U.S.-Mexico Migration Cooperation in the Trump-Sheinbaum Era

The U.S. and Mexican governments have different interests on migration but at times have found significant convergence on cooperation. The Mexican government prioritizes the protection of its own migrants abroad, especially in the United States, as well as those who return to Mexico. It also wants to control migration to avoid perceptions of disorder—a domestic political issue—while integrating those migrants living in the country and promoting legal migration pathways in the hemisphere (as part of regional leadership). More recently, cooperation with the United States on managing the border has increased importance in the overall bilateral relationship and has become a domestic imperative for Mexico. And Mexico, like the United States, is starting to face some regional labor shortages, something that will almost certainly increase as the population ages, and which will eventually require more strategic thinking about ways of attracting immigrant workers.

The United States also faces major labor market needs for which immigration policy matters significantly. But as a result of the high numbers of unauthorized arrivals over the past few years,  the U.S. government has been particularly focused on controlling unauthorized migration. In the Trump administration, border control (defined strictly by a lower number of migrant encounters) has become the single most important priority, along with a commitment to deporting immigrants in the country without legal status. President Trump has imposed tariffs on Mexico to demand full cooperation from the government next door on migration. He has expressed interest in the reinstatement of the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), additional Mexican government efforts to control migration flows from other countries, and the efficient return of deported Mexican citizens and citizens of other countries. He has occasionally hinted at the need for legal immigration to the United States to address labor demand, but there does not appear to be any intention to pursue this in the short to medium term.

Here, we assess the potential issues of cooperation and confrontation in migration policy between both countries, first summarizing the migration dynamics at the border in recent years. We then describe issues that may lend themselves to discussion between Presidents Sheinbaum and Trump, along with recommendations towards better cooperation.

Migration dynamics at the U.S.-Mexico border

Irregular crossings at and between ports of entry at the U.S.-Mexico border increased substantially throughout the Biden administration but had decreased considerably by the time of the 2024 presidential campaigns. From a record high during Biden’s presidency of 301,981 migrant encounters at the southwest border in December 2023, this number had fallen to 106,330 encounters by October 2024, the month prior to Trump’s election. As shown in Figure 1, the number of encounters at and between ports of entry converged between October and December 2024 at nearly 150,000 encounters each.

Figure 1. CBP-migrant encounters at and between ports of entry

Note: FY 2025 includes data up to December 2024.

Source: Muzaffar Chishti and Kathleen Bush-Joseph (2025, January 23). With “Shock and Awe,” the Second Trump Term Opens with a Bid to Strongly Reshape Immigration. MPI. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trump-second-term-begins-immigration

 While Mexicans continue to be the largest single nationality coming into the United States, the number of migrants from South America and Asia has recently increased. As shown in Figure 2, Mexicans were first surpassed by other nationalities in FY 2019, when 264,168 Guatemalan and 253,795 Honduran encounters exceeded the 166,458 Mexicans encountered by the CBP between ports of entry. In 2023 and 2024, the number of arrivals from both Mexico and Central America combined was eclipsed by arrivals from other countries farther away, including those from outside of the Western Hemisphere.

Figure 2. CBP-migrant encounters between ports of entry by nationality

Note: FY 2025 includes data up to December 2024.

Source: María Jesús Mora, Ariel G. Ruiz Soto and Andrew Selee (2024, June). Building on Regular Pathways to Address Migration Pressures in the Americas. IOM and MPI. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-iom_regular-pathways-americas-2024-final.pdf

Mexican immigration authorities have continued efforts to contain migrant flows from the south, as negotiated with the U.S. government in Trump’s first administration. Mexican authorities have even encountered more migrants than U.S. authorities since May 2024, with 125,499 encounters compared to the 117,905 encountered by U.S. authorities (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Migrant encounters by Mexican and U.S. authorities

Source: Colleen Putzel-Kavanaugh and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto (2024, October). With New Strategies At and Beyond the U.S. Border, Migrant Encounters Plunge. MPI. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/fy2024-us-border-encounters-plunge

Despite fewer migrant encounters at the southern border in 2024, Trump’s campaign promises to “close the border” resonated with key sectors of the U.S. public after years of high arrival numbers.

Potential issues of discussion between Sheinbaum and Trump

Meanwhile, President Sheinbaum has expressed a desire to reach agreements, but also emphasized the need to make any agreements with the United States consistent with Mexico’s national interest and Mexico’s own Human Mobility Model, which seeks to prioritize the regularization and empowerment of Mexican communities abroad and the structural causes of migration in communities of origin. The Mexican government has indicated its willingness to receive any Mexican citizen deported from the United States and has developed a strategy both to provide consular support to Mexicans in the United States and returnees to Mexico at the border. The Mexican government also seeks the preservation of DACA protections, the “Dreamer” program that gives legal status to young people brought to the United States as young children by parents without documents, since the majority of DACA recipients are from Mexico.  Further, it hopes to discourage the U.S. government from making long-term Mexican residents in the United States priority targets for deportation.

Based on these factors, possible bilateral migration issues for discussion are:

1. An orderly process for deportation that includes agreed-upon times and locations, with clear lists of those deported and prior notice of those with criminal records. Those who are deported should be sent to areas where sufficient resources exist to house and provide services to returnees, for instance. The two governments could evaluate interior repatriations, which would help migrants reach their hometowns faster and avoid some of the dangers present in border communities.

2. The Mexican government needs to ensure sufficient services to assist repatriated Mexicans, deportees from third countries that Mexico may agree to accept from the United States and those third-country nationals who remain in Mexico rather than continuing their journey north. Creating a one-stop shop for migrants (both Mexican returnees and migrants from other countries) to obtain documents, open bank accounts, and access services, as well as receive cash assistance or help in locating employment, could ensure better (re)integration outcomes. The Mexican government created one-stop shops along the border for receiving returning Mexicans through the “Mexico Te Abraza” strategy, and it is fairly well-designed. The U.S. government may want to consider how it supports these efforts, which reduce the incentives for onward migration to the United States and reentry attempts by returnees.

3. The two governments need to reach an agreement about the nature of measures to control the shared border. The U.S. government has expressed an interest in the reinstatement of MPP, which is likely to be preferable to a safe third country agreement for the Mexican government. Known as the “Remain in Mexico” program, the MPP required certain asylum seekers to wait in Mexico while their U.S. immigration cases were processed. However, the Mexican government will almost certainly want guarantees that migrants enrolled in MPP will, in fact, be processed for any immigration and asylum claims in the United States and that the U.S. government will be responsible for the ultimate dispositions of their cases, whether U.S. admission or deportation to their home or third countries. The termination of the CBP One appointment process at the border was met with a mixed response from Mexico, as the appointment requirement trapped many migrants in Mexico, but reduced incentives for irregular crossing (and thus fees for smugglers). Mexico’s overall response has focused on providing humanitarian aid while highlighting the benefits of CBP One in managing migration effectively by reducing irregular crossings.

4. The Mexican government has continued to receive citizens of a few mutually agreed on countries who are apprehended at the U.S. border and deported to Mexico; however, they have far less interest in receiving deportations of third-country citizens who are apprehended in the U.S. interior. In this sense, the United States faces a notorious bottleneck in migration enforcement beyond the border, as the return of some deportees to their countries of origin is not feasible due to safety concerns or refusal by their governments.

5. The Mexican government has a major interest in ensuring that Mexicans who have lived in the United States for more than ten years and have no prior convictions for criminal offenses are not targeted for deportation, and a similar interest in ensuring that the DACA program continues (or similar protections are signed into law). These are issues that should be on the table in any negotiation with the U.S. government, and the Trump administration should know that it will need to accede to reasonable demands for assurances in order to obtain cooperation. As of April 2025, it seems the Trump administration is more focused on migrants from other nationalities, but requirements for registration and recently announced agreements between DHS and the IRS and between DHS and SSA may heavily impact these long-term unauthorized immigrants, more of whom are from Mexico. Cooperation on recent arrivals and migrants with criminal convictions, especially if it includes the reception of third-country nationals, should be paired with the demand from Mexico that those migrants who are successfully integrated should not be primary targets.

6. The Mexican government and the private sector have been working to integrate into the labor market those third-country citizens who arrived in Mexico seeking to reach the United States and have now decided to remain where they are. The Mexican government’s ability to do this, if they succeed, shows a humane and effective way of assisting migration control efforts by providing alternatives to a dangerous crossing at the U.S. border.

7. The Mexican government has a significant interest in avoiding the imposition of tariffs, which would raise the cost of goods that are part of joint supply chains and affect consumers in both countries. At the same time, each government needs to be conscious of the red lines and political realities in each other’s countries, which could lead to a breakdown in negotiations. The failure to reach an agreement would be disastrous for both countries, but a perceived submission by either government to the other would be equally disastrous for the leadership of that government. There are many ways a negotiation could go off the rails, so significant diplomatic tact and a clear read of each other’s priorities and political reality are essential. And any negotiation will almost certainly have to be iterative and adjusted over time. A key factor will be the ability of the two countries to manage a public relationship that might be characterized as confrontational, with a private relationship of cooperation.

8. President Trump has indicated at least a passing interest in legal immigration and, especially, H-2 visas, which are overwhelmingly used by Mexican citizens. Streamlining processes for H-2A (agricultural seasonal) visas could facilitate greater use of this visa category for recruiting Mexican seasonal workers, who comprise over 90 percent of those who obtain H-2A visas. And there could be ways of expanding the cap for H-2B (seasonal, non-agricultural) visas in the future, perhaps by exempting returning workers from the cap. Roughly two-thirds of H-2B visas currently go to Mexican citizens. And any discussion of high-skilled visa reform in the United States could include ways of facilitating easier access to TN visas or ways that Mexican professionals can access the H-1B visa program more effectively.

Conclusion

Future bilateral agreements will depend on both administrations’ ability to balance domestic political pressures with the need for a stable working relationship. Key issues such as the coordination of deportations, the potential reinstatement of the Migration Protection Protocols (MPP), and the continuation of DACA require careful negotiation. The ongoing threats of U.S. tariffs, how specific tariffs are determined and the ultimate purpose of the tariffs (trade balancing or negotiating tool) will likely remain a crucial tension point. Effective cooperation in migration must consider both legal immigration and enforcement measures to create a sustainable and politically viable approach.

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