The images in this story are by Brazilian photographer Apolo Sales, whose photos are featured in the digital exhibiiton, “Documenting the Impact of Covid-19 through Photography: Collective Isolation in Latin America,” sponsored by ReVista and the Art, Culture, and Film program at Harvard’s David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies (DRCLAS.)

The exhibition, based on an Open Call for Photography launched in July 2020,  aims to create a critical visual record of our unprecedented times so they can be remembered by future generations.

Open doors

As a researcher in the history of the relationship between law and slavery, I’ve observed the impacts that biological events can have on the course of national policies. As historians like Sidney Chalhoub and Tana Hogarth have pointed out, yellow fever epidemics not only helped shape institutions, but also brought about profound changes in the geopolitics of the American continent during the revolutionary period. In the case of Brazil, the old Aedes aegypti could have played an important role in the process of ending the slave trade and in assembling racial ideologies in the 19th century. It remains to be seen just how far the impact of the coronavirus will play out, in what is already the greatest epidemic of the century.

U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s defeat of Donald Trump at the polls offers a ray of hope for those of us worried about intensifying Western populism. The way Trump handled the Covid-19 pandemic, in the end, seem to have eroded his gains in popularity, paving the way for the Democrats to return to the White House. In Brazil, ruled by a self-declared Trump follower, many interpret this movement as the exhaustion of a rhetoric that has accumulated its victories in warmongering against the elites, the progressive sectors and the media. Yet, this rhetoric ultimately came up against something more difficult to attack: the virus, and its economic and social consequences. Brazilian optimism has continued to grow. In the municipal elections two weeks ago, President Jair Bolsonaro suffered a severe defeat, failing to elect a single supporter in the 27 Brazilian capitals.

Municipal elections take place right in the middle of a presidential term, and end up serving as a kind of reflection of the strength of that president’s administration to date. This would be comparable to the U.S. mid-term elections. Bolsonaro is a president unlike any other, who imploded his own party early in his term. This, in Brazil, is unheard of, as the country has more than 30 official political associations with national reach. In his political strategy, however, the president chose to support individual candidates spread across various parties of the extreme right or populist right. He lost in absolutely all of the capitals he disputed. Could this be a sign that the coronavirus crisis will also overcome populism in Brazil? Only time will tell.

Bolsonaro’s administration, in fact, has reason to feel bitter about the spread of the virus. Not only was the promise of an ultra-neoliberal government beginning to animate very traditional sectors of the market, economic indices were demonstrating to some progress. Despite seeming to be short-term results, the fact is that the conditions were minimally favorable to the president before the beginning of social isolation and restrictions on trade and circulation. According to the Brazilian statistical institute (IBGE), the unemployment rate had fallen from 11.7% of the economically active population in October 2018 (President Bolsonaro’s election month) to 11.2% in January 2020 (last data before the coronavirus pandemic). The primary deficit for 2019 had been around R $ 95 billion (“R” stands for reais, the Brazilian currency) compared to R $ 161 billion the previous year. The stock market had also risen by 43% over the course of the same period.

Safe through the glass

In the nightmare

From the beginning of the coronavirus crisis to the present day, economic conditions have changed radically in Brazil. According to the IBGE, unemployment has increased from the figure previously mentioned of 11.2% to 14.6%—about 30%. Even within this rate, it is possible to see the migration of professionals forced to leave good positions due to the lure of informal, low-paid jobs. Workers with a formal contract (regular workers with all social security rights) decreased by 11.2% in relation to the end of 2019, a number much higher than those seen in informal workers. However, the bigger picture may actually be even worse. This is because the national occupancy rate was reduced from 54.4% of the active population to 47.1%, a number higher than the increase in unemployment mentioned above. The contingent outside the labor force increased by 21.2% in this period, and that of the potential labor force (people who could look for a job) increased by 61%.

The combination of these figures shows that many who are not employed are still not looking for a job, which would be justified by the existence of emergency aid programs during the pandemic period. These are programs that, of course, have their days numbered: in 2020, Brazil will carry the largest public account deficit in its history, projected to be at around R $ 900 billion, and its currency may have devalued by as much as 40% in this period.

Jair Bolsonaro has real reason to worry. On one hand his popularity still shows signs of resilience. However, the president has lost traditional sectors of his constituency (upper and middle classes), replacing it with new support from poorer members of society, whom are likely to be motivated by the income programs approved by the National Congress. With the end of this estimated aid scheduled in the coming weeks, and the explosion of unemployment to record levels, this cyclical gain in popularity is likely to disappear and a more realistic assessment of the situation will be made. For many, the overwhelming defeat in the municipal elections is already be an anticipation of this process.

In fact, there appears to be a relationship between the economic gains of the first half of the presidential term and the electoral results of the municipal elections. More economically successful presidents were able to maintain more structured bases in large Brazilian cities, which would ultimately lead to further support for their re-election. However, this support does not always work as clearly and obviously as one might imagine.

Only three presidents have ever been re-elected in the history of Brazil. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, elected in 1994 and re-elected in 1998; Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, elected and re-elected in the 2002 and 2006 elections; and Dilma Rousseff, elected in the 2010 and 2014 elections. An analysis of the economic indices of the first two years of their governments, and the eventual reflection in the first municipal elections of their mandates, can offer up interesting clues regarding the extent of the damage that the impact of the coronavirus could potentially cause for President Bolsonaro.

Corner

Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected in 1994, and his first two years were not exactly encouraging to the national income. Although in the period, GDP per capita grew a little—from 8.42 thousand reais a year to 8.71—unemployment increased from 5.1% to 5.4%. His party (PSDB), which had ruled five capitals in 1992, was reduced to four in the 1996 election. Although the vice president’s party (PFL), important in his government’s political coalition, won three of the six largest Brazilian capitals, his party won none of these central elections (in Brazil, the president and vice-president do not necessarily belong to the same party).

Lula was more successful in delivering short-term gains during his term, between the beginning of his administration and the first municipal election. He managed to reduce unemployment from 12.9% to 10.7% and the GDP per capita increased from 8.81 thousand reais a year to 9.22. Voters responded accordingly. His party (PT), which governed six capitals in 2000, started to govern nine in 2004, an increase of 50%. Among the six largest capitals, he won two elections with his own party candidacy, and supported the winning candidate of another party in one more election.

Dilma Rousseff, the last re-elected president, like her predecessor and supporter Lula, showed short-term gains in regard to the income of Brazilians. In the first two years of her term, she reduced unemployment from 7.2% to an impressive 4.9% and raised GDP per capita from 11.07 thousand reais a year to 11.27. Although she did not have an easy time in the municipal elections, it is possible to understand that her economic results were reflected at the polls. Although she won only five capital cities—reducing PT’s administration from six to five cities—, the Workers’ Party won, directly or indirectly, the two most significant cities in the country, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.

All the presidents mentioned above were re-elected. This shows us that, although the economic results of the beginning of the term seem to directly impact their first municipal elections, it is important to consider the weight that the elections in the cities will have on the subsequent presidential campaign two years later. Fernando Henrique, without significantly impressive results in the election of the municipalities in 1996, was re-elected in the first round (with 53.06% of the votes) in 1998. Lula and Dilma, with more notable victories in the elections of the cities in the beginning of their terms, had more difficult and tighter re-elections.

What does this tell us? Firstly, it is reasonable to imagine that the economic consequences already felt by the coronavirus crisis impacted on the absolute failure of Bolsonaro’s political efforts in the recent elections. It is also reasonable to imagine that the polls are already reflecting the decrease in the quality of life felt by many Brazilians, who are concerned about employment and income. The analysis of the municipal elections of the re-elected presidents could indicate that this election may have little importance for President Bolsonaro’s re-election bid in two years. However, it is worth noting that even in cases where the presidents’ parties have lost power, they have always managed to maintain a network of supporters in large Brazilian cities (whether by directly governed city halls or by political allies). Bolsonaro’s situation, therefore, goes beyond the relative decrease of power in the cities. Today, he seems to have very few supporters among the mayors who will rule the capitals from January next year.

Alone with my reflection

Of course, the coronavirus crisis does not simply have economic consequences. The population will assess the general conduct of government officials, the effectiveness of their policies in combating the spread of the virus, in treating patients and in conducting vaccine manufacture and distribution. The economic stituation, as we know, is overwhelming. Attacking globalism, progressivism and economic elites can become more difficult in a country where people are unemployed, craving income and work. The coronavirus does not seem to have overcome populism in Brazil. But it has certainly opened up a path for political agents to do so.