radio and television have begun to broadcast positive reflections of homosexual life. Literature often deals with issues of homosexual identity.

Gay, lesbian and transgender social organizations, as well as a thoughtful academy, civil society stakeholders and public state-controlled services, have placed homosexuality in the context of its cultural significance. Chilean writer and cultural critic Juan Pablo Sutherland, referring to the proliferation of writing on the homosexual issue, commented, “The advancement of the Chilean lesbian-homosexual movement and the visibility of its proposals have accustomed the public and the society in general to these outbursts generating at times significant discussions regarding cultural—and not just literary—production.”

In spite of recent advances in terms of political and cultural spaces, the homosexual in Chile today faces many challenges, including persistent homophobia. These shadows include discrimination, exclusion and identity issues that reflect the sometimes hostile environment. For example, in 2003, Chileans vehemently discussed whether homosexuals should have the right to donate blood for blood banks. Those opposed argued that homosexuals would donate HIV-infected blood, resulting in possible death for innocent persons. The underlying implication, of course, was that all homosexuals are AIDS-carriers. Blood banks ended up accepting blood donations from homosexuals, but shadows of prejudice against this kind of donation still linger.

Another recent case involved public knowledge about the homosexuality of a judge in charge of an investigation related to a pedophilia case. The case caused intense debate in the media as to...
whether homosexuals should be allowed to serve as judges, an issue that finally had a positive outcome with the judge confirmed in his position. But in this case, as in the one mentioned above, it is still possible to feel the violent tone of certain attitudes.

The Chilean backlash, or homophobic reappearance, can be placed in a larger context, including the continent’s economic globalization that has resulted in transformations of the cultural map of Latin America. National social and political aperture and regional integration have led countries such as Chile to insert themselves competitively in the global market. Thus, the public expression of sexual diversity becomes more difficult because of the inclusion of new meanings that not only can be ascribed to the countries themselves, but to the integration and exclusion process that globalization generates (García Canclini, 1995; Brunner, 1998).

MEDIA, POLITICS AND GAY PERFORMANCE
The globalization of communications requires theoretical and empirical research. This is particularly true of cases specifically related to media and information technologies and lesbian/gay and transgender persons or groups. In Chile, the relation between media—television, radio and press—and the gay/lesbian organizations is paradoxical. At the same time media discusses homosexual presence in terms of its symbolic and critical transgression, the gay issue is flourishing in its positive performance in the areas of entertainment and literature.

The perception of homosexuality as transgression in the mainstream news media reflects major trends in public opinion. In a 1998 FLACSO survey, 60% of men and women 18 years and older in Santiago considered interviewing prostitutes and/or homosexuals on television an unacceptable practice. This attitude contrasts paradoxically with the positive portrayal of homosexual issues or homosexuals as characters in television entertainment programs that elude direct or explicit criticism.

One recent example of this paradox was the television series Machos, the most successful soap opera in Chilean history, recently exported to Spain. Although we never saw the character’s boyfriend or any intimate contact between men, his love and loss and his struggle for family acceptance captured the Chilean audience. Eventually everyone accepted him, including his overly macho father and brother, a direct negation of the transgression message perpetuated in the news media. Perhaps most important, the protagonist was not a stereotypically gay character in the vein of Will and Grace and Queer Eye.

The Chilean alternative media have been encouraging non-stereotypical images of homosexual presence for much longer. The radio program “Triángulo abierto,” on the air since 1993, allows the broadcast of different types of journalistic venues, including the participation of lesbian/gay movement public speakers and the presence of homosexuals or homosexual themes from the academy, politics and culture. (See <http://www.orgullogay.cl/triang.htm>.)

HOMOPHOBIA
Despite some positive images in the media and the increase in homosexual civil society representation, there still exist important levels of public rejection of the visible presence of homosexuals in Chile.

A series of surveys and qualitative studies have shown that the majority of Chileans tends to reject homosexual men when they are part of institutions such as schools, army, television and politics. Fundación Ideas, a Chilean non-governmental organization, studied issues of intolerance and discrimination issues in persons 18 years and older. The 1997 study found that homosexuality topped the list of groups mentioned in terms of intolerance and discrimination, a much higher level than ethnic discrimination, for example. Subsequent studies continue to show high levels of homophobia, even though certain categories experienced a significant decrease in homophobic attitudes. For example, only half of those interviewed...
a 2003 survey approved the statement: “Medical doctors must study
the causes for homosexuality, in order to prevent their continuing
birth” (Chilean Government, 2003).

Homophobia results in serious lesbian and gay human rights
in Chile. Modification of legal regulations has not necessarily guar-
anteed the pacific and respectful co-existence with homosexual per-
sons and groups in our country. We lack the educational,
communication and judicial strategies to allow for the restitution
of homosexual dignity as persons and citizens. Illegal arrests and
intimidation continue. Social stereotypes and restrictions persist,
hindering the possibility of filing a suit in defense for acts of dis-
crimination and defamation committed against gay, transsexual
or lesbian persons (Ahumada y Sánchez, 2000).

Homosexual stakeholders in Chile have filed 66 denunciations
for discrimination in 2003 (MOVILH, 2003). Sociocultural and
economic inequities are also reflected in the definition of homo-
phobic behavior and ways of living homosexuality. Poor homo-
sexuals experience more violent and aggressive behavior. On April
12, 2003, the transgender organization Traves Chile publicly reported
that a gang of 30 men wielding knives and guns attacked their head-
quarters in downtown Santiago, when they were having a party.
In the act the transsexual Alejandra Soto was stabbed.

The homophobia and its violent consequences, of course, are
not exclusive to Chile. Amnesty International (1994) refers to extra-
judicial executions and forced disappearance of persons identified
as homosexuals throughout Latin America. These grave basic rights
violations are intertwined with police control and repression in en-
tertainment venues such as discotheques and bars throughout the
hemisphere (Montalvo, 1997).

In spite of recent advances in terms of political and
cultural spaces, the homosexual in Chile today faces
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co-existence.
The Struggle of the Mapuche Peoples

Deepening Democracy in Chile

By Guillaume Boccara

Chile’s Mapuche nation, with nearly a million members, is becoming a central protagonist of the new Chilean political and cultural panorama. Since the beginning of the 1990s and with the return of democracy, Mapuche organizations have emphasized the recuperation of usurped lands, socio-territorial reconstruction and the recovery of their collective rights. The Chilean state has been slow to react in an appropriate manner. The 1993 indigenous law recognizes the existence of cultural pluralism in Chile, but the Chilean state has not granted constitutional recognition to the Mapuche nation nor ratified relevant international treaties. The creation of the National Corporation for Indigenous Development looks after indigenous interests, but indigenous participation in social policymaking is minimal. Despite anti-poverty programs, the Mapuche continue being the poorest of the poor. In a recent report about the historical truth regarding relationships between the indigenous nations and the Chilean state, the commission of legal experts and social scientists failed to take into account Mapuche’s own perceptions of their relationship with the Wingka (non-Mapuche Chileans) and with a state that used violence and subterfuge to conquer them at the end of the last century.

In the last ten years, about 500,000 acres were returned to rural Mapuche communities. However, the serious problem of invasions of Mapuche territory by lumber companies has not been resolved. Megaprojects such as dams and highways continue to destroy the environment and to produce disastrous social and economic effects on the indigenous communities. The Chilean state cites its dialogues with Mapuche nation representatives, but it continues to persecute, repress and incarcerate many of the Mapuche militants, using the global rhetoric of anti-terrorism. In spite of this increasingly dark panorama of the indigenous nations of Chile, I decided to tell a story with a happier ending. I made this decision for three reasons: First, because the case which I relate tends to demonstrate that a pluri-national or a multicultural state is built above all on the respect of basic human rights. Second, because this same case shows the increased negotiation capacity of the Mapuche organizations, particularly since the reconstruction process in the “neotraditional” territories. Third, the Mapuche activists cited in this issue of ReVista directly tackle the dark side of the conflict between the Chilean state, the Mapuche nation and the large multinational corporations (for more lengthy interviews, see ReVista on the web <http://drclas.fas.harvard.edu>). I have written, then, the short history of a conflict between three Mapuche-Lafkenche (the coastal Mapuche) communities and an unfortunately famous large estate owner from the Carahue commune in Chile’s south central region.

Breaking Through the Retaining Wall: A Dream Come True

Mapuche community members in the Coi Coi valley enthusiastically broke through the retaining wall parallel to the fence separating indigenous land from the Durán estate in Chile’s coastal zone. Constructed a little after the devastating 1960 tsunami flooded the coastal lands of the now deceased Domingo Durán, the imposing retaining wall seeks to prevent further flooding. But by preventing the waters from running their natural course towards the Moncul river, this construction flooded more than 27 acres belonging to the Mapuche-Lafkenche community of the Lobería sector of Pilolcura. Green grass on the estate side of the palisades-wall now contrasts sharply with the flooded pastures of large reeds on the indigenous side (see photograph 3). Today, more than 43 years after the wall’s illegal construction, dozens of cows graze peacefully on the estate, while the scrawny animals of the Mapuche commune members find themselves buried in the muddy clay. “Nearly 12 hectares (29 acres) of our lands are now prone to flooding, and on the rest of the land animals barely survive; when one begins to construct one’s house the water appears right away” said a Pilolcura commune member.
Thus, community members consider September 9, 2003 a historic date. “It is a dream come true,” say Rosa Levío and Lucinda Huenuman—women from the Pilolcura community—with much emotion. “To achieve the opening of the retaining wall is a great victory resulting from several decades of struggle and mobilization,” declare Bladimir Painecura and René Huenchuñir, leaders of the *Newen Pu Lafkenche* Association, representing eight communities in the coastal Mapuche territory. Actual estate owner Juan Carlos Durán, present the day of the wall opening, recognizes that maybe his father committed an error in constructing this dike so harmful to Mapuche farmers, saying “nowadays it is necessary to work together in order to construct a country for all.” Leaders Fernando Huenchuñir of Champulli-Costa and Hernán Levío of Pilolcura say that three factors allowed for the dike opening: the return to democracy, community mobilization and the good will of the regional government and of public services. “We go about things in a legal manner,” said Levío. “We the Mapuche are not contentious like they would like to claim. Rather, we would like the support of the regional government. We would also like to construct a better future for our children through the work of the Mapuche organizations,” insists the president of Pilolcura. “We fight for what corresponds to us and we have looked for a solution through dialogue, the most beautiful thing there is.”

The *longko* (traditional chief) of Pilolcura, Juan Colicheo, anxiously grabs the shovel and pickaxe to break a hole through the wall and allow the water trapped for more than four decades to run freely. The *longko* emphasizes the collaboration and support of all the communities. “By opening this wall, the horizon is opened to us” declares another emotional community member, dressed in a Chilean soccer jersey on the day of the Chile-Peru match. He notes, with much happiness, that when the land dries they will be able to plant crops and build sturdy homes. The communities will continue to work together to drain the water. According to René Hunchuñir, 130 families will benefit from the drainage work.

**SATISFACTORY PUBLIC SERVICES**

The Mapuche of Champulli, Coi Coi, Pilolcura, the three communities in the valley of Coi Coi, are not the only ones that are happy. Ruben Cariqueo, a consultant for the regional government and coordinator of the public service project in the zone, shares the general sense of achievement. A few months after the signing of an agreement between the public services of the region and the Association *Newen Pu Lafkenche*, “concrete problems have been able to be solved through negotiation and conversations,” he observes. Environmental specialist Mario Castro from the South Araucanía Health Service also observed that opening of the wall can be considered an act of sanitation. Author of a report about the retaining wall’s impact, Castro says that the opening of the wall is the result not only of the pressure from Mapuche organizations but also of the support of several public services. Rodrigo Fuentes, substitute director of the water company (DGA), points out that “here a integral and definitive solution was sought so that this type of illegal situation will never be repeated again.” “According to the 1991 water code and to the much older civic code, it is not allowed for any property to produce a flood in another property” emphasizes Fuentes. Given the region’s size, public services cannot be aware of every illegal diversion of water, he observes. In the case of the Lobería sector retaining wall, the DGA acted in response to requests by the Association of *Newen Pu Lafkenche* communities. The situation reached a quick settlement because...
the substitute director, in addition to his own fieldwork, experienced collaboration with united and organized communities. Community participation, trained indigenous leaders and the public sector’s new way of looking at issues of land and Mapuche territory led to a peaceful resolution. The Mapuche demonstrated their capacity to negotiate but, above all, the State, in respecting the rule of law, contributed to reopening dialogue. In fact, the estate owner himself explains that what pushed him to accept the opening of the retaining wall was that “in legal terms it had to be that way.”

**THE CHILEAN STATE AND THE MAPUCHE NATION: TOWARDS A NEW AGREEMENT**

Community president Hernán Huenuman, DGA substitute director Fuentes and owner Durán emphasized that the solution to the conflict would have been impossible without the willingness of all the parties to have a dialogue, as well as respect for the current law. In this case, the state fulfilled its role of ensuring respect for the laws and of protecting the rights of the citizens, the communities and of the nations that live within the national territory. It is a good example of how democracy is constructed in a diverse or plurinational society through actions. In the end, the state did not do anything more or less than reestablishing a right that had been violated, but that ended the long conflict. An agreement signed on March 28, 2003 by the Neuen pu Lafkenche Association with the regional public services made easier the resolution of the longstanding problems between the Durán estate and the indigenous communities. According to Association President Bladimir Painecura, “This precedent can be imitated, but certain conditions must be met in order to be able to do that,” a point of view shared by sociologist Augusto González, technical advisor to the Neuen pu Lafkenche Association. González believes that the return to democracy, the new rapprochement of the state with the most distant parts of the country and the flourishing of the Mapuche rights movement help explain why what had not been accomplished for more than 40 years was accomplished in five months. The organizational capacity and the management of the Lafkenche Association both at the community level and the territorial level permitted it to knock on the correct doors. The victory underscored the organizational capacity of the communities in the Lafkenche territory; it was not just a successful resolution of the simple technical challenge of figuring out where to go to make one’s rights count. The organization of the communities according to an in-bred territorial ordering does not contradict the work of public services nor the state’s ambition to find integral solutions to conflicts and complex problems. In the case of the retaining wall, the Mapuche organizations and the Chilean state both seemed to draw strength from the episode, rather than entering in conflict. This represents a concrete example of how the solution to the so-called Mapuche problem passes through reform of the state and of its agents to the recognition of the Mapuche nation as a political, cultural, social, and juridical subject. That is how a new agreement appears possible through the daily construction of democracy adapted to the plurinational reality of the country. Even more so, the respect of the particular rights of the Mapuche nation tends to reinforce the universal rights of all citizens or groups of citizen, Mapuche or non-Mapuche. Far from representing a danger for Chile’s unity, the Mapuche social movement represents an opportunity for the deepening of the democracy in a socio-culturally diverse territory. The government itself seemed to share this idea, since it placed the notion of interculturality at the center of its reform of the state. The government has also aimed to strengthen dialogue, although often confronted with economic and political interests that go beyond the interests of Chilean civil society. The lesson of this story is that dialogue and negotiation are possible when democracy exists—which is not always the case when it involves respecting and recognizing the rights of the indigenous people of Chile.

**SEPTEMBER 9TH: THE MAPUCHE-LAFKENCHE-CHILEAN DAY OF PATRIOTISM**

To conclude, let us listen to the Pilolcura community member Richard Levio who summarized with humor and lucidity the significance of this important moment in both the Mapuche-Lafkenche history and in the relationship between the Chilean State and the Mapuche nation: “At least now the indigenous person is heard; before we were marginalized, we had no rights to anything. Today is a patriotic day for us. All we needed was the music to dance a pair of purunces (a Mapuche dance) with a pair of cueca (Chilean national dance). But given that we are all focused here on the opening of the wall, instead of the instruments we’ll use picks and shovels.”

Guillaume Boccara (Ph.D, EHESS, Paris, 1997), an anthropologist, is a researcher at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (France). He has worked for several years with Mapuche communities in Chile. He has been a fellow at the Program in Agrarian Studies at Yale, visiting professor at Yale University and at the Casa de las Américas (Spain). Among his more recent publications are “The Mapuche People in Post-Dictatorship Chile” in Etudes Rurales 163-164: 283-304 (2002), Guerre et Ethnogenèse Mapuche dans le Chili Colonial (Paris, Editions L’Harmattan, 1998), and Colonización, Resistencia y Mestizaje en las Américas (Quito-Lima, Editorial Abya Yala/IFEA, 2003). Boccara is currently working on the process of reterritorialization among the Chilean and Argentine Mapuche, neoliberal global governmentality and the reconfiguration of the nation-state in Chile and Argentina (E-mail<boccara@ehess.fr> or <chumilemi@yahoo.fr>).

---Hernán LeVío, Pilolcura Community Leader.

“We the Mapuche are not contentious like they would like to claim. Rather, we would like the support of the regional government. We would also like to construct a better future for our children through the work of the Mapuche organizations,” —Hernán LeVío, Pilolcura Community Leader.
Migration

The Hidden Face of Globalization

By Diego Carrasco Carrasco

In the last decade, citizens from Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina and Cuba have flocked to Chile. They migrated to Chile with expectations based on the stability of the economic model, university system, health services and the structure of the Chilean labor market. Although this migration has not been a large-scale phenomenon, the presence of foreigners has generated some instances of discrimination that have been denounced by organizations of migrants in neighboring countries: exclusion based on nationality, mistreatment, employment in underpaid jobs, and other excluding actions.

In the 1990s, the economic, political and financial situation of the country differed greatly from the shaky democracies and economies of other countries in Latin America. As a result, many of these Latin American nationals expect to find in Chile the right destination for finding a job and improving the living conditions of their families. This was the beginning of an important migration from Peru and Ecuador, but this time on an individual and job-oriented basis that has resulted in around 60,000 migrants in the last three years. The countries of origin have reacted by establishing high migration rates, rises in the cost of passports and certification to travel abroad.

Migration is not a new phenomenon in Chile, but these new immigrants are finding a completely different context from previous migratory flows. Like most Latin American countries, the Chilean society has its roots in migration. The first wave in the 19th century resulted from specific national policies to promote European migration in order to populate and develop the local economies in remote places. German families settled in the south, in regions inhabited by mapuches. English, Yugoslavian and French families immigrated to Patagonia. As migration grew stronger in the 20th century, Spanish, Italian and English families settled in Chile’s Central Region.

Most of Chile’s first waves of immigrants came from groups affected by Europe’s critical situation at the end of the 19th century and the two World Wars. European migration was promoted and encouraged through the allocation of land or some benefits stipulated by specific laws. In those days, the basic assumption was to favor European citizens because they were better at developing a work ethic as pioneers in areas not inhabited by Chilean citizens.

Playa Grande, Cartagena, 1988
The truth is that the German nationals were taken to areas that had recently been under dispute with the mapuches, and the English subjects and Yugoslav citizens were taken to areas that required a population that could guarantee territorial control in Patagonia. At the same time, the migratory flow of Chilean citizens of the Central Region to the northern territories that resulted from the war with Peru and Bolivia was encouraged.

In our more recent history, in the 1970s and 1980s, Chile was characterized for being a banishing country, mainly for reasons associated with political and economic events. General Augusto Pinochet’s military regime and the early-1980s economic recession led to the migration abroad of at least 500,000 Chilean citizens.

In the late 1980s, as a result of the highest macroeconomic growth in Latin America, the existence of a democratic system and the improved level of expectations about living standards, some 80,000 Chileans living abroad returned home—a phenomenon known as the “retorno.” To favor this migration, special laws were passed to establish settling privileges and benefits, special franchises to bring duty-free goods into the country and special loans. The government created an official office to provide assistance and advice to those who were returning to Chile.

The situation of today’s immigrants contrasts with not only previous European immigrants, who easily integrated into the cultural, economic and social elite, but the structures provided for the “retorno.” Policies must now be formulated in Chile to encourage the acceptance of diversity and non-discrimination and the construction of values and practices for integration. The migratory variable must be increasingly taken into account in the design of the economic, social and cultural model of any country aspiring to be modern—and that is Chile’s highest aspiration, to be an integral part of the globalized world.

Migration is one of the most important phenomena of globalization. Integration is only possible among people. In other words, we are interested in globalization at a human scale.

International law provides no definition of migration or migrant; it is getting increasingly difficult to distinguish between those who emigrate from a country for political, social or economic reasons and those who emigrate with the expectation of improving their living standards. However, it is possible to confirm that those who have no rights in another country are in a situation of increasing vulnerability and lack of protection. Very often they are stigmatized by other people as “illegal,” when they are actually human beings only lacking a politico-administrative status.

In the Americas, the vulnerability of immigrants shows the increasing gap between the development of regional policies to promote the flow of goods and services and a policy of restrictions to the migration of people. It is interesting to observe that every day there is more and more freedom for the traffic of apples, minerals, electric appliances and capital investment, while international restrictions on the flow of individuals and their families grow. This evidence clearly requires a deeper reflection about the need to consolidate a “globalization of citizens” as the basis for the construction of a global economy.

These considerations trigger the daily questioning of the actual validity of the human rights of around 13 million migrants in our continent, as they move from one country to another mainly for economic reasons. Attention has focused on Mexico, El Salvador, Haiti, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, and more recently, Argentina. These facts pose one of the most interesting challenges of our time, not always met at Economic or Regional Integration Forums: the need to establish a status of Inter-American Citizenship. Every person has human rights in view of their condition as a human being, and discrimination based on nationality cannot be tolerated. Every person has a natural citizenship the bases of which are the International Human Rights Treaties. It is the duty of our countries to set up the conditions for migrants to enjoy, exercise and demand such citizenship.

This need assumes the joint action of the countries of the region. Policies to protect the rights of workers or migrant families in the host country will not be effective unless they are accompanied by policies in the country of origin. It is this increasing and very often “hidden” demand that will make it necessary for our countries to adopt specific and definite agreements that should be compulsory, mandatory and widespread in the Americas, a continent that is growing and defining its character as a result of migration.

**THE VALUES OF TOLERANCE AND NON DISCRIMINATION**

In Chile, public policies have established a difference that favors the migration of “white” Europeans by regulating migration from neighboring countries. It may be of interest to observe whether the Chilean society has discriminating or excluding features, and whether differentiation between individuals is the result of a discriminating social pattern.

According to IDEAS Foundation statistics, Chilean society is clearly discriminatory, but through “passive” differentiation. In terms of gender, the statistics are clear: there is a clear inequality in the access to political and even economic decision-making posts for women. Women’s share of seats in the National Congress is an average 9.5%; their share in political parties is 26.2%, all this in a country in which the percentage of validly returned votes of women exceeds that of men (See <www.mujereschile.cl>). Only 39.5% of women access Higher Education.

On average, women get 50% less pay than a man for the same job (See <www.ideas.cl>).

As for sexual diversity, 46% of the Chilean population does not accept a gay or lesbian teacher for their children. These figures are only a sample of a society that discriminates in its cultural and social patterns.

This discrimination is based on one single traditional and classic cultural pattern of family parental model, which is male-oriented, with a Catholic background, basically Spanish in origin and “white,” with little tolerance for sexual, religious and even political diversity. The cultural situation in Latin America is similar.

The questioning arises when Chile is presented as an economically modern country. The question is whether this modernity is...
only limited to criteria for the economic management of large amounts of public spending money, or whether it is possible to build an integrating, tolerant and diverse modernity based on human rights.

To build from these rights, development should be consistent with the social, cultural and economic conditions. The recent experiences in Bolivia, Venezuela and Argentina show that the implementation of economic plans based on purely economic criteria imply the risk of social crisis and exclusion.

To sustain the Chile’s growth model, social and cultural integration policies must be implemented and the participation of citizens at all levels encouraged. Other necessary goals include the promotion of the culture of public interest, recognition of collective rights, improvement of low-income sectors’ access to justice, generation of a culture of respect for sexual and reproductive rights, encouragement of the use of public spaces, promotion of micro-practices of tolerance and the opening up towards a society that includes cyber-rights or the right to transparency and information. In short, a solid foundation must be laid to enable the creation of a culture of tolerance and diversity.

The academic world must take up this challenge through research, high-level events and proposals in the field of migration and fundamental rights. It must continuously test the coherence of equality in each context and lay the foundations for experience-based training in tolerance and even in the process of mutual acceptance.

An important issue is how to involve the corporate world in this process. Economic integration agreements have a high impact on the economic, social and cultural rights of both the associated countries and their populations. There has been a shift from the person who demands rights from the State to the person who increasingly demands more rights from companies. It is in this space that the question arises about the role of economic actors as promoters of human rights for one and all.

THE STATUS OF CHILEANS ABROAD

One of the debts still to be settled and one of the most serious contradictions of the migration policy of the country is the status of Chilean migrants in (and from) other countries. Because of issues of money, employment or resettlement, almost one million Chilean nationals do not have full civil and political rights. Groups of Chileans have repeatedly expressed their willingness to take part in the country’s economic, social and cultural life. Coalición governments have designed plans for their integration and social insertion, but the actual materialization of their political rights is still pending.

Despite the fact that in the early 1990s a specific policy was designed for the return of Chileans to the country, including tax exemptions and duty free rights, there is a legal, political and social scenario that in practice prevents these thousands of Chileans from resettling in the country. There are no international treaties that guarantee the exchange of pension or welfare funds, double taxation that works properly, trans-country border information flow and other aspects that must be regulated so as to allow for the full exercise of citizenship. If the country aspires to true globalization, it should acknowledge the rights of Chileans at all levels, beyond politico-electoral or party-political considerations.

In signing economic integration treaties with Canada, Mexico, the United States, the European Union, Korea, Central America, China and Japan, Chile should consider essential such issues as migration, protection of human rights of migrant workers and their families, as well as the definition of policies for the protection of the economic, social and cultural rights of nationals in the associated countries.

It will be thought provoking to get a glimpse of Chile’s capability to develop leadership in social and cultural issues, migration being one of them. The definition of a modern country assumes the consolidation of non-excluding citizenship.

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Seventeen years of authoritarian rule leave deep scars in the people of a nation. They also leave deep marks in an education system. On a trip to Chile in June 2003 to study the effects of education policies on the quality of education, I found that the devastating effects of those 17 years were still all too visible in educational institutions. It is no wonder.

Those who in 1973 thought that the perceived threats to freedom posed by the policies of the socialist government of Salvador Allende would best be contained by eliminating civil liberties, by negating people their basic human rights, by controlling what thoughts and ideas were legitimate, targeted the very institutions designed to help develop the mind. The military who ruled Chile for almost two decades dealt with educational institutions in the very same way that authoritarian governments of the left and of the right in Latin America have done for a very long time. This exacerbated problems that Chilean schools share with schools elsewhere in Latin America, namely that they insufficiently prepare children to think for themselves, to value their freedom and the freedom of others, to learn at high levels and to construct strong social networks of trust at the local, national and hemispheric levels.

This authoritarian regime replaced freedoms with fear and substituted the honest search for truth with dogma. It traded respect for obedience and supplanted critical reasoning with forced acceptance of the ideas that supported a regime whose legitimacy rested in the ability to eliminate those who opposed it.

Thus, the Pinochet government closed entire university social studies departments. It replaced academic university presidents with military officers. The curriculum of elementary schools was purged of contents considered a threat to national security. The government asked school supervisors to take on functions of political vigilance and control. School administration was placed under the supervision of regime-appointed municipal authorities who could control them more effectively. Educational research would have all but disappeared were it not for the work of a handful of research centers that received financial assistance from international foundations and development agencies and some of which received protection from the Catholic Church (such as the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano or the Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo de la Educacion).

In my trip last year, I discovered that education schools, where teachers are formed, are only now slowly beginning to respond to the democratic government’s initiatives to prepare a new generation of teachers. These fledgling teachers must be ready to appreciate and develop the ability of children to think for themselves and to value their freedoms and the freedom of others. In the words of the dean of a School of Education who has played a leading role in this reform of teacher education: “When I returned to this school, after 18 years in Europe, it was hard to believe how much this school and the university had changed. The best faculty were no longer here, and I realized I would have to work with those that were left, many of whom had been hired during the dictatorship. I quickly realized the daunting challenge of trying to improve what was left here.”

In addition to talking to many educators, I looked at the curriculum to develop literacy, and at the textbooks distributed to elementary schools. The consequences of the 17-year intentional state-led destruction of the educational research and development system were all too evident. Little educational research existed in the country. Scarce support existed for the production and accumulation of knowledge to improve educational practice. The results of this deficient research knowledge base are painfully evident. The Organisation for the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently coordinated a study of basic literacy skills of 15-year-olds in 41 middle income and high-income nations. It found that among these countries, Chile has one of the largest percentages of youths who can’t identify the principal ideas presented in a text. One in five Chilean students can’t demonstrate this basic level of literacy, compared to 6% on average in the OECD.

Compounding the effects of weak institutions to prepare teachers and to generate knowledge to improve educational practice, the culture of educational decision making and management still reflects legacies of the recent authoritarian past. I talked to many local education administrators and teachers in the south of Chile who reported that their suggestions often went unheeded. They had suggested ways to improve teacher professional development workshops and ideas for responding to local educational problems. Programs of instructional improvement supported by the Ministry of Education reflected the central administrators’ limited views of the most pressing needs and their potential resolutions.

The results of these lingering educational difficulties are troubling. As is clear to the democratic leaders of contemporary Chile, the prospects for increased productivity and for deepening a democratic culture rest to a great extent in the development of the human potential of all Chileans. Sharp gaps exist in the achievement of curriculum objectives among children of different income groups, as shown by tests administered by the Ministry of Education. Children in the poorest 20% of the income distribution obtain test results in language and math that are only two thirds of the results obtained by their peers in the richest 20%. As a consequence of these different odds to learn in elementary school, children from different income groups face different odds of finishing elementary school, of beginning and completing secondary and eventually of accessing college. One in four (23%) of the students aged 15-19 in the poorest quartile drops out of school before finishing high school, in comparison to 4% of the students in the wealthiest quartile. (ECLAC, 2002), Social Panorama
Top: Children from the town of Talagante preparing their work for a science fair; bottom: Nueva Imperial, Chile. Nov. 2000. MAPUCHE children study English—a government requirement—as well as their native language Mapudungun in the We Malal school. Children from outlying communities board at the school during the week, others are bused in daily. Behind are three oval “rucas” with traditional thatched roofs, two are used for workshops and the third for the school’s daycare center.
These differences in turn are exacerbated in differences in access and completion of college. These low educational results and severe gaps in educational opportunities for students from different income groups are problematic for a democratic state whose legitimacy rests in part on the perception that it offers equal opportunities to all citizens, a case made by Harvard President James Bryan Conant five decades ago. Newspaper articles point out that 82% of the business leaders and 45% of the political leaders are graduates of private schools, even though such schools serve only 9% of the students. These figures suggest that much of Chile’s talent is either untapped or insufficiently developed (La Tercera, June 7, p. 3).

Perhaps these deficient educational results are one of the reasons why support for democracy appears to be declining in Chile. In 2001 less than half of those polled indicated that they preferred democracy to other forms of government, (45%, down from 61% in 1997). This was lower than support for democracy in Argentina (58%), Costa Rica (71%), Peru (62%), Uruguay (79%) or Venezuela (57%). (Latinobarómetro. Cited in The Economist, July 28, 2001, Vol 360. Issue 8232). In the same survey one in three persons (31%) stated that they were indifferent to a democratic vs. a non-democratic regime type. In comparison, a very small proportion of the population in Uruguay (9%) and Costa Rica (7%) said they were indifferent (Latinobarómetro, Informe de Prensa Latinobarómetro 2002). Only one in four Chileans surveyed is satisfied with how democracy works in the country. Perhaps more troubling, only 13% of those surveyed in Chile say that they believe most people can be trusted, a weak base for the legitimacy of democratic leaders.

While democratic leaders have been working to help educational institutions recover from 17 years of effort to turn Chile into a closed society; educational change takes time. As evident by their results, present reforms have insufficiently addressed ways to improve pedagogy to prepare children for democratic life.

It will take several decades to replace the faculty of schools of education and to build solid research and development institutions and traditions. New faculty and teachers who are hired to bring in new perspectives and practices have, with the exception of those returning from exile, received a good part of their education under authoritarian rule. The process of replacing an authoritarian culture with a culture of democracy will be gradual and slow.

Numerous initiatives launched during the last decade are trying to stimulate this process of cultural change. These efforts need to be sustained and deepened. Most significant is the new social consensus on the importance of education to help the nation achieve its goals of improving the living conditions of all in Chile. This consensus resulted from a skillfully managed process of social dialogue in the mid-1990s. As a result, the zone of acceptance within which education and social policy are crafted expanded substantially. Chilean society significantly increased financial resources for education and launched several initiatives to expand educational opportunity. Financial and moral initiatives increased incentives to attract qualified candidates to the teaching profession, apparently with good results as the number of candidates for university entrance who choose education has increased dramatically filling all available spaces in schools of education. New programs were developed to support reform of teacher education institutions. The school day is being gradually expanded. Other efforts include the revision of the curriculum and provision of instructional materials to all students. Several special programs support improvement of the most marginalized schools, as well as scholarship programs to support high school and college attendance of low income children. More recent initiatives support educational opportunities for Mapuche children, who have been traditionally seriously marginalized. In my June visits to schools, I was particularly impressed by the innovations introduced in the curriculum by the use of information technologies. Recognizing the importance of preparing youth to communicate with others in the hemisphere, recent policy initiatives are supporting the introduction of English instruction in public school curricula. Judging by the public reactions and controversies surrounding Bolivia’s recent claims to have access to a sea port, Chile—as the rest of the Americas—needs global education to build inter-hemispheric trust.

I believe that the most valuable results of these efforts are the resulting cultural shift in Chile to allow the development of children’s capacity to think for themselves, to speak without fear and to value and respect the views of their peers. I was equally impressed by the openness and ease with which indigenous children communicated in rural schools in the south of Chile, as I was by the enthusiasm and assertiveness of students in crowded urban municipal schools. I marveled at the courage and self-confidence of future teachers in schools of education in Temuco and Concepción as they challenged reforms implemented by the Ministry of Education in a meeting with several of the most senior Ministry officials. What impressed me the most was the effervescence of the conversations among educators, the desire especially on the part of government officials, to critically reflect on what they are doing and their openness to contrarian views.

It is in this openness that lies the true difference with 17 years of fear and abuse. Chile is not a newcomer to educational reform. More than a century ago, Chile built a public education system, even sending out advisory missions to help other nations who were undertaking the same task. The democrats now governing Chile—by the authority delegated to them by the people—now face the challenge of staying the course and deepening the latest reforms to make schools into institutions to strengthen an open society. This will require that they create and nurture a new education culture where students, and teachers, can think for themselves, learn to think deeply about complex problems and learn to value their own freedom and the freedom of others to think independently. If they can do that, Chile will once again, as it did a century ago, have much to contribute to making Latin America more democratic, inclusive and open.

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The University Student Movement

'68 is only a memory

BY CECILIA RIVEROS ROMERO

Almost three months ago I witnessed an event that truly describes the situation of the students in my country. The elections for the director of the Federation of Students were happening at the Universidad Católica de Chile, one of our two more prestigious universities. I stop to clarify that this University, where I study, is characterized by an extreme conservatism. Because the economic right, to a large extent, controls many of the most important Chilean companies, the graduates of my university were and are the most fervent followers of the neoliberal policy imposed by the dictatorship of Pinochet. Indeed, the rightist tradition has obtained year after year the support of the Federation of Students, with some exceptions. For this year, we wanted to teach a lesson and we tried to register a left list using a name that has been traditionally used by the right (a child’s game, perhaps) to prove that the students’ vote is conditional upon a name and not on a concrete platform that satisfies their needs. We were able to obtain the necessary signatures to register this list—two hundred—at the last moment, because it is still feared in Chile to say “I am of the left.” We went to the inscription place and received our ballot sheets, thinking we had already won. Hours later, I received the news that it had not been possible to register our list because, mysteriously, a page with names had disappeared and therefore, we did not fulfill the minimum signature requirement. There was no other copy of those wrinkled pages that we thought would serve to wake up the lethargy of the students of the Universidad Católica, and with empty hands and impotent faces, we saw, once again that the right, with almost sixty percent of the votes, took control of the power in the Federation of Students.

While writing this anecdote, I realized that in many other places of Chile, similar events often occur. I believe that after the arrival of democracy in Chile, we students are no longer valuable interlocutors. Over thirty years ago, student organizations were solid, conscientious and applied in their objectives. Today, on the contrary, student leaders are not more than the germ of future political leaders, the political parties use them to extend their increasingly fragile bases of support. The streets are the scene of violent manifestations repressed like in the most severe years of dictatorship, but, in addition, I see with frustration that the young people who march do not know why they do it, nor know if they want to really do it. The voice of the students becomes the voice of the young people, a voice that is not heard in the middle of the applause for the Free Trade Agreement, nor in the discussions about the next president of Chile. There’s a lack of valid reference points to encourage students to organize themselves and work toward a common cause.

I dare to say that nowadays, a solid student movement in Chile does not exist. The ideas of change, university reform and education for everyone are stuck in the middle of the generalized apathy that young people feel about these policies. The problem is that we who really felt the necessity to create a student group resurgence were lost in the same networks which we want eliminated. I can only hope that more sooner than later the great tree-lined avenues are witness to mobilized students with new objectives of solidarity, hope and change.

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LIKE A BOLT OF LIGHTNING THAT ILLUMINATES A darkened landscape, attracting everyone’s attention, the recent commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the military coup of 9-11-1973 has compelled Chileans to confront a traumatic history that many had preferred to ignore or “forget.” The outpouring of television specials, commemorative events and political controversy—and the flood of individual memories and battles over the collective memory that they provoked—may not have settled old debates or persuaded old antagonists. However, they did underscore that “silencio” and “olvido”—conscious “forgetting”—are no longer viable ways of dealing with this past. This is even true for foreign observers of the coup—like myself. As a result, I decided to make public my private “Coup Diary,” published here for the first time. The diary’s particular value is that it is a first-person account by a witness who was also a trained observer acutely aware of the historical significance of the events he was witnessing. I have edited it to remove purely personal references and have added a few explanations for ReVista readers. Otherwise it is as I wrote it 30 years ago—the diary of my personal experience of that other 9/11.

Chile’s military coup brought Chile’s model democracy and President Salvador Allende’s “democratic road to socialism” to a violent end. Out of its ashes would emerge the 17-year dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, whose repressive politics, regressive social policy and neoliberal economics were the polar opposite of Allende’s Popular Unity government and whose gross violations of human rights would make Chile an international pariah—except in Washington. The 1973 military coup would change Chile forever, and alter the regional and hemispheric balance of power as well. It was a historical watershed of transcendent importance.

THE OTHER 9/11: A COUP DIARY

When the army tanks started firing at the presidential palace, I was standing across the Plaza de la Constitution. By then, his police guard had deserted Salvador Allende, leaving the desperate defense of his democratic road to socialism to a score of friends and associates who had chosen to remain with him in La Moneda in the face of certain defeat and probable death. I had also chosen to remain—across the plaza. I was a historian, I had reasoned, and I had to bear witness to this watershed historical event. But as the bullets started to rain down all around me, it began to look like I had made a poor choice.

It was all because I had gone to get my Chilean Resident identity card that morning.

I awoke at dawn on that gray and chilly late winter day, after a night of too little sleep filled with dreams of foreboding.

I left my house early that morning to get downtown before the offices of Identificaciones opened. I had been there the Friday before to get my identity card, but so many people were on line to get their safe conducts to leave the country that I had waited in vain to be seen.

One of them was Andre Gunder Frank, the German leftist intellectual and adviser to the MIR, the activist Revolutionary Left movement, who gave me the incredulous look...
September 11, 1973, made an indelible mark in Latin American history: it was the day a democratically elected Chilean government was overthrown by a U.S.-supported coup. Now, 30 years later, Chileans are coming to terms with that piece of their history.
reserved for fools and madmen when I told him what I was there for. “Don’t you know that there is going to be a rightist military coup,” he asked pointedly. I had been told by the head of Allende’s foreign press office that it would take place on September 12th. “Yes,” I said, trying to sound brave and principled, “but I’m staying.” I was not only a historian researching a book but also a journalist with a weekly radio program from Chile on WBAI. When the doors opened on 9/11/1973, I was first on line outside the ID card office. The young woman who had not been able to attend me the Friday before smiled at me and said she would call me in five minutes. But when she returned a few minutes later it was with a worried look on her face and a hurried statement that she would not be able to process my request—nor anyone else’s—that day. Her barely-open office was about to close for the day. Something in her voice stopped me. “Why?” I asked. “Is something wrong?” Her response was so classically Chilean: “Me parece que hay un problema en La Moneda”—“It seems as if there is a little problem at the presidential palace.”

This was it! I raced down the stairs and out the door heading for the Plaza de la Constitución. Next door to the offices of Identificaciones were the offices of Investigaciones, the Chilean FBI, the one security service that Allende had been able to staff with his loyalists. As I passed its doorway two detectives sprinted out carrying submachine guns and heading for a squad car. I asked them if anything had happened. One shouted over his shoulder—“No,” then paused and added: “todavía”—“not yet.”

I walked rapidly to the Foreign Press Office, which overlooked the presidential palace and the Plaza de la Constitución. The head of the office was not there, but my friend his assistant was. I asked what was happening. “It seems that there is an uprising of the armed forces,” he replied. “All of them?” I asked. “No,” he said. “Just the army, the navy and the air force.” That was not as crazy a statement as it sounds. It meant that the Carabineros, the militarized national police, the second largest force in Chile, with bases in every city, town and hamlet in Chile, was still loyal to the Allende government. If that remained true, a resistance to the coup could be mounted. I went to the window and saw the Carabinero buses disgorging dozens of uniformed police with heavy machine guns to take up defensive positions around La Moneda, joined by tanquetas, the light tanks of the Carabineros, used to control street demonstrations.

A few minutes went by and then the telephone rang. My friend picked it up: “Sí, sí” I heard him say disconsolately. He put down the phone and turned to me. “And now the Carabineros,” he said sadly. I looked out the window and saw the tanquetas begin to leave the square and the Carabineros pick up their machine guns and get back on their olive green buses, leaving the presidential palace all but unguarded. “Where is Allende?” I asked. “He is inside La Moneda. The president has said that he will only leave [Chile’s White House] feet first.”

It was just after 9 a.m. when orders came to lock up the building. I was welcome to stay if I wanted to. I was told. I debated my decision for a minute. The office had a great view of the presidential palace and the plaza in front of it. I would be able to see perfectly whatever happened.

But I remembered the Swedish photographer who was shot and killed in a similar window during the tancazo, the armored regiment mutiny of June 29, 1973. Moreover, if the coup succeeded, I would be in effect a prisoner in what its leaders would consider enemy territory. Most of all, I did not like the idea of being shut up, unable to leave no matter what happened. “Don’t fence me in,” I thought. Feeling very American.

So, I thanked him and wished him luck and dashed out of the building just as its front gates were swinging shut. I decided to watch what happened from the far corner of the plaza, so that I would not have to cross an open battleground to “retreat” towards my apartment building roughly a mile away. It was 9:30 and there was a small crowd of people, most of them workers from suddenly closed government offices, milling around in the street. Most of them were Allende supporters hoping for loyal troops who would rescue the government, as had happened in the tancazo two months before.

Suddenly Carabineros arrived and began to push the crowd back from the square. I took out my journalist credentials and tried to talk with them, but the look of rage with which they regarded me—and the civilians around me—stopped me. “This is going to be a very different coup than people expected,” I thought.

A little before 10 a.m. army tanks suddenly arrived in front of La Moneda. One took up position at the corner of the square near us, its gun turret facing away from the presidential palace. The crowd cheered, thinking that it was there to defend Allende. Then, slowly, ever so slowly, its gun turret wheeled and aimed at the presidential palace. There was first stunned silence and then an audible gasp, as the enormity of this act became clear.

We were standing near a shopping arcade. The Carabineros told everyone to go into the arcade, whose gates would be pulled shut and locked. There we would be safe from the fighting, they explained. I considered it but rejected the image. It looked too much like being shut up in a jail. I decided to take my chances out on the street. Weeks later I learned that after the coup, people inside the arcade were taken to the National Stadium for interrogation. Some of them disappeared forever.

A few minutes after ten, however, it looked like a bad decision. The tanks started firing at La Moneda. Suddenly bullets were everywhere, raining down from the government office buildings where the Socialist Youth were posted as snipers to defend the presidential palace. My corner was soon an untenable observation post. There were people falling wounded around me. Hugging the walls, I made my way back down the street (Morandé) to the next doorway, where I took refuge behind its Neo-Classical columns, newly grateful for the Chilean elite’s Europhile pretensions. In back of me, the tanks and machine guns were firing away, and in front of me the street was alive with sniper bullets. There was no escape. Opposite were the offices of El Mercurio, the leading rightist newspaper. From its second floor window a telescopic sight suddenly appeared pointing at me. There was nowhere for me to hide. If it was a gun, I was dead. I watched transfixed as the sight slowly swiveled and faced the presidential palace, revealing a camera with a long telephoto lens. I breathed a sigh of relief.

Then the firing stopped, as suddenly as it had begun. People came out from their hiding places, at first gingerly and then with greater confidence, as if it was all over. It was a symbolic corner, with the Congress building and the Supreme Court. They gathered in between these two symbols of Chile’s constitutional democracy and—as it was still Allende’s Chile—they began to argue: Who
was forced into the street at gunpoint, many outside of their battle station perimeter. I overheard them making plans for what they would do when the troops arrived. I stole a last glance at their tos tucked into their belts. I overheard them assumed that she was an Allende supporter, but I was mistaken. She was mostly apolitical, she explained, but leaning toward the Right. She had voted for the rightist candidate Jorge Alessandri in 1970 and said to me: “Two days before I would have been happy to see Allende hanging from a lampost, but this—"the Chilean military attacking the presidential palace, the symbol of Chilean democracy, this should not happen. This is not the Chilean way." The sky was getting darker, with a hint of rain. “El cielo no quería ver lo que pasará,”—Heaven doesn’t want to see what is going to happen,” she concluded.

I decided that I had to return to my apartment while I still could. I asked a young soldier where I could cross. He motioned to a bridge upriver near Calle Estados Unidos. It took me past the old U.S. Consulate—the only foreign consulate not to offer refuge or help during the coup even to its own citizens, one of whom, Charles Hormon, would be detained and executed as a consequence: later to become the story of the Academy Award-winning film Missing. I headed down a little side street toward my apartment in the Torres San Borja opposite what would become the headquarters of the military regime.

I passed a group of worried but determined men coming out of a doorway with a Socialist Party banner. Two of them had pistols tucked into their belts. I overheard them making plans for what they would do when the troops arrived. I stole a last glance at their tense, sad faces, at a determination born more out of desperation than optimism. They

The 1973 military coup would change Chile forever.
recently retired “General Prats was leading them”…. “loyal provincial commanders in the north were still holding out”—all of them false rumors or wishful thinking. There would be no loyal commanders and Prats would be assassinated in his Argentine asylum by the long arm of Pinochet’s Gestapo, the DINA. As part of Operation Condor, the secret alliance of Southern Cone security services which spread terror throughout the region, even assassinating a former Allende ambassador in downtown Washington.

By nightfall, phone calls brought truer but grimmer tidings: Allende’s death in the ruins of La Moneda, the triumph of the coup throughout the country. Outside my window, fighting continued. The city was blacked out, and from my window high over Santiago, I could see the helicopter gunships home in on leftist factories and shantytowns, a horrific light show of headlights and tracer bullets illuminating the darkened city sky. I slept fitfully, awakened at 4 a.m. by a loud bomb explosion. In the distance something large was on fire. I couldn’t sleep.

The firing went on all the following day, along with reports of the targets attacked – the Pedagógico, the University of Chile’s education school, the Sumar textile factory and the nearby slum of La Legua; the working class districts of San Miguel, the “Red County” to the south of the city; the shantytowns near the foothills of the Andes to the east. That night the armed forces commanders, the new Junta de Gobierno, appeared on television for the first time. Each one addressed the nation in turn. Pinochet was the most enigmatic, terse and anti-Marxist, but vague, as if he hadn’t thought about what he would say or wanted to do. The scariest was the air force commander Gustavo Leigh, who talked of the struggle to “excise the Marxist cancer” from the Chilean body politic and of the need to reverse the preceding 50 years of Chilean history. That included not just the three years of Allende’s road to socialism, but also the Alliance for Progress reforms of the Christian Democratic government of the 1960s, the welfare state and labor reforms of the Popular Front of the 1930s, even Arturo Alessandri’s introduction of mass democratic politics of the 1920s. Clearly this was not going to be a “soft coup,” a brief period of military rule to calm things down and then return power to the civilian political leaders as in past military interventions. Later that night I was awakened by the sound of animals roaring in agony. It was the lions in the zoo across the river, who had not been fed for two days. It seemed to me that they were expressing what too many Chileans felt that night, that they were symbolic of a nation in agony.…

The curfew ended at noon on Thursday, September 13th… I emerged from my building into a new Chile, with buildings pockmarked by bullets and people viewing each other with unease. On this incongruously sunny and beautiful day, I walked up to Avenue Vicuña Mackenna and past the Argentine embassy. It was surrounded by a Chilean army plateau, rifles at the ready. In front of its gates was a military pickup truck. Inside it was a tall, thin intellectual with thick glasses. He was on his knees with his hands tied behind his head and a bayonet sticking into his back. Next to the truck was a young woman looking distraught but impotent. Was he one of those named in the most wanted list? Or was he just a Chilean or foreign leftist intellectual who had tried to reach an embassy asylum but failed to make it?

I stopped to stare, but a soldier raised his rifle and started to point it at me, so I walked on.

I walked through the Plaza Italia, the midpoint of Santiago, which was under military surveillance, and thought of crossing the Mapocho to Bellavista, to retrace my steps of two days before. Then, as I approached the river bank, I froze in horror. In the shallow waters were the bloated bodies of young men, whose clothes identified them as pobladores, poor residents of the shantytowns upriver. Most had multiple bullet wounds. There were soldiers on the Pío Nono bridge eying me. I turned on my heel and hurried away. This was not only a very different coup than most Chileans had anticipated, but it would be a very different military government from the dictablanda, soft dictatorship—they had expected as well.

I walked down the Alameda’s broad boulevard to the newspaper kiosk where in the past I always bought the complete array of newspapers and magazines from right to left. There was a long line of people waiting to buy the only two newspapers now permitted—censored versions of El Mercurio and La Tercera, a centrist tabloid. When I got to the front of the line, the newsvendor greeted me as a long lost friend. “I am glad you are all right,” he said knowingly. A thought occurred to me: those now banned pre-coup publications were historic documents. I asked him if he still had any of the old newspapers and magazines and if he could sell them to me.

He reached under the counter and pulled out a stack and handed them to me. “Take them,” he said. “No charge. Just take them.” I was gathering up my stash of now historical publications when the man in back of me tapped me on the shoulder. He had a goat-beard and an intellectual manner and pointed down the street at the hurrying figure of an air force junior officer who had been on line as well. The officer had gone to report me to the nearest patrol, he warned. I had better get out of there fast. Hiding my newly “subversive” literature inside my censored official publications I walked away, at first slowly, then faster and faster.

By the time I turned the corner I was running, looking over my shoulder to see if anyone was following me. It was far more terrifying than the hour of bullets and near-death experiences that I had had to endure during the coup itself—an ominous harbinger of the dictatorship to come. I made it to my building, locked the door of my apartment and collapsed in a cold sweat. The street chant of Allende’s Rightist opposition—“Chile es y será un país en libertad”—“Chile is and will be a country in liberty”—echoed ironically through my mind.

I sat down and wrote in my diary: “It is very hard to learn how not to be free.”

It is a lesson that Chileans learned the hard way, during Pinochet’s brutal 17-year dictatorship.

It is a lesson that they are still struggling to unlearn today.

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Alvaro Hoppe is a Chilean photographer. He made the photographs accompanying this article in Santiago de Chile from 1983 and 1988. Published in Gonzalo Leiva Quijada’s Alvaro Hoppe: El Ojo a la Historia, the photos used here are courtesy of Hoppe.
NO a la TORTURA

UNIDAD Y...
The Coup in Chile

Reflections on the international reaction

BY ALAN ANGELL

I was in England at the time of the coup. Like many observers it took me by surprise—I thought that, difficult though the situation was in Chile, somehow a compromise would be worked out, probably with a referendum and with the Popular Unity government forced to moderate its radical policies. I was wrong. But then, so were many Chileans who also thought that there would be no coup, or that, at worse, there would be a limited and moderate intervention.

This is one reason for the continuing impact of the coup—it was not expected. Chile had an enviable record of constitutional government. Authoritarian governments in Spain or Greece or Portugal, following the collapse of fragile civilian regimes, were not regarded as fundamental departures from political practices in those countries. But Chile was different—at least that is what many observers believed, and with reason. The reaction was that if such a coup could happen in Chile, then it could happen almost anywhere.

In general, the Cuban Revolution had become a symbol of resistance to imperialist oppression for the world. The Chilean coup became, in turn, for the world in general a symbol of the brutal military overthrow of progressive regimes. Symbols are not accurate history. The repressive side of the Cuban Revolution was ignored. There were far more brutal coups in Latin America than in Chile. Grasp of the complicated politics of Chile from 1970 to 1973 was very superficial. But no one listened to their side of the story. There was genuine fear of a Marxist take-over. Many Chileans, not only the upper classes, were waiting in fear in the National Stadium. Even in the countries most remote from Chile geographically, socially and culturally, those images brought home in a direct fashion a picture of what was happening in Chile on the 11th of September and after. And those images from 1973 were joined by another one—the shattered car in which Orlando Letelier met his death in Washington in 1976.

A third factor in keeping the coup alive in the international community were the activities of the Chilean exile community. For a decade after the coup, opposition politics were conducted not in Chile but abroad. Many exiles were politicians with links with sister parties in Europe, other parts of Latin America and elsewhere. Chilean Socialists, Communists, Christian Democrats, and Radicals all found receptive communities outside Chile. The exile community was adept in seeking condemnation of the Pinochet government in international organizations such as the United Nations, and in persuading national governments to boycott Chilean trade and to sever links with the Chilean government. International sympathy for the Chilean opposition was widespread and strong—much more so than for the exiles from other military regimes in the Southern Cone.

It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of the Chilean coup on the political consciousness of a wide variety of countries. In the European Parliament, the country most debated (and condemned) for many years after 1973 was Chile. In Britain, Allende’s ambassador to that country, Alvaro Bunster, was the first foreigner to address the Conference of the Labour Party since La Pasionaria at the time of the Spanish Civil War. In Italy, analysis of the coup by the Communist party and its intellectual leader Enrico Berlinguer led to the ‘historic compromise’ by which the Italian Communist Party joined the government for the first time for many years. In France, the Socialist party debated extensively how to change its tactics after the Chilean coup. Countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand welcomed thousands of Chilean refugees.

This reaction was not short-lived. What was striking was how consistent the international condemnation was of the Chilean government up to the time of the plebiscite in 1988—by which time even the U.S. government had joined the critics. International coverage of the plebiscite was intense. For a European press that shows only a passing and cursory interest in Latin America, it was remarkable. Needless to say, the defeat of Pinochet was cause for celebration. Later on, the jubilant reaction of European political circles to the arrest of Pinochet in London in 1998 is testimony to the enduring impact of the coup of 1973 and the military government on the political consciousness of the international community.

Supporters of the military government will, no doubt, take all of this as indicative of a complete misunderstanding of the situation in Chile and will point to the other side of the story. There was increasing social conflict in both the Chilean towns and countryside. The government had lost control of its own supporters. The economy was in ruins and shortages and a black market made life intolerable for many people. There was genuine fear of a Marxist take-over. Many Chileans, not only the upper classes, supported the coup.

But no one listened to their side of the story outside Chile—and they were not helped by the crudity of the military government’s propaganda of which the infamous Plan Zeta was amongst the most notorious. Did this international response have any effect on the internal developments in Chile? I think it did. It contributed to the polarization of Chile into two camps—and helped to sustain a polarization of Chilean politics that persisted well into the period after the return to democracy. Widespread international condemnation of Chile forced the military regime into more of a defensive and hard-line posture than might have been otherwise the case. If the world would not accept the reasons for the coup of 1973 then so much the worse for the world—Chile would choose its own path, would develop its own institutions, implement its own policies and
ignore the rest of world as much as it could. Those who opposed the military government were not only wrong but were seen as allies of an international conspiracy against Chile and hence traitors to the country.

On the other side, the support given by the international community to the opposition in exile reinforced its belief that it had won the moral argument, that no compromise with regime was possible or necessary, and that if the struggle would be long and hard, it would also eventually be victorious. The defining issue in this confrontation became that of human rights, and the fact that the Catholic Church, through the Vicariate of Solidarity (incidentally an institution without parallel in any other authoritarian regime), supported the human rights cause reinforced the opposition in choosing this issue with which to confront the government.

The clash between government and opposition in exile became one of moral absolutes and in that kind of debate no one is really neutral—you either defend the government or you condemn it. That dichotomy created a division that split Chilean society almost into two halves. It is without precedent that a military ruler after such a long period of almost absolute power should request in a free and fair election an extension of his mandate for another eight years, gain a remarkably high if not majority vote, and then accept the result and organize another round of elections to choose a civilian president. But Pinochet’s supporters saw this not as a defeat but as a kind of triumph. They were the true democrats now.

What marked Chilean politics after 1990 until the arrest of Pinochet was the absence of debate over the coup, its causes and consequences. Of course there was debate over many issues—constitutional reform, social policies, macroeconomic policies—but not over the coup. Witness the brusque dismissal of the Rettig report by the Armed Forces, its political allies, and even the Supreme Court. They were right and were justified and the government was wrong. Full stop.

Chile is not alone in finding it difficult to come to terms with its past. It took Germans many years before they were prepared to examine the Nazi phenomenon in all its stark inhumanity; Japan still refuses to acknowledge some of the gross abuses committed during the Second World War. Or what of Spain—add the half million or so killed during the Civil War to the astonishing but accepted estimate of a quarter of a million killed by the regime in the aftermath of the war, and it seems incredible that no trials have taken place, nor is there any demand for them or even for a commission to establish the truth. Indeed one can argue—as I have in a chapter of a book about to be published—that the Chilean government has gone further in clarifying the past and in seeking justice for abuses than any other government—along with South Africa.

What was ignored in the reaction to the coup was the fact—unpalatable as it may have been—that it had widespread support, even amongst sectors of the poor. It is not uncommon for a military coup to enjoy initial support as the population wearies of the uncertainties and turmoil of a weak civilian government—Argentina in 1976 is an obvious example. What is very rare, however, is that this support persists over a long period of time and persists even after the return to a democratic regime. The Pinochet regime was unusual in many ways. The economic and social reforms followed an ideological agenda; the government constructed an institutionality in which it really believed; it accepted rejection in a plebiscite and followed the rules.

Oddly enough, these characteristics deepened rather than muted the polarization of Chile. Because the government was not simply a crude and corrupt elite content to plunder the economy, it created a mass of loyal support bound to it by ideological sympathy. The most obvious manifestation of this is the formation and growth of the Democratic Independent Union (UDI). This again is remarkable. The only two novel, successful and innovative political parties in Latin America are the UDI and the Workers’ Party (PT) in Brazil—one born in support of a military regime and one in opposition to it.

This then is the legacy of the coup—it created two opposed worlds in one of which the coup was the symbol of the salvation of Chile, and in the other, the tragedy of Chile. The ‘Si’ and the ‘No’ in the plebiscite of 1988 were much more than a simple response to the question of Pinochet as president for another eight years. They symbolized support for one of two contrasting views of history—in a way it posed a question about whether the coup of 1973 was justified or not. Even if Right and Left have converged in many ways—over economic policy for example—the dichotomy over the coup persisted.

But for how much longer? Does the memory of the coup really matter today? In some ways obviously less so as memories fade, as politics has become more a matter of routine and less a matter of confrontation, as economic policies have produced a remarkable record of success (with, it is true, major problems), as the issue of civil-military relations has moved to a smoother course. Yet while the human rights issue persists, while trials of military officers continue, while more evidence accumulates, the memory of the coup remains alive in contemporary Chile. And it is to the credit of Chile that there is a real attempt to face up to the past, to enter—at last—into dialogue between the two camps, to secure justice, to try to understand what happened and why.

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CHILE

Chile’s National Stadium
As Monument, as Memorial

BY KATHERINE HITE

“If, in the earlier twentieth century, modern societies tried to define their modernity and to secure their cohesiveness by way of imagining the future, it now seems that the major required task of any society today is to take responsibility for its past.”

—Andreas Huyssen, Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory

CHILE’S NATIONAL STADIUM BECAME A national monument on August 21, 2003. Thirty years ago, just after the Pinochet coup, the National Stadium possessed the largest single prison population in the country. Today, the stadium joins other civil-society-initiated quests to commemorate Chile’s painful past.

“You mean they actually use that place as a sports stadium today?” an American friend asked me incredulously. I was telling her about a piece I was researching for a book on the case of Chilean friend and colleague Felipe Aguero, a professor of political science at the University of Miami. In 1973, Aguero had been held and savagely tortured in the National Stadium. Three years ago, Aguero’s case made international headlines when he “outed” his former torturer Emilio Meneses, now a retired air force officer who had also become a political science professor. Meneses teaches at Santiago’s Catholic University.

For my American friend Jeanette, as for many around the world, Chile’s National Stadium evokes images of frightened, haggard young men like Aguero in the stadium’s stands, with soldiers monitoring their movements. For Jeanette, who is not particularly political, images of the National Stadium have been seared and frozen into her memory from Costa Gavras’s 1982 film Missing. The film is about the search for the American Charles Horman and the duplicity of the U.S. government in its active desire for a military overthrow of the Allende government. Horman was held in the National Stadium before his murder by the military regime, and Costa Gavras’s film conveys the brutality of what was taking place in the stadium’s stands, rooms, and tunnels.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the stadium was used as a temporary clearinghouse for European refugees and immigrants. International athletes and musicians perform on the stadium field. Yet during the comparatively brief but horrific moments from September to November 1973, the military国际化 the National Stadium in an unprecedented fashion. Among the many thousands who were held prisoner in the National Stadium in 1973, several hundred were foreigners from countries around the world.

On September 22, 1973, in a rather bizarre move to assure both Chileans and the international community that all was well in the Stadium, the junta opened the Stadium’s doors to national and international media for an official “tour” of the conditions there. As Chilean photographer and journalist Marcelo Montecino and others describe, the military’s gesture backfired, as reporters and photographers observed first-hand soldiers’ cruel treatment of the detainees, as well as the poor state of those held there. Dramatic black-and-white photographs and footage of the prisoners in the stands made their ways into the international media. These images have remained etched in the memories of citizens across the globe.

Moreover, recently declassified U.S. government documents reveal that the CIA closely followed what was taking place in the Stadium. The agency proved discerning in its assessment of the Chilean military’s account of both the number of prisoners and the behavior of the interrogators. One document also reveals that in their efforts to “manage” the stadium’s burgeoning number of prisoners, Chilean general Nicanor Díaz and Brigadier General Francisco Herrera specifically approached a U.S. government agent to seek assistance, including a technical advisor that “must have knowledge in the establishment and operation of a detention center.” The advisor would assist in surveying for a new detention site. The generals also “requested the possible loan of inflatable tentage or other portable structures and equipment for temporary housing until the detainees can construct their own housing and administrative buildings.” U.S. Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, who prepared the cable regarding the request, noted that while it might be ill-advised to provide an advisor for such an endeavor, the provision of tents and blankets might earn the U.S. some credibility with the United Nations Human Rights Commission, who communicated to him that the prisoners needed blankets.

Last year’s approval of the stadium as monument came none too soon. Since the 1990 transition from military rule, groups representing victims of human rights violations have fought strenuously to seek official support for arenas that publicly expose the
atrocities of the past, that materially represent the many violations of the authoritarian regime. The Stadium as monument will become an official "realm of memory" within a new political, legal and cultural milieu. This new environment has only recently begun to acknowledge the need to address more systematically the significance and consequences of state-sponsored torture as well as state-sponsored death and disappearance.

Entitled "Open Museum, Site of Memory and Homage," the monument proposal contemplates an array of symbolic commemorations, both within the Stadium’s walls and beyond its gates. Using audio and videotapes, murals, paintings, plaques, and sculpture, conceptualizers of the monument have developed a plan that travels through several areas of the Stadium. In addition, artists will create works that consciously relate what occurred in the Stadium to global human rights representations.

Their work will reflect the startling horror of executions and torture taking place between September and November 1973, that the International Red Cross estimates reached "some 7,000 prisoners on September 22." Between 12,000 and 20,000 Chileans and foreigners were detained in the Stadium for periods ranging from two days to two months. The Stadium was no mere holding tank. In a somewhat sterilized, matter-of-fact account of the conditions and treatment in the Stadium, the Chilean government’s Report of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation includes the following:

There is information on the practice of torture and abuse of prisoners in the National Stadium. For example, the room for medical treatment was sometimes used for this purpose. Firing squads were simulated and other cruel techniques were employed. As a rule the prisoners were subjected to constant and intense interrogation.

...The representatives and medical representatives of the IRCC (International Red Cross Committee) have found that many
prisoners show signs they have undergone psychological and physical torture.' This Commission also concluded that a number of executions took place inside the National Stadium, and that in a number of instances persons imprisoned there were taken out and killed. Such was the case of Charles Horman and Frank Terrugi, both United States citizens.

According to the truth commission report, at least 41 people lost their lives in the Stadium. Human rights groups believe the figure to be well in the hundreds, given the number of those who were detained in the Stadium, tortured and killed and then dumped in Santiago streets, ditches, and the Mapocho River during those early months of the regime. The imprints (including those etched into the Stadium’s walls by former prisoners) and the ghosts of those who were executed in the Stadium continue to haunt Chile. The many citizens who were tortured and survived their Stadium experiences find the 1991 truth commission report a sorely inadequate representation. It would take a decade for the Chilean democratic regime to return to the meanings of state-sponsored violence in the Stadium for policies related to truth-telling, compensation, and retroactive justice.

Human rights groups have established that there were more than eighty detention centers in Santiago alone. These clandestine jails used spaces ranging from schools and public buildings, like the Stadium, to private, secret homes and clubs. One of the most notorious of these secret centers was Villa Grimaldi, a place in which more than 5,000 Chileans were held and an estimated 240 people lost their lives. During the first half of the 1990s, several organizations mobilized to reconstruct Villa Grimaldi as a memorial site. The project will recover fragments and remnants of the presence of the prisoners, including the imprint of the past in a commemorative block that petrifies the memorial as inert material. In the stadium, citizens will travel in and through the monument, making relocation, distance, and inertia far more difficult. Locating the accounts of victims and their families within the monument necessarily engages the representations of the past atrocities with the vibrant, emotional lived experiences of the present.

Yet articulating this engagement among the pain inflicted on the former prisoners, the anxieties experienced by the prisoners’ loved ones, and stadium-goers constitutes a complicated enterprise. Professor of English and essayist Elaine Scarry has claimed that societies have yet to develop, or have yet even to possess the will to develop or articulate language that can really convey, in sentient terms, the intense pain of the tortured. Moreover, as Argentine sociologist Elizabeth Jelin writes, memorials are at inter-play with those who “possess” them in some way, those who often claim “ownership” based on memories of their own tactile, traumatic experiences in the memorials’ representations or spaces. Finding points of encounter that allow individual and collective, victim and viewer pain and grief to be muted, shots of the Stadium today are soft rather than sharp. Unlike documentaries on torture in which the filmmaker re-creates graphic depictions of torturous acts, Parot chooses to rely on the former prisoners’ accounts. For example, Felipe Aguero’s testimony of being tortured in the genitalia conveys a horror embedded in a discourse that is quietly, discreetly expressed and communicated. Parot avoids visual representations of “literal memory,” which may fold victims into themselves, as viewers shun the representations.

Inside, the Stadium-as-monument will preserve, commemorate, educate, and project. The project will recover fragments and remnants of the presence of the prisoners, including “a tour through the property and emblematic sites.” The dressing rooms of the Olympic pool will be recognized, for example, as spaces where the female political prisoners were held. The running track will be signaled

Politicians seem to recognize that past trauma must be integrated into a national identity. The nation should neither deny nor repress the trauma.
as the primary torture site. Inside a “Memory Park” will “harbor sculpture generated from public competitions.” Outside are plans to recognize the prisoners’ families desperately seeking their release and any information on their relatives’ conditions and needs.

In a personalized account, Chilean writer Ariel Dorfman claimed that a 1990 public act, in which newly elected president Patricio Aylwin addressed tens of thousands of Chileans in the Stadium, recognizing the atrocities that had taken place there, and in which wives of the disappeared danced the “cueca sola,” “exorcised” the Stadium for him. Dorfman wrote that he now felt free to enter the Stadium, which until then he had vowed never to re-enter. Yet within this inter-subjective space of relating to the Stadium as a site of horrific memory, the notion of “exorcising,” of “closing the chapter,” may not capture what many victims of that space may have had to do or may continue to do to survive with their memories and their scars.

Rather than exorcising their traumatic experiences, survivors must often find ways of integrating these experiences into their identities, often fitfully accomplished through the process of recounting. And here is one of the essential dimensions of the Stadium as national monument: public recognition of the need for an environment in which to facilitate or contribute to this process.

Like the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington DC, the challenge to conceptualize the National Stadium as a memorial involves striking some kind of balance between the nation’s shame and an honoring of the dead and wounded. Memorials that testify to the state’s violence against its citizens, such as Argentina’s El Olimpo, or the U.S.’s Kent State, stand in stark, inescapable contrast to official monuments of glorious pasts. Such memorials become contested terrain between a state, anxious to convey unity in the face of past polarization and state repression, and a society in which no one account of the past is universally shared.

At the outset of the democratic transition, Aylwin established an official “truth” that he had hoped would contribute to reconciliation (thus, the name of the truth commission) and to “turn the page.” The truth commission report was eloquently written. It recommended that symbolic monuments be erected. Yet the report focused on the dead and disappeared and not those who were imprisoned and tortured and managed to survive. Moreover, the state did not actively promote, disseminate or encourage public discussion of the report. Its arrival and fading from public light mirrored the ways in which the state has tended to repress painful memories.

Today, the Lagos administration’s act of approving the Stadium as an historic monument can be interpreted in several ways. After an elite silence regarding the past throughout most of the transition from military rule, politicians seem to recognize that past trauma must be integrated into a national identity. The nation should neither deny nor repress the trauma. The administration’s approval of the Stadium-as-monoment might thus be interpreted as an instrumentalist act. Chilean politicians across the spectrum have come to accept the inevitability of the unearthing of a traumatic past, and it might be politically strategic to take the offensive when it comes to symbolic representations of the past.

Yet socialist president Ricardo Lagos and his fellow socialist cabinet members and elected representatives have a complicated relationship to the past, including their relationship to Salvador Allende and his agenda for revolution-
Chile is a country of poets and artists. Here is a look at just a few aspects of the “other Chile,” including the new relationship between culture and consumerism.

Chilean Art

Between Reality and Memory

BY BEATRIZ HUDOBO HOTT

Chile’s contemporary artists do not cling to any particular ideology. Rather, this new generation of artists seek to understand the recent past without a sense of guilt or victimization. They look to the future with a critical and constructive view, without hatred.

Only a few artists focus on the political and social context. Instead, some vent their criticism on the economic model, the free market and the consumer society. An example is the well-received 1999 exhibition by Bruna Truffa and Rodrigo Cabezas at the National Fine Arts Museum, *Si vas para Chile* (If you go to Chile), taking its title from a well-known traditional folk song and making fun of consumer culture. Later, the artists produced another exhibition, *Si vas para el Mall* (If you go to the mall).

While many artists mock the consumer society and the search for easy and quick satisfaction, few concern themselves with the poverty, unemployment, and social and economic inequality that is part of modern Chile. The degree of social consciousness in art in Chile has varied in intensity over time. At the beginning of the last century, the so-called Generación del 13 used painting to highlight social concerns by depicting local customs. An incipient muralist movement in the 1940s, stimulated by the Chilean sojourn of Mexican muralist David Alfaro Siqueiros, and the 1960s’ “art of denunciation” somehow contributed several artistic ways of interpreting the aftermath of the Pinochet coup (see sidebar).

Yet social concerns have often been on the periphery. In addition to the contemporary mockery of consumerism, much of today’s artistic expression of social concerns deals with lifestyle and identity. The liberation of mores and customs greatly influences artistic production. Topics such as nudity, eroticism and homosexuality are no longer forbidden. There is a resurgence of conceptual art, in which theoretical discourse has great relevance. These trends are supported by a great number of art schools that are very keen on new aesthetic expressions. Painting does not escape the conceptualists’ scrutiny; it is often questioned as a means of artistic expression.
At the same time, technological developments have made it possible to incorporate new elements of artistic expression. The use of interactive multimedia has attracted a considerable number of young Chilean artists who explore the possibilities of combining painting, photography, found objects and video in their installations. There is an interweaving of elements and artistic expression. A crisscross of traditional and conceptual changes occurs as a product of a globalized world.

This globalized vision may also account for a number of ecological groups that have recently appeared on the artistic scene. The clay art of Zinnia Ramírez, Ana María Wiebecken, Leo Moya and Norma Ramírez reflect the increased use of organic materials as part of this newfound ecological sensibility.

In a sense, this ecological movement is a subtle return to Chile’s artistic past, but with a twist. Chilean art began with landscaping artists who worked in the European tradition with an elitist bent, as Chileans searched for their own identity in the last century. These early landscape artists showed little interest in Chile’s ancestral civilization, reflecting the relative absence of indigenous culture and pre-Columbian past compared to other Latin American countries. This attitude contrasts with some of the new ecological artists that use their art for the vindication of ancient cultures, particularly the Mapuche.

The recycling of discarded materials evokes both ecology and meager resources. The newspaper constructions of Andres Vio are a good example of this trend, creating an intertwining of contemporary art’s uncertainties and forms of expression related to Chile’s living conditions.

Other artists working with a different type of recycled materials have developed a “memory of the past” by searching for lost and found objects. Carlos Montes de Oca, for example, takes his findings out of context and presents them with poetic texts in boxes of impeccable craftsmanship. Some of his latest works have included interventions in urban spaces with small tents which reference the fragility and lack of protection of the human being.

Amid all these changes and experimentation, a very special type of inward-looking Chilean painting still persists, displaying great imagination in alluding to a dream-like world where timeless landscapes are filled with eccentric human figures and illogical objects. Most predominant among these artists are Mario Gómez, Edwín Rojas, and Lorenzo Moya. These artists recoil to a private subjective world, which
they splash on the canvass with rich imagination and dexterity. Despite its diversity, Chilean art is now only beginning to become an integral part of the international and domestic scene. The scarcity evoked by Vio and other recyclers is also an artistic commentary on the difficulty in catapulting contemporary Chilean art into established international circuits due to the lack of resources. Until the 1950s and early 1960s, Chile had been insulated from the international art world.

Within Chile itself, one can see that there is a growing relationship between art and the general public, as attendance to galleries and museums increases. Exhibition spaces—private and public—have increased as well. The opportunity for viewers to permit themselves moments of confrontation and reflection with art has greatly expanded.

However, much of the general public has difficulty understanding the complex theoretical proposals of conceptual art, neither grasping the codes nor possessing the necessary facts. As pointed out by Tomás Andreu, director of the avant-garde art space Galería Animal, some art dealers draw on the seduction of material, shock impact and the surprise element as way of attracting the public’s attention.

Nevertheless, art is becoming an integral part of the urban scene. Large scale sculptures, not only in Santiago but also in Chile’s provinces, bring art to urban spaces. Among the prominent sculptors that have taken part in these projects are Osvaldo Peña, Sergio Castillo, Francisco Gacitúa, Aura Castro, José Vicente Gajardo and Alejandra Ruddoff.

Chilean art may not necessarily incorporate a social message, but the very act of incorporating art into public life is a social statement. Within the overall cultural framework of Chile, successive democratic governments put great effort into elaborating a cultural policy, encompassing all artistic tendencies and expressions. The recently created Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes (National Council for the Arts and Culture) has created great optimism within Chile’s cultural community.

Private corporations—in keeping with the current free market economic model—continue to play a major role not only in financing artistic endeavors but in the promotion and diffusion of art. The role of private enterprise in fomenting art began for the most part during the military regime when the dictatorship shied from fostering cultural expression.

During the period of the dictatorship, an art market developed in Chile. New galleries opened up and the public timidly began to acquire contemporary art. The patrons who financed exhibitions and contests were the large corporations of the private sector, looking with favor on those artists who did not overtly politicize their works.

Today, Chile’s democratic governments seek a mixed participation between the public and the private sector for all sorts of art, socially conscious or not. Art expressions in today’s Chile are as diverse as the perceptions of every artist vis-à-vis his or her own life experience. Art will be the mirror that will rescue and preserve Chile’s cultural memory.

Beatriz Huidobro Hott is an art historian and curator in Santiago.

trend, this subversion of traditional means of artistic expression gave way to a conceptual art experimentation such as installations, art auctions and body art. ■ CADA (Colectivo Acciones de Arte), an interdisciplinary group of visual artists and intellectuals, utilized urban space to create new circuits for the flow of art. Main figures were: Lotty Rosenfeld, Juan Castillo, Raúl Zurrío, Diámel Eltt and Fernando Balcells. ■ The so-called Escena de Avanzada, composed of artists such as Eugenio Dittborn, Carlos Altamirano, Juan Davila, Francisco Smythe, Gonzalo Mezza, Carlos Leppe and Gonzalo Díaz, ponder over what is to be a painter in Chile. The Escena de Avanzada, a term coined by the art critic Nelly Richard (Richard, “Margins and Institutions: Art in Chile since 1973” Art & Text, Melbourne, 1986) point through their theoretical discourse to changes in the codes of cultural communication. ■ Dittborn acknowledges the precarious conditions of the country and plays around with it. He underscores the marginality of Chile in different aspects including the international art circuit. Dittborn sends his works through the mail in neatly folded packages. ■ Juan Dávila uses forms of Pop art with great irreverence and Carlos Leppe injures his own body to project his art.

1980s ■ In 1981, the first French-Chilean meet of video art occurs. In this gathering we found the works of Juan Downey and Alfredo Jaar. In opposition to the French video artists, who place great emphasis on the technology, these Chilean artists are more interested in the link between content and technology. A neo-expressionist trend emerges, influencing mostly younger artists fresh out of art schools like Bororo, Samy Benmayor, and Omar Gatica. Their work, a sort of action painting with open-minded ideas and technique, is perceived as an act of liberation against repression although no theoretical underpinning supports this body of work. It is impetuous and spontaneous with some influence by the Italian Transvanguardia movement. ■ Another group of artists, sculptors and painters base their work on a personal vision that originates in the inner soul of the artist, where fantasy’s flight plays a fundamental role. Principal figures include Mario Toral, Rodolfo Opazo and Gonzalo Cienfuegos. ■ With the onset of the economic crisis of 1983, censorship became weaker. An important group of exiled artists return, including José Balmes, who spearheaded a more politicized and testimonial art. Street mural painting appears in the shantytowns, suburbs and closed spaces. In 1988, the government called for a plebiscite, and the muralist brigades became visible again in support of “No” vote to decide whether the military regime should continue in power.

1990 ■ With the inauguration of a new democratic government, the art scene changed. Young artists who did not live in a dictatorial regime took charge of the memories of their parents. The awareness of human rights violations is a recurring theme for some. Because of the recent 30th anniversary of the military coup, the mass media revisited the history of the dictatorship, helping to relive or narrate the process with more maturity. —BHH
Contemporary Chilean Narrative

Literati Between the MP3 and Zanjón de la Aguada

BY LUIS E. CÁRCA MO-HUEICH ANTE

Toward the end of the 1970s, the upper class neighborhood of Vitacura in Santiago, Chile, gave rise to the Los Cabres and Bullevar Kennedy shopping centers. Chile’s first full-fledged mall, located in Vitacura’s Parque Arauco, soon followed. The importation of consumer goods imports boomed. In 1989, the Plaza Vespucio mall was built in La Florida, a populous mixed middle- and working class neighborhood, a world apart from the economically elitist areas of Santiago. Since then, malls in Chile have become a major component of contemporary mass culture and especially a place for many young people to hang out.

VIRTUAL REALISM?

Readers do not need exclusively to go to graphs and statistical data to learn about this Chile of the recent decades. Short stories and novels are excellent manifestations of “the great transformation” of this period. Without a doubt, by the mid-1980s, Chilean narrative is no longer about casas de campo (country houses), the preferred setting of one of the most influential contemporary Chilean novelists, José Donoso (1924–1996). Indeed, after his thick and masterful novel Casa de campo, Donoso himself incorporated a more urban scenario in his narrative: the Santiago of political repression (Pinochet’s years) and that of neo-modernization can be traced in the 1986 La desesperanza (Curtew).

Within this context, Chilean narrative has become increasingly about cities, shopping centers, television, movies, the culture of cell phones, DVD and MP3. These are the recurrent elements in the narrative of one of the most visible writers of the period: Alberto Fuguet (1964). His 1990 book of short stories Sobredosis (Overdose) opens with a movie-like scene in a fictionalized Apumangu, a typical shopping mall of the barrio alto in Santiago—the locus for the book’s literary imagination. Sobredosis has become a key reference in the genealogy of the literary and publishing phenomenon known as the “New Chilean Narrative.”

During the 1990s, Alberto Fuguet moved into the novelistic genre. His 1992 Mala onda (Bad Vibes) became one of the most widely read novels of the first half of this decade. Like José Donoso’s La desesperanza, Fuguet’s Mala onda takes place in a city whose atmosphere is marked by political tensions, with the heavy hand of the military siege as a very faded background. In Fuguet’s novel, in contrast to Donoso’s narrative, fashion, TV culture, movies, and publicity form the fabric of the daily life of its main character, 17-year-old Matías Vicuna, a boy who evokes J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye in a late twentieth century South American city. Fuguet’s 1994 novel Por favor rebobinar (Please rewind) accentuated this cityscape. One of its chapters occurs in a multimedia hotel setting, populated by images of the Allende and Pinochet years, images that playfully become part of the visual decoration, without major historical or political density. In addition, U.S. mainstream culture is incorporated in celebratory ways—no longer a traumatic North/South dilemma. Many narrative texts of the period exhibit lightness in regards to issues of political history, media and global culture. This has become a major feature in books ranging from Fuguet’s Mala onda to other more recent ones such as his Las pelícu-
las de mi vida (2003) to Andrés Velasco’s Lugares comunnes.

Alberto Fuguet’s narrative aesthetics have aimed to reshape not only Chilean literary imagination but also Latin American narrative. In a 1998 collection of short stories entitled McOndo (1998), bringing together seventeen Latin American writers, Fuguet suggests in the prologue that new Latin American writers have radically shifted from magical realism to a sort of virtual realism.

RECONVERSION OF THE MARGINS

What is left of the traditional political and social commitment of the writer? Is the new wave of modernization making meaningless any literary project aimed to remain politically and socially “engaged”? There is no doubt that the old-fashioned “committed writer” has left the intellectual and literary scene of contemporary Chile. In this process, some new writers have invented suggestive ways to critically talk back about issues of public culture and politics in society. Two interesting, but very different, literary styles have developed what we may call “literatures of the margins” in the late 20th and early 21st century Chile: Diamela Eltit (1949) and Pedro Lemebe (born in the mid-1950s).

Diamela Eltit’s 1991 publication of Vaca sagrada (Sacred Cow) in the Biblioteca Sur Series of Planeta Press, a mainstream publishing house, represented a shift for the development and circulation
of her narrative, formerly limited to the avant-garde elite of the 1980s in Chile and the MLA academic circles in the United States. The influential literary critic of the period, Ignacio Valente, from his literary column in the Sunday edition of El Mercurio, praised Eltit’s writing. Vaca Sagrada is a text that delves into the poetic and narrative potential of language in order to convey a hallucinating and deep journey into the realm of the female body. In this manner, Eltit’s text defies also the canonical code of the novel. By mixing poetic, narrative and conceptual writing, and collapsing the traditional notion of history or narrative plot, Vaca sagrada—like many of Eltit’s books—undermines the boundaries of literary genres. This type of neo avant-garde exploration is critical to Eltit’s narrative. In fact, her first book, Lumpérica (1983) (translated into English as E Luminata) shocked many readers. This text—perhaps, the best way to define it, or not define it—develops a highly codified literary language. It is a narration about the nightlife of a female body and its exposure to the violent signs of the city. Eltit’s most recent book, Mano de obra (2002), takes place in an imagined supermarket in which the characters seems to be enslaved to an nightmarish commodity culture.

While sharing with Eltit a certain critical edge, the writing of Pedro Lemebel has become more assimilated into the mainstream literary market. By the early 1990s, the signature of Pedro Lemebel began to circulate as the author of anti-establishment chronicles in alternative, left-oriented magazines, such as Página Abierta and Punto Final. He also founded, along with Francisco Casas, the Performance Group Las Vegas del Apocalipsis. His 1994 La esquina es mi corazón and his 1997 Loco afán, Lemebel’s first collections of crónicas urbanas (urban chronicles), brought to the fore both a creative and a troublesome way to speak openly, insolently, bitterly, and yet seductively (urban chronicles), brought to the fore both a creative and a troublesome way to speak openly, insolently, bitterly, and yet seductively about the daily and nocturnal milieu of homosexuals, lesbians, and transvestites, vis-à-vis the urban glamour of modernization and the political history of Chile. His most recent book of chronicles carries as a title the name of a poor neighborhood in southern Santiago: Zanjón de la Aguada (2003). Through Lemebel’s writings, lo popular becomes again popular in Chilean reading communities. His first novel Tengo miedo torero (2001), translated into English as My tender matador (2004), is the story of a transvestite and a radical leftist militant who often hang out in the poor southern periphery of Santiago, while participating in underground politics and planning the assassination of General Pinochet. This novel—like Fuguet’s Mala onda in 1994—became a best-selling book in 2003. Sexual difference, conspiratorial political plots and anti-establishment views have taken the literature of Lemebel to the center of the literary market, on a national and international scale.

THE “LETTERED CITY” STILL SURVIVES?

In 1991, Gonzalo Contreras (1958) published his first novel La ciudad anterior as a result of receiving a prestigious literary prize by the El Mercurio literary supplement. Like Fuguet’s Sobredosis, this novel represented a milestone in what was then called the “New Chilean Narrative.” La ciudad anterior relates the story of an arms merchant who ends up in an unknown provincial city, near a highway and somehow stuck in the past. Highly visual and cinematic in its language, well-crafted in its literary style, and compact in its structure, this novel—along with his 1998 El gran mal (The Great Evil)—has placed Gonzalo Contreras among the most talented and skillful writers in contemporary Chilean literature.

In 1999, the prestigious Prize Rómulo Gallegos, considered by many as the Latin American Nobel Prize, was awarded to Roberto Bolaños for his 1998 novel Los detectives salvajes (The Wild Detectives). The prize placed Bolaños’s narrative on the spotlight as a path-breaking literary talent in the contemporary scene of Latin American narrative. Los detectives salvajes is about two men who become nomadic figures traveling around the world in search of a disappeared female writer. Bolaños’s novel takes place in many countries: Mexico, Liberia, Israel, Angola, France, the United States, and Spain. In my view, Bolaños’s narration poses fascinating questions about the issue of displacement, nomadism, and transnational imagery.

The works of Contreras, Bolaños, Eltit, Lemebel or Fuguet suggest a dramatic relocation of “lettered culture” within the context of a country strongly marked by the advent of the global era. The cohabitation, or at times tension and disjunction, between the literati and the market, the literary field and the new media ecologies, the lettered subject and the social margins, has evolved into new ways in the contemporary intellectual and cultural scenario of Chilean society.
“So what’s Harvard doing in Chile?”

BY STEVE REIFENBERG

“So what’s Harvard doing in Chile?” is a question that I am rather often asked as program director for Harvard’s Regional Office of the David Rocke- feller Center for Latin America Studies (DRCLAS) based in Santiago, Chile. There are at least three answers to this question.

“Many different things,” is the obvious first answer, especially for anyone who even quickly flips through this edition of ReVista: Harvard astronomers are studying the stars from some of the most powerful telescopes in the world atop the Andes, Harvard public health specialists are exploring lessons from Chile’s health reform, and Harvard architects and urban planners are exploring innovative designs in low-cost housing and in the process transforming the way their respective fields think about these challenges.

At the same time, Harvard College students are studying at local Chilean universities, Harvard medical students are participating in international service learning projects and doing clinical rotations, while other enterprising Harvard students are working as interns at vineyards and as volunteers at community organizations.

So the first answer focuses on the rich diversity of research, teaching or other professional activities of Harvard faculty from across the University, and study, internships and work involvement of Harvard students.

“A bold institutional experiment for Harvard University,” is a second answer. For the first time ever, Harvard University has established an office outside of the United States with a mission to serve all parts of the university—faculty, students, and administration—in promoting the work that Harvard wants to do in this region of the world (in this case, in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay.) Based in Santiago, the Regional Office is designed to enhance opportunities for Harvard faculty to carry out their research and collaborative projects, as well as greatly expand the opportunities for Harvard students studying, working, or doing research in the five countries.

Harvard’s President Lawrence Summers has challenged those who work at Harvard to think about international issues, globalization, and the role of Harvard in the world.

“He has us setting our sights very high,” says DRCLAS Director John Coatsworth. “This new Regional Office represents an important institutional experiment in how Harvard is working to both make a difference in the world and to have what is happening in the world reflected back at Harvard.”

Since its August 2002 opening, the DRCLAS Regional Office has hosted more than 40 Harvard faculty members and administrators working on projects in the region, as well as organized dozens of Harvard-faculty led conferences and seminars. Working closely with Harvard’s Office of International Programs, the Regional Office in Santiago administers Harvard’s only University-administered study abroad program. The Harvard College study abroad program in Chile is more than just one more opportunity for Harvard students; it is a first-time institutional experiment for the University.

“This Santiago program is a model for what we hope to see a lot more of in the future: experimentation that leads to good DRCLAS regional office in Chile that occupies a portion of the third floor of the FLASCO building.”
What's Harvard doing in Chile? A lot, ranging from developing innovative social housing designs to experimenting with a bold, new institutional model for the University.

opportunities for our students to engage in the local culture and university life,” says Jane Edwards, the Director of Harvard’s Office of International Programs.

“I went to study in Chile because that is the one place that Harvard runs a study abroad program,” explained Melissa Dell, a junior economics concentrator currently studying in the program.

“I wanted to have access to Harvard’s resources while studying abroad,” says Manuela Zoninsein who participated in the fall 2003 program. “I liked the balance in the program. After the initial two-week Harvard orientation, I was given the independence to be a normal Chilean student. At the same time, throughout my time in Chile I had access to a great Harvard staff if the need arose.”

“Having the opportunity to study and at the same time do research at the United Nations Economic Commission that is right next door to the Harvard office was an incredible opportunity,” says junior government concentrator Lewis Smith who also participated in the fall 2003 program.

“Building bridges and creating synergies,” is a third answer to what is Harvard doing in Chile.

“Harvard’s decision to establish a formal presence in the region has had an incredible energizing impact on the local Harvard alumni,” says Harvard Club of Chile Alumni President Andrés Rodríguez. The Harvard alumni of Chile have helped dozens of students find internships and work opportunities, and have organized and hosted numerous academic conferences and seminars with Harvard faculty. The Harvard Alumni Association, Harvard Alumni Club of Chile and DRCLAS organized a reception for President Lawrence Summers on March 30, 2004 prior to a major address he gave on “Globalization and Education” at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America & the Caribbean (ECLAC) in Santiago.

“Making the connections to Harvard alumni in Santiago has been an enormous help to our project,” says Harvard anthropology professor Gary Urton, who has been collaborating with the Museo Chileno de Arte Precolombino in Santiago on a major exhibition and research project on the Incan khipus.

“The Harvard alumni in Chile have been invaluable in raising awareness about our work, and the current exhibition of the Incan khipus that is cosponsored by Harvard and the Museo PreColombino is one of the most successful exhibitions in the museum’s history,” says Urton’s partner in Santiago, Carlos Aldunate, Director of the Museo PreColombino.

The presence of the Regional Office has also made connections across international boundaries through initiatives such as the Bolivia-Chile-Peru Project: Exploring Opportunities for Mutual Gain.

“People solve problems better when they are able to meet face to face, without the pressure to make a commitment,” says Harvard Law School professor emeritus Roger Fisher, who has helped lead two-week-long sessions for influential actors from the three countries at DRCLAS in Cambridge this past year.

“Chile and Bolivia are the only two countries in South America that do not have diplomatic relations, and there are few venues for them to explore creatively, and without commitment, new ideas in how to improve the relations,” Fisher explains. “The Bolivia-Chile-Peru project represents an important dialogue that is very difficult to organize without a third party facilitator. There is a critical role that a leading academic center like Harvard can play, and that the DRCLAS Regional Office can facilitate, in creating the space that allows leading actors from government, military, business, church, media, civil society and cultural institutions to learn about how each other sees the problem and think together about a better future. These are incredible opportunities.”

So the answers to the question, What is Harvard doing in Chile? are multiple: many things, an institutional experiment, and building bridges. But those answers raise other questions, particularly as Harvard thinks about its international strategy.

“In my view, this experiment of the DRCLAS office in Santiago has proven to be a huge success for a growing number of Harvard faculty and students, administrators and alumni,” says John Coatsworth, “but it also raises an important set of questions for the University about the future of internationalization at Harvard.”

The questions include: should Harvard continue the experiment in Chile past the initial three-year pilot phase? (There will be a full evaluation of the pilot project by the University in the summer 2004). Should the University as a whole draw lessons from the global strategy of Harvard Business School that has set up HBS offices around the world? Should the University establish a network of field offices in every major world region, each with a university-wide mandate? Should Harvard manage its own study-abroad programs in other countries, as it does in Chile?

In the end, the hope is that experiments like the DRCLAS Regional Office will help answer some of these questions by exploring, defining, and refining the ways that Harvard can have an impact in the world and bring those experiences back most successfully to the University.

Steve Reifenberg is the Program Director for the DRCLAS Regional Office in Santiago, Chile. He served as DRCLAS Executive Director from 1996 to 2002.
HERE HAVE BEEN TWO MAJOR MOMENTS in the history of social housing. The first one was in Germany in 1927, when the best architects of the time tried to solve the problem of low cost housing with construction in Stuttgart’s Weissenhof Settlement.

The second moment, in 1970, was the Previ-Lima project in Peru, when the world’s best architects collaborated to overcome housing shortages. The end of the project marked the closing of the second chapter, a long hiatus in the involvement of big-name architects in the challenge of housing for the poor.

Well, we are planning to write the third chapter of this story by bringing back the best international architects to work on the most challenging of architectural issues: how extremely low cost housing can be a real means to overcome poverty.

ELEMENTAL, as our social housing program is called, seeks to build seven model projects, of around 200 units each, throughout Chile. These projects will use the best practices in construction, engineering, social work and architecture to offer a real and concrete contribution to the problem of housing access for the poor.

We began our search for a way to contribute in March 2001 when we met with Chilean Minister of Housing Jaime Rabinet. When we told him that we wanted to contribute ideas and projects in the area of social housing, he eagerly responded that the timing was right: the government was about to start a new housing policy.

The new concept Vivienda Social Dinámica sin deuda—Dynamic Social Housing Without Debt (VSDsD)—intended to favor people in extreme need. Our contributions regarding that new policy were highly welcome, he told us.

In the last 25 years, Chile has experienced radical changes in its housing policies that made it become a case study at a world-wide level. This interest is mainly in the fact that Chilean housing policy has focused on subsidizing the demand more than the supply. It acts as a facilitating and coordinating state between the necessities of the settlers and the deprived interests of the constructors to generate an efficient and active market of social housing. According to the Chilean Building Chamber, in ten years, Chile could arrive at deficit zero in terms of housing.

Under the innovative VSDsD program, each family receives a subsidy of a $7,500 voucher; the program includes those without the capacity to pay back a loan or without access to financial credit. Considering current values in today’s Chilean building industry, this low budget allows for just 300 square feet of built space. This means that the beneficiaries have to build their own housing. They must transform the mere housing solution of a simple subsidy into a dynamic dwelling (hence the program’s name).

What’s important about resolving the housing problem and making the new housing policy a success is to provide the proper framework for analyzing the problem and providing solutions.

Until the ELEMENTAL project, Chile’s housing programs had lacked the participation of top-rate architects. Indeed, in Santiago’s XII Architecture Biennial, the social housing prize category didn’t even have a winner for lack of participation, even though 60% of all Chilean construction in terms of square footage is dedicated to social housing.

Looking at the way the housing market operates today, we can find three principal architectural types in low-cost housing. We understand previous errors and their social consequences, so we are in a position to correct them. However, this new policy introduces some terms into the already difficult equation of low cost housing, which recognized building types are unable to respond to. We need to find precise answers for these new conditions.

Let start by looking at how the market operates today:

The first typical kind of low-cost housing assumes that one family equals one lot, for everything: the land, the infrastructure and the house itself.

Therefore, the tendency is to look for the cheapest pieces of property, most likely on the city’s periphery, far away from the opportunities such as work, education, trans-
It is not even a possibility in Dynamic Social worst evaluations in every possible respect. This type of housing has received the quality of the house. Instead of efficiency, producing severe problems in the environmental width. Thus, whenever a family wants to add a new room, they block access of the original rooms to light and ventilation, producing severe problems in the environmental quality of the house. Instead of efficiency, what we get then is overcrowding.

Finally, we have tall building constructions. This type of housing has received the worst evaluations in every possible respect. It is not even a possibility in Dynamic Social Housing because it blocks any possible expansion.

A project’s first goal should be more efficient land use so sites can be located within the network of opportunities of the cities. The second goal is to develop an architectural type with a strategic position in the lot to guarantee future quality of urban space. That architectural type should also allow an easy and safe self-expansion of housing for every family. Finally, house design should anticipate the best possible scenarios of that future expansion. Good design (and therefore good public policy) should take care of all the aspects that individual initiative—no matter how much money, time or energy is spent—will never be able to produce.

If we could synthesize with a kind of equation, both the fundamental goals of a housing policy, and specifically the ones regarding this VSDsD new policy, we would say the following:

To design
1. neighborhoods
2. made out of good quality, flexible to grow housing units
3. well located in the city
4. with the capacity of being developed harmoniously in time
5. structurally safe

everything x U.S. $7,500 per family.

To solve this extremely difficult equation, we had to meet at least two conditions: actually building the housing and following the same rules as everybody else so that the project could be replicable.

In this context, a group of professors from the Harvard Design School—Andrés Iacobelli, Pablo Allard, Jorge Silvetti and Alejandro Aravena—got together the Faculty of Architecture and the Program of Policies of the Universidad Catolica de Chile, the Housing Ministry of Chile (MINVU) and the David Rockefeller Center of Latin American Studies of Harvard University with a group of important Chilean construction companies and social institutions to develop the Fondef/CONICYT project ELEMENTAL: “Initiative to innovate and to construct seven sets of very-low-cost housing in Chile”

We set out to seek the best possible architectural design, the best possible engineering and construction using development and lab tests for new pre-fabricated components and antiseismical systems, and the best possible social and community work.

To get the best possible architecture, we organized an international competition attracting more than 730 architectural teams from all over the world. The jury included Chilean Housing Minister Ravinet, Chilean Building Chamber President Fernando Echeverria, Architects Association President José Ramon Ugarte, well-known architects Paulo Mendes da Rocha, Luis Fernandez-Galiano and Rafael Moneo, and Harvard Design School Professor Jorge Silvetti, who chaired the competition that garnered winning proposals from professionals and students from Iran, Venezuela, the United States, Uruguay, Spain, Holland and Chile, among others.

Winning architects will incorporate the ideas of communities benefited in the design process, as well as those of local building companies, architects and engineers.

ELEMENTAL has managed in his first months of life to revitalize to a large extent the interest in the “problem” of ELEMENTAL housing. Nevertheless, the proposed ideas must now pass the sieve of the reality and must actually get constructed within the restrictions of the system. The confidence of the Chilean government and the different partner institutions is a good sign that we might make a difference in this relevant problem and reaffirm the university’s role as a bridge to the country’s development.

Alejandro Aravena, a Visiting Professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Design, is Adjunct Professor in the Architecture School of the Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and has run his own independent professional practice since 1994. Pablo Allard is head of the Cities, Landscape and Environmental Studies Unit at the Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and is the principal of ALLARDESIGN architecture and urban design. A former DRCLAS graduate student affiliate, he received his doctorate in Design Studies from the Harvard Graduate School of Design in 2003.

For more information on ELEMENTAL, see <www.elementalchile.org>.
Health Reform Process in Chile

HSPH Students Observe

BY THOMAS BOSSERT

W e hardly knew what to expect. Doctors had been striking against the health reform laws two weeks before we arrived. Newspapers were full of debates over the proposed reform. We’d organized a course for 15 Harvard School of Public Health Masters students to experience this remarkable and exciting period of innovation in Chile for public health issues. The students came to see first hand the process of reforming health systems and innovations in community medicine approaches, including the assessment of social capital initiatives—the two major public health issues in Chile today.

Chile was one of the first countries on the continent to significantly reform its health system in the 1980s. It introduced new programs of public and private social insurance schemes, promoting the growth of private sector providers and decentralizing their public health services. Chile has been a model for health reform in many other countries. Since the restoration of democracy in the 1990s, many in the health sector have been proposing new reforms to correct many of the problems that emerged in implementation of the initial reforms.

A leader in promoting community-oriented health systems, Chile is also a laboratory of innovations in outreach programs, community participation, 24-hour emergency service units and special programs for the elderly and other specific risk groups. The Universidad Católica has implemented pilot programs with recent innovations in community medicine around Santiago. Complementing these programs is a research project to assess the role of social capital (trust in others and participation in voluntary groups) in health care services and health status.

As the faculty member in charge of the course, I have had considerable experience in Chile—beginning with my Ph.D. dissertation research on the Allende regime in 1973 and continuing over the last ten years in various public health research and consulting activities. I was able to draw on many of my contacts and friends who are now major actors and observers of the health reform process and community medicine initiatives.

The course came at a critical time in the health reform debate. We could not have had a better opportunity to observe the process of health reform in practice since we were there during an intense period of debate over the new reform laws, including strikes and demonstrations by the Colegio de Médicos. And, as we were nearing the end of the third week one of the key pieces of reform legislation passed the Congress just as we were having a celebratory group dinner with some key reform advocates. We were able to congratulate them collectively in person over food and wine.

The 15 masters students were a great mix of medical students (who were complementing their program with a year for an MPH) and other social scientists (many of whom were taking courses mainly on the U.S. health system in our Health Policy and Management program). They quickly caught up on the system issues and consistently surprised me and the Chileans with their well-targeted and penetrating questions and comments. In addition, they were a friendly and cooperative group who were very supportive and good-natured throughout the program—a chemistry that does not always happen in these kinds of courses. Since four of the students did not speak Spanish, the others took it on themselves to do whispering translations that worked out better than we expected. We also had three Chilean medical students in the Universidad Católica family medicine residency program who were fully integrated into the course. They gave useful detailed commentary, but also found that the course helped them to better understand their own system and the reforms.

Four HSPH alums devoted enormous energy and time to getting key officials to speak to the students and to organize field trips to hospitals, clinics, insurance companies, mayors and community groups. The alums included officials in key ministry positions, as well as a university professor who got her MPH degree in 1978. We also had a stimulating interview with the editor of the leading newspaper, El Mercurio, who is also an HSPH alum.

The program began with an overview of Chilean politics and urban planning by two Harvard alums, one from the Graduate School of Design and the other from the Kennedy School. The students then attended a day of lectures on the Chilean health system, focusing on epidemiological trends and the history of health reforms beginning in the early 20th century. This overview, led by a former Minister of Health, now head of the Department of Public Health of the Medical School at Universidad Católica, was followed by another day of lectures at the Ministry of Health where the Minister began to inform the students of the new proposals for health reform. All the key officials involved presented different aspects of the reform package. The next day we met with two officials from the major opposition, the Colegio de Médicos, with passionate defense of their position and an introduction to the intensity of debate in Chile. Then we met with the editor of El Mercurio and other outside observers who outlined several key issues and offered thoughtful evaluations of the nature of the debate over reform.

With this introduction to the current debate, we spent the following week visiting the actual facilities in several municipalities in the Santiago metropolitan area and in rural areas in the Aconcagua region. At these visits we were introduced to a new model for community health programs based on segmenting the community into territorial districts with a team of health professionals responsible for an integrated program of health care for the community. The students were able to observe the conditions in both public and private facilities, discuss the reforms and community health issues with health providers, with insurance providers and with mayors. They were even treated to traditional Chilean hospitality with local children performing “cueca”
Innovative strategies for increasing public health for the “public good” are not a static textbook concept but a shifting concept that is actively worked out amongst government groups, NGO’s, physicians and the public. As a family physician, I had the chance to learn how my profession functions in Chile and to respect differences in the Chilean family practice. It was interesting to see this form of family practice adapt itself to the climate and needs of the Chilean system.

**INCREDIBLE HOSPITALITY**

Spending three weeks in Santiago and learning about and watching health policy-making in action undoubtedly was a very unique opportunity. We had incredible access to key players and stakeholders in the health policy-making process. By the end of the program, we had a very good sense of the proposed reforms and their strengths and weaknesses, and more importantly, a new framework for analysis and approaching health sector reform in any country.

Most touching during my stay was the incredible hospitality our hosts constantly showered on us. They answered endless questions, provided mountains of information, and graced us with elegant lunches, warm greetings, and an openness that one typically reserves for family or close friends. And time and time again, I thought that we could learn about much more than health care from our Southern neighbors.

Karen Pelley is in her second year of the two-year Masters of Science (MS2) in Health Policy and Management at the Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH).

Thomas Bossert is the Director of the Politics and Governance Group at the Harvard School of Public Health.
Salamanca of the Southern Cone
Harvard Study Abroad in Chile

BY ERIN GOODMAN AND ANÍBAL SEPÚLVEDA

FEW DECADES AGO, CHILE WAS COMMONLY perceived as a long, earthquake-prone country in South America with a tough human rights record that made even intrepid travelers wary. Today, the return to democratic rule, increasing prosperity, active social and cultural life, and excellent universities have all helped convert Santiago into a Spanish-speaking destination of choice for foreign students, a sort of the Salamanca of the southern cone. While the strange lingo spoken by young Chileans may make some students nervous, soon the chilenismos become like passwords into a unique linguistic club (¿cachai?).

In February 2003, the DRCLAS Regional Office in Santiago and the Harvard’s Office of International Programs established a semester-length study abroad program for Harvard College students. One year later, as participants return to Harvard and word of mouth spreads, the program’s enrollment has doubled. The Harvard study abroad program in Chile is the first-ever Harvard University-administered study abroad program anywhere in the world.

Program participants are able to matriculate at one of three universities: the Pontificia Universidad Católica, the Universidad de Chile, and the Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez. The selected students—meeting requirements of intermediate Spanish and an adventurous spirit—arrive in Santiago before university classes begin to take part in a two-week orientation program in which they are introduced to the history of Chilean culture and the quirks of Chilean Spanish. Harvard students live with Chilean host families to enhance their experience and their Spanish. Throughout the semester, students are encouraged to travel both within Chile and beyond. The DRCLAS Regional Office often facilitates many program options—including internships at local, national, and international organizations.

During the orientation program and throughout the semester, students visit famous and less famous sites, including Isla Negra, poet Pablo Neruda’s coastal home-turn-museum, and La Victoria, the first squatters’ settlement in Santiago and South America, dating back to the mid-1950s. In the same week that the students are welcomed to the Santiago office of CEPAL-ECLAC, the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean, they have the chance to visit orphanages such as the Hogar Domingo Savio, providing social services to underprivileged children. This diverse combination of experiences allows the students to have a broad perspective of Chile politically, economically and socially providing them with the tools necessary to form their own analyses.

Program participants are able to matriculate at one of three universities: the Pontificia Universidad Católica, the Universidad de Chile, and the Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez.

DRCLAS is able to provide a cushion of logistical support for students so that they are able to take full advantage of their experiences and the new environment around them without the hesitation that comes with stepping where one hasn’t stepped before, while feeling confident that Harvard University is behind them in this endeavor. Recent participant and History concentrator Carlos Rojas (Harvard College ’04) observed: “The program made each step of getting to Chile and into the university easy. Receiving credit was also very easy. I believe that DRCLAS and its many links with individuals and organizations in Latin American made any interest a possibility. Normally the difficulty in studying abroad is the effort necessary to bring together different institutions for your own needs; DRCLAS eliminated this stress.”

Erin Goodman is Student Services Coordinator at the David Rockefeller Center. She spent two years as an exchange student in Chile and in Brazil. She holds an undergraduate degree in International Relations from Wellesley College and is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in International Education Policy at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. Aníbal Sepúlveda is a certified simultaneous translator and holds a diploma in International Relations from the University of Chile. He formerly was Assistant Resident Director at University of Chile Butler program. Currently, he works as the Student Programs Coordinator for the Regional Office of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies in Santiago, Chile.

University students at their studies.
The center of our galaxy passes directly overhead Las Campanas in Chile. Velvet dark night skies and long stretches of clear weather provide extraordinary opportunities to study astronomical objects not visible from the Northern Hemisphere.

That’s why the twin Magellan Telescopes, an enormous 6.5 meters in diameter, provide a sharp and intimate view of the Magellanic Clouds, satellites of our own Milky Way Galaxy. Harvard professors and students, astronomers from other U.S. universities and their Chilean counterparts are finding this outpost located at an altitude of 8000 feet on the fringe of the Atacama Desert is bringing them closer to understanding our universe.

Astronomers use Magellan for a wide range of programs, from finding new (small) planets in the solar system, through studies of stars, galaxies, and galaxy clusters, all the way up to measuring the properties of the Universe on the largest scales. My own work at Magellan focuses on determining the properties of the mysterious Dark Energy that appears to be making the expansion of the Universe accelerate.

One recent discovery at Magellan by Kris Stanek and my postdoctoral student Tom Matheson helped crack open the mystery of the origin of gamma ray bursts by showing that, after the light from the burst had faded, there was a supernova at the site of a type we recognized. These events probably mark the formation of a black hole at the center of a massive star.

Harvard faculty, postdoctoral and graduate students are frequent visitors to Chile, with about 140 nights of observing time each year, typically in four- or five-night blocks reserved for them. Some undergraduates have also arranged to work at observatories in Chile and we hope to expand this activity. Contacts with Chilean universities are cordial, but not as close as those of Princeton and Columbia, which have joint postdocs who spend time at each institution, but are entitled to apply for the telescope time reserved for Chileans.

Harvard is a 20% partner in the Magellan Telescopes, completed in 2002 at a cost of $67.5 million. Gifts from Harvard alumni provided the resources for Harvard to join the Magellan Project. About 10% of the observing time on this and most other telescopes in Chile, is used by Chilean astronomers, providing them with an extremely valuable resource in return for hosting the observatories.

Harvard is also a member of AURA, the organization that runs the Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory in Chile for the NSF, and of AUI, the organization that runs the National Radio Astronomy Observatory, which is building the Atacama Large Millimeter Array high on the altiplano in the extreme north of Chile.

Together with our Magellan partners (MIT, Michigan, Arizona, and the Carnegie Observatories) we are exploring the possibilities for the Giant Magellan Telescope with seven huge mirrors. This would be the world’s largest optical and infrared telescope. We hope that Harvard will continue to have an important role in the development of astronomy in Chile.

Robert P. Kirshner is Professor of Astronomy at Harvard University and an Associate Director of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Joining the Harvard Astronomy Department in 1986, he served as Chairman of the department from 1990-1997. He is an author of more than 200 research papers dealing with supernovae, the large-scale distribution of galaxies, and the size and shape of the Universe. He is also the teacher of Science A-35, a core curriculum course for 250 Harvard undergraduates entitled “Matter in the Universe.” The vivid (and slightly hazardous) demonstrations in Science A-35 led to Kirshner’s being featured in Boston Magazine in its October 1998 article on “Nutty Professors.”
Constructing a Multiparty System in Mexico


A REVIEW BY SOLEDAD LOAEZA

The defeat of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, known by its Spanish acronym as PRI, in the July 2000 presidential election was the anti-climatic finish to the process of democratization that had lasted nearly three decades. Many were expecting emotional explosions of joy for the PRI’s defeat, popular demonstrations such as those in Argentina and Chile or in Poland and East Germany with the collapse of dictatorships. But in Mexico, the celebrations for Vicente Fox’s victory were not very different from those of any winning candidate in ordinary democracies. At midnight on voting day, the then-president of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), José Woldenberg, announced the conclusion of the day’s results to a drowsy audience who, between yawns, congratulated each other on the success of the electoral process. The routine nature of the voting sealed IFE’s triumph as a credible and effective institution. Through the application of new electoral rules, the institute had managed to modify both the electoral rules, the institute had managed to modify both the electoral rules, the Institute of the Interior to commit to an early release of the voting results. José Newman was the official who made the announcement. One notable case in point is that of José Newman, who as secretary of the Interior to commit to an early release of the voting results. The government officials rashly made a public announcement—without any kind of legal obligation—that thanks to a computerized system, they would be able to reveal the voting results just a few hours after the closing of the polls. José Newman was the official who made the announcement in an arrogant manner that Newman’s budding political career.

Preston and Dillon write their history based on many histories—those personal versions of their interview subjects. The great advantage that the authors of *Opening Mexico* give us are versions of the events narrated from the point of view of different activists and politicians in power or in the opposition. In spite of the fact that the authors do not name many of their sources, these can be identified relatively easily simply through their versions of events. One notable case in point is that of José Newman, who, in 1988, was director of the National Electoral Registry, and whom many consider responsible for the debacle of that year’s presidential election. *Opening Mexico* tells us quite a different story, recounting a parallel system of vote tallying, also set up in the Secretary of the Interior, that was rumored at the time and out of Newman’s control. According to this account, a certain Oscar De Lasse headed up this program and is fingered in the book as the frivolous person who pushed the Secretary of the Interior to commit to an early delivery of the official results. In effect, a few days before the election, government officials rashly made a public announcement—without any kind of legal obligation—that thanks to a computerized system, they would be able to reveal the voting results just a few hours after the closing of the polls. José Newman was the official who made the announcement in an arrogant manner that Newman’s budding political career.

The weeks to follow, Newman put the country on the verge of an institutional collapse. The manner of relating this story in the book suggests that it was told to Preston and Dillon by Newman himself, attempting to rewrite history through this venue. It would have been interesting for the authors to check his account of events with other protagonists or documents from the period. In the same fashion, each one of the episodes related by Preston and Dillon are controversial matters in Mexico, about which many different versions exist. For example, the reader can very well imagine that Manuel Camacho, a PRI militant since his youth and the thwarted presidential candidate in 1994, gave the authors much of the information about the presidential succession that year. Likewise, the 1994 financial disaster, the cause of which is still a subject of harsh debate, is discussed in *Opening Mexico* from the viewpoint of Jaime Serra, the unsuccessful Treasury Secretary, who some see as a victim and others as a culprit. The voice of President Ernesto Zedillo’s personal secretary Liébano Sáenz can also be heard in the book’s description of the tensions between the president and Francisco Labastida, the losing PRI candidate in the year 2000. All these testimonies are valuable, although biased, and therefore cannot be taken as factual accounts. For non-Mexican and younger readers, it would have been useful for Preston and Dillon to have allowed room for...
other viewpoints and to provide more context about the personal bias of their interview subjects. This addition would have shed more light on the political treasure trove they have present in the narrated accounts.

In February 1908, reporter James Creelman of Pearson’s Magazine published an interview with the dictator Porfirio Diaz, in which Diaz announced that he would not run for re-election in 1910. We do not know if the article had some impact on readers in the United States, but the translation in the Mexican newspaper El Imparcial had serious political repercussions. The publication of the interview set off the electoral race that would end with Madero’s uprising, Díaz’ fall and the beginning of the Mexican revolution. Since then, the relationship between Mexican politicians and foreign correspondents, in particular those from The New York Times, is a factor in local political life. There have been some correspondents so close to the political elite that they appeared more PRIist than the PRI. That is not, to be certain, the case of Preston and Dillon. However, the reading of their book evokes Creelman’s Díaz interview because the reader has the sensation that those interviewed saw in the work of the correspondents for the prestigious newspaper a means to relate their own version of events or to settle accounts with some enemy. At the very least, the interviews presented to their subjects an opportunity to describe their own version of events and shape for posterity their self-image with the assistance of the credibility of The New York Times. This follows the historical example of Diaz, who appeared to address himself more to a Mexican public than U.S. readers. Because of this, one of the most interesting aspects of this book is the self-description of each one of the interviewed subjects. Nevertheless, the journalists should have intervened to reestablish a balance between what their sources were willing to tell and what they hushed up.

Opening Mexico does not aspire to be an academic book. It is the work of two newspaper correspondents who had the opportunity to live surprising moments in Mexican political life. Preston and Dillon fulfill their role as historians of the present very well; at times, their reporting lacks a touch of skepticism, but is more than compensated by the freshness of many of their pages. Their descriptions are better than their explanations that resort to historical predetermination by seeking in the legends of the Aztec past the key to electoral fraud. It is as if to understand the election of George Bush in Florida in the year 2000, we would look for the answer in the systematic extermination of the American Indians, who after all are closer to us in time than the Aztec Empire.

Soledad Loaeza, professor of political science at the Colegio de Mexico, is a 2003-2004 Radcliffe Fellow. She is the author of El Partido Acción Nacional, la larga marcha, 1939-1994, (Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999) and is currently researching presidential power in Mexico.

Inside the Ring of Fire


A REVIEW BY TARA YN A. GRIZZARD

Traditionally, anthropologists have divorced themselves emotionally and physically from their subjects, placing the highest priority on objectivity and the role of the anthropologist as expert observer, while often neglecting or de-emphasizing the potential for advocacy that anthropologists may have, particularly those who work with populations in which torture, genocide, or other human rights violations may be occurring. Current concerns over the ethical ramifications of observing without intervening in populations where these violations are present have made ethnographic work in vulnerable groups a difficult task, one in which the ideal balance of the roles of observer and advocate is difficult to ascertain and even more difficult to achieve. Few U.S. anthropologists have provided personal examples of how to manage ethical and professional issues inherent in working with communities in crisis; very few have used their vantage point as researchers to educate others on a broader level about the on-going tragedies their work encounters.

Providing this example is Beatriz Manz, a recent speaker at Harvard and an anthropologist at the University of California-Berkeley, whose latest work, Paradise in Ashes, is an intense, detailed account of the atrocities of the civil war in Guatemala in the 1980s. This work gives Manz a distinct place among a small handful of other notable books describing an observer’s perspective on modern-day genocide. The culmination of her 20+ years working and living in the village Santa Maria Tzejá, Paradise in Ashes is not only perhaps the most detailed longitudinal account of the civil war but also provides a striking example of an optimum balance of advocacy and ethnographic analysis in the face of human tragedy. Manz, Chilean by birth and influenced by the coup of the Pinochet era, shows the reader through well-done ethnographic analysis how the war marches on through generations of Guatemalans born to Santa Maria Tzejá, the first village visited by the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), or the Guerrilla Army of the Poor, and a central site of conflict and army intervention during the war. Throughout the book, Manz unflinchingly details not only the immense loss of life that the villagers endured throughout the war but also those whom she lost as...
BOOK TALK

well, dedicating the book in part to Myrna Mack, a friend and Guatemalan anthropologist murdered by the military for her subversive activities organizing Guatemalan women’s groups.

Manz’s straightforward perspective on the war, coupled with her excellent analyses, gives the reader a rare and intimate perspective on Guatemalan politics, one rarely seen in other foreign-penned accounts of the Guatemalan civil war. Particularly well-done is Manz’s account of the creation and settlement of Santa Maria Tzejá in the 1970s. In the chapter, “Settling in the Promised Land,” Manz discusses the arduous journey, personal sacrifices, and immense work that the village’s future inhabitants put forth in order to settle what they had presumed to be an inconspicuous, relatively worthless bit of rain forest so that they might have land and a better future for their families. Her account of the hope and optimism with which the villagers raised up Santa Maria Tzejá, assisted in part by Catholic organizations such as MaryKnoll and church groups, not only poignantly frames the horrific story of war to come but also encapsulates the local setting for much of the Guatemalan civil war, where Indian villages, Catholic priests and nuns, and church groups of all descriptions became targets for the government’s war against its own people.

Also notable is her account of the army’s “re-building” of Santa Maria Tzejá in her chapter “A Militarized Village”. After its destruction by the army, government forces, in an effort to control the nearly annihilated indigenous population, invited new settlers to Santa Maria Tzejá to replace those villagers who had fled to Mexico, creating tensions between the village’s previous settlers, the antigúos, and the new settlers or nuevos; Manz describes not only these tensions but the solidarity eventually achieved between antigúos and nuevos despite the original intent and the army’s psychological and physical control of Santa Maria Tzejá during that time.

Paradise in Ashes is deeply engaging in part due to the compelling, emotionally gripping and often horrific subject matter and also due to the personal perspective from which Manz occasionally relates. Using clear, objective, and direct language, Manz also provides appropriate remedial history for those who, for whatever reason, may not have been cognizant of the extremes of this particular era in Guatemala and showcases the political and social forces at work in the creation, destruction, and eventual rebirth of Santa Maria Tzejá. Manz’s own efforts to be an accurate and ethical witness are also detailed as Manz describes her own personal actions in the light of the civil war through work with local activist groups, reporting “disappearances” and murders to the often unconcerned authorities, or writing editorials and articles to broadcast the Guatemalan army’s reign of terror, showcasing the author’s own delicate negotiations between advocacy and academia.

Finally, Paradise in Ashes makes an enormous impact as a first-hand observer’s account of perhaps one of the largest-scale genocides in Latin American history since the first “settlement” of the Americas. The details of her personal journey as anthropologist, advocate, and friend to the people of Santa Maria Tzejá also make a significant contribution to public anthropology as a guide for those who might seek to integrate political activism and advocacy into their academic inquiries. With skill, sensitivity, and a trained eye, Manz expounds not only on the tragedy resulting from the civil war in Guatemala but, importantly, also the intricate web of social and political factors contributing to it, giving academia and a broader audience alike a foundation for future work in Guatemala as it continues to arise from two decades of terror and repression.

Taroyan A. Grizzard is a 4th year medical student pursuing a combined MD/MPH program at Harvard Medical School and Harvard School of Public Health. A recent intern at the Universidad de Chile’s CEMERA (Centro de Medicina Reproductiva y Desarrollo de la Adolescencia) clinic in Santiago, her research interests include adolescent medicine and cultural aspects of women’s health in Latin America.

Civil Society: Facing New Challenges


A REVIEW BY EDUARDO DARGENT

A CIVIL SOCIETY IN ARGENTINA, Chile, Colombia and Peru has contributed to democratic governance over the last two decades. Relations between civil society and State in this region are complex. In this edited volume, Peruvian sociologist Aldo Panfichi has set out to examine such diverse actors as unions and professional associations, human rights groups, environmental groups, corporate foundations, feminists and low income women’s organizations.

The book, part of a three-volume series including Mexico and Brazil, stems from a worldwide research project directed by the University of Sussex’s Institute of Development Studies and funded by the Ford Foundation. Project participants share the conviction that the social sciences in the southern hemisphere need to focus more closely on the social and political dynamics within civil society.

The 23 authors—senior scholars and promising younger researchers—in this 19-chapter volume share a minimum definition of the concept of civil society, while recognizing the difficulty of applying it in practice. They also recognize the normative value of the concept, sharing the conviction that democracy is much more than periodical elections and involves an active participation in the public sphere. From these common starting points, the authors exercise broad freedom in highlighting the ways in which diverse processes—social, political, economic, cultural—imprint the collective actions and organizational dynamics in each country.

Four national overview chapters (by Argentine sociologist Enrique Peruzzotti, Chilean civil society specialist Gonzalo de la Maza, and political scientists Mauricio Romero from Colombia...
and Farid Kahhat from Mexico) make evident that diverse national experiences lead to different maps of civil society and different paths of civil society action. However, as Panfichi points out in his introductory piece, common themes allow for a comparative analysis of the cases involved.

One common theme involves the impact of the last two decades’ economic reforms on the mobilization and organizational capacity of civil society. Authors in this volume, to varying degrees, share the view that free market reforms have only exacerbated poverty and inequality, factors that in turn impede the consolidation of democracy. Several chapters stress that much-affected labor unions have been the actors most profoundly weakened by the move away from statist economies.

In this respect, I believe the book properly shows the tension between recent economic reforms and the interest of diverse civil society groups. Authors in defending Latin America’s precarious welfare states, which are gradually being reduced in the name of international competitiveness. Yet despite general enchantment, there is also recognition that the social policies of the 1960s and 1970s were also ineffective at overcoming poverty and inequality; “answers” developed by critics of today’s reforms smell distinctly like the old recipes.

The book is crossed by this tension: that the egalitarian policies, the basis of the welfare democracy the authors believe in, are limited by the necessity to maintain competitiveness in the international sphere. How to obtain enough economic growth to maintain a welfare state that will reduce inequality seems to be the question that Latin Americans want their politicians to answer.

Various authors also analyze how regional human rights organizations have recently shifted from their traditional interests in defending civil and political liberties, towards an agenda focusing on social, economic, and cultural issues—and on how to defend basic human rights against economic change. However, no consensus exists about the ways in which “control” over state action in these areas could be established. The chapter by Argentine lawyer Roberto Saba states well the need to make such criticisms more professional and technical in order to be effective (p. 174).

At the same time, the decision by civil society organizations to become more technical and professional can also be a problem. Civil society in these countries is far from homogeneous. To some degree, there is a “richer” civil society with considerable resources and comprised of largely middle class professionals, and a “poor” civil society formed by the poor themselves. Many of the examples presented in this book of successful institutions—in terms of their contribution to democracy—are part of the “richer” civil society. If we concentrate on the requirement of professionalization in order to gain access to the public sphere, a different kind of social exclusion may develop.

A related issue is the degree of autonomy that these institutions have in respect to the State. Although remaining “independent” is a problem for all organizations that in some way or another have relations with the State, again the challenge is far greater for those institutions comprised of citizens from lower classes. The extreme case seems to be Peru. Kahhat’s chapter shows the extreme vulnerability of organizations principally funded by the Peruvian state as they grapple with issues of politics and patronage.

Nonetheless, in the opinion of this commentator, the discussion about autonomy should not focus solely on the way in which such poor peoples’ organizations relate to the State. It fails to examine the autonomy of civil society organizations vis-à-vis other sources of finance, especially in the case of the NGO’s. An examination of how domestic public agendas may not always be constructed from within the countries, but conditioned by external aid, would have been an interesting addition to this otherwise thorough book.

The examination of feminism and human rights across these countries is both broad and deep. The four articles about feminist movements present a paradox: despite the generalization of diverse feminist demands in these societies, feminism remains weak as a political discourse. “Sporadic feminism,” as sociologist María del Carmen Feijoo calls it (p. 198), means that many young women now lead their lives in the public sphere according to feminist values and question traditional sexist practices. These women, internalizing aspects of the feminist agenda, are increasingly assuming positions of public prominence (including as ministers of defense and foreign affairs). Hence common sense may lead us to believe that the old feminist battles have been won.

However, the authors point to a loss of the ideological strength of the feminist movement, which weakens it as such. Furthermore, there are suspicions that the changes are not as profound as believed. The authors share the conviction that machismo is alive and well within society and defend the necessity of articulating diverse feminist voices in order to develop a more political agenda.

In the field of human rights, the authors show how violence has marked the processes of consolidation as well as the policies developed by human rights organizations in different contexts. Argentina and Chile, under military dictatorships, have birth to a strong group of organizations dedicated to the defense of basic liberties. For Colombia and Peru this occurred as a result of internal conflicts under civilian rule. All of these organizations have collaborated in the constitution of more plural and democratic societies, but their impact in the public sphere varies from country to country.

For Saba, for example, the environment of crisis and violence in which human rights groups developed in Argentina, and their own decisive actions, allowed society in general to initiate a difficult process of learning to build a more plural and deliberative society. The Chilean case is in some ways similar. According to Saba, because these organizations defend universal liberties and not sector-specific interests, they are more disposed to adopt a pluralistic position. These organizations had a key role in post-dictatorship transition processes in Argentina and Chile, and in the defense of life and rule of law in the context of internal armed conflict in Peru and Colombia. Each has contributed to the construction of a more egalitarian society, without which a democracy would not have strong legitimacy.

Finally, a word about our present. I believe that recent dramatic events taking place in the countries discussed in the book—and in others such as Bolivia—illustrate the pertinence of its publication. Whether responding to economic crisis in Argentina, bringing Lula to power in Brazil or carrying out a Truth Commission in Perú, civil society organizations have been fundamental agents of social and political change, and fundamental to the defense of democracies that are responsive to their citizens’ needs.

Eduardo Dargent is a Peruvian lawyer with a MA in Political Philosophy from the University of York, UK. He was formerly a researcher for the Andean Commission of Jurists. He is now a researcher and lawyer for the Special State Attorney’s Office for the Fujimori-Montesinos case.
RESIDENT LARRY SUMMERS HAS been pushing more students to study abroad—and now he’s leading from the front,” was how the Boston Globe reported on the first official visit by Harvard’s President to South America where he visited Santiago, Chile and São Paulo, Brazil from March 30 to April 2. In addition to meeting with Harvard students who are studying, working, or researching in the region, he also met with educational, business and policy leaders, including Chilean President Ricardo Lagos, Harvard alumni and friends, and in each country made a major public speech.

President Summers was accompanied on his visit to Chile by Harvard Professors John Coatsworth, Jorge Domínguez, and Andrés Velasco.

“At time when there has been more misunderstanding by the United States of the world and of the United States by the world….it seems to me profoundly important that we all do our part to promote understanding in all directions. There are few things that can do that like the interchange that a University makes possible.”
“I am here in Chile to visit what is probably Harvard’s most significant external presence, a regional office which services all the University,” he said to a group of about 100 Harvard alumni and 25 Harvard students at DRCLAS’s Regional Office in Santiago.

“The David Rockefeller Center is a remarkable and vibrant institution which is making a great contribution to Harvard University...It has also given our students an opportunity to live and learn outside of the United States using a formula which is new to Harvard.”

“I am convinced that in next generation, it will be so important for Harvard to become a truly global university. If Harvard is to lead in the intellectual life it must understand what is going on not just in the United States, not just in Western Europe, but in the entire world.”

ECLAC Deputy Executive Secretary Alicia Barcena and Summers at public address at ECLAC headquarters in Santiago.

Summers with former Chilean Secretary of the Treasury, Eduardo Aniłat

Summers on DRCLAS Regional Office Terrace with Harvard students engaged in study abroad program, as well as doing research and internships in Chile.
The Eyes of Time
Viewing the work of Leo Matiz

BY MIGUEL ANGEL FLÓRES GÓNGORA

LEO MATIZ, A LEGEND IN 20TH-CENTURY PHOTOGRAPHY, was born in 1918 in Aracataca, Colombia, the hot and marginalized mythical territory on the banks of the Magdalena River that is also Gabriel García Márquez’ birthplace.

Matiz was not only a photographer, but a painter, caricaturist and creator of newspapers and art galleries. As a gallery owner, in 1951, he held the first exhibition of the Colombian painter Fernando Botero in Bogotá.

As a 24-year-old in 1940, Matiz set off through Central America on foot to reach Mexico where he hoped to to live off of painting, cinema and caricaturing. He defined his artistic vocation by affirming: “I am a painter because of atavism, photographer because of hunger and crazy because of talent.”

Much of his youth took place in the anarchic and agitated atmosphere of Colombian and Central American cafés and news-rooms, earning money by selling caricatures to illustrate the literary and political pages.

His abundant long hair, his absurdly colored jackets, his mustache in the style of a Mexican cinema gangster, his indiscreet and impulsive guffaws, the folder under his arm full of caricatures and color drawings turned him into the center of the intense intellectual bohemia of Bogotá and Central American capitals.

Matiz scrutinized the faces, gestures and defects of the people he observed, converting his caricatures into scathing and incisive commentary. Important film makers, painters and caricaturists like Gustave Doré, George Grosz, Nadar and Guadalupe Posada influenced the caricatures of Leo Matiz, providing his drawings with agility, penetrating observation and irony. Above all, he refined his sharpness for outlining faces—an art that he subsequently transferred to photography and which he exercised with mastery in portraiture.

The Colombian photographer’s arrival in Mexico in 1940 transformed his vital and aesthetic perspective. The discovery of cinema, muralism, the polychromy of the landscape, the Mexican history plagued with popular insurrections and betrayed revolutions and the cultural inheritance of the Aztec and Maya civilizations, served as a fountain of existential liberty and artistic creation.

He traveled around Mexico, taking photographs for magazines such as Así, Life, Reader’s Digest, Harper Magazine, Look and Norte. Matiz evokes that intense journey through the rich and diverse Mexican geography, affirming that “The magazine Así launched me as a graphic reporter in Mexico. I began to look for themes and discovered the old and deep Mexico, eternal and fleeting. There before my eyes was the baroque architecture, the paintings, the murals, the Maria islands and the poignant histories of its presidents, the pulque, the starving coyotes in the desert, the day of the dead, the sacred temples and the purity of Yucatan, the red ants in the desert, the women of Pancho Villa, the dead trees, the divas in the movies, the cemeteries, the colour of the folk crafts, the peasants and the remote hope of their redemption.”

Matiz’s friendship with Mexican muralists, especially the painter David Alfaro Siqueiros, led to the visual documentation of the mural Cuauhtémoc contra el mito through more than 500 photographs. However, a few years later, Siqueiros exhibited 70 paintings inspired by the photographs of Matiz in Mexico City’s Palacio de Bellas Artes. Indignant at seeing his images redrawn and used in unauthorized murals, Matiz made strong accusations of plagiarism against Siqueiros in the Mexican press.

In turn, the muralist politicized the case, accusing Matiz of being a North American imperialist agent and an enemy of muralism. He set fire to Matiz’s studio and had him expelled from Mexico.

Leo Matiz died in Bogotá, on October 24th in 1998. His images and artistic legacy are conserved and promoted by the Foundation Leo Matiz as an intense and suggestive brevity of the 20th century, which Matiz was able to communicate with beauty and expressive force.

Miguel Angel Flóres Góngora is a Colombian journalist. He is the author of La metáfora del ojo, a biography of Leo Matiz.
Reader Forum

I just wanted to pass on congratulations on another terrific issue of ReVista. I thought the Winter number on Children was stunning in both its depth and breadth. You managed to bring together so many issues, concerns, and approaches to understanding the lives of children in Latin America and more broadly in our globalized world. I’m impressed. Keep it up!

LIZ COHEN
HOWARD MUMFORD JONES
PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

As part of the John F. Kennedy School of Government in Harvard University, an institution proud of its diversity and renowned for being one of the most international universities in the world I never expected to read a document such as “The Hispanic Challenge” by Samuel P. Huntington, chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies.

As a Mexican, Huntington’s words offend me. However, what is behind them scares me more. While reading this paper, I started to reflect on the beginnings of the ideology that became the Nazi Party’s justification for the Holocaust, where millions of Jews were brutally killed. If I remember clearly, it all began with arguments based on economic data, religion, culture and yes, language.

The author of “The Hispanic Challenge” carefully leaves out of his game data that could undermine his theory. For instance, it seems strange that he omits data on the economies in those states with the highest presence of Hispanics, particularly Mexican Americans such as California or Texas. It appears that Mr. Huntington forgets that the presence of the Hispanic community in those states has helped to build that wealth. He surprisingly omits that Mexican Americans work hard, (many times in those jobs that nobody else is willing to take) buy goods and pay taxes to the government who also distributes them among some universities like Harvard to pay salaries of professors of course based on economic data, religion, culture and yes, language.

One should be in favor of interaction and integration among civilizations that results from lowering the barriers between states, (in other words, globalization), spends his time finding a threat in applying that kind of relation between the United States of America and México. Maybe this answers why Latin America has not been closer to the U. S.—because the elites like Huntington oppose it.

Everyone knows that the history and success of the American people is based on a JOURNEY OF MIGRANTS strengthened by the diversity that immigration has brought. Today, people come from Mexico looking for better ways of life and in exchange, they offer hard work, respect and loyalty.

I believe the Hispanic students at Harvard have a moral duty to speak loud for those who don’t have the chance and the resources to do so.

JOSÉ LUIS NOVALES

The Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition defines xenophobe as “one unduly fearful of what is foreign and esp. of people of foreign origin.” This definition looks familiar, does not it?

I can’t understand how the chairman of the Harvard Academy for International Studies, who should be in favor of interaction and integration among civilizations that results from lowering the barriers between states, (in other words, globalization), spends his time finding a threat in applying that kind of relation between the United States of America and México. Maybe this answers why Latin America has not been closer to the U. S.—because the elites like Huntington oppose it.

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I believe the Hispanic students at Harvard have a moral duty to speak loud for those who don’t have the chance and the resources to do so.

JOSE LUIS NOVALES

Letters to the editor are welcome in English, Spanish or Portuguese. Please send your comments, suggestions and complaints to: June Carolyn Erlick <jerlick@fas.harvard.edu> or DRCLAS, 61 Kirkland St., Cambridge, MA 02138.

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