A Review of Authoritarian Consolidation in Times of Crisis: Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro

Authoritarian Consolidation in Times of Crisis: Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro, edited by John Polga-Hecimovich and Raul Sanchez-Urribarri (Routledge Press, 2025, 323 pages)

What happened to the exemplary democracy that characterized Venezuelan democracy from the late 1950s until the turn of the century?  Once, Venezuela stood as a model of two-party competition in Latin America, devoted to civil rights and the rule of law. Even Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s charismatic leader who arguably buried the country’s liberal democracy, sought not to destroy democracy, but to create a new “participatory” democracy, purportedly with even more citizen involvement.  Yet, Nicolás Maduro, who assumed the presidency after Chávez’ death in 2013, leads a blatantly authoritarian regime, desperate to retain power.

Authoritarian Consolidation in Times of Crisis: Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro offers a welcome in-depth analysis of Maduro’s authoritarian reign in Venezuela.  The authors in this edited volume all seem to agree that, whether looking at the military, institutions, opposition or foreign affairs, all developments have contributed to consolidating Venezuelan authoritarianism. It is not a hopeful book. And yet, I would argue that between the lines, we may find areas that could provide potential space for an opening.

Admittedly, most of us who write about Venezuelan politics embrace an unabashedly democratic bias.  We tend to view democratic decline as a tragedy, perhaps understandable in the context of widespread insurgency, and maybe defensible when revolutionaries sacrifice democracy on the altar of social justice. If the authors share this pro-democratic bias, as they apparently do, they nonetheless offer a very interesting and useful change in perspective.  Throughout, the authors shift the lens to authoritarian consolidation, rather than democratic destruction. In the introduction, John Polga-Hecimovich and Raúl Sanchez Urribari explain that “like their democratic counterparts, autocrats are faced with the task of preventing breakdown and erosion of their authority, deepening and organizing the regime, and generating legitimacy among elites and the population—all in the service of survival and longevity.” (p. 13). The volume thus portrays autocratization as a deliberate goal and process. And, so far, Maduro has been overwhelmingly successful in achieving that goal.

Controls: Guns, Money and “Democratic” Institutions

Any regime seeking to protect its power must first establish a monopoly of power. Chávez had already achieved much of this through the politicization and cooptation of the armed forces, as well as by mobilizing supportive military groups. Maduro, however, has gone further, even incorporating criminal gangs into the mix.

The military remains primary, given its firepower. It seems fitting, therefore, that the book leads with John Polga-Hecimovich’s chapter on “Coup-proofing the Venezuelan Military.” Admittedly, I read this chapter largely looking to see how much it replicates my article, “Military and Politics in Venezuela: Coup-Proofing from Pérez-Jiménez to Maduro” (Oxford Encyclopedia of the Military in Politics). Much of the chapter does echo the coup-proofing policies that I explore, such as financial and personnel policies, and counter-balancing, or creating other militarized forces that could potentially help block a coup attempt. Polga-Hecimovich also adds the concept of “diversionary engagement,” particularly looking at Venezuela’s claim to Guyanese territory as a method of redirecting military attention. Yet, it is difficult to see Guyana as enough of an actual threat to deter potential military insurrection.

More striking is the dramatic shift in public sentiments revealed in this chapter. Overwhelmingly beloved, Chávez could count on devotion to help ensure military subordination, especially after years of purging the disloyal and promoting the faithful. In contrast, Maduro has necessarily relied on more transactional forms of coup-proofing.  Thus, if the Chávez government bribed the armed forces with privileged access to scarce resources like food, the Maduro government has been compelled to rely even more on material lures.

At the same time, the Maduro administration increasingly looks to non-state forces to exercise control over a highly discontented population. In “Criminal Governance in the Post-Chávez Revolution in Times of Questioned Legitimacy,” Verónica Zubillaga, Rebecca Hanson and Francisco Sánchez describe the decentralization of Maduro’s repressive control. The government relies on both criminal gangs and colectivos, locally based “armed para-state actors” with roots in the 1960s guerrilla movements, with evolving arrangements over time.

If weapons stand as the first pillar of power, then money would be second. Venezuela’s economy struggles with its reliance on oil exports, inefficiency and sanctions from the United States. According to Benedicte Bull, Antulio Rosales and Manuel Sutherland, in “Authoritarianism Capitalism in Venezuela,” Maduro has embraced limited economic liberalization, pulling back from the regime’s socialist goals in pursuit of growth.  The authors contend that this purported economic liberalization has surprisingly strengthened the government, rather than advancing political liberalization, as might be expected. I suspect the discrepancy comes from the questionably liberal nature of these policies. Is this actually “authoritarian capitalism”—institutionalized structures—or “crony capitalism” based on patron-client relations?  The descriptions sound more like simple corruption.  Again, we see a regime using all of its resources, material and otherwise, to ensure control.

Venezuela’s legal structures have offered other paths toward the deepening of autocratization. Thus, in “Venezuela’s (Un)Rule of Law under Nicolás Maduro,” Raul Sanchez-Urribarri and Victoria Capriles write of the dramatic deterioration of the rule of law under Maduro, with the structures remaining in place, but increasingly at the service of the regime. Even Venezuela’s Supreme Court (TSJ), the institution charged with ensuring constitutional compliance, instead acts in support of the regime. Marsília Gombat and Michael M. McCarthy (“Elections, Maduro’s Authoritarianism, and Regime Survival”) show that elections have likewise been subverted.  They suggest that elections serve to create the illusion of competition, even while the government ensures that the opposition loses. Nevertheless, this is an area where I see cracks in this volume’s pessimistic framing, as elections still present opportunities.

Media, Decentralization and the Struggling Opposition

The Maduro regime similarly permits, but constrains, forces that could and should check the government: the media, local governments and the organized political opposition. Iria Poyosa (“The Control of the Information Environment”) demonstrates how political polarization under Chávez led first to liberal politicization of the media and then censorship, with the latter peaking under Maduro. State and local challenges to authoritarian control have also failed. Rosa Amelia González and Stefania Vitale answer the question “Can Decentralization Contribute to Authoritarian Consolidation?”  with a resounding yes. The authors demonstrate how the government used financial controls like the takeover of the Venezuelan state petroleum company (PDVSA) to manage states and reward loyalists. While local government still exists, the regime has alternately removed or threatened opposition mayors and has blocked regional candidates. These interventions attract less attention than irregularities at the national level, but authoritarianism still wields a heavy hand.

The national opposition has fared little better. The puzzle of Venezuelan authoritarianism is that it continues to wear a democratic mask. So, given Maduro’s massive unpopularity, why has the opposition been unable to dislodge the regime? According to Orçun Selçuk and Pablo Hernández Borges (“The Venezuelan Opposition under Maduro”), the opposition only “effectively challenged” the regime when it “used institutional strategies and remained united”  (p. 82). Otherwise, all opposition strategies seem to have helped Maduro. However, the authors’ category of “extra-institutional” seems excessively broad, lumping together violent and non-violent methods, despite the very different impacts that these methods have on the opposition’s legitimacy.

Beyond that, the cases of institutional unity discussed also seem to have backfired; Selçuk and Hernández’s descriptions demonstrate short-term symbolic wins followed by intensified autocratization to combat the opposition surge. The latter coincides with David Smilde and Isabel Rowan Scarpino’s finding that actual openings only seem to occur in the absence of a serious opposition challenge, at least as perceived by the government, and when foreign powers’ efforts relied more on diplomacy than hardline approaches.

Ultimately, these analyses create a quandary. Inaction certainly will not resurrect democracy, yet strong actions only seem to provoke greater authoritarianism. Can the international community fill the gap?

International Community: Strengthening Autocracy or Reaching for Democracy?

Unfortunately, the international community is complex. While the United States, European democracies and some Latin American states have advocated for democracy, other powerful countries have supported Maduro.

International democratizers have taken essentially two strategies: sanctions and diplomacy. Sanctions, as David Smilde and Isabel Rowan Scarpino demonstrate, often had inconvenient unintended consequences, encouraging Venezuelans to redirect their anger and frustration toward the United States rather than Maduro. Efforts at diplomacy frequently also failed. Devastating economic conditions and Maduro’s own abysmal popularity ratings did force the regime to negotiate more frequently.  However, in “Circular Talks,” Miguel Ángel Martínez Meucci shows that Maduro has used internationally facilitated bargaining tables to regain stability and to actually strengthen authoritarianism (227). This has been feasible because most were more focused on resolving conflict than redemocratization, favoring Maduro. Conflict eased, and in each case, authoritarianism remained comfortably in place.

While Western democracies struggled to change Venezuela’s political course, other powers, such as China, Russia, Iran and Cuba stepped in. As Adrianna Boersner-Herrera demonstrates, some offered loans, while others—especially Cuba and China—contributed to “social control and surveillance.”  But, rather than a true cohort of allies based on shared interests or values, most of these contributions seem largely pragmatic. China and Russia, in particular, had already exhibited growing influence in the region (Victor Mijares, “The Maduro Doctrine). The United States’ withdrawal and sanctions mostly created new opportunities for both of these countries to expand economic and political ties. With the possible exception of Cuba, which shares Venezuela’s commitment to socialism, each country seems to have been acting based on self-interest.

Even emigration served Maduro’s autocratization. While Maria Puerta Riera suggests that President Trump’s hardline policies appealed to the Venezuelan diaspora, other authors demonstrate that strong external pressures have generally resulted in the regime becoming more resolute. More striking, the emigration of an estimated quarter of Venezuelans has, according to Charles Larratt-Smith and Daniel S. Leon, served as a valuable pressure valve for the regime. The first wave of relatively wealthier Venezuelans diminished political pressures, while subsequent waves of less affluent people reduced social welfare demands. Taking an interesting, counterintuitive position, the authors also argue that even Venezuela’s widespread hunger served the government’s interests. The scarcity allowed the Maduro administration to government to “weaponize hunger” essentially by feeding only those who were politically loyal, deepening clientelism. This epitomizes one of the book’s strongest and darkest messages: that the Maduro government’s overwhelming priority is its own power, rather than the Venezuelan people.

Looking Back, Moving Forward

Edited volumes unavoidably have both strengths and weaknesses, and this text is no exception. The book builds on the expertise of 24 fine scholars, who collectively have contributed a total of 16 chapters. Yet I found myself wishing that more authors had read and built on their colleagues’ chapters; and that Routledge editors had been more thorough, especially with translations and ensuring that charts—probably originally in color—were readable.  I also found myself in general just wanting more: certainly not more chapters; fewer would have been preferable. But most chapters lacked sufficient historical context, and many could have benefited from more elaboration on concepts and details than their page constraints undoubtedly permitted.

Mostly, though, I would have liked to see, if not a happy ending, at least a more concerted effort to discern where the cracks might appear in the regime. The authors created a consistent story of a regime that has turned all pressures—sanctions, diplomacy, economic collapse, organized political opposition—into opportunities to strengthen authoritarianism.

Yet, I did see some light shining through.  Elections continue. They are seriously flawed, and as the July 2024 presidential election revealed, easily ignored by determined autocrats. However, they show underpinnings of Venezuelans’ continuing democratic expectations, and each round provides opportunities for opposition.  The book also shows that the democratic international community could shift its strategies, since negotiations focused on democratic processes appear to have had more success in encouraging political openings than those only seeking to resolve conflicts. Finally, throughout the book, the authors emphasize the multiple ways that the government uses resources to ensure loyalty or, at least, compliance. How might this relationship be ruptured? If the economy improves, the government’s ability to directly offer food or other necessities becomes less valuable. Ultimately, this regime—or at least this leader—does not have the support of the Venezuelan people. Maduro may have thus far succeeded in consolidating authoritarianism, but he has failed at achieving political legitimacy. Venezuela’s democrats may yet find a path.

Deborah L. Norden (Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley) teaches Political Science at Whittier College. Norden’s research focuses on militaries, democratization and democratic decline in Latin America, particularly Argentina and Venezuela.

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